

SOCIALIST
UPSURGE
IN
CHINA'S
COUNTRYSIDE



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SOCIALIST UPSURGE IN
CHINA'S COUNTRYSIDE

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PREFACE

This book is a collection of material intended for people working in the countryside. The preface for it was originally written last September. Now, three months later, that preface is already out of date. The only thing to do is write another one.

This is the situation. The book has been edited twice, first in September and now again in December. The first time, 121 articles were selected, most of them reflecting conditions in the early half of 1955, a few covering the latter half of 1954. Advance copies of these articles were printed and distributed to responsible comrades from provincial, municipal, autonomous regional, and regional Party committees attending the sixth plenary session (enlarged) of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, held from October 4 to 11, 1955. Their comments were requested. Because they felt that additional material was needed, after the meeting supplementary material was sent in from most provinces, cities and autonomous regions. Since much of it reflected conditions in the latter half of 1955, it became necessary to edit the book again. We cut 30 articles from the original 121, and kept 91. To these we added 85 selected from the newly-received material, bringing the total in the present book to 176 articles — about 900,000 words. The comrades responsible for the editing have gone through all of the material, and have made some changes in phraseology, added notes to explain difficult terms and prepared a topical index. In addition, we have commented on some of the articles, criticizing certain erroneous ideas and making certain suggestions. To distinguish our comments from those of the

editors of the periodicals in which the material originally appeared, ours have been signed "Editor." Because part of our comments were written in September and part in December, there is some difference between them in tone.

Much more than a mere question of material is involved, however. The point is that in the latter half of 1955 the situation in China underwent a fundamental change. At present (late December 1955), of China's 110 million peasant households, more than 70 million (over 60 per cent), in response to the call of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, have joined semi-socialist agricultural producers' co-operatives. In my report of July 31, 1955, on co-operation in agriculture I stated that 16,900,000 peasant households had joined co-operatives. But since then, in only a few months' time, over 50 million more have joined.

This is a tremendous event. It tells us that we need only one year — 1956 — to practically complete the change-over to semi-socialist co-operation in agriculture.* In another three or four years, that is, by 1959 or 1960, we can complete, in the main, the transformation from semi-socialist to fully socialist co-operatives. It tells us that if the needs of this expanding agriculture are to be met, the socialist transformation of China's handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce should also be speeded up. It tells us that the scale and rate of China's industrialization, and the scale and rate of the development of science, culture, education, public health, and so on, can no longer be entirely the same as originally intended. All must be appropriately expanded and accelerated.

Is this rapid advance of co-operation in agriculture healthy? It certainly is. Every local Party organization is giving all-round leadership to the movement. The peasants are taking

* Actually, by November 1956, over 96 per cent of all peasant households throughout the country were in semi-socialist co-operatives and fully socialist advanced co-operatives. Eighty-three per cent of them had joined the advanced co-ops — *Translator*.

part in it with great enthusiasm and in a very orderly manner. Their keenness for production has reached unprecedented heights. For the first time the vast majority of the people see their future clearly. With the completion of three five-year plans, that is, by 1967, the production of grain and many other crops will probably double or treble the highest output prior to the founding of the People's Republic. Illiteracy will be wiped out in a relatively short time, say seven or eight years. Many of the diseases most harmful to man, such as schistosomiasis, diseases formerly considered incurable, we now are able to treat. In short, the people can see the great road open before them.

The problem facing the entire Party and all the people of the country is no longer one of combating rightist conservative ideas about the speed of socialist transformation of agriculture. That problem has already been solved. Nor is it a problem of the speed of transformation of capitalist industry and commerce, by entire trades, into state-private enterprises. That problem has also been solved. In the first half of 1956 we must discuss the speed of the socialist transformation of handicrafts. But that problem will easily be solved too.

The problem today is none of these, but concerns other fields. It affects agricultural production; industrial production (including state, joint state-private and co-operative industries); handicraft production; the scale and speed of capital construction in industry, communications and transportation; the co-ordination of commerce with other branches of the economy; and the co-ordination of the work in science, culture, education, public health, and so on, with our various economic enterprises. In all these fields there is an underestimation of the situation which must be criticized and corrected if the work in them is to keep pace with the development of the situation as a whole. People's thinking must adapt itself to the changed conditions. Of course no one should go off into wild flights of fancy, or make plans unwarranted by

the objective situation, or insist on attempting the impossible. The problem today is that rightist conservatism is still causing trouble in many fields and preventing the work in these fields from keeping pace with the development of the objective situation. The present problem is that many people consider impossible things which could be done if they exerted themselves. It is entirely necessary, therefore, to keep criticizing these rightist conservative ideas, which still actually exist.

This book is intended for comrades working in the countryside. Can people in the cities read it too? They not only can, but should. It is all about new things. Just as every day, every hour, there are new developments in the cities in the cause of socialism, so it is in the countryside. What are the peasants doing? What is the connection between what the peasants are doing and the activities of the working class, the intellectuals, of all who love their country? A look at this material about the rural areas will help supply the answers.

To enable more people to understand the situation in the countryside, we intend to select 44 of the 176 articles and publish them as an abridged edition of 270,000 words. In this way, those unable to read the entire collection will still be able to learn something of rural problems.

MAO TSE-TUNG

December 27, 1955

THE PARTY SECRETARY TAKES THE LEAD AND ALL THE PARTY MEMBERS HELP RUN THE CO-OPS

(In the *Tangshan Peasants*, April 30, 1955)

This article is very well written. It deserves being the first piece recommended to the readers of this book.

There are still quite a few people everywhere like the ones described in the beginning of the article. Because they do not understand and are afraid of being asked questions, they "make a detour around the co-op." So-called "drastic compression"—the issuing of orders to dissolve whole batches of co-operatives—is also a manifestation of "making a detour around the co-op." But its advocates do not limit themselves to mere passive evasion. Rather with one sweep of the knife they "cut down" (to use their own expression) a great many co-operatives, and in a highly diligent manner. They take up their knife and—chop!—another troublesome problem out of the way. They are always telling you how difficult it is to run a co-operative. According to them, their hardships are simply inconceivable.

Countless examples throughout the country refute their arguments. The experience of Tsunhua County in the province of Hopei is one such example. In 1952 none of the people there knew how to run a co-operative. They solved this problem by buckling down and learning. Their slogan was: "The Party

secretary takes the lead and all Party members help run the co-ops." As a result, they went "from not understanding to understanding," "from a minority knowing how to the majority knowing how," "from the district officials running the co-ops to the people running them themselves." In three years, 1952-1954, 85 per cent of the 4,343 peasant families in the 11 townships of District Ten, Tsunhua County, Hopei Province, joined semi-socialist co-operatives. As for productivity in this district, comparing 1954 with 1952, grain increased by 76 per cent, timber trees by 56.4 per cent, fruit trees by 62.87 per cent and sheep by 463.1 per cent.

We have every reason to ask: If this place could do it, why can't others? If you say it is not possible, what reasons can you offer? I can see only one reason — unwillingness to take the trouble, or, to put it more bluntly, right opportunism. That is why we have this "making a detour around the co-op," that is why the Party secretary does not take the lead, why all Party members do not help run the co-operatives, why co-op members go from "not understanding" to still not understanding, why the co-ops never get beyond the stage where only a minority know how to run them, why running the co-operatives always remains in the hands of the district officials.

Or we have the other situation where certain individuals take the knife in hand and, when they see a troublesome co-operative, hack it down. Nothing will ever be accomplished that way. We have proposed such slogans as "Dynamic leadership, steady progress," and "Make comprehensive plans, give more active leadership." What is more, we agree with the entirely correct slogan raised by the comrades of Tsunhua County, "The Party secretary takes the lead and all the Party members help run the co-ops."

Hasn't there been "dynamic leadership, steady progress," in Tsunhua County? Hasn't there been comprehensive planning and more active leadership? Of course there has. But isn't this dangerous, rash? No. The danger lies in "making a detour around the co-op," and this danger has been overcome by the Tsunhua County comrades. The danger lies in "cutting down" whole batches of co-operatives on the pretext of avoiding rashness. There is none of that in Tsunhua County.

What of the claim that "the speed at which co-ops have been developing has gone beyond the understanding of the masses and the ability of the officials to lead"? How can that be reconciled with the situation in Tsunhua County? The people there demand co-operatives. The officials there have gone from "not understanding to understanding." We all have eyes; can anyone see any danger in Tsunhua County? In three years' time they built up their co-ops step by step. Their grain output increased by 76 per cent, their timber trees grew by 56.4 per cent, their orchards increased by 62.87 per cent, their flocks were 463.1 per cent larger. What kind of danger do you call that? Is that what is meant by "rash"? Can we say that "the speed at which co-ops have been developing has gone beyond the understanding of the masses and the ability of the officials to lead"?

Taking part in the co-operative movement in Tsunhua County is the Wang Kuo-fan Co-operative, originally consisting of 23 poor-peasant families and a three-quarter share in the ownership of a donkey. It was nicknamed "The Paupers' Co-op." But relying on their own efforts, in three years' time its members accumulated a large quantity of the means of production. They "got it from the mountains," they explained. Some of the people visiting the co-operative

were moved to tears when they learned what this meant.

Our entire nation, we feel, should pattern itself after this co-op. In a few decades, why can't 600 million "paupers," by their own efforts, create a socialist country, rich and strong? The wealth of society is created by the workers, the peasants, the working intellectuals. If they take their destiny into their own hands, use Marxism-Leninism as their guide, and energetically tackle problems instead of evading them, there is no difficulty in the world which they cannot overcome.

Finally, we want to thank the anonymous author of this article. Bubbling with enthusiasm, he gives a detailed description in vivid terms of a district in the process of building co-operatives. His article makes no small contribution to the cause of co-operation throughout the country. We hope every province, region and county will be able to bring forth one or more articles as good as this one.

— EDITOR

District Ten of Tsunhua County, Hopei Province, is divided into 11 townships which contain 42 villages with a total population of 4,343 families. Farming co-ops in the district were first set up in 1952, as an experiment. Today, the district has 72 co-ops, some purely agricultural, others combining agriculture, forestry and herding. Eighty-five per cent of all the peasant families in the district are co-op members. The co-operative movement here is essentially sound.

As co-operation spread, all kinds of productive activities in the district developed rapidly. Agricultural output in 1954 was 76 per cent higher than in 1952; there were 56.4 per cent more timber trees, 62.87 per cent more fruit trees and 463.1 per cent more sheep.

And as production rose, the peasants saw a great improvement in their material and cultural life. Fewer and fewer people were short of grain and more and more had a surplus. From the spring of 1953 to date, houses with a total of more than 4,000 rooms were built or repaired in the district, and the number of draught animals increased by over 2,300 head. There was a sharp rise in the peasants' purchasing power. In 1954 they spent a total of 667,000 yuan, 377 per cent more than in 1952.

One important reason why the co-operative movement has been so successful in this district is the conscientious way in which the district Party committee has observed the spirit of the slogan, "Let the Party secretary take the lead and all the Party members help run the co-ops."

FROM NOT UNDERSTANDING TO UNDERSTANDING

In the spring of 1952, the Communist Party Committee of District Ten helped form two farming co-ops as an experiment—one in the village of East Hsiao-chai, the other in Wanglao. This was something new. Not only did the village officials and the co-op members know nothing about running a co-operative, the members of the district Party committee didn't know either. So every time district officers went into the countryside, they dodged the co-ops, not daring to try to cope with any of their problems. Even when co-op officials went to the district Party committee for advice on specific questions, it dared not give them a definite answer.

For example, Chen Tai, chairman of the East Hsiao-chai Co-op, made a trip to the district to ask Chao Yung-hsing, secretary of the district Party committee, what to do about the investments which all members were supposed to make in the co-op. All Chao said was, "Talk it over with the members. Handle it any way you like, provided everybody agrees."

After the autumn harvest that year, eight new co-operatives were formed. The inability of the district officers to lead the co-ops was more apparent every day: it became the most urgent task of the district Party committee to solve this problem and promote the gradual development of the mutual-aid and co-operation movement in such a way that the Party secretary really did "take the lead and all Party members helped run the co-ops."

The first thing the district committee did was to give the district administration officers a course of instruction on policy in regard to mutual aid and co-operation. Two hours a day were spent studying the "Decisions on Mutual Aid and Co-operation in Agricultural Production" taken by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, other relevant instructions issued by higher Party committees, guidance given in the press about establishing and running co-ops, and newspaper reports about the experience of other co-operatives.

On this course, Chao Yung-hsing, the secretary, and all the other members of the district committee were the pace-makers, keeping a step ahead of the others and giving them the benefit of what they had learned. Chao frequently summed up what he had read and explained it to the group. This was quite helpful to the district officers. Whenever one of them was sent to the villages, the district committee gave him a study task, so that he could keep up his studies even when out in the field. On his return to the district centre he was supposed to give an answer to his study problem and offer his notebook for inspection. In this way, all the district officers soon grew really enthusiastic about studying mutual-aid and co-operative policy, and learned quite a bit.

This, however, was all book-learning, and the men lacked practical experience. When they ran into a real problem, they were unable to solve it. As a result, at that time in the co-ops, there were still cases where people were forced to stand around idle, and people weren't working well to-

gether, but the district officers couldn't do anything about it. Some of them became very upset. They thought that the policy on mutual aid and co-operation was too complicated, that they would never really understand it.

So the district committee decided to do two things: first, to form a special committee—composed of the members of the district Party committee and the responsible officials of the district government—to lead the mutual-aid and co-operative movement and deal with specific questions connected with the formation and running of co-ops as they arose; second, to send members of the district Party committee to work and actually live in the co-ops, investigating and solving difficulties, and reporting back their experience.

It was fairly common then for people to be kept standing around. This was rather serious, and so the district committee sent Secretary Chao and two other comrades to the co-op in the hamlet of Hungya to introduce a method which had proved successful in the Kuo Yu-en Farming Co-op in Shansi. This was known as the "work to contract and guarantee output" method. It consists of each team or brigade within a co-op contracting to complete a certain job for a certain number of work-points and guaranteeing that the yield will reach a certain figure.

The three remained on the farm for more than a fortnight. During this time all meetings of the district Party committee were held in Hungya. Chao Yung-hsing went over their experience at the co-op, and various ways of doing things were discussed. Members of the district committee frequently called at the co-op to discuss things and see how the methods proposed were working out. By treating this co-op as a testing ground and making a concerted effort to cope with its problems thoroughly, not only was the "work to contract and guarantee output" method successful here too and there was hardly any hanging around on the job, but the quality of leadership also improved considerably. The Party committee members thus began to get some idea of what

was behind the problems of the co-ops and to find a way to solve them.

After the Party committee summed up its work at the Hungya Co-op, everyone was convinced that, to lead the co-ops properly, it was absolutely necessary to make a thorough study of Party policy on mutual aid and co-operation and go deeply into the directives which higher Party committees had issued on these matters. But this was not enough. It was also necessary, taking Party policy as a guide, to come to grips with the practical problems of the co-ops, to apply the experience of the masses, and to improve leadership. At the same time everyone became firmly convinced that, given a willingness to go directly to the co-ops and study their difficulties on the spot, no problem need remain unsolved. That was the best way of discovering problems, of solving them, of educating the masses, and of educating the leaders. To be unwilling to probe into the affairs of a co-op, to keep away from it, was wrong. It was not easy to go deep at first, but after a spell of hard work, results would be forthcoming.

FROM A MINORITY KNOWING HOW TO THE MAJORITY KNOWING HOW

Members of the district Party committee gradually got to understand co-op problems better and learned how to solve them. The leaders began to take the initiative. At that time, however, only four members of the district Party committee and a few administrative officials here and there knew how to lead the co-operatives. The vast majority of district officials were incapable of doing so. Some of them were still giving the co-ops a wide berth whenever they went into the countryside. When people from the co-ops sought them out with problems, they dodged giving answers.

The Party committee then decided to teach all district officers how to run a co-op. It emphasized that all work must centre round mutual aid and co-operation, and that all

officials must learn how to be co-op leaders. To teach them quickly, the committee adopted the following measures:

1) It Undertook to Develop Trainees. At that time there were 25 officials for the entire district. These were divided into four teams, and each team was led by one of the relatively experienced committee members, and accompanied him on his trips to the co-ops. As soon as the officials gained practical knowledge from their observation of the way the committee members worked, they were required to take over and handle the co-ops' problems themselves. In this way many of the officials soon acquired confidence and were able to spot sources of trouble and deal with them.

For example, Chang Chen-min, secretary of the office of the district government, made rapid progress after working together with Secretary Chao on practical problems. In investigating output difficulties on the Chen Tai Farming Co-op in East Hsiao-chai, he discovered that they were putting too much emphasis on subsidiary occupations and not enough on farming. He helped the officers of the co-op to change this situation.

2) It Adopted a Policy of "Push Them In; Pull Them In." While most of the district officials now had the courage to tackle problems alone after their practical training, one or two were still scared of attempting anything without a Party committee member at their side. The district Party committee worked out a double-barrelled device to bring these officials on. On the one hand, they were "pushed" into the co-ops. This was done by the district committee sending them to work in designated co-operatives with instructions that if they ran into difficulty they were to try to find a way out with the aid of the co-op's officers and the local village officials. If they got properly stuck the district committee helped them out. On the other hand, the district officials were "pulled" in too. The co-ops were told that if a problem arose, they could summon any of the district officials at any

time. In this way officials gradually overcame their timidity in facing up to co-op problems.

For example, Li Shao-wen, deputy head of the district, had always found himself at a loss when confronted with co-op problems, and was unwilling to handle them alone. But when the district committee sent him to the Chao Jui Farming Co-op to deal with bad organization of labour that left people standing around idle, and the co-op officers and members insisted that he went, he had no alternative. After a fortnight of investigation and hard work, with the help of the district committee, he worked out a solution—a system of contracting for work-points on particular short-term jobs. It proved very successful.

3) It Constantly Summed Up Experience and Improved the Party Leadership and the Ability of All Officials. Once the district officials were all willing to go into the co-ops and deal with their problems, the next step was to improve their ability as fast as possible. The Party committee, besides giving them a chance to learn on the job, started systematically summing up experience. Whenever a committee member solved a co-op problem that was both fairly common and fairly serious, he summed up what he had done, gave a report to all officials and everyone discussed it. The committee also helped the officials sum up and learn from experience. This frequent exchange of experience was a great help in making officials and the district Party committee, too, more capable at work.

Besides this, the county Party committee set up a political study centre. This proved very valuable to district officials in their handling of co-op problems.

For example, the Chen Tai Co-op had been under the thumb of two rich peasants ever since it started almost a year before. They were using the co-op labour to work their land while they themselves went off to do a bit of private trading. This, of course, weakened the co-op. Although the district officials had been aware of the situation for some time, they

didn't know the whys and wherefores or what to do about it. Then the county Party committee made a report at the political study centre on the Party's class policy in the countryside and analysed the situation in the Chen Tai Co-op in the light of it. This cleared up the confusion in the minds of the district officials, and they promptly led the co-op in throwing out the rich peasants so that it became well-knit and strong.

In this way, even before the autumn of 1953, every one of the district's 25 officials could solve co-op problems unaided, and twelve of them showed promise of unusual ability in the field of mutual aid and co-operation.

FROM DISTRICT OFFICERS RUNNING THE CO-OPS TO THE PEOPLE RUNNING THEM THEMSELVES

After the autumn of 1953, as a result of the thorough publicity and explanations of the Party's general line during the period of transition to socialism, the great mass of the peasants became much more keenly aware of the need for socialism. By the spring of 1954, there were already 43 co-ops in the district. But this meant that the district officials could no longer cope with all the work of the co-operatives on their own. It became necessary, in keeping with the maxim that "the Party secretary takes the lead and all the Party members help run the co-ops," for Communists and officials in the townships and the co-ops' officers to learn to do the job thoroughly.

For this purpose, the district Party committee took measures to:

1) Solve Key Problems, Absorb Experience, and Teach on the Basis of Proven Facts. Working on the line that "the Party secretary takes the lead," the district Party committee's secretary Chao Yung-hsing, deputy secretaries Li Chit-seng and Lu Chen-tang went to three different co-ops and worked on various problems. After solving them, the prob-

lems were discussed by the district Party committee. The way they were solved was summed up and passed on to the district cadres. The solutions were also passed on to the rank-and-file Communists, local government officials and co-op officers in the course of lectures given at political study centres run by the Communist Party and the New Democratic Youth League. In this way, not only did the leaders learn from practical experience; they were able to give thorough explanations to others.

2) Establish Mutual-Aid and Co-operative Networks and Maintain a Constant Exchange of Experience. In the spring of 1954, the district Party committee, in keeping with the instructions of higher Party committees and with the situation in the district at that time, established 11 mutual-aid and co-operative networks — one in each township. The secretaries of the township Party branches were made chairmen of the networks, the vice-chairmen being chosen from among the more experienced co-op chairmen. Members included committee members from the township Party branches, the village heads, the officers of the co-ops and the leaders of the mutual-aid teams. Each township network met twice a month, and district cadres took part. The problems of mutual aid and co-operation were fully discussed and experience was exchanged. Any problem which the meetings could not solve was referred to the district Party committee for consideration and decision.

The advantage of this method was that it did not over-tax the district Party committee, the local officials and co-op officers learned quickly, and problems could be solved promptly.

For example, the Yen Man-sheng Co-op used to buy pig manure from its members (some raised their own pigs), taking the entire output and paying by weight. It was found that a few members were mixing too much earth in with the manure so as to get a higher price. This, of course, lowered the quality of the manure. So the co-op changed to a system

of paying according to the number and size of the pigs and how quickly the manure was delivered, and did all the earth-mixing itself. In this way the quality of the manure was kept up without the members losing their incentive to collect it. After this method was reported to the network, 13 other co-ops took it up.

3) Get the Old Co-ops to Look After the New. To help the officers of the new co-ops learn their jobs, the district Party committee put out the slogan, "The old co-ops should help the new; the new ones should learn from the old." The committee urged the officers of the old co-ops to visit new ones and help them, and encouraged the new co-ops to ask the officers of old ones for their assistance, thereby making for a close relationship between the two. This not only promoted unity between the old and the new co-ops and gave the new co-ops' officers regular training; it also made it possible to spot and resolve difficulties as they arose.

For example, when the Chao Hung Co-op was established in 1954, it hadn't the faintest idea how to set about making the "Four Estimates" — that is, of the productive capacity of the co-op's land, what ought to be paid for buying or hiring animals, what should be paid to buy or rent farm implements, and how to calculate the value of each member's daily labour. They wandered from one subject to another for days without getting anywhere and the members began to bicker. Then, without waiting for an invitation, the chairman of an old co-op in the neighbouring village came over, and thanks to him, they sailed through the "Four Estimates" without a hitch.

Some of the co-op book-keepers couldn't keep accounts, but they soon learned with the help of book-keepers from the old co-operatives. The two book-keepers of East Hsiao-chai Co-op alone helped eight new co-ops start keeping proper accounts.

4) Organize Visits to See Things on the Spot and Give Practical Education. The district Party committee arranged

two kinds of opportunities for seeing things on the spot, one based on the seasons and the other giving training by observing how specific problems were handled.

The first covered a wide field, depending on the time of year. For example, during spring planting, all or some of the district officials, the township and village officials and co-op officers, would go to a co-op where the district Party committee was working on key problems, and see for themselves how the co-op members were taught to co-ordinate their work with the national plan. At summer hoeing time they could see how to make the best use of labour. In the autumn they could study on the spot how profits should be divided. This helped the co-ops anticipate the major seasonal problems, and since they were no longer being suddenly confronted with difficulties which demanded urgent solutions, their leaders could take timely, practical action in a planned way.

The second kind of study by observation was to go and see how some specific difficulty common to all the co-ops at a given time was dealt with. For example, many new co-ops were formed in the spring of 1954. Some of them were not very clear on the management policy to be followed by co-operatives and always asked the government for more funds than they actually needed. Five co-ops in one little hamlet alone requested an advance of 800 yuan. The district Party committee then organized a "see it yourself" group composed of the officers of 43 co-ops and took them on a tour of Wang Kuo-fan Co-operative, which was run very economically.

When it was started in 1952, this co-op had a membership of 23 poor-peasant families. All it possessed in the way of livestock was a three-quarter ownership in a donkey. It was very short of tools and farm supplies too. None of the members could raise enough money to invest in the co-operative. People called it the "Paupers' Co-op." Yet poor as they were, they didn't rely on government loans, but on their own labour power. Every day they travelled to a mountain ten

miles away to cut brushwood which they sold as fuel, and with the money bought some of the things they needed. From the winter of 1952 to the spring of 1953, they earned a big sum by cutting brushwood. Besides helping out some of the member families, the money was also used to buy an ox, a donkey, 30 head of sheep, and a cart with iron-bound wheels, as well as things like harness and fertilizer.

They continued to cut fuel, and by the spring of 1954 the co-op had acquired a mule, five oxen, two donkeys, 65 sheep, 12 pigs, a cart with iron-bound wheels, and an insecticide sprayer. All of these, to put it in the members' own words, they "got from the mountains."

Visitors to the Wang Kuo-fan Co-op were deeply impressed. They were convinced that only by being economical and planning production in the light of local conditions could a co-op become strong and increase the income of its members. Some of the visiting co-op officers were moved to tears, and pledged themselves to learn from the Wang Kuo-fan Co-operative. The chairman of one co-op which had applied to the government for a loan to buy an animal said, "We can depend on our own labour and get our money 'from the mountains' too."

After this tour, 38 co-operatives cut 2,300,000 catties of brushwood, and with the money they got for it bought implements and animals. Since the spring of 1954 the district committee has led over a dozen "see it yourself" tours, and each has produced a very good response.

5) Divide the District into Areas and Give Training Courses in the Slack Season. In order to give systematic education to government and co-op officials, the district Party committee divided the district into areas and gave short training courses during the slack time of the year. During the courses, in addition to certain key points which the Party committee wanted to put across, anyone could raise any question he liked, and the district committee helped give him an answer. For example, in the spring of 1954, some of the

township, village and co-op officials, although they knew how to start a co-op, did not know how to run it. Using this period when there was no hoeing to be done, the committee divided the district's co-ops into four areas, according to what kind of co-ops they were and their distance from one another. A five-day training course was given in each area. A total of 350 township, village and co-op officials took part. The district Party committee explained several major factors in the running of a co-op and organized discussion groups presided over by chairmen of old co-ops.

Everyone felt that the courses were down to earth and really solved problems. A number of people said they were like a department store — you could get anything you needed from them on how to run a co-operative. This time everyone really began to get the idea how it should be done.

Over the past year or so, because the district Party committee has been using the various methods described above, the township and village officials and co-op officers throughout the district have become much better at running co-operatives. Of the 41 township officials in the district, 16 have become "experts," and 25 are "semi-experts." Of 375 major officials on a village level (such as secretaries of village Party branches, village heads, etc.), 144 can be considered "expert," and 231 "semi-expert." All the village Party branch secretaries, with one exception, are serving as co-operative chairmen or vice-chairmen. They are applying the spirit of letting "the Party secretary take the lead and all Party members help run the co-ops" in a practical way.

A WHOLE VILLAGE GOES CO-OPERATIVE IN A LITTLE OVER A MONTH

(A statement by Wang Chih-chi, Chairman of the East Chuankou Agricultural Producers' Co-operative, Hsingtai County, Hopei Province, on August 15, 1955)

This material is very convincing. The development of a healthy co-operative movement in a particular locality depends on Party policy and the manner in which we do our work. As long as every aspect of our Party's policy on co-operation is correct, as long as the Party does not merely issue orders or over-simplify matters when rousing the people to join co-operatives, but instead reasons with them, helps them analyse the situation, and relies entirely on their understanding and willingness, there certainly will not be much difficulty in establishing co-operatives everywhere and, what is more, increasing output.

The village of East Chuankou in Hsingtai County, Hopei Province, was liberated long ago. By 1952 every one of its 70 peasant households had already joined mutual-aid teams. They had a strong Party branch in the village, and they had Wang Chih-chi — a leader whom the people trusted. All the conditions were ripe. And so in 1952, that village, in little more than a month, organized a co-operative and achieved semi-socialist co-operation.

What about places without such ideal conditions? In those places it is up to the people there to create them. In a few months, or a year, or a little longer,

they can do it. They can create the conditions they need in the course of their normal work. They can set up a few small co-ops; this is precisely what is meant by creating the necessary conditions for co-operation in a whole village, a whole township, a whole district.

The experience of East Chuankou also makes very clear how a Party branch should conduct its educational work among the people, how it should rely on their understanding and willingness to establish co-operatives. The "pointing out of difficulties" method used in this village is worth our special attention.

On the question of organization and supervision of labour, the material describes how the snarl in East Chuankou was untangled, with the result that they greatly increased production from year to year. Facts proved that their co-op was a healthy one. The main indicator by which all co-operatives should measure their health is — is production increasing, and, how fast?

— EDITOR

East Chuankou is a small village in the hills of Hsingtai County, Hopei Province. In the whole village there are only 70 families of which 31 are old middle-peasant and 38 are new middle-peasant families; one is a poor-peasant family. These families contain a total of 290 people who own 670 *mou* of land, or an average of 2.3 *mou* per person. Before the War Against Japanese Aggression, because the land holdings were small and the soil was of poor quality, the peasants led a miserable existence and had to live on chaff and wild roots six months out of the year.

Nineteen forty-two was a year of severe drought but, led by the Communist Party, the village organized four seasonal

mutual-aid teams and managed to pull through, thanks to the side-lines the teams instituted. In 1947 the village completed land reform and all seventy families were organized in seven mutual-aid teams. In 1949, the seasonal mutual-aid teams became year-round organizations. For the next few years, the teams solved some of the manpower and draught animal shortages, and made beginnings in fertilization and improving the soil. Output increased sharply. By 1951 the village was producing an average of 369 catties of grain per *mou*, almost triple the pre-war yield.

To further increase output, it was necessary to add more fertilizer, develop subsidiary occupations, build irrigation works and improve the quality of the soil. But mutual-aid teams could not do these things. The peasants said: "A mutual-aid team never changes. We overhaul it every year but it's still the same."

After the autumn harvest in 1951, the mutual-aid team members began to lose interest. It was just at this time that the village Party branch secretary, Wang Chih-chi, paid a visit to the Keng Chang-so Agricultural Producers' Co-operative in Jaoyang County. He saw with what zest the co-op members threw themselves into production, and observed that they were all working away together even in the "slack" winter season. Very interested, Wang Chih-chi learned how to organize a co-op. He had found the way forward from mutual-aid teams.

After his return, the Party committee of Hsingtai County decided to establish a co-operative of 12 to 20 families in East Chuankou, as an experiment. Accepting the task, Wang put the Communists of his village branch through a course of study on the approach to socialism, co-ordinating this with measures to strengthen the Party. This helped give the Party members confidence that they could run a co-op.

To further encourage them, at a meeting of the Party branch, Wang outlined the advantages the Keng Chang-so Co-operative enjoyed over mutual-aid teams and explained how

it was run. He analysed how, in the light of local conditions, the establishment of a co-op would improve agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry in the village, and help build up the barren mountain regions. Wang criticized one of the Communists, Liu Chi-teh, who went broke taking flyers in private trade while neglecting his farm work. This was a lesson for all Party members, Wang said.

The Party members thought these matters over and discussed them among themselves. Then 19 out of 20 Communists, together with their families, registered to join the co-op (18 were new middle-peasant families, one was a poor-peasant family). The only one Communist who didn't apply had more and better land than the others, and was fairly well equipped with animals and farm implements. He was afraid he would earn less as a co-op member.

The village Party branch thought it necessary to have some non-Communists in the co-operative, too. And so the Party members went to the various mutual-aid teams and discussed with them the advantages of agricultural co-ops. After about ten days of this kind of education, the new middle peasants recalled how much they had gained from following the lead of the Party in the past, and many of them decided to join the co-operative. Said Wang Ching-wei:

"If we stick with the Party we can't go wrong. Self-support, Reduction of Rent and Interest, Land Reform, Develop Production — every campaign the Party's led has been for our benefit."

Some of the old middle peasants who were relatively short on land and long on labour, once they understood that part of the co-op's return would be distributed according to work done, felt that by joining they would not be the losers. Families with limited labour power seldom got their ploughing and planting done on time, even though they belonged to mutual-aid teams. Once in the co-op, they would not have this worry any more.

Thirteen families registered for membership, including eight new middle-peasant and five old middle-peasant families. Plus the 19 Communists and their families, that made a total of 32 applicants.

Nevertheless, because this was something new and no one was too clear on the details and there were no regulations to guide them, people had all kinds of doubts. Said one old middle peasant:

"It sounds all right, but I think I'd better wait another year. If it works out well I'll join. Otherwise not."

Bachelors were afraid that grain would be distributed according to the size of families and they would be at a disadvantage. People with large households were afraid they would have to contribute a bigger share of manure than others. The women were also confused:

"It's easy to divide grain," they said, "but how are you going to share things like stringbeans and squash and cabbage?"

The village Party branch collected the various questions and worked out 42 preliminary measures which answered them all. The measures were posted and everyone discussed them. Those 32 families which had already registered their applications for co-op membership had no complaints. Families which had not registered were also quite satisfied, and a number of them wanted to join.

The applicants already exceeded the planned maximum figure of 20 families, and the Party branch was afraid that unless everyone was determined and clear of purpose, many difficulties might be created — especially since the co-op was only to be experimental the first year. It therefore announced that any man who wanted to join would first have to call a meeting of his family. Only if his whole family agreed would his application be accepted.

After five days of family discussions, the number of households wanting to join the co-op reached 59. Among the 27 latest applicants were ten new middle-peasant families and

17 old middle-peasant families. Most of these had decided to apply after careful consideration, but a few "came along" simply because so many other people were joining. Three or four families had had hot debates, the sons and daughters —members of the New Democratic Youth League, and eager for progress — wanting to join, the fathers being opposed. In the end, the fathers were persuaded. "Let the young people run the families!" they said, and applied for co-op membership.

Fifty-nine applicants seemed quite a lot to the village Party branch. It was far more than they had originally planned. No one in the branch had ever run a co-op before, and they were afraid that if it grew any larger it would be hard to handle. They decided to "close the door" and not accept any more applications. But the 11 families in the village which had not sought membership (nine old middle-peasant and two new middle-peasant families) now had a change of heart. They felt that remaining outside the co-op, they "had no future." A middle peasant and the one Communist who had consistently refused to join, preferring to stand on the sidelines, called a meeting of the 11 families and asked the village Party secretary to attend. They pleaded for permission to join the co-op.

"We're all kinds, sizes and shapes," they said. "Even if we formed a mutual-aid team, we'd never get along together, off by ourselves."

The Party member criticized himself. "Before, I was nearly six feet tall when I walked down the street. Now, because I didn't apply for co-op membership, I don't feel any higher than three!"

All the 11 families pressed for application. After the village Party branch talked the matter over, and the district Party committee approved, the co-op accepted the 11 families.

Thus, in a little over a month, the entire village had gone co-operative.

But the village Party branch recalled that in urging everyone to join the co-op only advantages had been talked about;

no mention had been made of the troubles which might arise. To prepare the people for all contingencies, it was decided to give the co-op some publicity, pointing out the difficulties lying before them.

Of course we all hope the co-op will be a success, the Party branch told the villagers that it'll give us an increased yield at harvest. But this is only an experiment. We have no experience. Though others have done a good job of it, we may not. Others have raised their output. Maybe we won't. Another thing to remember is that working collectively isn't as free and easy as working on one's own, or on a mutual-aid team. There are bound to be some restrictions. There'll probably also be quarrels from time to time, and a certain amount of hold-ups in work is hard to avoid. Everyone had better think these things over. Anyone who's afraid of trouble shouldn't join. There's still time to back out. . . .

The branch said that no one should be afraid to "retract" or "reopen the case." "Everyone should make up his own mind."

After a number of public discussions, the branch called for a completely new registration of applications. Only those who really wanted to join should put down their names.

Not one of the original applicants failed to sign up again.

Although the villagers were determined to have a co-operative, they were very concerned about who would be "the head of the family." Would the chairman and other officers of the co-op be people they trusted? At their request, the village Party branch conducted democratic elections, and a 15-man management committee was chosen, headed by the branch secretary, Wang Chih-chi. Everyone was satisfied. Led by the committee, the co-op members divided into four brigades and set to work.

From the time the drive started to form a co-op to the day of its actual establishment, only a little more than a month had passed.

The co-op was now in operation. But everyone was used to working in small mutual-aid teams. They had never tried to organize the labour power of over 140 adults before. At first they relied entirely on enthusiasm, keeping no record of what work was done or how much each member had actually finished in a day. They just plunged on blindly.

Of course this didn't get them anywhere, so they went back to the "fixed points" system they had used in the mutual-aid teams. A person was classified as either a "strong" or "weak" worker, and each day was credited with a definite number of work-points accordingly. This method was followed for three or four months.

It worked out badly. For one thing, the management committee, assigning people to jobs only as they arose instead of planning in advance, was kept running around in circles. For another thing, the members were becoming apathetic. Some of them began to feel, "What if we get to the fields late and come home early? We earn the same number of points anyhow." As one man expressed it: "Whether I push it hard or take it slow, my work-points never change. With all the dawdling going on around here, we'll never raise our output."

Finally the atmosphere became so lax that it was difficult for the management committee to find people to assign to jobs. Things had reached a point where "the chairman was pressing the brigade leaders, the brigade leaders were pressing the members, and the hard workers awaited impatiently in the fields while the lazy ones loafed on street corners."

A new system called "fixed rates with flexible assessment" was tried at autumn harvest. Each member was rated as being capable of earning a certain number of work-points per day. But, taking these points as a basis, what he was credited with depended on how much he actually did in a given day, and how well he did it. Democratic discussion among all the members of his brigade at the end of the day's

work decided whether he should receive more or less than his basic "fixed rates."

While better than the "fixed rates" arrangement, because there were no standards for quality of work, it was very difficult to apply the "flexible assessment" part of the new system. In the evening when the day's work was over, everyone would get together to discuss how many points each member should receive. The arguments lasted half the night. Members said these weren't "flexible assessment" meetings — they were "inflexible battles to the death!" Some said, "My family's food depends on what's decided at those meetings. Why shouldn't I argue?" For a fraction of a point, men shouted themselves blue in the face.

Some members didn't like to hurt people's feelings, and were always willing to give a man a bit more than he deserved. They thought, "An extra couple of points will come out of the co-op as a whole. But if I offend him, that will make bad blood between him and me personally."

Some members couldn't stand losing sleep night after night. "I'll take whatever number of points they give me," they said. "Doing a little extra work won't kill me, but this damn staying up all night might!"

The general consensus of opinion was, "The work is easy to do but hard to reckon. We argue about it for hours, and everyone gets sore at everyone else. By the time we finally go to sleep, we're all dead tired."

Having learned from this experience, in the spring of 1953 after the village Party branch and the co-op management committee talked it over, the co-op adopted a "piece-work" system. In the beginning, the average member doubted whether it would get the work done, while the lazy ones were afraid it would put an end to their coasting, and both were opposed. The management committee, after summing up and pointing out the failings of the previous methods, decided to give the new method a trial on one job first and then gradually apply it to the other work of the co-op.

The test was made in the section for making sun-dried bricks. The men who cut the bricks and spread them out to dry in the sun were given 2.5 points for every hundred. The men who mixed the earth and clay got 1.8 per hundred. Three teams took part in the experiment. It was found that the average member could produce 700 bricks in a day, earning 17.5 points.

When this news spread among the other members, and they realized that the more they worked the more they earned, they became interested in the "piece-work" system and wanted to institute it on their own jobs. Soon the whole co-op was using it. This is how it operated: The total work-days required on a given job was calculated and points allotted for it. The job was then divided among the brigades, which turned it over to their members. Each brigade guaranteed to complete its share of the work.

Productivity increased with the institution of this system. Wang Chen-teh, previously rated as a 7-point man, used to ask only for light work, complaining that his back hurt. After the "piece-work" system was adopted, he earned 11 points in one day carrying the water for planting cotton. As the enthusiasm of the members increased, all jobs were finished ahead of time. For instance, it was originally estimated that it would take 25 days to plant 270 *mou* of cotton. Instead, the work was completed in 16.

At first, only quantity was provided for under the system, and people were producing as much as they could, as fast as they could, with no regard to quality. During hoeing, some members were so anxious to move ahead rapidly that they neglected to break up the ground as they hoed. The fields were covered with solid chunks of earth. When this was discovered, strict quality standards were imposed.

Another failing of the system in the beginning was that it placed no time limits. Some members, secure in the knowledge that certain jobs were theirs, were in no particular hurry to complete them, and often finished their private work

first at the expense of the work of the co-op. Time limits, therefore, had to be set for every job.

Gradually, the system developed to a point where three guarantees were given for each particular job: that a definite quantity would be produced, that it would be of a certain quality, that the job would be completed by a certain date.

But because approximately the same number of work-points were being given for ordinary jobs as for jobs requiring technical skill, for light work and for heavy, some members continued to angle for the easy jobs. The system was amended to correct this situation by making provision for inspection and awards. Besides individual members checking on one another, inspection teams were organized to examine all the work going forward on particular sections of land. Brigades and individual members who did a job especially well were publicly commended or given awards. Those whose work was poor were publicly criticized and, when necessary, they had to do the job over again, or a deduction was made from their work-points.

After operating under the "three guarantees" system for a year, the co-op officers felt that it still did not arouse sufficient concern for production. In 1954, therefore, a system was proposed whereby each brigade would be responsible for certain fields all year round and would guarantee definite output. Some members were hesitant, fearing that they might not reach their targets and would have to make good the difference to the co-op. It was explained that goals would be set for each field according to the quality of its soil, and that fertilizer and labour power would be allotted to it accordingly. Generally speaking, the targets would be set higher than the average yields of previous years but lower than what it was estimated the fields should reasonably be able to produce. Thus reassured, everyone agreed to try the new system out.

All the land of the co-op was divided into sections, taking into consideration the sizes of the fields, the crops to be

grown, soil quality, and distance from the village. Then, depending on their ability, the members were assigned to the various sections, more going to the larger sections, less going to the smaller sections. After a harvest target for the entire co-op was agreed upon, sub-plans were made for the brigades responsible for the various sections, setting forth the kind of crops to be raised, harvest targets, and the number of work-days required. Moreover, a chart was drawn, showing the number of work-days needed for each crop—from ploughing to harvest—plus the target yield to be reached, to help the co-op and the various brigades co-ordinate their plans.

To stimulate enthusiasm, the co-op made a rule that 70 per cent of everything a brigade harvested in excess of the planned target figure would be divided among the members of that brigade, 20 per cent going into the co-operative's reserve and welfare fund, and 10 per cent going to the co-op's award fund. In the event of natural disasters, or the co-op failing to give a brigade its necessary supplies, the brigade would not be held responsible for any losses which might result.

Some work, however, could not be calculated on a piece-work basis. The way a man was scored depended on the nature of his job. Where possible, he was credited on a piece-work basis. Where it was difficult to fix norms for a particular job, the "fixed rates with flexible assessment" method was used. Some jobs were such that there was practically no difference between the way one man did them and the next—like opening the irrigation sluice gates. For these, "fixed rates" were given. Seven points a day were given for the irrigation job, no matter who did it.

The "guaranteed harvests" method gave a great boost to labour productivity. For instance, Brigade Four had guaranteed to plant 76.4 *mou* of cotton, using a total of 611.2 work-days. The result was that it used only 372—a 60.8 per cent increase in labour productivity.

Quality was also improved. When the time came to raise a specified number of cotton seedlings per row—in accordance with the close-planting-in-wide-rows method—the women guaranteed that they would maintain 3,500 plants to the *mou*, and replace any plant that died or grew poorly. Said the members:

"Last year we worked to earn points, and we didn't give a hang about output. This year we've guaranteed to reach definite targets. We've just got to fulfil the plan."

But the co-op still had problems. The chief one was that each brigade thought only of itself. There were eight mules and seven donkeys in the co-op. Every brigade demanded the mules. No one wanted to use the smaller animals. Some brigades worked the mules without even waiting for them to finish eating.

To get the maximum amount of fertilizer on their fields possible, some brigades pretended they drew less fertilizer from the supply depot than was the fact, and this led to no end of wrangling. Some brigades were only anxious to rush ahead, caring nothing for the progress of the other units. This influenced the progress of the co-op as a whole. For instance, at watering and planting time, Brigade Two finished three days ahead of schedule. Instead of helping the other brigades, every one of its members went off to enjoy himself at the fair.

When this situation came to light, the management committee divided both the better and inferior animals equally among the brigades and made them responsible for their care and for accumulating the animals' manure. Each brigade also had to make its own compost. At a meeting of the whole co-op it was explained that when one brigade fell behind it affected everyone's share in the profits; brigades which were in the lead were urged to help the ones having difficulty. It was decided that members could be loaned to other brigades after they had finished the work in their own units, so as to ensure that the entire co-op would complete its plan.

Another problem was the income of members working full time at subsidiary occupations. These people shared in the profits equally with the other members. However, they received no part in the division of income in excess of target figures, and they complained about it.

"If we don't reach our targets we have to pay the difference," replied the members who worked in the fields. "There's no such rule for subsidiary occupations."

The management committee solved this difficulty by treating the subsidiary occupation people as members of the various brigades, in equal numbers. At harvest time, they shared in excess income with the other members of their brigade. If there was any loss, they had to bear their part of the burden.

In 1955, after summing up its experience for 1954, the co-op made the following amendments to its methods:

1) Redistribution of manpower, animals, implements, land sections and use of fertilizer.

A. Manpower: In assigning members to brigades, consideration shall be given to the distance they live from the various fields, the convenience of the leaders, and what members work best together. Each member may appraise his own ability and, after the other members have discussed this, he shall be given a rating. Thereby a reasonable distribution of manpower was maintained. When necessary, suitable readjustments shall be made.

B. Animals: The 13 animals owned by the co-op and which originally were temporarily loaned to the various brigades are now assigned to them permanently, and the brigades are responsible for their care and use. Loans of animals from one brigade to another must be made only on mutual consent and with the approval of the management committee.

C. Implements: The co-op now has its own large and medium-sized farm implements. These will be allotted to the various brigades according to size and condition of the

implements, and the brigades will be responsible for their maintenance. Members must pay for any damage to implements which they borrow for use on their own private plots.

D. Land sections: Members complained that in 1954 the sections were marked out only on the basis of administrative convenience. In 1955 four land sections were created in accordance with quality of soil, crops to be raised and distance of fields from the members' homes.

E. Fertilizer: The co-op shall give credit for all natural fertilizer collected, according to its quality. It shall determine how much fertilizer to give each brigade, depending on the quality of the soil and the crops to be raised on the land section for which the brigade is responsible. If the brigade supplies the fertilizer itself, it shall be credited with its value. Brigades drawing more than their planned allotment of fertilizer shall be required to increase their yields accordingly. If the co-op is unable to supply the planned allotment, the yield target figures may be lowered accordingly. This will prevent any scrambling for fertilizer among the brigades, and will encourage them to accumulate their own.

2) Harvest targets shall be higher than those of average years, but lower than the targets of the annual plan. For instance, the cotton target for 1955 exceeds the 1953 (a good year) harvest figure by 18.9 per cent but is about 10 per cent lower than the planned target.

The 1954 practice of calculating yields in money was changed to calculating them in kind so as to avoid too much attention being paid to industrial crops at the expense of the ordinary crops.

In 1954 points were given for certain kinds of work without regard to circumstances. As of 1955, careful consideration shall be given to such things as physical conditions and weather. For example, in raising cotton, different points shall be credited for planting done with a seeder than for

planting done with drills; a distinction shall be made between hoeing before and after rain.

3) Establish and improve various systems.

A. Inspection system: Because inspection was neither careful nor timely, in 1954 some fields were cultivated badly. Starting 1955, the co-op chairman, the brigade leaders, the team leaders, and the co-op members shall be jointly responsible for inspecting the work on a rotation basis.

B. System of awards and penalties: This system shall be based on the principle of definite points for definite jobs—regardless of whether they are finished ahead of time or require overtime—giving awards for exceeding production targets, and penalizing for failing to reach the mark. Eighty per cent of the earnings in excess of target figures shall be divided among the members of the brigade topping its goal. An additional 10 per cent shall be given to those workers in the brigade who have shown special merit. The remaining 10 per cent shall go into the co-op's reserve fund. No responsibility shall be borne for losses due to natural calamities, but members shall pay 70 per cent of losses which could have been avoided.

C. Financial management: Receipts must be given for all implements and other things loaned to the brigades, and they shall be checked at given seasons of the year. Maintenance men shall be appointed in each brigade who will be responsible for their care.

In the past four years the East Chuankou Co-operative has grown stronger and better by the day. It has been steadily increasing its production.

In 1952, the year of its establishment, its total harvest came to 277,164 catties, 11.98 per cent higher than the return for the entire village in 1951.

The second year, 1953, the co-op gathered 325,483 catties, 17.43 per cent over the 1952 figure.

In 1954, the third year, floods caused a decline in production. The total harvest was 294,522 catties. Although this was 30,000 catties less than 1953, it still was higher than the 1952 figure, and 18.99 per cent more than the yield in 1951—the year before the co-op was formed.

This year, 1955, the crops are growing very well. In the absence of any natural disasters, according to preliminary estimates, we should harvest about 420,000 catties.

The members' income has also continued to increase. The average villager's income in 1951 was 876 catties. After the formation of the co-op, it rose to 1,060 in 1952 and 1,281 in 1953. In 1954 the figure dropped a little because of the floods. That year the income of the average member was only 1,100 catties. We expect it to be much higher this year.

THIS TOWNSHIP WENT CO-OPERATIVE IN TWO YEARS

(By the Co-operative Production Department of the Communist
Party Committee of Kunshan County, October 14, 1955)

Those who do not believe it will be possible to attain an elementary form of co-operation in various localities within three years (the people raised the slogan of achieving co-operation within three years and it has been criticized by opportunists), those who do not believe that areas which were liberated later can attain co-operation at the same time as areas which were liberated earlier, please take a look at this township in Kunshan County, Kiangsu Province! There, they went co-operative not in three years but in two. This was not in an old liberated area, but in a 100 per cent pure and genuine newly liberated area. And this newly liberated area is striding ahead of many old liberated areas. What can you do about it? Pull it back again? Of course not. The opportunists have no choice but to admit defeat.

The people are filled with an immense enthusiasm for socialism. In a revolutionary period those who only know how to follow the routine paths cannot see this enthusiasm at all. They are blind. All is dark before them. At times they rant to a point of standing truth on its head and confusing black with white. Haven't we had enough of persons of that sort? Those who can only travel the well-trodden paths always underestimate the enthusiasm of the people. Let

something new appear and they invariably disapprove, they rush to oppose it. Later, they admit defeat and do a bit of self-criticism. But the next time something new appears, they do the same things again—and in the same sequence. This becomes their regular routine in regard to anything and everything new.

That sort of person is always passive. He can never get going at a critical moment. Someone always has to give him a poke in the back before he will move forward. How many years will it be before that sort of person can walk of his own accord, and do it in a proper way?

Let him walk a while among the people, learn what they are thinking, see what they are doing—that is how to cure his ailment. Let him get some advanced experience from them and publicize it. That is the medicine for rightist obtuseness. May we suggest to him and his kind that it wouldn't hurt to give it a try?

—EDITOR

There were 677 households in Hsihsu Township, Kunshan County, Kiangsu Province. Of these, poor peasants and the lower sections of both the old and new middle peasants constituted 502 households; the upper middle peasants, 123 households; ex-landlords and rich peasants, 52 households. Two agricultural producers' co-operatives were set up in the spring of 1954, ten more in autumn, and still another one in the autumn of 1955. The membership of these 13 co-ops constituted 89 per cent of the total peasant households in the township. This meant that co-operative farming of a semi-socialist character has in the main been achieved in the township.

AFTER THE LAND REFORM

After the land reform in Hsihsu Township was completed in the spring of 1951, the enthusiasm of the peasants, particularly that of the poor peasants and farm labourers who had received land, was greatly increased. At that time, the local Party branch began organizing the peasants into labour mutual-aid teams. The rich harvests in 1952 and 1953 brought the yield of the land to the pre-war level, and the life of the peasants greatly improved. In spite of all this, class differentiation continued to take place in the rural areas. The rich peasants and speculative merchants stopped at nothing to line their own pockets. Tai Huei-po, a rich peasant, paid only five pecks of rice to get back his three *mou* of land which had been requisitioned during the land reform; and, as if forgetting himself, he said: "Anyone who needs money may come and borrow from me." Kuo Huei-ju, a well-to-do middle peasant, bought nine *mou* of land less than a year after the land reform. By 1953 there had already been 11 new rich-peasant households. Among the nine Party members in the township, five did some business and four bought land. On the other hand, the life of a large number of peasants was getting worse. Figures for 1953 showed that 39 households sold their land, 57 households borrowed money from usurers and two poor peasants had to hire themselves out as farm hands. At that time, the poorer sections of the peasantry were getting terribly worried. Some of them said: "If nothing is done about it, who knows the bad old days will not return?"

TWO CO-OPS SHOWED THE WAY

In the autumn of 1953 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China published the general tasks for the period of transition to socialism. After studying the general tasks, the socialist consciousness of members of the local Party

branch was raised. The advantages of getting the peasants organized in the past two years came under review. Comrades were brought to realize that a small-peasant economy was no good and that the road of capitalist exploitation was a blind alley. This was done by asking them to recall what the past was like and compare it with the present, and speak out the bitterness of life in the past. It was made clear that the task of the Party branch was to lead the peasants to set up co-operatives. The Party secretary made a self-criticism of his past mistake in buying and selling draught animals for his own profit and in carrying out exploitation in the mutual-aid teams.

As a result of the popularization of the general tasks there was a new atmosphere in the rural areas, the atmosphere of socialism. On the initiative of seven Party members two co-ops were established embracing 181 peasant households, and 353 households joined mutual-aid teams. The poor peasants and the lower middle peasants felt enormously happy about this and said: "We poor people know which way to go now." But the well-to-do peasants hesitated, and the landlords, rich peasants and counter-revolutionaries resorted to acts of sabotage. The Party branch realized clearly that if the two co-ops were run successfully many other people would follow suit to set up more co-ops. If they failed, that would give the bad elements an excuse for opposing socialist transformation. The Party branch was determined to make the two co-ops a success.

In the course of the popularization of the general tasks, nine peasants were admitted into the Party, bringing the total number of Party members to 18 in the whole township. Fourteen of these Party members had joined the co-ops. After each of the two co-ops had set up a Party sub-branch, with the secretary and three officers of the township Party branch directly leading them, work began energetically.

The first thing was to concentrate upon running the productive work well. It was true that when the co-ops were first

set up, the members' feelings varied. While the poor peasants were in high spirits, the middle peasants wavered. But they had a common desire to make a first-rate job of their productive work. In the spring, the Party branch led the members to build and repair such irrigation works as dikes and ditches and to accumulate manure. The Chipu Co-op, for instance, accumulated enough manure for 267 *mou* of land, several times more than before the co-ops were formed. An average member in a co-op could accumulate enough manure for 1.7 *mou*, while a man working in a mutual-aid team could only accumulate enough manure for 0.6 *mou*. This fact fortified the members' confidence and stunned the middle peasants outside the co-op. In early summer, the Party branch urged the members to complete successfully the harvesting and sowing for the season and improve their farming technique. It also led them to overcome the greatest flood in a hundred years, and made a good autumn harvest possible.

Field work was done chaotically in spring; the members scrambled for work to do like a hive of bees, while the cadres themselves were too busy to give directions, and consequently all were dissatisfied with this state of affairs. The system of short-term responsibility for work was introduced during summer harvesting and sowing, but because the group leaders didn't know how to allocate manpower, chaos, though on a smaller scale, still prevailed and labour efficiency remained low. The chaos was removed in autumn when a plan for short-term field work was drawn up by the production groups which were again subdivided according to the nature of the jobs to be done. It was after a long period of trial and error, coupled with an arduous ideological struggle, that good order in productive work was brought about. The poor peasants and the lower middle peasants on the one hand and the well-to-do middle peasants on the other, for instance, had reacted quite differently to the system of fixed responsibility for a specified job. The former gave positive support to it, while the latter were loud in crying that the work was too heavy

and that they couldn't stand it. It was only when the well-to-do middle peasants were brought to realize that labour was glorious and increased yield was impossible without hard work that an agreement in viewpoint was reached.

During the past year the policy of mutual benefit was examined from time to time in order to strengthen the unity between the poor and middle peasants. Opinions differed greatly in the matter of buying the members' animals and farm tools. The animals were paid 10 per cent less than the market price and this caused general dissatisfaction among the owners. Junks were pooled in the co-ops, but their owners were reluctant to allow them to be used without their tacit approval. They reasoned in this way: "When the co-op is no more and our junks have already been ruined, what shall we do then?" In assessing the yield of land, the grading of the land was fixed too wide apart. In many cases, the land holdings of the poor peasants were unfairly classified as grade 4 and the yields on their land underestimated, bringing in its trail a low dividend on the plots in question when the harvest came. As a result, more than ten households did not get enough grain to pay the agricultural tax. The poor peasants couldn't afford to contribute to the share fund, while the middle peasants, not wanting to, proposed that when a member contributed manure as share it should be spread on his own land. So the poor and middle peasants couldn't get along well. The poor peasants were dissatisfied, accusing the upper middle peasants of selfishness. The upper middle peasants, on the other hand, complained that the poor peasants profited at their expense. Time came for making advanced payment of income to the members, and the Party branch took the opportunity to educate them on the importance of relying upon the poor peasants and uniting with the middle peasants, which was the Party's class line in the rural areas. It took great pains to explain to them why co-operation would benefit all and estrangement would bring loss to everyone. It criticized some middle peasants for their discrimination against the poor peasants, and

some poor peasants for harbouring the idea of sponging on the middle peasants. After consultation it was decided to pay an additional sum of money to the owners of animals who had already sold them to the co-ops and certain adjustment was also made on the price paid for the members' junks. Land which had been rated as grade 4 was changed to grade 3. The Party branch urged the members to contribute to the share fund and made uniform arrangement whereby manure was to be spread according to the conditions of land. The poor and middle peasants hung together since then.

The rich peasants were dealt a telling blow for their wrecking activities. During the past year rich peasants outside the co-ops made frenzied attacks on the co-ops. When the members were busy accumulating manure they fanned the discontent of the middle peasants who had joined by saying: "Joining a co-op may be a good thing, but the work is too heavy and nobody can stand it." Seeing that the low-lying land of the co-ops was flooded, while the high land was not, these rich peasants took advantage of this situation to incite work groups No. 1 and No. 6 which had more high land to break with groups No. 7, No. 8 and No. 9 which had less. They said: "Look, once in a co-op, other people's bad luck will soon bring you down, too." And they did this just at the time when the co-ops were deep in the work of preventing flood and draining the water-logged land. At the busy farming season they baited the mutual-aid team members with higher wages to work for them, and because of this one of these teams broke up. They also made attempts to break up the co-ops. In autumn, when the co-ops sold grain to the state in accordance with government decrees, they hurriedly reaped their crops and stored them away in an attempt to cheat the government about their yield. They said to the co-op members: "There's no freedom in a co-op, but working independently you can eat as much as you like." Seeing that every single act of sabotage committed by the rich peasants produced a bad effect on certain

co-op members, particularly the upper middle peasants, the Party branch lost no time to educate the co-op members, exposed the rich peasants' wrecking activities before the people and sternly took those to task who had been found engaging in unlawful practices. Two rich peasants who had wormed themselves into a mutual-aid team were expelled. All this dealt a telling blow to the rich peasants, while serving to sharpen the vigilance of the co-op members. Some upper middle peasants said: "We know now that a rich peasant is not of the same mind with us. We must keep a sharp lookout whenever he opens his mouth."

The two co-ops were consolidated after difficulties, as mentioned above, were tackled and overcome. The yield for the whole year was 10 per cent higher than the neighbouring mutual-aid teams. The members said in high spirits: "After joining the co-ops, our life has become better and better. The land reform made the peasants able to hold up their heads; co-ops do more than that, they make the land yield more as well." The poor peasants and lower middle peasants who had not joined were so impressed by what the co-ops could do that they applied for membership one after another. Those upper middle peasants who had been passive and wavering also changed their minds and asked to join. Shih Hui, an upper middle peasant, who had secretly been competing with the Tungfang Co-op for a year, got a smaller yield at a much higher cost. In the end he was compelled to say: "I accept defeat. Now I want to join the co-op."

PHENOMENAL EXPANSION

In the autumn of 1954, 53 mutual-aid teams wrote to the Party branch, expressing their desire to set up co-ops. More than 400 households applied for membership in the co-ops. Thus a high tide in the co-operative movement emerged.

Most of the Party members were prepared to lead the peasants in forming co-ops, but as the job was altogether new to

them they didn't know how to get it done. They said: "Let's wait until the district and township functionaries come and give a lead." Certain members were still wavering, saying: "We don't want to join this year, we'll wait until next year when we'll have something more to fall back on." The Party branch realized clearly that it was impossible to lead the co-operative movement unless Party members' had reached a unanimous opinion on this matter. So it called three meetings of members on the branch committee and two general meetings of all members to study the decisions on agricultural co-operation adopted by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Co-op functionaries, moreover, reported on the experience of running co-ops in the past year. Through the discussions everyone came to a better understanding, and those who were unwilling to join made self-criticism for their muddle-headedness; those who didn't know how to run co-ops gained more confidence. A consensus of opinion having been obtained, the Party branch proceeded to take stock of the situation in the township. On the basis of the desire of the peasants, the condition of key personnel and the foundation of mutual aid in the locality, it drew up a plan for setting up more co-ops. The plan visualized the establishment of ten new co-ops before the autumn harvest and the expansion of the existing co-ops wherever necessary. Over 60 per cent of the peasant households in the township were expected to join. The rest would be organized into 15 mutual-aid teams to be led by the co-ops. Seventy-seven key personnel in running co-ops were chosen from those mutual-aid teams which were to be turned into the ten co-ops under consideration; 52 of them were poor peasants. They received training through a delegate meeting of mutual-aid teams and co-operatives. The preparatory work for the formation of co-ops was thus completed so far as the organizational side of the question was concerned. This was followed up by carrying out propaganda and education among the masses of

peasants, and as a result, more and more peasants applied to join.

At the time, the great majority of the peasants were in real earnest to join. But there were also peasants who, in spite of their desire to join, had many misgivings because they were not quite clear about such matters as the assessment of the yield of land to be pooled in the co-ops, the dividends on land and payment for work, the bringing in of draught animals, farm tools and manure as investment. These people were mostly middle peasants. There were also those who had no love for co-ops although they had applied for membership. In face of this situation, the Party branch called a delegate meeting of mutual-aid teams and co-operatives, a meeting of young members and a women's meeting to publicize the principles and policy of agricultural co-operation and the actual steps to be taken. The increased yield of the two existing co-ops was held up to show the superiority of co-ops. Their functionaries explained at length the measures they had taken to deal with the various questions concerned, so that the Party policy on farming co-operation became clear to all. At the same time, villages in the township sent deputations as well as individuals to visit the existing co-ops. They had a good look at their land, animals and junks. (Some people were worried that co-ops could not take good care of the animals or repair the junks.) They also interviewed different sorts of people in the co-ops: the old middle peasants, the households which had many persons but little land, the orphaned and widowed, etc., so that they were enabled to understand how their income went up after they'd joined. That helped the peasants to rid themselves of their anxieties and stimulate their enthusiasm to join.

The plan drawn up by the Party branch was discussed by the delegate meeting of mutual-aid teams and co-operatives. Decisions were reached as to which mutual-aid teams were to set up co-ops, who were going to join and who were not qualified to, and who, because they were unwilling to join,

would not be enrolled for the time being. Then the key personnel who were to run the co-ops and the active elements set out to talk with the peasants, making it clear that all those enrolled should do so voluntarily. It took just a month to set up ten new co-ops; 68 per cent of the total peasant households in the township had joined.

THE CO-OPS WERE GIVEN A CHECK-OVER

With the formation of the ten new co-ops, the Party branch had to assume a much heavier responsibility than before. At the outset, every co-op asked the township functionaries to help solve its difficulties. So many questions claimed their attention at the same time that they could hardly tend to one without overlooking the other. The functionaries and members of the new co-ops did not have any experience in collective productive work and it would take some time to adopt the successful measures which had been used by the existing co-ops. They didn't know how to draw up production plans, and the system of fixed responsibility for a specified job did not work with them. Jobs were assigned on the spot every day, and not a night passed without seeing them busy calculating work-points. When a job was on hand, no matter whether it was big or small, the whole brigade went at it. The members were after quantity and speed, paying no heed to quality at all. Almost without exception, the book-keeping was in a mess. Wastage was appalling. In less than a month the Chipu Co-op used 30 catties of paraffin.

The Party branch made a study of these problems and came to the conclusion that this deplorable state of affairs, if not set right, would lead to trouble. So it was decided that the Party branch should strengthen its leadership over the co-ops.

The Party branch, first and foremost, formulated definite demands as regards winter production, leading the members to improve irrigation facilities and accumulating manure. The purpose was to make preparations for the whole year's pro-

ductive work and to keep every member occupied. All co-ops drew up production plans concerning farm work as well as the use of the land and labour power, organized work teams, divided the land for the cultivation of various crops and put into effect the short-term system of responsibility. Current production was getting on the right track. The Party branch also drew up a plan for increased yield covering the whole year, and urged the peasants to carry out the production plan for each farming season.

In checking over the co-ops, the Party branch introduced a system whereby every Party member was given a specified duty to perform. In addition to regularly calling meetings of its committee to discuss work, it divided the co-ops in the township into two major units. The Party secretary and the township head took the helm of one key co-op, while giving guidance to five new co-ops. The Party committee member in charge of mutual aid and co-operation and the one in charge of financial affairs led another key co-op, giving guidance to the other five. Other committee members and the township functionaries went back to the co-ops to which they belonged to lead production. Every production brigade was put in the charge of a functionary or a Party member. The experience any brigade gained would be extended to the whole co-op. The Party branch used the co-op chairmen's meeting to exchange experience in good time. The meeting was presided over by the Party secretary and also attended by leaders of the mutual-aid teams. At every meeting one or two questions were solved. First, the two key co-ops, that is, the two old co-ops, reported on their own experience, and discussion of it was held in the light of the conditions of the various new co-ops. Decisions would not be made until everything was clarified, and only then the various co-ops were required to carry them out. If there was any snag in the course of their execution, they could go to the key co-ops for further exchange of views. How to prevent the rich peasants from engaging in

concealed wrecking activities also formed an important subject of discussion at such a meeting. A number of rich peasants had secretly curried favour with the functionaries. At the co-op chairmen's meeting a warning was sounded to keep a sharp lookout so that the rich peasants would not have the slightest chance to make trouble. In addition to the chairmen's meeting, there were a committee for directing farming technique, a committee on financial affairs and a committee on propaganda (the last mentioned later failed to function properly). At the time of spring sowing, the question of raising yield was discussed at the chairmen's meeting, and then the committee for directing farming technique met to discuss the concrete steps to be taken to increase the output.

During the busy farming seasons the Party branch organized emulation drives between co-ops, between production brigades, and between the members. In the course of the emulation drives, visits to co-ops were organized, and work done was examined in good time. Work was summed up and assessed regularly to educate the members in collectivism. In 1954 the Party branch summed up the over-all work of the co-ops as many as four times. Each time a comparison was made between the achievements now made and what was achieved in the past; a comparison was also made with those who stood outside the co-ops. This enabled the members to realize more clearly the advantages of getting organized and so gave them a vivid socialist education. On the basis of the members' better political understanding, they were encouraged to criticize themselves for their selfishness, conservative way of thinking and the idea of pulling out to work independently again. This helped a great deal to fortify the members' confidence in running co-ops. Co-op member Shen Feng-liang, who was a well-to-do middle peasant, confessed: "I changed my mind three times in a year. The first time was after the rice seedlings were transplanted; the second, when the plants began to bear ears, and the third, just before the autumn

harvest. Every time I went to my own field and saw the plants growing stout and beautiful, I began to worry whether I'd get less from the co-op than when I worked on my own." The regular summing-up of work helped to set the members' anxieties at rest and inspired them with greater determination to take the socialist road.

As the result of a year's hard work and the check-over given from time to time, the two old co-ops made further progress and the ten new ones were consolidated.

THE WHOLE TOWNSHIP MARCHED TOWARDS CO-OPERATION

Before the autumn of 1955 there were still 148 households which had not yet joined co-ops. The situation was complicated by the fact that the great majority of them were upper middle peasants. In Tanghsiang Village, 27 out of the 29 households which remained outside were upper middle peasants. In Chuhsiang Village nine out of the 11 households which were not co-op members were upper middle peasants. There were also those who engaged in other occupations besides cultivating land. Few key personnel could be found among these peasant households to run co-ops. However, seeing what co-ops could do, all of those who stood outside changed their attitudes. Even the well-to-do middle peasants acknowledged their defeat in production. The members of a mutual-aid team in Peishuanghsiang Village who were middle peasants paid a visit to the co-ops' fields and commented afterwards: "It cost us much more than the co-ops, but their crops are much better. We've stronger men working, but their yield is higher." Chang Lao-tai, a well-to-do middle peasant who had been full of doubts about co-ops, went to the Tanghsiang Village three times to apply for membership in the co-op. Shih Hui-sheng, also a well-to-do middle peasant who had enrolled twice but changed his mind each time, went to

the township government a dozen times or so in the autumn of 1955 to apply for readmittance, pledging that he would never change his mind again. The members of a mutual-aid team in Hengtang Village dismissed their team leader Yao Huiyuan, a well-to-do middle peasant, for his singular selfishness. They said: "A man of his kind is not fit to be a future co-op functionary."

Taking account of the general opinion of the mutual-aid teams and the condition of functionaries, the Party branch decided that the main task in 1955 was to expand the existing co-ops, while the establishment of new ones was of secondary importance. In the light of the geographical distribution of the mutual-aid teams, the condition of the key personnel and the ratio of the peasant households of different sections, it drafted a plan providing that, with the exception of the 19 households in Hsingkang Village (including ten poor peasants, four lower middle peasants, five upper middle peasants plus six active elements) which would be organized into a new co-op, others in the whole township who applied to join would be persuaded to join the 12 old co-ops. After the plan was adopted the delegate meeting of mutual-aid teams and co-operatives and the general meeting of members were held to give the members an education on this matter. And the key personnel and active elements set out to canvass the peasants one by one whenever necessary. As a result, 134 households applied for membership. By now, all peasant households in the township have joined the co-ops, except 16 landlord households, 36 rich-peasant households, and eight households of dependents of counter-revolutionaries and of bad elements, two well-to-do middle-peasant households, three households which had been the owners of oil-pressing workshops and a loafer.

To meet the new situation the Party branch set up four sub-branches according to the locality of the co-ops. The Youth League and women's organization also set up their branches. The 13 co-ops in the township were divided into

four units and an equal number of joint management committees were set up. The joint committees were to be under the guidance of the Party sub-branch. With the setting up of these organizations, a foundation was laid for merging the small co-ops into large ones and for establishing an advanced, fully socialist co-op.

A MODEL OF CO-OPERATION

(From the *Chekiang Rural Work Bulletin*, No. 51, March 17, 1955)

This experience should be publicized everywhere. All townships which have completed land reform, set up Party branches and have a number of mutual-aid teams can, in a relatively sound manner and without making too many mistakes, reach the stage of semi-socialist co-operation in a year or two—and increase production to the bargain—provided they follow the same line as Tengchia Township, Chekiang.

Many comrades think it is very difficult to organize co-ops. They say we are sure to make many blunders. And so they hold back, afraid to push co-operation. This is only because they have swerved from the line taken by the leaders of Tengchia.

This line—of going deeply into problems of one place, then applying the experience gained there in all other places—this is the same line followed in District Ten, Tsunhua County, Hopei, and in Chenghsi Township, Fengyang County, Anhwei. It is none other than the famous Marxist-Leninist line which our Party has long adhered to and which has proved so effective in all its work among the people.

— EDITOR

Tengchia Township, Shouchang County, Chekiang Province, was chosen by the Shouchang County Committee of the Communist Party as a “key township” to try out things and set

the pace in co-operation for the mountain areas. It has 420 households with 1,811 people living in three villages. Ninety per cent of its area, or 17,098 *mou*, is mountainous, seven per cent of its area, or 1,323 *mou*, is arable and the remaining three per cent is waste land.

In the spring of 1954, an agricultural and forestry co-operative and 24 mutual-aid teams were organized on an experimental basis. The co-op was named “Kuangming” (Bright Light). The leading officials here were quite clear about what had to be done and were fully conversant with local conditions, so they were able to give effective support to the Kuangming Co-operative and help it increase its output and income. As a result there was a rapid growth of co-operatives throughout the township and its production quickly increased. Now there are four agricultural and forestry co-operatives with 184 households, or 52 per cent of the total households that should be organized in the township, and eight mutual-aid teams with 109 households, or 31 per cent of the total households.

We can sum up the experience of this township in successfully promoting the co-operative movement and in increasing production under the following heads:

1) The “key co-operative” should be made use of to give a lead to mutual-aid teams and individual peasants on how to do their work, and to help them overcome difficulties. The leading officials in the township should make regular arrangements for the key co-operative to give what help it can on its own initiative to the peasants in its neighbourhood in solving production difficulties and also to help the mutual-aid teams work out short-term production plans and improve their farming technique.

Here are some examples:

In 1954, the Teng Kang-yao mutual-aid team was short of draught animals for the spring ploughing. The Kuangming Co-operative came to its aid by renting it a newly bought buffalo.

Teng Teh-kun, a member of the Hua Tung-kou mutual-aid team, fell sick just when his rice was ready for harvesting. His team mates were so busy reaping their own crops that they had no time to look after him. He was worried and his health took a turn for the worse. As soon as the Kuangming Co-op heard about this, it sent five co-op members who reaped Teng's entire crop for him in a single day.

Hsiung Tien-sheng, an individual peasant, couldn't get on with his sowing because he had neither draught animals nor implements. It was the Kuangming Co-op that helped him sow his fields.

All this made a very good impression on the people. And this wasn't all. During the busy seasons, the members of the mutual-aid teams rushed off to work without making sure what was the best way of arranging the various jobs that had to be done. The Kuangming Co-op gave them a hand by sending them some of its experienced members. In the spring of 1954, the Teng Chu-shui mutual-aid team had many jobs to do all about the same time — planting maize, cultivating the fields, transplanting rice seedlings, picking and processing tea. Everybody rushed to work eagerly but didn't know how to go about things. The co-op sent Wang Teng-kao, an active member, to discuss things with the team and they succeeded in drawing up a schedule of work that put the things in order of importance. They decided first to plant maize on the higher slopes of the mountain facing north and then on the lower slopes facing south. They apportioned the work properly between men and women members and arranged a sensible division of labour. Order was brought out of chaos. In the meantime the co-op took the initiative in inviting the most active members of the mutual-aid team to come to the co-op to get experience in working out short-term production plan and in managing production activities. Hsu Chi-lin, the assistant team leader, came back to the team after studying the co-op's methods and worked out a 15-day plan for the team. This got

the enthusiastic backing of the rest of the team and it was fulfilled in 13 days.

In 1954, when the time came to plant maize, the mutual-aid team found that it had no one who knew how to grow seedlings and transplant them. The co-op laid out a sample plot in good time and also sent several officers to help and guide the team. In this way close contacts were established between the co-op and the other peasants, and the prestige of the co-op went up. Peasants who had not previously paid much attention to it, now began to do so. Mutual-aid teams which had refused to admit the advantages of the co-op were now convinced of them. They themselves now rallied round the co-op to learn from it and went to visit it. Its productive and other activities became the standard for comparing those of neighbouring mutual-aid teams and individual peasants.

2) The peasants should be taken round to inspect the fields of the key co-op which should pass on to them its experience in production and co-operation in general.

Mutual-aid teams and individual peasants were taken regularly to inspect the key co-op's work and activities. The advantages of collective production were systematically publicized and the influence of the co-op grew among the mass of peasants. As they inspected the co-op, they compared its work with that of the mutual-aid teams and individual peasants, and tried to make out why the co-op was more productive. Take the growing of young rice seedlings for instance. Those grown by the co-op were larger and greener than those grown by the mutual-aid teams and individual peasants. The leading officers explained why. It was because the co-op, by burning the stubble which covered the field, wiped out insect pests, and increased the soil's fertility. The peasants also compared results as they looked over the maize crops growing on the mountains and learned that the reason why the co-op had grown better maize crops than its neighbours was that it had sown the seed with drills instead of broadcasting. The new method allowed the maize plants to grow up with even

space between them, giving them plenty of air and sunshine, and with deeper roots which made them more resistant to gales and drought. As a result of these inspection tours, the peasants came to understand the advantages which the co-op enjoyed as a result of collective production. They saw that the co-op was able to do things that mutual-aid teams and individual peasants were incapable of. Many examples proved this. The Hua Tung-kou mutual-aid team, one of the key teams, decided to catch up with the co-op in introducing new farming technique. When the co-op adopted better methods, for instance, of weeding and cultivating the plots where rice seedlings were grown, the team tried to follow suit. But as the team worked fundamentally on an individual basis, it could not keep to a well-knit plan of work. Some members did not want to do much weeding as they were afraid it would increase labour costs. So the team failed in its competition with the co-op. The mutual-aid teams also tried to adopt the method of sowing maize seed with drills, but failed because they could not organize all the labour power of their teams according to a single, centralized plan. Experience convinced the peasants that only by organizing co-operatives could they raise output and improve farming technique.

After the autumn harvest, eleven mutual-aid teams in the township which had come under the influence of the key co-operative and got help and encouragement from it decided to turn themselves into co-operatives.

In order to pass on the benefits of the experience of the Kuangming Co-operative, joint committee meetings of the co-ops and mutual-aid teams were held where the most active peasants could hear how the co-op was organized and put under good leadership. At first, the co-op introduced what the members were thinking and what their motives were when they joined the co-op; how political and explanatory work was organized to help them overcome their misgivings; how the preparatory committee of the co-op was set up and how agricultural and forestry work was planned. Later, the co-op

passed on its experience in dealing with trees pooled by members, in organizing the management committee, in working out the co-op's short-term production plan and in organizing production teams and groups, etc. Such information was extremely valuable to the peasants and helped the co-operative movement in the township make steady progress.

3) With the key co-op as its centre, production emulation drives should be promoted among the peasants so as to improve agriculture and forestry.

The increase in the number of agricultural and forestry co-operatives greatly heightened the enthusiasm of the peasants in their work. The leading officials, taking the Kuangming Co-op as the key unit, took a further step in putting forward a plan to expand afforestation and other work during the winter season. At a meeting of representatives of mutual-aid teams and co-ops, the Kuangming Co-op challenged others to join it in a friendly production competition. The challenges were taken up by the three newly organized co-operatives and all the mutual-aid teams in the township, and a friendly competition was started during the winter season.

In December 1954, the Kuangming Co-operative announced that it had enlarged the area sown to spring crops by 49 *mou*, an increase of 22.5 per cent over the winter 1953 figure of 218 *mou*; it planted 56,500 trees, or 54.3 per cent of the number of trees planted in the township and 1,170 catties of tea-oil seedlings; it restored 25 *mou* of tea gardens and sowed tea-oil trees on 160 *mou*; it dug four ponds and built three dams, spending over 700 work-days on them. For this outstanding record, the Kuangming Co-op was elected the model co-operative of the township.

The Chiaoting Co-op carried out co-op policy pretty well, keeping up production while organizing the co-operative. The Hsiatsewu Co-op also had a good record; its members proved themselves hard workers. Both were elected model co-ops. At the same time, three model mutual-aid teams, seven town-

ship model peasants and 24 village model peasants were elected.

This winter production campaign launched throughout the township on the basis of mutual aid and co-operation was a success. The areas sown to barley and rape-seed were 75 per cent larger and five per cent larger respectively than in 1953; 103,950 timber trees, 69,408 tea-oil trees, 8,617 palm trees and 11,925 cypress trees were planted; 820 *mou* of tea-oil plants and 200 *mou* of tea gardens were restored; two thousand catties of tea-oil seedlings were planted.

DILIGENT AND FRUGAL CO-OP OPERATION

(By Wang Lin, reporter on the *Hopei Daily*,
May 4, 1955)

The co-op introduced here is the so-called "Paupers' Co-op," led by Wang Kuo-fan. Diligent and frugal operation ought to be the policy of all our agricultural co-operatives — of all our enterprises, in fact. Factories, stores, state-owned and co-operative enterprises, all other enterprises — each should be run in keeping with the policy of diligence and frugality. This is a policy of economy, one of the basic policies of socialist economics.

China is a big country, but it is still very poor. We shall need a few score years before we can make China prosperous. Even then we still will have to be diligent and frugal. But it is in the coming few decades, during the present series of five-year plans, that we must particularly advocate diligence and frugality, that we must pay special attention to economy.

Many co-ops forget the need for economy. This is bad, and should be corrected quickly. Co-ops which are run diligently and frugally can be found in every province, in every county. These should be publicized as examples for all to follow. Co-ops which are diligent and frugal, get high yields and are generally well-run, should be given awards. Those which are wasteful, get very low yields and are generally poorly-run, should be criticized.

— EDITOR

In the short space of three years the members of the Chienming Agricultural, Forestry and Livestock-Breeding Co-operative in Szeshihlipu in Tsunhua County, Hopei Province, have grown rich. Once they were as poor as could be. This happened because of the successful running of their co-operative.

The village, which has 154 households, is tucked away in a cluster of trees on the northern slope of Mount Changyu.

Before 1952, every year the government had to distribute over 50,000 catties of grain for relief and well over 100 suits of winter clothes there; and in spite of this aid four households still had a very difficult time. Now these households are living much better than before. Those who once had no place of their own have now built houses, and the houses which were tumbling down have been made as new. Wang Yung used to have only one quilt for his family of seven. Over the past two years the family has bought a new print-covered quilt for every member. Now, too, they have a new house with three rooms. Pointing it out proudly Mrs. Wang said: "When I'd been in the co-op a year I bought a quilt. When I'd been in two, I moved into a new house. If we hadn't joined the co-op, we couldn't have afforded to put up even a shed." These are facts which anyone can see for himself.

How did this poor co-op become rich? Why was there a constant rise in the income of its members? And why had they stuck to it as they had?

BUILT FROM SCRATCH

After the autumn harvest of 1952, the Party Committee of District Ten, Tsunhua County, asked the Party branches to get the peasants to go in for co-operative farming. Wang Kuo-fan and Tu Kuei, members of the Party branch, started canvassing the peasants to form a co-operative. Twenty-three households, the poorest people in the village, joined the co-op

enthusiastically. The co-op had 230 *mou* of land but no carts or farm tools. It had no draught animals except a three-quarter share in the ownership of a donkey! Middle peasants often made cynical remarks like: "What price the 'key personnel'? Used to get winter clothes from the government every year, and now they're forming a co-op!" The peasants in the village usually cart manure to the fields in winter. This co-op had no animals or carts to do the job. In face of these difficulties some members hung back. "When I was in the mutual-aid team," said Wang Yung, "they had four donkeys and an ox. Without a single beast the co-op can't do a thing," adding that he'd made up his mind to leave the co-op after the 1953 autumn harvest. Shao Ching-chang, Tu Chun and some other members proposed to borrow from the government to buy animals and carts. "The government helped us out even before we'd joined the co-op," said Wen Chih-li. "Now we have one, the government should give us more help." The five Party members in the co-op, including Wang Kuo-fan, the chairman, and Tu Kuei, the vice-chairman, guided by the Party branch, took stock of the situation. Wang Kuo-fan's view was that a co-op ought first to make best use of the collective energies of the members to overcome difficulties, ensure increased yields and raise members' earnings. To borrow from the government before there was something to fall back on would cut down the members' earnings later on. He proposed that the members should go to the hills to cut wood and use the money thus obtained to buy carts, animals and tools. A meeting of Party members was called to discuss the problem. Addressing the meeting Wang Kuo-fan said: "You know what the Party says: only labour creates happiness. If we're not scared of a bit of hard work, we'll overcome all our troubles. If we put our backs into it, carts and horses are ours. We can get them from the hills. . . ." Those who had pleaded for a loan changed their minds. The chairman's way was obviously the right one. There were nineteen males in the co-op, and they swore they'd use their nineteen pairs of hands

to build from scratch. So the Party members divided their work. Tu Kuei, the vice-chairman, took the 17 men and lads to Wangzeyu, about ten miles inside the next county (Chienhsi County), to cut wood. The chairman and Wu Hsiu-ying, a woman member of the Party, stayed at home and got the village women busy collecting manure, clearing stones off the fields and seeing to the irrigation ditches. Three weeks later back came the wood-cutters with 40,000 catties of timber. That sold for 430 yuan. The co-op now had some money.

It was getting on for the lunar New Year, and some short-sighted members were all for sharing out the money so that they could all have a jolly holiday. Wang Kuo-fan was against it. If they spent the money on New Year, he said, in a few days there'd be nothing to show for it. Holidays came and went, but they had one worry all the time: how to produce enough to live on. That was something they ought to bear in mind. The members talked it over at great length, and came to realize that they must lay something by for a rainy day. It was daft to play ducks and drakes with all you had. In the end they used the money to buy a cart with iron-bound wheels, an ox, a mule, nineteen sheep, and an assortment of small tools.

Of course that didn't end their difficulties. They now had sheep without folds, a cart without harness, and animals without fodder. Besides, they had two households whose food had run right out. So all the members of the co-op were asked to take out another share so that it could put up a sheep-fold. Every man contributed two large nails, two sticks and two bundles of straw. For the rest, there were plenty of stones in the river bed, and work started right away. When the sheep-fold was finished nine of the men went off to the hills for timber again. It was spring-sowing time, so the other ten stayed at home, and they and the women carted manure to the fields and prepared the land. Three weeks later they'd finished, and the wood-cutters were back too. The timber they'd cut sold for 210 yuan. That meant fodder for the animals and

food for those who'd run short, and the co-op also bought another mule and eleven sheep. Besides this, they bought some equipment and started to run a beancurd workshop.

But you can't wipe out all the effects of long years of hard times at one stroke. When spring sowing began the seed grain wasn't to hand, and over half the members had reached the end of their food stocks. Things looked bad, and some members began to toy with the idea of borrowing again. "If there's no other way out," said Wang Feng-teh, "there's nothing we can do but ask the government for a loan." So the officials called a members' meeting to discuss if there really was nothing else they could do about it. Several people were against falling back on the government instead of finding a solution to their problems themselves. As they rightly said, everything is difficult at the start, but if members gave their minds to it there were probably more ways than one to extricate themselves from their troubles. The discussion went on and on. Tu Kuei and Liang Chin-tien, two Party members, offered to lend grain they didn't need themselves to those who had none, and this set the other members an example of helping one another when they were in difficulties over food. Then members pooled their stocks of seed sweet potatoes and planted out more than twenty plots. Some contributed seed grain they'd kept for their own use, and others borrowed seed from relatives and friends. Spring sowing was finished and the immediate difficulties were tided over. They got more than 500 yuan for the seed sweet potatoes they didn't need themselves. That was a great help to all the members whose food stocks ran short during the summer hoeing.

ANOTHER PUSH

But just before autumn harvest they ran into even worse trouble. While they were waiting for the grain to ripen the food supply of all the members began to run short. Everybody was very depressed. Wang Yung was sorry he'd joined.

"Before I joined the co-op," he said, "my son worked as a farm labourer. He only earned a picul of grain a year, but he didn't have to eat at home. Now he works in the co-op, he earns nothing, and we've got to feed him." One of the members, hoeing his field, piled the scattered stones on the edge of Wang's land. Wang stopped him doing so, saying, "You let it alone, or there'll be trouble. Besides, who knows? I may not be in the co-op after harvest."

Some members proposed that they should eat the crops before they were ripe. The management committee did everything it could to spur the members on to one last push before harvest. It would be the greatest pity to ruin the harvest when it was practically ready. "Pull your belts a wee bit tighter now and we'll have all the more grain in the autumn." It organized teams of members to cut grass and sell the hay to buy grain. But the hay went cheap, and the little money it brought in didn't buy enough to feed so many mouths. Chairman Wang and his family went without food for two days so that other members might have something. When Chao Yung-hsing, secretary of the Party Committee of District Ten of Tsunhua County, asked him about the co-op's troubles, he replied, "My family won't mind missing a couple of meals if the co-op can stand on its own and nobody's ever hungry again." The secretary of the district Party committee kept on telling the members that they could borrow some money to tide them over the food shortage, and that they should turn the grass they cut into compost to save having to buy fertilizer at spring sowing. Finally they borrowed 50 yuan to buy grain.

When autumn came the co-op reaped a large harvest, and the members earned 60 per cent more in real wages than when they had working on their own. They managed to accumulate 2,400 yuan worth of common property, which augured well for increased yields in the future and made the members far happier about the way things were going. Wang Yung, the one who had stopped other people piling stones on

the edge of his land and who had said he wanted to withdraw from the co-op after the autumn harvest, owned 11 *mou*. He had a family of seven, three of them working. When he was in the mutual-aid team in 1952 he harvested only six piculs of grain. The first year he joined the co-op he got 41 piculs. Off he went to see the chairman and a member of the management committee and said, "Let's knock down that line of boundary stones at once. It cuts down the land by a furrow or two, and makes ploughing difficult as well." To which the chairman replied, "You let it alone or there'll be trouble." Wang saw that his leg was being pulled, blushed and said, "I've made up my mind this time. I'll stay in the co-op as long as I live."

A year after it was formed the co-op had settled most of the thousand and one difficulties it was up against, and productive work was going well. But the members didn't crow or show off before the middle peasants who'd stayed outside the co-op because they were doubtful if it could hold its own. On the contrary, they did all they could to help them and establish closer relations. During the late summer and early autumn it poured continuously for days on end. On the seven *mou* belonging to Tu Fang, one of the middle peasants, the weeds grew higher than the crops. Things were as bad with Wen Chih-chuan's three *mou* of sweet potatoes and Wen Yung-chuan's three *mou* of rice. They lost hope and swore there was nothing to do but count the crops a dead loss. Then, in the nick of time, members of the co-op volunteered to give a hand, and the crops were saved.

Another case was that of the middle peasant Wang Yueh. Three in his family worked 30 *mou* of land, and they had a donkey, three oxen and four pigs. In the spring Wang has boasted, "Let the co-op work their heads off. I bet it'll take them three years before their fields produce as much as mine." He had a strip of land that adjoined the co-op's, and quite deliberately planted it with the same crop — maize — as the co-op did. Summer came, and it was time for the second

muck-spreading. The co-op carted manure to their maize-fields, and because they had plenty of labour it was spread almost as soon as it arrived. Wang Yueh also carted manure to his field. It took him all day, and he had to leave it piled up on the edge of the field overnight. During the night it rained cats and dogs, and the whole of the manure was washed away. In the autumn the co-op's crops were splendid, while his. . . . That opened his eyes.

And not only his. It dawned on the middle peasants that the reason the poor ones were making such a fine job of their co-op was that they were all working together and pulling the same way. "If it hadn't been for those fellows with nothing but a shoulder-pole and an axe to work with," said Wang Feng-jen, "the co-op wouldn't have been started at all." People who had once thought that it didn't pay to have anything to do with the poor, now began to give the co-op a helping hand and to ask to join. Wang Kuan-chou and Tu Heng drove carts for the co-op during the day and chopped straw for the animals in the evening. Tung Fu's wife even gave a promise that she'd stop wagging her tongue and abusing the neighbours if they let her join the co-op! Another woman, whose application had been turned down, and who was always quarrelling with, and even threatening to divorce her husband, said: "Let me in, and I'll never quarrel with him again!" Anyhow, the membership of the co-op went up from 23 households to 83.

CUTTING COAT ACCORDING TO CLOTH

So they had their co-op with its economy in a much better state, and with the middle peasants inside it. Thus the members split into two schools of thought. Most of the older ones, of whom the chairman and vice-chairman were typical, took the view that the middle peasants had joined because they saw how the co-op had overcome difficulties and increased its income by hard work, and that although the co-op was cer-

tainly better off, it was still necessary to go on budgeting carefully and working hard. A few of the older members, however, and the middle peasants who'd recently joined, thought that the time had come for the co-op to blossom out a bit. The middle peasants — Tu Feng, Wang Hsiu-shen and others who'd joined — proposed that the co-op should buy their animals and carts to make it more presentable. Besides, they said, that would save their owners from "suffering losses," as they'd be able to use the co-op's animals and carts.

That was a new problem for the co-op. The two proposals were so diametrically opposed that obviously the right answer had to be found if the members were to go on getting bigger incomes, if the co-op was to continue to make progress. The Party branch got Party members and Youth Leaguers discussing the proposals and also canvassed the members for their opinions. One old member, Shao Ching-lin, said, "We must know where we are. There's no point in dolling up the co-op for appearance's sake. It's head and shoulders above those working on their own, but that's because we're organized, and have overcome difficulties and increased output. What's the point of putting on airs?" The other side of the picture was given by middle peasant Tu Chung, who said, "Say what you like, the co-op ought to buy the animals and tools. That'll set the owners' minds at rest."

Wang Kuo-fan, the co-op chairman, who was also a member of the village Party branch committee, summoned a meeting of the management committee to discuss the matter. They came to three conclusions: First, that the co-op simply hadn't the money to buy all the animals and tools at once; they'd be up to the eyes in debt if they did. Secondly, that some of the new members, particularly the middle peasants who'd recently joined, who had asked the co-op to buy the tools and animals, had done so because they thought it would save them trouble, not because they thought it would benefit the co-op. Thirdly, that the best course was for the beasts and tools to remain in

private hands for the time being, and that the co-op should pay the owners for their use.

The next thing was to convince the members that this decision was correct. That meant careful explanation of two points.

First, whether the co-op would gain or lose by buying animals at that stage. They worked it out this way. The new members owned 17 beasts. Suppose the co-op paid an average of 80 yuan for each, that would amount to 1,360 yuan. Then the beasts would have to be fed. Say each needed two catties of fodder and six catties of straw a day, then approximately 12,410 catties of fodder grain and 37,230 catties of straw would be needed a year. That would cost another 1,737 yuan. Then you couldn't keep all the beasts in one place, so you'd have to pay two men's wages to look after them. Assume that each worked 300 days a year and was paid 1.40 yuan a day, that meant another 840 yuan. So the outlay would be at least 3,937. On top of that you'd have to buy harness and gear, and even then you wouldn't have bought the tools from the members. It would mean running up a huge debt. It would take the yields of 500 *mou* to pay it off, which meant that however good the harvest was, the majority of the members would still go short. If the debt wasn't all paid at once the people who'd sold their beasts and tools to the co-op would moan. And anyhow, whether they paid off the debts all at once or by instalments, it would be a terrible setback for the co-op.

The second thing was to convince the owners of animals that they wouldn't lose if the beasts were privately kept and co-operatively used, the co-op paying for their use. The co-op needed animals all the year round to plough, cart earth and manure, and so on and so forth. Suppose the co-op paid 0.50 to 0.60 yuan a day for the use of an animal and used it 200 days a year, the owner would get 100-120 yuan. Besides, if the owners kept their own animals, they could use them at other times to husk rice, pay visits, for carrying, for hire.

Besides that, of course, there would be the manure. Almost everybody kept a pig or two, and between the pigs and the draught beasts they could count on fifteen cart-loads of manure a year, which, at 2.50 yuan a load, would bring in another 37.50 yuan a year. So those who owned and reared their own animals stood to make quite a bit out of them, and would certainly be better off.

These two calculations were so simple that everyone understood the pros and cons. Wen Chih-li, one of the members, said, "Running a co-op's not different from running a home. You only buy what you can afford. It won't matter if we don't buy the carts and horses till the co-op's earned enough to pay for them. It's no good biting off more than we can chew."

So the owners of the animals agreed to the proposal. But then fresh questions cropped up. For instance, suppose the animals were kept by the owners and used by the co-op, what would happen if both wanted to use them at the same time? When the co-op had the use of so many beasts, what guarantee was there that they'd be properly used? As some of the owners said, "People who use other people's property tend to be careless with it." Other members were worried about farm tools privately owned and co-operatively used. What would happen if they were damaged?

That led to more discussion, and it was made clear to members that the co-op would not only be using animals at spring sowing and autumn harvest, but would also embark on various forms of rural development, improving soil, etc., which peasants working on their own couldn't hope to do, so they needn't worry about the beasts not being used. Then, so that owners knew beforehand where they stood, it was decided that they themselves should work out how many days a year the co-op could use their animals and let the co-op know. They also took a decision that the co-op must always have animals to use when it needed them, and that if the owners and the co-op wanted to use them at the same time, the co-op should have

priority, so that production shouldn't be hampered, provided it didn't use them for more than the number of days a year agreed on with the owner. As regards the way animals were to be used and treated, it was made clear in discussion that though animals weren't being turned into common property, they were to be used to work the fields of all members of the co-op, and members would have to look after them just as well as they would any property owned by the co-op in common. The beasts would be allocated to the same production brigade as their owners, who would have to finish the jobs given them in the time set. In this way owners wouldn't have to worry about other people ill-treating their animals. Another decision was that if tools privately owned and in co-operative use were damaged, the co-op would be responsible for repairs. The solution of these problems helped the co-op to avoid the pitfall of ill-considered purchase of means of production, and thus ensured that the co-op could advance steadily.

EARN MORE AND SPEND LESS

After the problem of animals and farm tools was solved, members got into the habit of looking down on such jobs as chopping firewood and cutting grass, and took it into their heads to go in for such side-lines as carting goods and pressing oil, to bring in a bit more money. The co-op called the work brigade leaders together to talk it over and impressed on them the importance of running a co-op by frugality and hard work. There were two kinds of productive work the co-op could do and it had to choose between them. One was to spend a lot of money at the start with no guarantee of the outcome. The other was to increase income by hard work without any capital expenditure at all. When it was put to them in black and white like that, the members plumped for the second way. They gave up the idea of chasing big things and getting rich quick. All agreed that the motto had to be "slow but sure."

In the winter of 1953 they bought three oxen with the money they'd earned from cutting wood. They didn't ignore any possible source of extra income. At the start of the autumn harvest in 1954, when the state was asking everybody to make a first-rate job of the harvesting and threshing, they took a pledge to bring in every single grain. The chairman did a bit of figuring for the members. The co-op was growing 300 *mou* of peanuts. If, said he, they let slip only one pod in every cluster, the total loss would be something like 5,100 catties. It was a staggering figure, and it opened members' eyes. The men swore they wouldn't leave a single pod behind. The women vowed to do the reaping and threshing so carefully that the extra grain would bring in enough to buy a rubber-tyred cart.

Actually, they bought two mules and two rubber-tyred carts at a cost of 1,550 yuan, 200 yuan worth of fertilizer and 180 yuan worth of fodder in the autumn and early winter of 1954. This they did without borrowing a penny from the government. They'd raised the money by harvesting and threshing with special care, by chopping firewood, cutting grass and shelling peanuts for the supply and marketing co-operative. They also took particular care to keep down expenses. In the autumn of 1953 an arrangement was started whereby members kept their own farm tools and the co-op used them and was responsible for their repair. It soon turned out, however, that this arrangement was a big drain on the co-op's finances. Some members used tools carelessly, knowing that if they damaged them the co-op would pay. One member, for instance, ruined a hoe through sheer carelessness as soon as he started to use it. That cost the co-op four yuan. To plug this loophole the co-op adopted a "fixed expenditure on each item" system that had been started by the Wukung Township Agricultural Producers' Co-op in Yaoyung County. It was first tried out by four work brigades, and applied to repairs to small tools only. Each brigade was given 20 yuan a year. If that wasn't enough to cover all repairs, the brigade

had to raise the rest itself. If it was more, the members kept the surplus. The result was that no brigade used the whole amount. At first the system applied only to small tools, and there was still far too much damage to large ones: repairs to such tools in 1954 came to no less than 120 yuan. Nor did it apply to stationery: members helped themselves to paper, ink and paraffin from the accountant's office! So in the spring of 1955 they took a decision to apply the system to all tools. They also fixed expenditure for the accountant's office, for the shepherds and for the transport teams.

Before the system went into effect, the management committee made tentative suggestions and got the members of eight production brigades to discuss and, if necessary, amend them. The middle peasants who joined after the autumn harvest of 1954 weren't satisfied with the arrangement. They argued like this: every brigade cultivated 200 *mou* and used all sorts of farm tools. What use was 30 yuan a year to keep them all in repair? What they really ought to do was to buy new tools. The older members refused to agree. "Look," said one, "if your tools were good enough to use before you joined, why can't you use them now? We must make do with what we have. There's no need at all to buy new ones. It's not asking much to expect you to pay out a cent or so for every yuan the co-op itself spends, is it?" And another added, "Tools don't break just like that, not if you use them carefully. Thirty yuan is plenty if you've got a sense of responsibility."

A lively discussion ensued. It was generally agreed that the proposed system was a good one, and it was adopted and strictly enforced. That stopped the drain on the co-op's resources. As the chairman said, "Constant dripping wears away a stone. The co-op has just enough property to scrape through with. It doesn't look much, a penny here and a penny there, but it all amounts up and you end up with a big loss."

Yes, since it was formed in the autumn of 1952 the Chien-ming Agricultural, Forestry and Livestock-Breeding Co-

operative has overcome many difficulties. People got to see the advantages of getting organized, and the peasants flocked in. Within three years the co-op grew from 23 households to 83, and then to 148. Every single person in the village qualified to join has done so: the whole village has gone in for co-operative agriculture. When the co-op started it had no tools and equipment to speak of. In three years it accumulated more than 6,000 yuan worth of common property, including 12 head of cattle (seven of them out of their own beasts), two donkeys, three mules, five carts (three with iron-bound wheels and two rubber-tyred), and 103 sheep of various breeds. Six hundred *mou* of terraced land have been planted with fruit trees, and a thousand *mou* of barren mountains afforested. Along the river bank north of the village there are 270,000 poplar trees now ten to twenty feet high. Tu Kuei, the vice-chairman, is in the habit of saying, "With the leadership given by the Party and our own hard work, we'll turn Szeshihlipu into a fine, flourishing mountain village in five years. By then everybody will be better fed and better clothed, and we'll all be able to really enjoy the songs of the birds and the scent of flowers when the day's work's over."

RUN THE CO-OPS DILIGENTLY AND ECONOMICALLY, DEVELOP THE MOUNTAIN REGIONS

(By Li Lin and Ma Ming, September 15, 1955)

This is about the Gold Star Co-operative led by Li Shun-ta, where they farm, grow trees, tend orchards and raise stock. In the three years since its inception it has grown quite large. It now has a membership of 283 families. Although located on very poor soil in the Taihang Mountains, because everyone has worked hard, it has begun to take on a new look. Manpower is utilized 110.6 per cent more effectively than in the days before the anti-Japanese war when everyone worked for himself, and 74 per cent higher than in the time of the mutual-aid teams which existed before the co-op was formed. The co-operative's assets have increased from 120 yuan in its first year to 11,000 yuan. In 1955 each member received an average income of 884 catties of grain — 77 per cent more than in pre-war days, and 25.1 per cent more than in the mutual-aid team period. Within three years, the co-operative has already surpassed its five-year plan by 6 per cent.

We can learn from the experience of this co-op. If large increases in output can be attained in places poorly endowed by nature, why can't we do still better in areas where conditions are more favourable?

— EDITOR

The township of Hsikou in Pingshun County, Shansi, used to be a cluster of desolate, out-of-the-way villages in the midst of the Taihang Mountains. Some 1,200 metres above sea level, it was a place of high, bleak ridges and tiny, scattered plots of land with a mere sprinkling of earth. Nature there was pretty grim. For instance, Hsikou Village had 473 *mou* of arable land, but it was carved up into more than 2,700 separate strips. What's more, torrential rain was always washing away the banks of the terraced fields. It was a nightmare to retain water or soil at all.

In the nine years between 1943 and 1951, 26 mutual-aid teams were formed in the whole township. By this form of organization the peasants used whatever labour power and cash they could spare to bank the slopes of terraced fields high up on the ridges so as to retain an increasing amount of water and soil. They also extended the area under cultivation by cutting new terraces out of the hills, keeping the terracing in good repair, and bringing under cultivation land which had been formed by the settling of river silt. Steps like this led to a year-by-year increase in the peasants' income for the township as a whole. By 1950, the mutual-aid team formerly led by Li Shun-ta had been able to increase its annual yield per *mou* by 77 per cent compared with the years before the anti-Japanese war. So a situation came about where people could say proudly, "Nowadays we eat a great variety of food and enjoy all sorts of relishes with our meals." That was a great change from the days before the anti-Japanese war when the peasants would tell you, "We've got to fill our bellies with bran and such green-stuff as grows wild. Even millet meal is a luxury!"

But because the different households in the mutual-aid teams farmed mostly on their own, they found it impossible to undertake much in the way of bigger jobs or introducing any sweeping reform in farming technique to develop the hilly regions. So at that time it was out of the question to bring about any radical change in this poverty-stricken area. Then,

in 1952, Li Shun-ta, answering the call to raise yields, set the pace by starting the Gold Star Agricultural, Forestry and Animal Husbandry Co-operative. The peasants gave it a ready welcome, and in its first year, it grew so fast that by the end of the year 51 per cent of all peasant households in the village were in it.

AN INSPIRING PROSPECT

The way the Gold Star Co-op grew and consolidated itself meant that you could start considering the next step — how to get out of the mountain districts the wealth that must be there. But it wasn't easy to discover how to ensure constantly growing yields, how to exploit the natural resources of the locality to the full. The peasants who had toiled there for generations couldn't see any way out for the poorly endowed place. As they put it, "There are gullies and bare rock everywhere! How can you think of tilling land by machinery and marching towards socialism when you can't even find a plot big enough for a tractor to turn round on? We've pooled our labour and draught animals, and tried every feasible technical improvement. There just isn't any way of getting bigger yields — there's not a dog's chance."

So when Sang Jung-ho, a well-to-do middle peasant who wasn't in the co-op, moved to the plains of Luan County, five others including Li Teh-tsai, whom we shall be mentioning again later, determined to follow suit. The district, village and co-op officials were at a loss to know what to do about this new problem: Make them stay? No, the prospect of better yields wasn't so encouraging, and really it seemed as good a way as any. Let them go their own way? That wasn't any good, either. If they went there'd be no guarantee that the yearly production plan would be fulfilled. Besides, there were so many hilly regions in the country; who was going to develop them if things were allowed to drift like that?

To cope with this situation, the Pingshun County Committee and Hsikou Village Branch of the Chinese Communist Party started taking steps to get the masses on the move. In the light of the policy mapped out by the higher Party committees on the all-round development of agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry, they drew up a practical long-term plan for developing the hilly regions. This really did give the peasants a glimpse of the bright prospects of socialism. Again, early in 1952 the Pingshun County Party Committee led the peasants in Hsikou to make an on-the-spot investigation, taking all relevant factors into account, of how best to exploit the possibilities of developing agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry to the full. Having done this, they went on to draw up a comprehensive plan for the three-year period 1952-54. This plan called for an increase in the annual income of the village from the equivalent of 925.48 piculs of grain to 2,175 piculs. It called for steps to conquer the drought that always threatened all the non-irrigated land in the village. These included the building of small dams and reservoirs at seven points, and the storage of every possible drop of spring and rain water. Besides this, 120 *mou* of land which had been covered by silt was to be prepared for cultivation. It also proposed that wild slopes should be planted with fodder grass as a means of developing animal husbandry. This plan was a great stimulus to all the peasants because it gave them confidence that by their own efforts they could transform their barren hills out of all recognition. It made Kuo Chang-tse, a peasant who had moved out of the area, regret that he hadn't stayed. It made Li Teh-tsai, Kuo Pao-shan and others, who had been about to follow Kuo Chang-tse's example when the plan was announced, change their minds and settle down to the work of making their home village a better place to live in.

The return of Li Shun-ta from his visit to the Soviet Union in the autumn of 1952 led to even greater activity in Hsikou. Li showed his fellow villagers the pictures he brought back

with him, pictures of dense forests, big lumber mills up in the hills, towering, magnificent buildings, roads climbing up to the mountain tops, and so on, all in Siberia. He went into details about how, guided by Stalin's plan for transforming nature, the peasants on the Siberian uplands were planting trees everywhere and producing huge quantities of timber, and how collective farmers in the hills of Georgia went in for a combination of agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry and were using machinery and power. This made the peasants see that their home and the Soviet Union had something in common, made them realize that what the Soviet Union was today Hsikou might be tomorrow. It also let them see that the combination of agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry which the Siberian peasants had started was the right road for them to take.

Li Shun-ta impressed on his fellow villagers that, however far they looked into the future, they should start from where they stood. So they drew on Soviet experience of developing hilly regions and, bearing in mind actual local conditions, revised their former plan of work and extended the period it was to cover from three years to five. Then, after the Party published its general line of policy for the period of transition to socialism, they worked out a 15-year comprehensive plan for the development of agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry. This plan specified which areas were suited to each type of farming. Eighteen thousand *mou* of bare slopes in the township were to be closed off and planted with various kinds of fruit and timber trees and grass; of the 500 *mou* of shoals and mud-banks in the river, 300 *mou* were to be reclaimed, and cattle, sheep, pigs, poultry and bees of good breeds raised in large numbers. When the whole plan is completed, Hsikou will be a place dotted with groves of trees and flocks of cattle, and the income per head will be nine times as large as in 1952. In the process of drawing up these plans the Hsikou Party branch ran a series of meetings to find out what the peasants thought about it all, so that nothing

that might lead to increased production should be overlooked. It constantly explained what the plans were and what the carrying out of them would mean. This was a real inspiration to the peasants, who became more and more enthusiastic about developing their hills. Now all the co-ops in the three villages in Hsikou Township have merged to form a big one that embraces 97 per cent of the 283 households. From personal experience the peasants have learned that only by pooling and making rational use of all their labour and financial resources can they fulfil the 15-year plan.

RATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF LABOUR

They wanted the long-term plan of work to be a success, but it looked as if the labour formerly employed on agricultural production on some 1,920 *mou* of arable land would not be enough for the all-round development of agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry in a vast area covering 20,800 *mou* of upland. In the old days labour was used very inefficiently. The peasants used to have such sayings as, "You work your guts out half the year; the other half you idle away the time." "January, plenty to eat, February, just rest, early March, still may be some rest." Since the mutual-aid teams were set up the peasants had somewhat outgrown this long-standing habit of enjoying a slack season in winter, but the waste of labour power was still appalling, because the conflicting claims of collective labour and individual farming were still not settled.

The organization of the Gold Star Co-operative provided conditions favouring the better use of labour, and it took two steps towards rationalization.

The first was intended to improve the division of labour, and fell under three heads:

- 1) Labour was to be organized in line with the needs of both the long-term plan of work of the co-op as a whole and its annual plans. They set up teams for field work, and sec-

tions to take care of forestry, animal husbandry, capital construction and the financial side respectively, all under the management committee of the co-op. At the same time every bit of labour available was put to productive work, and care was taken to give out work in such a way as to be within the capacity of the individual member and to give the special aptitudes of everybody full play.

2) They introduced a rational system of paying for labour which ensured that quality and quantity of work were up to standard and allowed the various production targets to be reached. At the start people had tended to concentrate on current agricultural production and forget about the long-term plan. That was because no provision had been made for remuneration of work put in on capital construction, afforestation and reclamation of alluvial land. Later on they worked out a scheme to pay for every bit of labour, and this ensured that both current and long-term targets were reached. Some members tended to go all out for quantity at the expense of quality so as to gain more work-points. To check this tendency piece-work system was started for all important jobs. That had the effect of improving both quality and quantity. The principle of equal pay for equal work done by both men and women was strictly applied, and in 1955 alone women contributed 8,967 work-days—35 per cent of all work-days put in on agricultural production.

3) They cut down every possible bit of labour wasted on non-productive work. For instance, at one time all manure for the distant upland plots had to be carried there by hand. The new idea was to build byres for the cattle there, so that manure accumulated right on the spot. That saved something like 2,400 work-days a year. In 1955 the amount of labour spent on odd jobs was cut to 3.3 per cent of all work-days, compared with 7.8 per cent in 1954.

The second measure was a labour emulation drive organized by the Party and a propaganda campaign to bring to the constant notice of the co-op members the great things being done

in China to build socialism, to show them how concerned the Party and government were about people living in the hilly regions, and to publicize production results on the co-op itself. All this filled the peasants of Hsikou with a great love for their native place and gave them confidence to battle against nature. "What are a few hills?" you hear them saying nowadays. "Our future is boundless!"

In the dead of winter when the earth was still frost-bound and deep under snow you found co-op members scaling the heights to blast rock and repair the stone banking of the terraces. An extra 95 *mou* of alluvial land recently added to the acreage under cultivation was won by peasants who brought rocks from afar to bank plots and retain the sediment that would otherwise have been borne away by flood water. Here every inch of soil won, every tree planted, meant so much heavy toil.

In 1955 the co-op put in 61,368 work-days on agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and subsidiary occupations. On an average each able-bodied man contributed 220 or more work-days a year, and each able-bodied woman 78. That meant that the extent to which labour power in the co-op was being utilized was 110.6 per cent more than in the days before the anti-Japanese war, and 74 per cent more than in the days just before the birth of the co-op itself.

STRICT ECONOMY

Any general development of agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry required enormous financial and material resources. This was something for which the co-op had to rely on its own resources: they couldn't just ask for state assistance. But at that time the co-op had but little capital. So the management committee studied the situation and decided to make do with whatever local resources they could lay hands on. Hard work and thrift: that was their motto. Every single thing they could put to use they used. Every-

thing that would bring in money they did. This is the record of their efforts:

1) They tried out every possible means of increasing income and accumulating capital to expand production. In the four years between 1952 and 1955, the annual sum which the members invested as capital for this purpose ranged from 14.3 to 28.23 per cent of the gross annual income. In 1955, the co-op made use of the tiny plots of waste land on the edges of fields and village and so gathered an extra autumn harvest of 310,000 catties of vegetables. Since a proposal by the vice-chairman, Shen Chi-lan, that women members should be persuaded to go out and collect sheep dung was adopted in the spring of 1955, the co-op stored more than 1,000 yuan worth of it in the course of the year.

2) They constantly reduced costs in every branch of production. The co-op originally planned to raise a hundred pigs and buy 30,000 catties of bran and 5,000 catties of coarse grain each year to feed them. But the women members who looked after the pigs found out that they did quite as well with more wild green-stuff and corn-cobs, less bran and no coarse grain at all. So in 1955, when the number of pigs had increased to 137, they were fed on 35,000 catties of green-stuff which the women had gathered, and 149,000 catties of corn-cobs. That saved grain and bran, to the value of 1,800 yuan. Formerly, huge quantities of maize stalks were used as fuel, and fertilizer had to be bought. In the past two years, the peasants have given up the practice. In 1955 they prepared 9,600 piculs of compost out of rotting maize stalks. That was enough fertilizer for 160 *mou*.

3) They cut out waste and reduced expenditure on non-productive items. A plan to build 60 new sheds between 1952 and 1954 was stopped and part of the old cotes and caves were used as sheep-pens and cattle sheds. In its early days the co-op lost 2,000-3,000 yuan on animal husbandry because of poor management. In 1955, it saved 6,470 yuan by cutting five unnecessary items in the expenses. The co-op gathered

more than 570,000 catties of hay for the use of the cattle in winter.

In dealing with all the matters mentioned, the Gold Star Co-operative paid particular attention to collecting and applying rationalization proposals made by the members. Members were properly paid for any work they did and received an adequate return on any investment they made in the co-op. The exact amount was fixed by discussion. This ensured that the co-op got what was needed for the annual investment in production and helped to increase the amount of common property owned by the co-op year by year. The value of this common property has increased nearly a hundred times; that is, from 120 yuan in 1952, when the co-op was set up, to 11,911 yuan in 1955.

THE FACE OF HSIKOU IS CHANGING

For the past four years the co-op has been carrying out the policy of running co-ops thriftily to develop the mountainous areas. And Hsikou Township really has begun to take on a new appearance. From the top of Mount Houpei, the highest point around, the place looks like a picture: The lush green of newly planted trees blends with the crops in the terraced fields. Thriving crops of maize and millet cover the newly made terraces and uplands. In a year or two, the Canadian poplars will have grown huge. Apple trees from Northeast China and grape-vines from Tsingtao will be bearing fruit. Pastures have been extended and now more than a thousand horses, cattle and sheep graze there. In 1955, the gross income of the co-op, it is estimated, will be equivalent to 862,766 catties of grain, of which 609,663 will come from agricultural production. That means an average income of 884 catties a head, a 77 per cent increase compared with the days before the anti-Japanese war, or 25.1 per cent compared with the days just before the co-op was started. This income is 23.3 per cent higher than peasants outside the co-op get. As

far as the total value of output is concerned, it will be 0.6 per cent over the target set in the township's five-year plan.

Increases in production have made it possible for the peasants to live better. Nowadays it's quite common for them to own rubber shoes, electric torches, umbrellas and blankets. The number of primary schools in the township has risen from one in the days before the anti-Japanese war to four. The co-op runs five spare-time schools attended by 442 of its members. Besides this, 114 young peasants, men and women, have joined literacy classes. Forty-nine of them have reached a good standard of literacy, and 22 have learned 500 to 1,000 characters. Classes have also trained 43 people as book-keepers, tallymen, readers for the newspaper-reading groups for illiterates, and technicians for the co-op. The co-op has its own library, wireless sets, telephone, bags for taking books to those working in the fields, a musical group, newspaper-reading groups, and other educational facilities and entertainments. The new public health and midwifery centres have simple but good equipment, and keep matters affecting public health before the peasants. And talking about changes in the sphere of public health, the peasants of Hsikou say, "Before liberation, we had two lots of blood-suckers — the landlords by day, and bugs and fleas by night. Sometimes you had to move out into the courtyard because nobody could sleep a wink indoors. Now we can sleep in peace at night and work with joy in the daytime."

They sing a little song in Hsikou nowadays:

*O'er the whole of Hsikou Chairman Mao's like the sun,
Life's been improving since the co-op began!*

Full of confidence, the peasants of Hsikou are now making greater efforts than ever, and paying even stricter attention to thrift as they go ahead with their plan to transform their township.

TWELVE CO-OPS GIVE A BIG BOOST TO STOCK-RAISING

(By the Office of the Communist Party Committee of the former province of Jehol, September 20, 1955)

A well-written article. It can be brought to the notice of all stock-raising co-operatives.

— EDITOR

THE HERDSMEN OWN THEIR OWN LIVESTOCK AND LIFE TAKES A RAPID TURN FOR THE BETTER

The Uniut Banner in Jehol Province is a vast area: it stretches 300 *li* from east to west and 160 *li* from north to south. Sparsely populated but rich in water and grass, it has extensive pasture-lands. The Banner has seven administrative districts — the local word is *nutak*. One of which is entirely agricultural, three engage in livestock-breeding, and the remaining three go in for both. Uniut has a population of 59,419 in 7,793 households, and 18,253 of them — 30.9 per cent of the total — are Mongolians. In 1947, the people in the pastoral areas decided to join with those in the agricultural areas in carrying out land reform, which did away with feudal oppression and exploitation once and for all. For the first time in their life, many impoverished herdsmen owned livestock of their own and became masters of the grassland.

Over the past few years, local branches of the Chinese Communist Party and the local authorities at all levels have, as Chairman Mao has advised, encouraged people to "get or-

ganized and go in for more stock-breeding." So, giving proper consideration to the needs of different localities, they have helped poor herdsmen take on productive work and make livestock-breeding their main occupation. By concerted effort and close unity between the various nationalities, local bandits were wiped out. Having thus restored peace, the government decided to exempt the people from taxes. This helped lighten the burden on the herdsmen and improve their conditions. Besides this, the government raised the prices they paid the people for their livestock and animal products. These measures helped bring about a rapid development of animal husbandry and completely changed the face of these formerly poverty-stricken pastoral areas.

According to 1952 statistics, Uniut then had 147,656 head of livestock — 7.4 per cent more than in the previous peak year, 1943. The number of cattle had grown by 58.4 per cent, and goats and sheep were nearly as many as in the peak year. As animal husbandry thrived, the people's income greatly increased. In 1952, for example, the average purchasing power of the people was 4.7 times that of 1949. The herdsmen's life and habits have changed too. They have gradually switched to a more settled life. Take the Zukht *gatzaa* (township) of the seventh *nutak* for instance. In 1952 it had 170 one-storeyed houses, half as many again as in 1947, while the number of yurts (tents) fell by 23 per cent.

Great improvements have also been made in the rearing and management of livestock. The natural increase is faster, and the death-rate has dropped. Statistics for three pastoral areas for 1952 give the breeding-rate of cattle as 92 per hundred, which was 10.2 per cent higher than in 1951. In the second *nutak*, 5,361 out of 5,476 cows (i.e. 97.9 per cent) were served. As to livestock devoured by wolves, or lost by disease, 1949 figures gave 333 horses, 3,497 cattle and 7,441 sheep. In 1951 they were down to 98 horses, 1,057 cattle and 2,031 sheep. That is, the number of livestock lost in 1951 was 8,085 fewer than in 1949. Something that deserves special

mention in the management of livestock-breeding is the growth of certain rudimentary forms of co-operation covering wolf-hunting and joint grazing, and of mutual aid and co-operation in pasturing. As a result, less livestock was lost than when flocks and herds were looked after separately and by individuals, and they bred faster. These rudimentary forms of co-operation were well received by all concerned.

A CHOICE OF TWO ROADS

The situation as regards social classes in the stock-breeding areas has changed greatly since the rich harvests of 1949-1951. According to investigations made by a working team from the Jehol Provincial Party Committee in the afore-mentioned township, there were 74 households in the village before land reform. Three of them tended cattle for others, 37 were poor herdsmen, 29 were fairly well-to-do herdsmen, one was a well-off herdsman, three were big livestock owners and one was a landlord. Putting it another way, the poor and not well-off were 93.4 per cent of all households; the well-off herdsmen were 1.3 per cent; and the big livestock owners and the landlord, 5.3 per cent. By 1952, the life of 72 households in the township had improved; 22 of the households which used to lead a pretty difficult life were no longer hard up, while the number of well-off herdsmen had increased to 23 households. At that time most of the poor herdsmen owned two cows; besides the income they got from farm produce and subsidiary occupations, they did odd jobs for others, and so were able to live fairly decently. Most of the middle herdsmen had three or four head of cattle, and the average income was 840 to 1,000 catties of grain a head. Some of the middle herdsmen had grain left over after they'd bought food and clothing. Well-off herdsmen had, on the average, at least six head of cattle, and the average income was more than 1,080 catties of grain a year a head. They lived comfortably. Some of them even had hired labour to help them in their work.

As a result of the increase of livestock, various forms of management have come into being. One way is to employ hired hands. Take the same township for example. In 1950, 40 households (or 54 per cent of all the households) jointly employed hired hands to look after their livestock. By 1951, this increased to 49 households (or 65 per cent of the total number of herdsman households). Among these two were those of big livestock owners and 33 of middle herdsmen.

In the management of agriculture, in 1950 there were 13 households (17 per cent of the total number of herdsman households) which employed people to till their land and paid them either a proportion of the earnings agreed upon by both parties, or a third of the earnings which were equally divided into three parts: one-third was for labour, one-third for the land and the remaining one-third for draught animals and farm tools. In 1951, there were nine such households. Usurers were also becoming more and more active; some even lent money at 30 per cent interest. After production has developed, even some Party members and officials who did not have a clear understanding of socialism employed people to till their land and paid them a fixed amount of the earnings; they also became money-lenders and tried to earn money like capitalists.

Another form of management is co-operation in grazing. From 1949, when it was first encouraged, to the beginning of 1952, 14 co-operative grazing teams, 23 work-exchange mutual-aid pasturing teams and 238 rotation pasturing teams were formed in the Banner. These rudimentary forms of mutual aid and co-operation manifested their worth in the following ways:

- 1) The livestock was looked after by people whose special job it was, and as a result the death-rate fell.
- 2) They economized manpower: some people could be relieved of the work of pasturing and engage in tilling instead. That settled the question of manpower.

3) The people's income increased. Take the Punsak Team for example. In 1949, the members of its eight households had only 189 head of big livestock. By 1952, however, even after they had sold 109, they still had 479 head left.

4) Work done haphazard by individuals gave way to work based on mutual aid as a first step to co-operation, and this raised the efficiency of labour.

But this rudimentary form, the mutual-aid team, still failed to do all that the members wanted in the way of increasing production, and many herdsmen asked for stock-breeding co-operatives to be formed.

In December 1951, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party circulated inside the Party the Draft Decisions on Mutual Aid and Co-operation in Agricultural Production. In co-ordination with the campaign to strengthen the Party organization, the Banner Party Committee educated its members in socialism and criticized capitalistic tendencies on the part of some Party members. This was an eye-opener to the herdsmen. Genden, a Party member, said: "I've too many livestock to look after by myself. If I employ other people to see to them, I'd be following the example of the big livestock owners. The only way out of the difficulty is to join the co-operative." Erdenkhu, in charge of women's affairs, said: "If we stick to the old ways and don't organize so as to pasture the livestock together and pay everybody for the work he does, we can't make socialism a reality." Mingan-Bayan said: "It's not enough just to have more livestock. I've got to improve the strain, too. If we go on working on our own, a single household will never be able to afford to buy a single shorthorn. If we join a co-operative, we shall have more people, more strength, and things will be easy." Kombu, who tended cattle for others, said: "With the Communist Party leading us, my life has been improving. But it's hard for us to go on improving it single-handed. If we join a co-operative and share out the work among ourselves according to everyone's skill and ability, we'd all get rich if

we do our work well." In response to requests from the most active of the poor and not so well-off herdsmen, in April 1952 the Banner Party Committee set up two livestock-breeding co-operatives in the Zukht and Dzhalnud Townships as an experiment. Thirty-nine households, or 15.8 per cent of the herdsman households in the two townships, joined the co-operatives, bringing in with them 2,693 head of livestock, 81 per cent of all they owned. The number of herdsmen who joined the co-operatives was 31.6 per cent. In 1955, 60 per cent joined the mutual-aid teams, among whom were 114 Party members, constituting 58.3 per cent of all the Party members (179) among them.

HOW THE CO-OPS WERE FORMED

It took more than a month to set up the two co-ops. A fortnight or so was spent in thorough discussions; and in the next three weeks, specific problems were discussed and solved. The following work was done under these two heads:

1) There was an intense campaign of propaganda and explanation for the purpose of clearing up the wrong notions of the herdsmen. At the beginning, it was found that the members' views varied quite a lot. Over 40 per cent of them had faith in the Communist Party. "The Party," they said, "has given us guidance all these years, and our life has been improving. We certainly shan't go wrong if we follow the Party and take another step forward." Even so, they still had no clear idea of what the advantages of having a co-op were. The others had lots of worries. Some felt that they'd "lose face" if they didn't join the co-op, while others simply drifted along with the current and went the way the wind blew. Some feared that they'd be left alone and were afraid of being looked on as backward. Others, again, were unwilling to join the co-ops and did so only reluctantly after much persuasion by their sons. Even when they were already in the co-ops, some members were still half afraid they might

lose by it, so their attitude was to hang on in the co-ops and see what came of it. Generally it was the younger members who were keen, and the older ones who had misgivings. But after thorough propaganda and explanation all these problems were cleared up. A lot of careful calculations were made, and after that members found out that they had nothing to lose by joining the co-ops, and so they left off worrying.

2) Specific steps were taken to solve problems that cropped up. At the beginning, when the co-operatives were first set up, mistakes were made in distributing dividends. For instance, when the animals belonging to members were pooled in the co-ops, they were calculated in terms of "standard cows"—ten sheep were taken as equivalent to one cow. Members found this very confusing. For by this method they would not be able to know the number of animals they had handed in to the co-op. Quite a few of them said: "It's just making our animals the common property of everybody." Basing themselves on comments from the members, the chairmen of the co-ops, after thorough discussion, decided to assess the value of the animals at the time they were pooled. But this method was not good enough, either. It was too troublesome to make an assessment every year. So, as neither situation was satisfactory, the chairmen got the members together for democratic discussions and thorough consultations, and together they worked out a sound and acceptable way of pooling the animals as shares and of paying bonus.

A. In accordance with the different kinds of animals and the earnings that could be derived from them, dividends were distributed according to the number of shares each animal was worth. The value of each animal was assessed according to local market price, with ten yuan to a share. It was then worked out how many shares each herdsman was entitled to after his animal was pooled in the co-op. When the members withdrew from the co-ops, they could take back their animals according to the number of shares they held.

B. The proportion in dividing dividends was based on the kinds of animals, the amount of labour entailed and the amount of profit derived. For cows, the proportion was fixed at 50 per cent for labour and 50 per cent for the animals. For sheep, it was 40 per cent for labour and 60 per cent for the animals; and for horses, 20 per cent for labour and 80 per cent for the animals. The proportion for by-products as milk was fixed at 60 per cent for labour and 40 per cent for the animals; and for wool, 40 per cent for labour and 60 per cent for the animals.

C. If anything happened to the animals, the action taken was to depend on the circumstances. For losses that could be prevented, such as working the animals to death, losing them or letting them be eaten by wolves, the co-ops were to be held responsible, and the owners could get back their shares for these animals. In the case of unavoidable losses or losses which occurred despite steps taken to prevent them (e.g. from rinderpest), the co-ops and the owners shared the loss. The co-ops were to be responsible for the loss of young born to animals in the co-ops.

D. In order to look after those animals which had not been put into the co-ops, the co-ops undertook to pasture them, if the owners wanted them to and paid for it to be done. All the members said they were satisfied with this method. As for the organization of labour, the members of the co-ops were divided, according to their ability, into teams in charge of rearing and grazing the beasts, dairy-farming, agriculture and subsidiary occupations. On how to calculate work done and assess work-points, it was decided that a work-day should count as ten points. All this was to be decided democratically, taking into account each person's strength and ability, experience, skill, and the quantity and quality of work actually done. If work were sometimes done well and sometimes not so well, the work-points could go up or down, as the case might be.

LIVESTOCK-BREEDING CO-OPERATIVES PROVE THEIR WORTH

After the two co-ops were set up in the Banner in 1952 as a sort of experiment, experience was gained. In the spring of 1954, another two co-ops were set up. In autumn of the same year, eight more were formed. At present, the whole Banner has 12 livestock-breeding co-operatives with a membership of 192 households. There are 9,536 head of horses, cattle, sheep, donkeys and camels, of which 7,641 head (234 horses, 2,736 cattle, 4,671 sheep and goats) have been put into the co-ops by their owners as shares: that is 80.2 per cent of all livestock owned by the members. Almost all the rest — 1,792 head of old and weak animals (212 horses, 674 cattle, 733 sheep and goats, 155 donkeys and 18 camels), constituting 18.8 per cent of all livestock — the members have kept for their own use. Finally, there are 103 head of livestock—1 per cent of total (14 horses, 10 cattle and 79 sheep and goats) owned by the members collectively. Each of the three pastoral areas in the Banner has at least one co-op; one of them has as many as five. Of the 22 villages which go in for livestock-breeding, nine have co-ops (of these villages three have two co-ops each, the other six have one each). Of the households engaged in livestock-breeding—3,299 in all—5.8 per cent have joined the co-ops.

Now about the size of the co-ops—(a) the number of households in the co-ops, and (b) the number of livestock. On the average, each co-op has 16 households — the smallest 11 and the largest 29. Each co-op has an average of about 800 head of livestock of all kinds (including those kept by the members for their own use). Two old co-ops have about 1,700 head, while ten newly established ones have about 7,800 head. The Chienchin Co-operative in the Third District has the fewest — 213 head.

The composition of the co-ops. All 12 livestock-breeding co-ops in the Banner were formed out of all-the-year-round

mutual-aid teams. These co-ops are comparatively strong, with 34 Party members, 45 Youth Leaguers and 50 other live-wires. Except for two co-ops which have Youth Leaguers but no Party members, all the others have two to four Party members each; one has as many as eight. These co-ops were generally set up after six months of discussions and consideration. It even took a full year to set up some of them. They have proved a success and shown their worth. They have become a necessary transitional form in helping the herdsmen set about socialist transformation.

The 12 livestock-breeding producers' co-operatives have shown their superiority in the following ways:

1) By means of these co-ops, the extremely scattered, backward and individualistic way livestock-breeding was run has been changed into a co-operative economy, semi-socialist in character and run collectively. Difficulties arising from shortage of labour and the chaotic management which characterized the scattered and individual efforts in the past were solved by unified management and planning, democratic administration and centrally planned distribution of labour. Generally speaking, in the two or three years after they were formed, the output of these co-ops was 20 to 30 per cent greater than that of mutual-aid teams or of herdsmen working on their own. The co-ops have proved to be "the most economical, most effective and fastest method" of developing livestock-breeding, and the only road which herdsmen who formerly worked on their own can take to socialism. These co-ops have made a great impression on the herdsmen. They always say that the co-ops, with so many members, have the strength and ability to do things they cannot do individually. There are more ways in which a co-op can increase production. Their animals are fatter and larger, breed faster, and fewer young are lost.

2) Such co-ops improve the management and administration of livestock-breeding, and lead to more skilful ways of rearing beasts and increasing the rate of breeding. The live-

stock have increased rapidly and fewer died, because a new system was introduced by setting up special teams with the specific responsibility of taking charge of grazing, caring for young animals, preventing animal diseases, and so on. Thorough, business-like methods of administration have replaced the old, careless ways which left everything to the hazards of nature. Artificial insemination has largely replaced the old haphazard method of letting the animals breed by themselves. The co-ops now split their animals up into groups of suitable size and then detailed a definite number of people to look after them, bearing in mind how far off the pastures are. The general practice is to herd the animals to the grassland in spring, take them to the marshes in summer, and to the sand-hills where grass can be found in autumn. This method of shifting the beasts to different pastures in different seasons and making rational use of pasture-land, has led to the animals gaining rapidly in weight. The co-ops have sunk wells on the grassland and build pens and sheds. As a result, the animals have become much more resistant to disease. The co-ops are able to breed from selected beasts, keep enough stock-getters, mate the animals at definite periods, improve the technique of mating, know definitely when animals are in heat and reduce sterility. That means that more young animals grow up strong and healthy. The breeding-rate of females of all kinds on the First Red Glow and First Red Flag Co-operatives is 1.5 per cent higher than that of animals owned by local herdsmen, while the death-rate is 10.9 per cent lower. The conception rate of served animals in the 12 co-ops is over 95 per cent. On the Second Red Flag and Second Red Star Co-operatives, the rate is 100 per cent. By the end of 1954, the total number of livestock was 47 per cent greater than when the co-ops were first set up. The net rate of increase was 8.7 per cent, and the quality of the animals improved.

3) Because the co-ops have operated a plan for an experimental division of labour and skills, the best possible use

can be made of labour. The co-ops are thus able to pursue quite a variety of occupations, with livestock-breeding as the main one, and so raise the income of the members. With regard to division of labour and craft, the management committees of the co-ops have put into practice a responsibility system after the division of labour has been made. They have put the finances and accounting on a sound basis, improved management, made a rational readjustment of labour organization in accordance with the members' abilities, made appraisals of work done and allotted work-points in a rational way, set up a system of giving awards to encourage the members, gradually put into practice a responsibility system for production in the various seasons, and thoroughly carried out the principle of "to each according to his work." All this has made members put their hearts into their work and has increased their income. Let's take four old co-ops as examples. Before they became co-ops, the people engaged in individual farming and subsidiary occupations, and their total income was about 4,400 yuan. But now their total income has increased to about 5,400, a 31 per cent increase over what they used to get before the co-ops were formed. The Zukht Co-operative has organized 46 men and women members in a proper way, and made a careful arrangement of the work to be done by them. Nine of them are in sole charge of pasturing the livestock, seven work in the dairy, and the rest, in accordance with the needs of production work in the different seasons, help in moving the livestock to different pastures, caring for the young of animals, cutting osiers, building sheds and sinking wells; and in summer and autumn they cut 320,000 catties of grass. During intervals in their regular work, twenty of them cultivate 120 *mou* from which they receive 1,132 yuan; they also cut 5,000 catties of *mahuang* (joint fir) from which they can get 220 yuan. Over the past two years, trees were planted on 25 *mou* of land by collective effort, thus combining agriculture, forestry and livestock-breeding and making them support one another. All the co-

ops have increased their income from all their undertakings. At the end of the year when the distribution of income was made, it was found that, besides giving the members what they should get, there was some common property accumulated, and this provided a material basis for the expansion of production.

4) The setting up of livestock-breeding co-ops has strengthened the work of preventing animal diseases, killing wolves, combating natural calamities, and has ensured good harvests. For instance, contagious pleuro-pneumonia of cattle, anthrax, Brucellosis, parasites, rabies, glanders and sheep scab are extremely harmful to the breeding of livestock, and it is exceedingly difficult for individual herdsmen to rely on their own strength to combat them. In dividing the animals into groups for pasturing, the co-ops can give technical guidance, inoculate the animals in good time against diseases or isolate them for proper treatment, and, by separating diseased animals from healthy ones, check the spread of disease and reduce the death-rate. Wolves are a great menace in the pastoral areas. Since the animals have been put under collective management, all the co-ops have organized wolf-hunting teams, and have set up a sort of co-ordinated defence system with neighbouring co-ops, teams and villages. This has basically checked the menace of wolves. In 1949, wolves took a toll of 11,271 head of big and small livestock in the Banner. But since the establishment of the livestock-breeding producers' co-operatives, wolf-hunting teams have been strengthened and the livestock of the co-ops are basically free from the menace of wolves. The co-ops have also helped mutual-aid teams and individual herdsmen launch a hunting campaign against the wolves. In 1954, in the whole Banner only 912 head of livestock were killed by the wolves.

5) Under the guidance of the state and in accordance with needs in the expansion of industry and agriculture, it is comparatively easy for the stock-breeding co-ops to do away with conservative ways of thinking, improve breeds, make use of

mowers and other new types of machines, develop dairy-farming on a small scale, increase raw materials for industry and consolidate the worker-peasant alliance. The state stock-farm in the area has 27 head of Holstein cattle, 7 shorthorns and 190 merino sheep (of which 25 are merino rams from the Soviet Union) as stud beasts. In 1952, it helped the Zukht Livestock-Breeding Co-operative put 42 ewes to the rams, and 42 lambs were born the next year. In 1953, another 91 ewes were put to the rams, and 72 lambs were born in 1954. All the lambs born survived and grew up well. The first batch of fine-wool lambs born in spring 1953 weighed 94 catties each in autumn, 18 catties more than local breeds. The work of improving the breed of sheep in all the 12 co-ops has practically been accomplished; at present the breeding of Holstein cattle and shorthorns which provide both milk and meat is being popularized among the herdsmen. Because of collective management, the Zukht Co-operative has ample means at its disposal. In 1953, it set up a small dairy, and bought some small machinery for it. With these machines it made powdered milk, and its income has more than doubled. Another example: a mower can cut 10,000 catties of grass a day. That would take a man ten work-days. Thus the work of the members has been lightened and the amount of fodder stored has been increased.

6) After the livestock-breeding co-ops were set up, the members who used to live wide apart from each other have been, wherever production work called for it, enabled to live in community. This has not only facilitated the management and administration of livestock-breeding and the exchange of experience, but has also made it more convenient for the herdsmen to learn to read and write, thereby raising their understanding of socialism. In the past, the herdsmen were in the habit of moving about in the different seasons; they settled wherever they could find water and grass, living far apart, with little chance of getting any education. After they got organized, they began to live together in community,

they have now their own houses, and their animals have proper sheds. So it has come about that men are leading a prosperous life and animals multiply rapidly. The old way of living in isolation without much contact between the households has been done away with; the educational level of the herdsmen has been gradually raised and their health improved. In the Zukht Co-operative, only two members could write a few simple words in the past; the rest were illiterates. Now there are 23 members (13 of them women) who can read and write; seven members can write simple letters and read newspapers in Mongolian. More and more people are learning to read and write, and their socialist understanding and collective spirit are continually becoming greater.

7) All the co-ops have gradually accumulated reserve and welfare funds to be used to buy medical equipment and cover other expenses in combating animal diseases, to buy small tools and instruments, and for the welfare of the members. Thus the herdsmen's inability to cope with difficulties in the past when they worked on their own has been overcome and the expansion of livestock-breeding on a sound basis ensured.

8) The livestock-breeding co-operatives have not only manifested their superiority as described above. They also play a most important part in bringing about the socialist transformation of the pastoral areas. The establishment of these co-ops and the settlement of the herdsmen in certain areas in community have greatly facilitated the co-ordination of work with supply and marketing co-ops, credit co-ops and handicraft producers' co-ops, thereby enhancing the development of co-operative economy in the pastoral areas.

The masses of poor and not so well-off herdsmen have come to know from experience the superiority of the livestock-breeding co-ops, and are anxious to join them. In early September 1955, it was reported that 120 households of herdsmen had asked to be admitted into the co-ops. After hearing Chairman Mao's report on agricultural co-operation, Bayankheshge, a herdsman who worked for the government, said

happily: "We've worked in mutual-aid teams for three or four years. Now we'll have a brighter future!" The Banner Party Committee has drawn up a plan for the expansion of stock-breeding co-ops: Apart from expanding the existing co-ops, they plan to set up nine new ones in 1955 to include 336 households — about 11 per cent of all herdsman households in the whole Banner. In 1956, they plan to set up another 18 (with an average of 16 households to each). And they also plan to establish an additional 19 before spring ploughing in 1957. So the plan is to establish a total of 46 co-ops, with a membership of more than 20 per cent of all herdsman households in the Banner. In some townships half the herdsman households will have joined the co-ops. Thus after a few years, co-operation in livestock-breeding will have been practically accomplished.

WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED FROM EXPERIENCE

1) Our Party enjoys a high prestige among the herdsmen. The poor and not so well-off herdsmen are extremely anxious to get organized and develop production. The few herdsmen who have become better-off since liberation also have great faith in our Party. Though they are not very enthusiastic about co-operation, they can be persuaded to follow the road to socialism, because they do not have enough labour of their own to tend the large number of livestock they have, and because they know that to employ people to tend their animals is not something they can be proud of. In the past few years since liberation, a foundation has been laid for co-operative pasturing and the herdsmen have already formed the habit of temporary co-operation in pasturing. Besides, there is the example set by the old co-ops and the influence of the great drive to agricultural co-operation which has swept the country. Because of all this, there is bound to be an upsurge in the co-operative movement in livestock-breeding, too, in the

not too distant future. This is something we should be able to foresee.

2) To the herdsmen the animals are both the means of production and the means of life. The herdsmen love their animals as much as peasants love their land. The animals are living things, and the herdsmen have a great affection for them. It is necessary, therefore, to follow properly the policy of voluntariness and mutual benefit in the course of setting up a co-op, and to carry out the work of persuasion and education thoroughly. Generally, it takes longer to establish a livestock-breeding co-op than to set up an agricultural producers' co-operative — the preparatory work takes a month or so. The concrete problems of a livestock-breeding co-op must first be discussed thoroughly, and only after the herdsmen have given their approval do we persuade them to contribute their animals as shares. Because of the seasonal character of livestock-breeding, co-ops can be set up either in spring or winter. There are, in fact, many occasions which may call for the establishment of a co-op, and it is comparatively easy to take up the question of setting up such a co-op with the herdsmen, and expand co-operation in livestock-breeding as may be required. As the herdsmen themselves need mutual aid both to do their work and make up for their lack of manpower, it is necessary to act cautiously in the pastoral areas, and to actively carry out the principle of "comprehensive planning and firmer leadership." Those who lead must be at the head of the masses and not lag behind them.

3) Before a co-op is formed, proper preparations must be made.

First, a co-op must be established on the basis of mutual-aid teams which are, at present, the most simple and practicable form of co-operation of a rudimentary socialist character. Large numbers of them are already established, and they are the form most easily accepted by the herdsmen. The mutual-aid team will also be the main form of organization for the herdsmen for some time to come. Leadership

given to this form must be greatly improved. The consolidation, expansion, and advance of mutual-aid teams to higher forms lay a reliable foundation on which co-operatives may be gradually built. This is because the mutual-aid teams have capable men to lead them, the animals in the teams are accustomed to live together, and the people in these teams have experience in centralized management. Thus, when a co-op is set up, the herdsmen will not feel that it is something for which they are not prepared, and the animals, too, having worked with the mutual-aid teams, and being used to being together, will not trample upon or jostle one another and cause losses as would probably happen if they were put altogether all of a sudden.

Secondly, we must train leaders in the co-ops; we must, in particular, seriously set about choosing and training people as chairmen and book-keepers, besides people to rear the animals and safeguard them from disease. As to ways of training, we must, besides opening short-term training classes, organize visits to other co-ops every so often, or invite chairmen of old co-ops to tour the mutual-aid teams to give lectures, or even ask the co-ops to take responsibility for training batches of apprentices, for setting up a network for mutual aid and co-operation in livestock-breeding, and in the course of practical work, training batches of leaders for the new co-ops.

Thirdly, we must pay attention to the make-up of co-op membership. We must first help the poor and not so well-off herdsmen to join: between them these constitute 65-75 per cent of all herdsmen. Generally speaking, we do not for the time being try to get the better-off herdsmen to join. The big livestock owners, local landlords and landlords and rich peasants who have fled to these pastoral areas from other places should definitely be barred from joining.

Fourthly, in setting up a co-op, consideration should be given to the following points: that the economy in pastoral areas is of a scattered and unorganized character; and that

the herdsmen live wide apart and are always on the move. When a co-op is being set up, discussions and democratic consultations with the herdsmen should be thoroughly carried out. Old habits and working practices of the herdsmen should be taken into consideration, and it should be seen whether enough functionaries are available. A co-op should not be too large in its early stages. To run a co-op diligently and economically should be promoted. We should not be too hasty in building houses, changing the herdsmen's abode or asking them to live together in settlements. There must be comprehensive planning; the conditions of the pasture-land, how and where the herdsmen live, and the conditions of the various strata of herdsmen should be fully grasped; there should be unified planning regarding people to run the co-op, of labour power, livestock, pasture-land, land for industry and agriculture, etc. Efforts should be made to find out if disease is prevalent among the animals so as to prevent it spreading after the animals are brought together.

4) The principle of voluntariness and mutual benefit should be strictly adhered to. Before setting up a co-op, arrangements should be made regarding the contribution of shares and the division of bonus. (A) There are two ways of entering the animals as shares into a co-op: (a) All kinds of animals entered as shares are reckoned in proportion to the "standard cow"; the owners themselves stand to gain or lose when the animals gain or lose in weight. (b) Pay the owners a certain amount of money for their livestock, and give them bonuses for the shares they have contributed. Of these two forms, the herdsmen prefer the latter. (B) When livestock are entered as shares, we should see to it that members have milch cows for their own use; consideration should also be given to the fact that the members are in the habit of eating mutton and riding horses and should be allowed to keep an appropriate number of sheep and horses for their own use. Apart from looking after collectively-owned livestock and those which have been entered as shares, the co-op should also, in accord-

ance with the principle of mutual benefit, take on the responsibility of pasturing such animals as members have kept for their own use. (C) A co-op needs money for fodder, injections against diseases and administrative expenses. So when animals are pooled, besides reckoning them as shares contributed by members, some of them should be set aside as reserves for the co-op. (D) Reserve and welfare funds may be accumulated gradually as in the case of agricultural producers' co-operatives. As livestock-breeding is something which brings in a steady income and as the animals breed pretty fast, under normal conditions the reserve and welfare funds should generally not be less than those of agricultural producers' co-operatives. But, at the beginning, these funds should not be too large. (E) Rationally fix the payment for a work-day, bearing in mind the number and kind of livestock. (F) In dividing bonuses, we should abide by the principle that bonuses should mainly go to labour, with appropriate consideration to payments for animals; bonuses mainly take the form of animal products and products of agricultural subsidiary occupations. So as to ensure that the animals increase in number, young animals, stock-getters and females must, as far as possible, not be distributed as bonus. Consideration must be given to spreading the income of the herdsmen because of the seasonal character of animal husbandry. For this reason, the main produce may be divided among members once a year, and by-products twice a year. This does not affect the co-op's production, and will be more convenient to members.

5) Livestock-breeding co-ops must pay constant attention to the work of consolidating themselves; they should pay special attention to increasing and protecting the animals, improving the breed, and raising the quality of produce. They should also popularize experience in carrying out the "responsibility system" as applied to pasturing the animals in groups of varying sizes and detailing special people to look after them; rationally readjust the organization of labour and

payment for work done; put financial management and accounting on a sound basis; rationally distribute animal products and products of subsidiary rural occupations, and continually increase the accumulation of common funds of the co-ops. As the increase of its animals and animal products indicates whether a co-op is being well run or not, livestock-breeding should be its main occupation. Labour power should be made proper use of; experienced and able people should be put in charge of stock-breeding; the teams and brigades of the co-op should be rationally organized, and people capable of rearing animals should be included in the co-op's management committee. Better leadership must be given to livestock-breeding, and vigorous steps taken to improve skill. Proper attention should be paid to such important work as the mating of animals and preventing disease; management and administration must be improved to ensure the increase in the members' income. With all this as the basis, the management of agriculture and subsidiary occupations should then be improved so as to bring about a further increase in the members' income. But this must not be done at the expense of livestock-breeding; agriculture and subsidiary occupations must not supersede livestock-breeding, which is the main occupation of the co-op. Economic help should be given to poor herdsmen to ensure that they hold a predominant position in the co-op.

6) Political work must be well carried out, and cultural and educational work improved. They are important, for they help in running a co-op well. As the great majority of the members of a livestock-breeding co-op are people belonging to national minorities, it is necessary to pay special attention to pursuing the Party's policy towards such minorities, and educate members to work for closer unity between them and respect their habits and customs. Both before and after setting up a co-op; political work must be done well and kept up. The leaders must at all times know exactly what the viewpoints and ideas of the members are, so that they are

always able to do whatever is necessary to convince them, bring them to see the right way of looking at things, and continually improve their understanding of socialism and make them keener on their work. The socialist understanding of the members must first be improved to provide a basis for reforms in the co-op; such work should not be considered as a simple matter, to be done in haste. Attention should be paid at all times to the training of Party members, Youth Leaguers and other active people, and also to setting up branches of the Party and Youth League. Women's work should also be properly attended to. Party members and Youth Leaguers both inside and outside the co-op must be taught to set an example in rallying the masses inside and outside the co-op, so as to ensure that the co-op does its work well. The Party and Youth League should also try to recruit more members, to provide better leaders and ensure the consolidation and healthy expansion of the co-op.

THE ROAD FOR FIVE HUNDRED MILLION PEASANTS

(By Li Kai and Ching Shen in the *People's Daily*, November 28, 1955)

This co-operative, consisting of three poor-peasant families, in a few short months has had an enormous influence on the entire countryside. Everyone has heard of this remarkable, valiant little co-op in Hopei Province. It has strengthened the courage of all our poor peasants.

— EDITOR

I

In his report on "The Question of Agricultural Co-operation" Chairman Mao Tse-tung says, "In one very small co-operative of only six households in Hopei Province, the three old middle-peasant households firmly refused to carry on and left. The three poor-peasant households decided to continue at all costs, stayed in, and the co-operative organization was preserved. The fact is, the road taken by these three poor-peasant households is the one which will be taken by five hundred million peasants throughout the country. All peasants working on their own will eventually take the road resolutely chosen by these three poor-peasant households."

The small co-operative which Chairman Mao singles out for special mention is one organized by Wang Yu-kun, Wang Hsiao-chi and Wang Hsiao-pang, three poor peasants living in the village of Nanwang, Anping County, Hopei.

Our interest in this co-operative roused, we paid it a visit, arriving on November 21, 1955. We immediately noticed the exciting and stimulating atmosphere there. Early morning found the peasants, both men and women, out working in the cold wind, sweeping up fallen leaves for compost. At dusk, coming home from the fields, the peasants formed a long procession on the narrow road, calling to each other and exchanging news about the work of the day. "More than two hundred households have joined the co-op lately," the village functionaries told us. "To make sure of a good harvest next year, the members started agitating to take only ploughed land into the co-op with them. By tomorrow" — November 24 that was — "the co-op members will have finished ploughing 4,700 *mou*." The previous year the snow caught the villagers with more than 500 *mou* still unploughed. The fields lay deep under snow and they had to wait till spring before they could do anything more.

"Listen to Chairman Mao and follow the road taken by Yu-kun and the others. Join the co-operative and make it a success!" That has become the watchword for the peasants of this village. Those who had already joined all wore smiling faces and looked very pleased. Members of the village co-operative preparatory committee were as busy as bees, some looking over and fixing a price for the farm implements with the members, others checking the books and planning how to put the co-op's land to the best use. "If you'd come in spring," said Wang Mi-kuei, the Party secretary, "you wouldn't have seen anything like this. At that time quite a number of well-off peasants were clamouring to get out of the co-operatives! They weren't at all keen on work. But since the small co-ops merged into a big one, those who backed out have come back. Things are run quite differently now."

Yes — in the short span of one year, a tremendous change has come over Nanwang Village.

II

The high tide of the movement to go over to agricultural co-operation reached Hopei in the autumn of 1954. The three small co-operatives in Nanwang Village quickly turned into two fairly large and six small co-ops. Instead of 21 households in the village, the co-operatives now boasted 264. Wang Yu-kun, a Party member, Wang Hsiao-chi and Wang Hsiao-pang, all of them poor peasants, showed how brimful of enthusiasm for socialism they were. They were not only the first to join a co-op, but they did their utmost to make it a success. Some of the better-off peasants, though, had joined the co-op intending to grab whatever they could get out of it. They pretended to be keen but they weren't really interested in making the co-op do well. They were, on the quiet, calculating how to advance their private interests. The Party secretary at that time, an upper middle peasant by the name of Wang Wen-chang, failed to carry out the policy of the Party. He only looked after the interests of the well-off peasants. Ten out of the fourteen brigade leaders and deputy leaders in the medium-sized co-op which he led were also upper middle peasants. The three poor peasants, Wang Yu-kun, Wang Hsiao-chi and Wang Hsiao-pang, belonged to this co-op.

As soon as the co-operative was formed, its members decided that draught animals owned individually should be pooled in the co-op at market price, because most of the members had animals and fodder of their own. On the afternoon fixed, the poor peasants and lower middle peasants who owned draught animals brought them to the co-op. The well-off peasants, however, Wang Wen-chang among them, did not produce their mules. As if that wasn't enough, the leaders of the co-op decided to let the peasants who had kept their mules keep 30 per cent of their fodder too. But the poor and lower middle peasants who had pooled their mules were told to hand in all the fodder in their possession so that it could be used

to help the teams which hadn't enough. (These teams were short of fodder precisely because several of their members had kept their mules at home.) Wang Yu-kun and other poor peasants in the co-op fought hard against this unjust decision, which served the interest of the well-off peasants at the poor peasants' expense. No sooner had Wang Wen-chang said that mules were not to be pooled in the co-op than Yu-kun asked him: "What's the idea? Why should the better-off households keep their mules and the poor peasants' mules farm the co-op land?" Seeing that things were not going the way he wanted, Wang Wen-chang sold his mule without a word to a soul. Wang Yu-kun also took the co-op leaders to task over the question of fodder. "Those who brought in their draught animals," he said, "have to bring in more fodder, while those who didn't are allowed to bring less. You're only making things easy for the well-off peasants. Why don't you think of the poor ones?" "It's a question of mutual aid and brotherly love," argued Wang Wen-chang glibly. "Pooh!" said Yu-kun, "you talk of brotherly love when you want the poor peasants to bring their fodder. Why don't you ask the better-off ones to show some brotherly love when the poor peasants have no grain for food?" Wang Wen-chang had no answer to this. However, the responsible Communist members of the co-op still did nothing in the way of examining their own bourgeois ideas. They even grew worse and began to neglect their duties — Wang Wen-chang, for instance. There were some who tried to discredit Wang Yu-kun. At one time, when Wang Yu-kun's kiddy had died and he was feeling depressed, they told the county Party committee that he showed no interest in his work and wasn't carrying out Party policy (by which they meant the opinion of a mere handful of Party functionaries, an opinion which worked against the interest of the poor peasants). But Wang Yu-kun fought back. At a Party meeting in which a comrade from the county Party committee took part, he exposed their fail-

ure to stick to a class stand. Their scheme to discourage Wang Yu-kun failed.

In spring 1955, the well-off peasants not only displayed no fervour in work, but also started to spread rumours among the people. "It's impossible to keep the co-op going," they said. "The organizing of it is having a bad effect on agricultural output." "Let's split it up into smaller co-ops — we'll be able to manage small ones better!" But most of the poor and lower middle peasants were determined to stay in the co-op. The only trouble was that the Party organization needed a shake-up that would bring the poor peasants out on top in the co-op. But worse happened: the functionaries who came to help the villagers consolidate their co-ops were swayed by the views of a small number of well-off peasants and rashly decided to split this medium-sized co-op into seven little ones — one for each of its production brigades. The six households of Wang Yu-kun, Wang Hsiao-chi, Wang Hsiao-pang and the middle peasants Wang Chen-huai, Wang Chen-fu and Wang Lo-ho were organized into one of these little co-ops.

III

The functionaries sincerely believed that after this split the small co-ops would flourish. But contrary to their expectations, the small co-ops ran into difficulties: the question of members wanting to withdraw popped up time and again. This was because a number of the better-off peasants had no real wish to get the small co-ops going. What they wanted was to change the bigger co-op into smaller ones and then kill off the smaller ones. Wang Wen-shuang, leader of one of the production brigades, was an upper middle peasant who, before the co-op broke up, gave his solemn word to the functionaries that if the co-op split up, he would run a small co-op well. But when the split occurred he cried off being the leader on the pretext that he was not up to it, and

asked the members to elect another chairman for the small co-op. Some of the members wanted to elect Li Wu, a Party member, but he made them elect Wang Tan-tan, who was politically backward and no good as a leader. And before very long, since Wang Wen-shuang did nothing to help the chairman he'd sponsored himself, this co-op went on the rocks.

While the upper middle peasants were clamouring to walk out of the co-op, a number of Party and Youth League members and the most active of the poor peasants continued to push ahead along the road pointed out by the Party. Wang Yu-kun, Wang Hsiao-chi and Wang Hsiao-pang were in the forefront of this group. At that time, bitter struggles over which of the two roads (socialism or capitalism) to follow were raging in Wang Yu-kun's co-op. The wheat sown by the co-op in the just under five *mou* of land owned by Wang Chen-huai (an upper middle peasant) grew exceptionally well. Every time Wang Chen-huai walked past his land he started making selfish calculations: none of the other six households in the co-op had land as fine as this piece of his, and he felt that there was no advantage for him to be in the same co-op as the poor peasants. When he saw how some small co-ops went to pieces, he talked it over with his brother, Wang Chen-fu, also a middle peasant, and they decided to withdraw from the co-op. Another middle peasant, Wang Lo-ho, also asked to withdraw when he heard their decision. Although Wang Yu-kun tried to explain the government's policy to them and point out the right road to follow, hoping to induce them to stay in, he had no success. "We don't want to take that road as yet. We'll wait a bit and see," they said.

In May, the three poor peasants who wanted to stay in the co-op had a meeting. "Look," said Yu-kun resolutely, "the Party tells us that if we want a good life for ourselves and everyone else, we've got to persist in going the co-operative way. I shall follow the Party's advice — I'm going to stay in the co-op. What about you?"

"My mind's made up," said Hsiao-chi. "There's no other way for a household like mine except to join the co-op." "I've had enough of going it alone," said Hsiao-pang. "Let them withdraw. As long as you two want to carry on, I'll go with you." This determination of theirs to make the co-op a success proved to be a tremendous force. They agreed that even if the other three households insisted on backing out, they would carry on. They decided that in that case they would take one of the co-op's two oxen and carry on with three people and one ox.

Not long afterwards, a work team sent from the county and district to put the co-ops on a sound basis arrived in Nanwang Village. At a meeting, the work team comrades asked the peasants what they thought about things. The three middle peasants still said they wanted to withdraw from the co-op, but Wang Yu-kun, Wang Hsiao-chi and Wang Hsiao-pang vowed that they would stay and carry on without the other three.

What was it that made these three so determined to stay in the co-op? Let's examine the case of each.

Wang Yu-kun was a man in his prime, but he had suffered countless hardships in the old society. Before the land reform, he was one of the poorest of the poor peasants in the village. To make a living, he had had to work as a hired hand for the landlords. After he received land in the land reform, his life got gradually better. He was as active as anyone in the struggle that ensued during the land reform; it was then that he was admitted into the Communist Party. However, though he owned about a dozen *mou* of land, he had no farm implements and shared the ownership of a draught animal with another peasant, so the yield he got by individual farming was low — only a thousand catties or so of grain — and he had a large household to feed. Life wasn't easy for him. The Party's policy of encouraging agricultural co-operation showed him the direction to take and gave him strength. So in the co-operative movement in 1954 he was

a real live-wire in leading the peasants to organize co-operatives.

Wang Hsiao-chi is a younger man — a member of the Youth League. He and his mother well remembered the hard, bitter days before the land reform. After his father died, his mother had to bring him up alone and they were constantly short of food and clothing. After the land reform, their living conditions improved, but they had no farm implements and only part ownership of a draught animal shared with three other peasants. He was young and inexperienced and knew little about farming, so the yield of their land was low, and it was still hard for them to make ends meet. When the Party pointed out that the road of agricultural co-operation was the only sure way for peasants to shake off poverty, he talked it over with his mother and was one of the first to join the co-op.

The third, Wang Hsiao-pang, in his childhood had known the bitter experience of having to beg with his mother to live at all. After the land reform, because he lacked many of the things that a farmer needs he was far from successful in working his land. He dreamt of ways of making life more comfortable but it was impossible to achieve anything on the basis of individual farming. He had neither draught animal nor tool, so he always had a hard time coping with the sowing. Even when he did manage to get the seed in, it was still hard to tend the crops well without this, that and the other. He used to go round a lot with Wang Yu-kun and other Communists, so as soon as he realized that it was only by taking the co-operative road that he could shake off poverty, he was filled with a burning desire to make the co-op work well. In the drive for co-operation in 1954, Yu-kun, Hsiao-chi and he were the keenest in the whole village.

At the time when there were three households in Wang Yu-kun's small co-op demanding to withdraw and three others steadfast in wanting to carry on, the proper thing for the

work team to do was to cherish and foster the socialist fervour of the peasants, support them in their actions and help them make a go of their co-op. But instead of doing so, the work team thought that a co-op had to look like "a proper co-op" . . . how could three households achieve anything? So they sought out Wang Yu-kun and told him, "Look, you've only got three households now. You can't run a co-op on that, but we don't mind if your three households turn themselves into a mutual-aid team." These words were like a dash of cold water over Yu-kun's head.

To all appearances it did look as if the people in Nanwang had cooled off in their struggle for co-operation. Actually, the struggle went on without a moment's respite. That very evening, Yu-kun got Hsiao-chi and Hsiao-pang together. "It's like this," he told them. "The other three households are determined to back out. The work team thinks that there are too few of us and we haven't got the conditions for a co-operative, so they tell us to form a mutual-aid team. In my opinion, it doesn't matter whether we call ourselves a team or a co-op. We must still go on owning the draught animal collectively, share in contributing fodder, and work collectively to make a good job of our farming." The others agreed and so they carried on.

IV

Not long afterwards, news of these three peasants who refused to be deterred from taking the road to socialism reached Peking and the ears of Chairman Mao. Chairman Mao praised their action and fervour for socialism and told the Party to give them its backing.

Early in July, Anping County Party Committee sent Comrade Chou Chiu-hsueh to help the three peasants run their co-op. They held a meeting on July 18. When Chou explained that the Party leaders supported them in their desire to stay in the co-op, small as it was, they were no end encouraged. "Ever since I was told, about twenty days ago, to turn the

co-op into a mutual-aid team," said Yu-kun, "I've been uneasy and unsettled. I couldn't help feeling that nobody ought to block the road pointed out by the Party. And it turns out that's really so."

The four of them discussed how to make a success of the co-op and came to the conclusion that results would tell—they must make a good showing on their land. Although they had not much in the way of tools, they must still show an increase in yields and produce more than the peasants who worked on their own.

That summer there was nothing but trouble. Locusts made an appearance in the two *mou* of late millet in the northwest corner of the village. The millet ears were just beginning to form, but if the locusts touched them, the crop would be finished. Wang Yu-kun, very worried, dashed off to buy insecticide and applied it. The pests were exterminated. Soon, however, another batch appeared, and this time there were more of them than the first time. Yu-kun and his fellow members worked like Trojans and exterminated them as fast as they appeared, so their two *mou* of millet suffered no damage. But the early millet belonging to Wang Chih-pin, a peasant farming on his own, suffered severely from the pests because he was unable to take effective measures to wipe them out. In the autumn, the co-op reaped 150 catties per *mou*. Wang Chih-pin only got a little over 50 to the *mou*.

One blazing summer day at noon it was so hot that the leaves of the maize curled into rolls, but two men wielded their hoes in a battle against weeds in the maize field in the northwest corner of the village. They were Hsiao-chi and Hsiao-pang. There had been a lot of rain that summer and the weeds had run riot. Yu-kun's small co-op decided that they must clear them at all costs. When others retreated under the shade for rest, they carried on doggedly. In the finish, on the co-op's 40 *mou* of land, you couldn't find a single stray weed. What a contrast that was to the land next to theirs belonging to Wang Lo-tai, a peasant working on his

own. He had had no time to hoe properly and weeds were everywhere.

The co-op, of course, needed money to carry on its work, but where were they to get it from? The three members told one another they had just got to cut down expenses and save every possible penny. For several months the only thing they spent money on was oil for lamps and a bottle of writing ink. Before harvest time, the government saw that they were really hard up and gave them a loan of 200 yuan which they bought a cart with. This bit of help gave them new heart.

It was with such dogged persistence that the three poor peasants battled against all kinds of difficulties and finally increased the yield of their land. In 1954, before the three households were organized, all they reaped from their 40 *mou* was 950 catties of millet, 1,600 catties of maize, 1,300 catties of peanuts, 450 catties of cotton and 3,000 catties of sweet potatoes—the equivalent of approximately 6,580 catties of grain. In 1955, as a co-op, they reaped 1,800 catties of millet, 1,980 catties of maize, 2,000 catties of peanuts, 700 catties of cotton, and 5,000 catties of sweet potatoes—the equivalent of approximately 9,950 catties of grain. They had increased their yield by more than 50 per cent compared with the year before. Naturally the real income of the three households was also greater than before. After deducting expenses, each household still had 1,100 catties more grain than the previous year. Compared with peasants outside the co-op they were far better off. Wang Lo-ho, one of those whose household backed out of the co-op, farmed his land with tools pretty much the same as those used in the co-op. But just when the crops needed tending most, Wang Lo-ho fell ill. His fields became choked with weeds and he only got an average of 150 catties per *mou* from his 19 *mou* of land, which was 90 catties per *mou* less than the co-op reaped.

When Yu-kun and the other two started their tiny little co-op, well-off peasants who had not joined a co-op jeered

at them and sarcastically called theirs "The Giant." But the spirit and determination they displayed in following the road of agricultural co-operation at all costs and the fact that they did increase the yield of their land finally convinced everyone. No one mocked them any more. Nobody jeered about "The Giant."

The county Party committee not only backed Wang Yu-kun's co-op, it also reorganized the Party branch in Nanwang. Wang Wen-chang, the Party secretary who had insisted on taking the capitalist road, was expelled.

V

When Chairman Mao's report on "The Question of Agricultural Co-operation" went out to the countryside, it also reached Nanwang. When Yu-kun heard that Chairman Mao himself had praised them, he hastened to take the good news to Hsiao-chi, Hsiao-pang and their families. When she heard about it, Hsiao-chi's mother was moved to tears. "So Chairman Mao himself knows about our co-op too," she said. "Chairman Mao takes a real interest in us peasants." And she urged her son always to listen to the words of Chairman Mao and see that the co-op did well. The Party branch also passed Chairman Mao's directions on to the peasants and Nanwang Village was in a state of rare excitement. Members of the Party and Youth League and the live-wires among the poor peasants who were keen on the co-ops now held their heads high. Yu-kun, Hsiao-chi and Hsiao-pang were so busy that they hadn't a minute to rest, going round and using their own experience to convince the peasants that they should join the co-op. In a few days, they persuaded nine households to apply for co-op membership. People who had backed out now realized how wrong they were and wanted to join again. Some upper middle peasants who were dubious before and others who had withdrawn also decided to plump for the co-operative road.

A headquarters to direct everything — the village co-op preparatory committee — was set up. The villagers elected Yu-kun its vice-chairman. Excited and glad, the peasants applied to join the co-op. Two hundred and eighty households were admitted as members, that is, 85 per cent of the peasant households in the village were drawn in. "We must run our co-op well. By autumn next year, we'll be able to report to Chairman Mao on the results of our large co-op." That was what the members and their leaders told one another to spur themselves to do even better.

Nanwang Village is a fine little place and we found Wang Yu-kun, Wang Hsiao-chi and Wang Hsiao-pang to be people bent on going the socialist way. When we look at them, when we look at Nanwang Village, we can clearly see the road to be taken by our five hundred million peasants. We wish them greater success as they march forward on the road of agricultural co-operation.

THEY INSIST ON TAKING THE ROAD TO CO-OPERATION

(By Shih Shu-fang, in the *People's Daily*, September 20, 1955)

This is an extremely interesting story.

Socialism is something new. A severe struggle must be waged against the old ways before socialism can be brought about. At a given time, a section of society is very stubborn and refuses to abandon its old ways. At another time, these same people may change their attitude and approve the new.

In the earlier half of 1955, most of the well-to-do middle peasants opposed co-operation. In the latter half, a number of them changed their minds and indicated their willingness to join, although some did so only because they hoped to obtain control of the co-op. Another group wavered a great deal. They said they wanted to join, but in their hearts they were not willing. A third group was composed of people who stubbornly insisted that they would wait and see.

Village Party organizations should be patient on this question. Control of the co-op leadership must be established in the hands of the poor peasants and the new lower middle peasants. Therefore it does no harm if some of the well-to-do middle peasants enter the co-operatives a little later; in fact it is better that way.

— EDITOR

There is an agricultural producers' co-operative in Tungwang Village, Hsinlo County, Hopei Province. It is a small co-op composed of three poor-peasant households and one family of lower middle peasants. When it first got started it came up against many difficulties. But its members, uniting as one man, have overcome all the obstacles in their way and advanced steadily along the co-operative road.

NO MUTUAL BENEFIT, NO CO-OP

In September 1954, the movement for mutual aid and co-operation in agriculture was going forward vigorously in Tungwang Village. Two mutual-aid teams with 12 member families were reorganized into an agricultural producers' co-op. Lei Huan-teh, the leader of one team, became chairman of the new co-op. Lei Hsi-tao, who had led the other, became the vice-chairman.

Chairman Lei Huan-teh, however, failed to run the co-op according to the principles of voluntary participation and mutual benefit. In 1954 when it was time for sowing the winter wheat, Li Lao-suo, one of the members, made a suggestion. "We must try to find a method for recording work-points," he said. "We'll make a mess of things if we aren't careful from the start." But Chairman Lei wouldn't hear of this. "What's the use?" he retorted. "We're all good neighbours. It would do no harm if one of us got a bit more or less than his due." So the sowing was done in a disorganized way, without any definite system of registering how much work each member had done.

Chairman Lei did not agree to a work-point system because he thought he personally had nothing to gain from it. Although he had some thirty *mou* of land, he was the only real worker in his family. Both of his sons were weak and could do no heavy labour. When the sowing came, he alone took part in it, leaving his sons to look after the pigs at home. Lei Hsi-tao, the vice-chairman, saw this and did the same.

Naturally, there was discontent among the members. "It's bad enough that we work without writing down points," said Li Wu-mao, a poor peasant. "But now they've gone even further, leaving their sons to take care of their own pigs at home. We really can't stand any more of this." When Chairman Lei heard of his remark, he flew into a rage. "Old Li," he thundered, "if you want to stay in the co-op, all right; if not, you can get out."

That same autumn, Chairman Lei led some members in setting up a carpenter's shop. Generally speaking, it is only fair that all the members should have a chance to take part in subsidiary occupations of this kind. But Chairman Lei and others made a rule: if you didn't invest eight yuan in the shop, you couldn't work in it. As a result, poor peasants like Lei Lai-hsi and Lei Tung-erh were barred from the work. Then something even more unfair happened. The co-op had bought a mule. The money came from a government loan, for which the poor peasants had to pay interest, just as the middle peasants did. But that mule worked all winter for the carpenter's shop, in which no poor peasant had a share. Meanwhile the heaviest part of the farm work fell on the shoulders of the poor peasants, since they had no part in the subsidiary occupations. For example, Lei Tung-erh, who built eight pig sties in one stretch, received nothing for his labour.

"LET'S PART FRIENDS"

A work-point system was finally adopted in the spring of 1955. Chairman Lei felt that he had nothing more to gain from the co-op. So he began to instigate the other middle peasants to withdraw with him. Sowing-time had come again. The middle peasants worked their land with the help of their draught animals and carts. The fields of the poor peasants were left utterly neglected. Lei Lai-hsi, a poor peasant, had four *mou* of land, which had not been sown in time. The

carts moved back and forth across his plot, leaving deep wheel tracks which remained for a long time.

When the work of checking over and consolidating the co-ops began, the middle peasants led by Chairman Lei insisted on withdrawing. Not wishing to appear singularly backward, Lei began to urge some poor peasants to get out too. "If the co-op doesn't break up," he told Li Lao-suo, a Communist, and Li Wu-mao, an active poor peasant, "I'll give it up and go to Shansi Province." "You can go if you like," Lao-suo answered. "We'll carry on." Chairman Lei talked to Li Wu-mao several times about this. But Li stood firm.

Meanwhile groups of cadres from the township, district and county governments came to help the co-op. They and the leading peasants in the co-op continued to stick to the principle of uniting with and educating the middle peasants. Members of the township Party committee also spent twelve days showing the middle peasants the prospects of socialism in the countryside, and explaining the principles of voluntary participation and mutual benefit. But although the middle peasants got satisfactory answers to all the questions they raised, they left the co-op just the same.

The poor peasants, on their part, were determined to make the co-op succeed. "The Communist Party has led us to liberation," Li Wu-mao said, "and we'll certainly go all the way with it to socialism. I've drunk bitterness when working on my own, without even a cart or a draught animal to help. Nothing can make me go back to that."

"We've seen a better life since land reform," said Lei Shun-tao, a lower middle peasant. "But as far as production is concerned, we're still up against difficulties. We can't overcome them unless we keep up our co-op. I'll follow where the co-op leads."

"Never mind the difficulties!" declared Li Lao-suo, as if swearing an oath. "I'm a Communist. I'm not afraid of

them. If we all put our shoulders to the wheel, we can certainly make this small co-op a success."

He was elected chairman of the co-op.

NO IMPASSE

The news that the co-op was reborn occasioned much comment in the village. The common view was that it couldn't live long, for lack of draught animals, carts and so on. And in fact the co-op was beset with difficulties in its new start. In this critical period, the township Party committee decided to send two of its members, Li Chung-erh and Lei Yin-hsueh, to guide the work. Li spent two days with the members, helping them to map out a plan for the current year. It was time for spring sowing and the only draught animal the co-op could boast of was Lei Shun-tao's small, emaciated mule, which was too weak to do much. Its cart was in bad repair.

Chairman Li Lao-suo went to the Party committee with his trouble. "Don't worry," Party Secretary Lei Chiü-wei told him. "You can fix my cart and use it. We can spare it for a while." Lei Hsin-hsi, a poor peasant who lived in the same courtyard with Li Wu-mao, also offered help. "Don't bother," he said generously, "you can use ours." So the question of cart was solved.

Then came the work of sowing. The middle peasants, just before they withdrew, had played a trick on the co-op: They had ploughed and sown all their own land, which had laid neglected after the previous autumn harvest. When they got out, the co-op still had 17 *mou*, all of which belonged to the poor peasants, unploughed and unsown. The poor peasants grasped the nettle. As their mule was too weak to draw the plough by itself, they sent two men to help it, one dragging the plough in front and the other pushing it from behind. One day Chairman Li took the mule and worked the potato fields, which were hard and dry. Man and the animal worked

with such vehemence that at the noon break they were too exhausted to eat anything. It was with greatest difficulty that the co-op ploughed its 17 *mou*, plot by plot.

"Between the green and the yellow" (the pre-harvest period), as the saying goes, there wasn't enough food for men or fodder for the beast. Though the chairman tried to borrow right and left, he could not get enough to feed all the people. Again he went to the Party committee for help. Li Chung-erh, a committee member, lent him 20 yuan and 400 catties of hay. "For a new co-op with little capital like yours," he said encouragingly, "difficulties are bound to crop up. But they can be overcome, if you all work with one mind."

It was now June. The crops on the sandy soil were drying up fast under the blazing sun. The co-op members used all their strength to water the land day and night. They fought the drought as one fights an enemy on the firing line. The men helped the mule to pull the water-wheels and took its place when it was tired. These strenuous efforts lasted almost three months.

After the wheat harvest there were more and more farm work. They had to hoe and water the fields and plant sweet potatoes at the same time. And at this juncture Li Wu-mao, who did the most work, fell ill. Chairman Li Lao-suo, who was also secretary of the township people's council, was tied down with government wheat-buying work. Only Lei Shun-tao pressed on with the hoeing.

For a time there was a real danger that the six *mou* of potato fields would be left unplanted. The peasants, at their wits' end, called on the four women in the co-op. The women, complete strangers to field work, had to learn sowing from the very beginning. Li Wu-mao, in spite of his illness, had had to go out to teach them, and to look after their seven children. They finished planting, but there was still five yuan to pay for potato shoots. The co-op's creditors were inexorable. Penniless and desperate, the peasants sent Lei

Shun-tao to the Party committee to seek help. Li Chung-erh again lent them the money they needed, from the funds of his own co-op.

VICTORY

The co-op did not end up the way some middle peasants in Tungwang Village thought it would. On the contrary, it advanced along the path indicated by the Party, the path to which the members of the co-op had long been devoted. They came out victors at last.

Local peasants who worked on their own and lacked labour power and animals, lost much of their crop in the 1955 drought. But the small co-op, relying on common efforts of its members, overcame all sorts of difficulties and kept its land supplied with water at all times. As a result, its crops suffered no damage. The maize yield reached 250 catties per *mou*. By the autumn of 1955, they expect to reap a rich potato crop of 20,000 catties from 13 *mou* of land, with 2,000 catties per *mou* as the best yield. The groundnuts (planted on three *mou*) and other crops also came up well. Part of the harvest from one *mou* of egg-plants was sold for about 60 yuan; the total yield would bring 80 yuan or more. With this income, the co-op would be able to defray its miscellaneous expenses for the year and return some of its loans.

In 1954 when the co-op members were still in a mutual-aid team of four households, their food crop was 8,854 catties. The 1955 crop, however, is expected to total 13,300 catties — 4,000 catties more than 1954. Li Wu-mao, a poor peasant, had a crop of some 1,600 catties in 1954; but he has good reason to expect 3,000 catties this year. Lei Shun-tao, a lower middle peasant, did not get enough to eat in 1954; but he is going to get 8,000 catties of potatoes alone in 1955. His life will obviously be much better. Lei Kou-pa, who withdrew from the co-op, will probably get some 1,300 catties less grain this year than in 1954. The reasons were the drought

and lack of manpower due to the bad health of one member of his family. "If I had stayed in the co-op," he said regretfully, "I wouldn't have suffered such a big loss."

Would you care to ask Li Wu-mao about the year's harvest for the co-op? "Well," he would answer with a warm smile, "if we hadn't persistently carried on the co-op, no one would have dreamt of such a rich crop." "To be sure," Lei Hsin-hsi's aunt would put in with envy. "Everybody thought this small co-op a short-lived thing. But what has happened now? They have definitely pumped life into a co-op that 'died'!"

WHO SAYS A CHICKEN FEATHER CAN'T FLY UP TO HEAVEN?

(A report from the Anyang Regional Communist Party Committee's Office for the Co-operative Movement, originally appearing in the November 2, 1955 issue of the *Honan Daily*)

This is an excellent article. It will open the eyes of a great many people. The Party organization in this place never wavered on the question of co-operation. It stood four-square behind the destitute peasants in their demand for a co-op and in their victorious competition with the well-to-do middle peasants; it firmly supported them as they grew from a small co-op to a large one, increasing their output year by year, till by the third year the whole village was in co-operatives. The well-to-do middle peasants had jeered: "They've less money than an egg has hair, yet they think they can run a co-op. Can a chicken feather fly up to heaven?" But that is just what this chicken feather did.

Here we had a struggle between two alternatives — socialism and capitalism.

China's rich peasants are economically very weak: that part of their land which they worked in a semi-feudal manner was taken from them during the land reform. The great majority of the old type of rich peasants are no longer able to hire labour, and they have an unsavoury reputation. But the well-to-do and fairly well-to-do middle peasants are quite strong, and they form 20 to 30 per cent of the rural

population. An important aspect of the struggle in China's countryside between these alternatives is the peaceful competition between the poor peasants and the poorer middle peasants on the one hand and the well-to-do middle peasants on the other.

Let us see who increases production in a two or three-year period: Is it the well-to-do middle peasants working alone? Or is it the poor peasants and the lower middle peasants working together in co-operatives? At first only the co-ops organized by some of the poor peasants and lower middle peasants compete with the well-to-do middle peasants. Most of the poor peasants and lower middle peasants are still watching from the sidelines. At this stage both sides are fighting for adherents. Standing behind the well-to-do middle peasants are the former landlords and the rich peasants. They give their support to the well-to-do middle peasants, sometimes secretly, sometimes openly. Standing on the side of the co-operatives is the Communist Party.

Party organizations should follow the example of the Communists in Nantsui Village, Anyang County, and firmly support the co-operatives. Unfortunately, not all the rural Party branches have done so. And where they didn't, confusion arose.

First of all, there were public debates on whether or not a chicken feather can fly up to heaven. Of course this is a serious question. In thousands of years has anyone ever seen one that could? The impossibility of such a feat has practically become a truism. Where the Party does not criticize this old saw it may bewilder many a poor peasant and lower middle peasant. Moreover, with regard to administrative staff and, further, with regard to material resources — such as the ability to raise loans — the co-

ops have a hard time if the Party and the government do not give them a hand.

The reason the well-to-do middle peasants dared trot out such moth-eaten proverbs as "chicken feathers can't fly up to heaven" was because the co-ops had not yet increased their output, the poor co-ops had not yet become prosperous, and the individual, isolated co-op had not yet become one of hundreds of thousands of co-ops. It was because the Party had not yet gone to every corner of the land with banners flying and explained the benefits of co-operation. It was because the Party had not yet pointed out why, in the era of socialism, the ancient truism that "a chicken feather can't fly up to heaven" is no longer true.

The poor want to remake their lives. The old system is dying. A new system is being born. Chicken feathers really are flying up to heaven. In the Soviet Union they have already got there. In China they've started their flight. Chicken feathers are going to soar up all over the world.

Many of our local Party organizations did not give strong backing to the needy peasants. But we cannot put all the blame on them, because the higher authorities had not yet struck a mortal blow at opportunist thinking, nor made an over-all plan for the promotion of co-operation, nor improved the leadership of the campaign on a nation-wide scale.

In 1955, we did these things, and in the space of a few months the situation changed completely. The people who had been standing on the side-lines came over, whole groups at a time, to take their stand with the co-operatives. The well-to-do middle peasants also changed their tune. Some applied to join the co-ops. Others prepared to join. Even the crustiest die-hards among them didn't dare to argue

any more about whether chicken feathers could fly up to heaven. The former landlords and rich peasants were completely deflated. The punishment which the People's Government meted out to a number of counter-revolutionaries who had been endangering public security and trying to wreck the co-operatives also had some bearing on this.

In short, in the latter half of 1955, a fundamental change took place in the balance of power between classes in our country. Socialism made a mighty advance. Capitalism took a heavy fall. With another year of hard work in 1956, we can, by and large, put socialist transformation in the transition period on a sound footing.

— EDITOR

Prosperity Agricultural Producers' Co-operative in Nantsui Village, Anyang County, Honan Province, was founded in the spring of 1953. It was at the start a tiny, poor co-op of 18 households, but it had Chang Huai-teh, a member of the Communist Party, at its head. Led by the Party branch, they kept together, taking the rough with the smooth, determined to take the socialist road and work valiantly and well. Finally they got the co-op running very well indeed, and it grew to 88 households. The whole village joined in co-operation. This particular co-op is now the standard-bearer of the co-operative movement in all the villages around.

FROM A POOR MAN'S TEAM TO A POOR MAN'S CO-OP

The poor peasants of Nantsui Village received land during the land reform, but because they had no money, because their soil was poor and because they were short of animals and implements, they still faced many difficulties. Trying to find a way out, in the autumn of 1950, Chang Huai-teh,

Chang Huai-fu and another poor peasant began swapping labour on some jobs and working together on others. In 1951, when the People's Government called on the peasants to organize and increase output, they were the first to respond. They expanded their three-family unit to a seasonal mutual-aid team of seven poor families. As a result of the team's efforts, their wheat yield that year rose from 100 catties a *mou* to 120.

In 1952 the team grew to 11 families (ten poor-peasant families, one lower middle-peasant family) and worked as a team all the year round. Although the team was now larger, it still did not have enough farm tools; it had only seven donkeys and four wheel-barrows. In the busy seasons, men had to drag the ploughs and harrows themselves; manure had to be carried by wheel-barrow or in baskets hung from shoulder poles, and the crops were brought from the fields in the same manner. Some of the well-to-do peasants in the village jeered and called the team "The Paupers' Brigade," "The Shoulder Pole Company," and "The Skinny Donkeys." Nevertheless, its members were able to do many things as a team which they had not been able to do working alone. There was no longer any question of weeds strangling the young plants, or flooded fields, or not being able to plant on time. Yields increased.

By friendly co-operation they were able to minimize or eliminate the effects of natural disasters and human misfortunes. That year, 1952, right in the middle of the spring planting, poor peasant Chang Kuang-li fell seriously ill. The whole team went to visit him. They helped him pay for a doctor and attended to all the work in his fields. So that he could rest with an easy mind, they hoed his seven *mou* of cotton three times, although the custom was to hoe only twice. Chang Kuang-li's plants came up thick and strong. When he left his bed and saw them, he was moved to tears. In the autumn, his cotton crop averaged 150 catties to the *mou*. He had never had such a harvest.

"Organization makes us strong; with unity and mutual help you will be able to do much better." That was the conclusion reached by every member of the team.

In the winter of 1952, when the Communist Party was busy with a campaign to strengthen the Party and to increase membership, Chang Kuang-li and a number of other enthusiastic poor peasants consulted the village Party branch about the team becoming a co-operative. Chang Huai-teh, the team leader and secretary of the Party branch, made several trips to two co-operatives in neighbouring villages to learn how they worked. After the campaign to strengthen the Party was concluded, the village branch put forward a plan that Chang Huai-teh's team should combine with another mutual-aid team to form a co-op. There were 23 families in the two teams. After a winter spent in discussion and preparatory work, the co-operative was formally established on the first day of 1953. Five middle-peasant families dropped out, saying, "You go ahead first. We'll wait and see!" That left ten poor-peasant families and eight of the lower middle peasants who were determined to take the road to co-operation.

THEY KEPT THEIR CHINS UP

When the co-op was formed, some of the well-to-do peasants ridiculed it, saying, "They've less money than an egg has hair, yet they think they can run a co-op. Can a chicken feather fly up to heaven?" The co-operative was just getting started, and it is true it came up against all sorts of problems. At the height of the spring planting only 12 of the 18 families had enough to eat. Tsui Feng-lung, Chang Shou-sheng and two other poor-peasant families had to hire themselves out as farm hands. Any day they couldn't find work, that day their families had nothing to put in the cooking pot. Worse difficulties were encountered in production. Seven draught oxen were so weak from lack of fodder that if they fell, they couldn't get up. The co-op didn't even have enough

money to buy proper hemp rope: they had to tether their animals with straw ropes. If their attention wandered, the oxen would give them the slip and eat the crops. The well-to-do peasants made up a sarcastic jingle: "We don't care a jot for ghouls or ghosts; the co-op's oxen scare us most."

All that the members had been able to bring to the co-op were a dilapidated old cart, two crude ploughs and four seeders — none of them all of a piece. There were no replacements for parts that were missing, and not even a whip to drive the ox. When they used the cart to haul coal, it was always breaking down, because the animals were weak and thin and the drivers didn't know their trade thoroughly. Middle peasants with carts were fed up having to help them out on the road, and finally refused to travel to the mine in company with the co-op teamsters. At that time the co-op was an isolated little island in the village.

But thanks to the firm leadership of the Party branch (six of the seven Communists in the village had joined the co-op), the members were determined to make a go of it. Chang Huai-teh, secretary of the village Party branch and chairman of the co-operative, said at a Party meeting:

"I'm a Communist. We have a hard time at home. But even if my family has to go without food for three days I'm not going to stop leading the fight to put our co-op on its feet. I'll never bow my head!"

His attitude strengthened the resolve of the other Communists. "We'll see this thing through," they said. "We're going to make that chicken feather fly right up to heaven!"

The Party secretary often told them stories of the Long March — how the Red Army climbed the menacing Snow Mountains and crossed the dreaded Grasslands, to remind them of the way Communists fought and conquered formidable difficulties. This helped to put them on their mettle.

The co-op members rallied together and solved their problems one by one. Some of them received loans or subsidies from the government, but they did not rely entirely on this;

they helped one another in a spirit of class solidarity. When the family of the co-op chairman had nothing to eat, the other members on their own initiative chipped in with three pecks of grain. When there wasn't enough grass to feed the animals, Communist Chang Kuang-li set an example by removing two broken window frames and two cross-beams from his house, selling them and giving the proceeds to the co-op to buy fodder. The other members were so stirred that they too set about making their inanimate belongings serve their living possessions. Using Chang Kuang-li's "method," they raised ten-odd yuan — enough to solve the fodder problem temporarily. Later, the government loaned them 10,000 catties of cotton-seed cake, which ended the fodder shortage for good.

They also became more efficient at carting coal. The Party branch called on them to "learn the things you don't know how to do. What three men are doing let two men do." With Communists Tsui Feng-wu and Li Chen-yu taking the lead, all the co-op's teamsters were soon doing their work well.

The Communists and the other co-op members were indeed "breathing the same air and sharing a common destiny." This was why everyone concerned was thoroughly optimistic about the co-op's future. The one exception was Li Yung-hsiang, a man who had become a lower middle peasant even before land reform. He was still not well-to-do, but he was slightly better off than the average co-op member. When he joined he had invested a large rickety old cart and a half share in the ownership of an ox. He was afraid he would not get a square deal in the co-op, and at one time was thinking of pulling out. But finally the warm co-operative friendliness of the poor peasants and the general enthusiastic atmosphere convinced him that he should stay in.

In this way the co-op members not only got through spring — for them a time of empty bins and larders — but they also planted 120 *mou* of cotton on time and according

to plan. By giving them a loan of 550 yuan, even before their wheat ripened, the government encouraged them to expand productive activities. They used the money to buy two mules and a cart. They became more enthusiastic about their work than ever.

"It's not going to be a poor man's co-op much longer," said the people in the village.

THE RESULT OF THE CONTEST

Not long after Prosperity Co-operative was formed, some of the relatively well-off middle peasants went into action. Tsui Chin-kao and eight other well-to-do middle-peasant families plus two poor-peasant families organized a mutual-aid team (actually it was a co-operative disguised as a mutual-aid team). They jeered openly at Prosperity Co-operative and secretly planned to compete with it. These middle peasants were confident that with the rich soil, good carts, good animals and ready cash at their disposal, they could crush Prosperity Co-operative and strengthen their own position as leaders of the mutual-aid team. But the result was that they lost the contest and Prosperity Co-op won. The mutual-aid team harvested an average of 95 catties of cotton per *mou*; their millet averaged 160. The co-op's 103 *mou* of millet land gave a yield of 200 catties to the *mou*; its 118 *mou* of cotton fields gave a yield of 120 catties per *mou* on the alkaline-free land and 93 catties per *mou* as a combined average of the alkaline-free and the alkaline land together. The co-op's millet yield was 40 catties a *mou* above that of the mutual-aid team. Because the co-op had quite a bit of alkaline land, its average cotton yield was less than the team's, but it was still better than the average for the entire village — 90 catties to the *mou*.

How could a new co-op, which was so poor, get such good results? First of all, because, led by the Party branch, its members were frugal and worked hard. Some of them had

been discouraged when they saw the mutual-aid team's carts carrying load after load of fertilizer, bought at the supply and marketing co-op. They were afraid Prosperity Co-operative was too poor to compete. But the village Party branch encouraged them, urged them to use every available moment collecting natural fertilizer. They built three big privies which all the families in the co-op agreed to use. They also got "fertilizer" by tearing down the compound walls and brick oven-beds of every member and making good use of the dirty earth thus obtained. In this way they were able to get enough good fertilizer at a very small cost.

Secondly, they responded to the call of the Party and the government to improve methods of cultivation. Since liberation, experience had taught them that they could be sure of one thing — that the advice of the Party and Chairman Mao was always sound. They planted their cotton close together but in widely spaced furrows as the government recommended and, except on the small plots of alkaline land, replaced any plants that did not come up. This preserved an unbroken line of growing plants. As the cotton grew, they took turns watching over it, seeing to it that every plant was exposed to sunlight and the breezes. The cotton ripened early. There were few spoiled bolls. The harvest was large, and it fetched a good price.

What impressed people most was the co-op's excellent millet harvest. It was obtained by sowing the improved "Huanung Number Four" seed on all 103 *mou* of the co-op's millet fields and using the "single seed and close planting" method. The harvest was a record-breaker.

In the mutual-aid team, however, no one wanted to try out new techniques. The mutual-aid team not only failed to use better seed and go in for close planting, but some even said, "In the old days when we had no Communist Party to lead us, we got good crops without close planting." Well, that autumn there was a big storm just before the harvest. The plants of the mutual-aid team, growing wide apart, had

no strength to withstand the wind. Many were destroyed and the team had to stand the loss.

Prosperity Co-operative achieved such a remarkable increase in production that more peasants wanted to join. The lives of the members took a turn for the better. Even peasants still outside the co-op exclaimed:

"It's a poor man's co-op no longer. That chicken feather is flying all over the sky!"

Twenty-six peasant families applied for admission. "If you don't let us join, we'll push our way in," cried some of the poor peasants and lower middle peasants.

And the mutual-aid team? Not only did no one want to join it, but several of its original members dropped out. Two of them pleaded to be admitted to the co-op.

FROM SMALL TO BIG, FROM POOR TO PROSPEROUS

After the 1953 autumn harvest, the village Party branch summed up the accomplishments of the co-op in the year since it was established and cited them in support of the Party's general line of policy during the period of transition to socialism. The success of the co-op was offered as a vivid and tangible proof of the superiority of socialist methods, and it strengthened the conviction of people both in the co-op and out that the co-operative road was the right one to take.

"We've got animals and carts now," said the co-op members. "Our output is higher. We're living better. We don't have to use shoulder poles any more. We'll never forget the Communist Party as long as we live."

The leader of a mutual-aid team, Chang Shun-chang, a lower middle peasant, applied with all five member families of his team for admission to the co-op. "We'll go along with the Party branch wherever it leads," they said.

Now that most of the peasants understood the advantages of co-operation, two more co-ops were formed in the village. The three co-ops had a total of 64 families — over 60 per cent

of the village's 104 households. Prosperity Co-operative increased its membership from 18 families to 35. Of these, 18 families were poor peasants, 13 were lower middle peasants, and only 4 were middle peasants who had become well-to-do since liberation. It was still composed mostly of poor peasants.

In 1954, its yields were also considerably greater than in 1953. The wheat output rose from 140 catties a *mou* to 158, millet from 200 to 212, cotton from 93 to 123.5.

This proved that poor peasants and lower middle peasants could, when led by the Party, organize co-operatives and run them well. There was absolutely no justification for looking down on them or saying that a co-op could not be run successfully without the well-to-do peasants.

In the autumn of 1954, inspired by the achievements of Prosperity Co-operative and the fine results obtained by the co-ops in Kuowangtu and other villages where mechanized cultivation had been introduced, the three co-ops combined so as to be big enough to warrant the use of farming machinery. They also increased their membership by another 24 families. Except for 14 families of former landlords, rich peasants, and two families under surveillance for criminal activities, everyone else in the village — including all the 88 poor and middle-peasant families — were now in the co-op.

In the year that followed, the three-in-one co-op operated on a large scale, using farming machinery, and planting in conformity with the national plan for their region (except for 30-odd *mou* set aside for grain and a few vegetable plots, their whole 1,100 *mou* of arable land were planted entirely with cotton). As a result, their 1955 harvest promised to be even more striking than those of the two previous years. Four hundred and twenty *mou* of wheat fields have averaged 198 catties to the *mou*. Twenty-six *mou* sown and cultivated by machinery have brought in an average of 267 catties. On 1,004 *mou* of cotton fields (including 400 *mou* of cotton planted after the wheat was harvested), the goal set was 124,142

catties, and the brigades working there gave a guarantee that they would reach that figure. Now, according to preliminary estimates, they should obtain at least 132.5 catties a *mou*, which will bring in a total of 133,317 catties — 9,175 catties more than the original plan. The third brigade is responsible for 204 *mou* of cotton fields. Under the plan it had guaranteed the very high figure of 29,946 catties. It has already gathered 27,310 — 91 per cent of plan — and still hasn't finished harvesting. In the absence of any sudden natural calamity, it will easily reach its target.

Income of the individual members of the co-op has also increased from year to year. The table below shows the figures in yuan for seven families over a three-year period.

Name	Status	Number in		Income (Yuan)		
		Family	1953	1954	1955*	
Tsui Feng-wu	poor peasant	5	372.64	488.77	666.73	
Chang Kuang-li	„ „	4	153.90	238.70	455.30	
Tsui Feng-lung	„ „	4	225.70	347.10	462.90	
Chang Shou-sheng	„ „	2	217.00	368.20	445.60	
Tsui Feng-cheng	new middle peasant	2	700.20	1,029.00	1,036.00	
Hsueh Wen-kuei	lower middle peasant	5	238.30	538.30	607.20	
Li Yung-hsiang	middle peasant	4	319.60	411.30	508.90	

Many poor members have become prosperous. Of the 35 original members of Prosperity Co-operative, at the time of the 1954 autumn harvest 28 families had enough grain over and above what they needed as food for the coming year to be able to sell 3,000 catties to the government. That year they banked 1,500 yuan in the credit co-operative. According to preliminary estimates for 1955, only seven families — widows, old folks and invalids and the family of one man who works on the administrative staff of the township office — will earn less than they did in 1954, though they will still

have enough to live on comfortably. All the other 81 families in the enlarged co-op will earn more. Chang Shou-sheng, who used to be the poorest member of the co-op, had a surplus of 80 yuan in 1954. In 1955 he and his wife earned 445 yuan. They expect to deposit about 200 yuan in the credit co-op after putting aside enough for all their 1955 living expenses. When the final balance for 1955 is struck, there should be many more new depositors.

The enthusiasm of the members soared when the estimated income figures were posted. On October 8, twelve members cut over 5,000 catties of green-stuff for compost, an average of more than 400 catties a man.

Why was the co-op able to continuously increase its output, to grow from small to large, from poor to prosperous, from weak to strong? Because the Party branch in Nantsui Village firmly carried out the Party's class policy in the rural co-operative movement. Following the lead of Prosperity Co-operative, peasants throughout the township formed fourteen more co-ops. Prosperity Co-operative's chairman and accountant became leader and chief accountant respectively of the network of co-ops in the townships of Chentsunying and Taochiaying. Prosperity Co-operative has become a model for peasants in all the surrounding townships and a standard-bearer in the forefront of the co-operative movement.

*Estimated.

THE "BACKWARD AREAS" ARE NOT NECESSARILY ENTIRELY BACKWARD

(By a work team of the Communist Party Committee of the former province of Jehol, October 15, 1955, in the *Chengteh Masses' Daily*)

For many Chinese, 1955 can be said to have been a year of dispelled illusions. In the first half of 1955 many still clung tenaciously to certain misconceptions. But by the latter half of the year, they could hold out no longer and had to begin believing in the new.

For instance they had thought that the people's demand that the whole countryside go co-operative within three years was an idle dream; that co-operation in the north could be achieved more quickly than in the south; that it was impossible to run co-ops in the backward areas, in the mountain regions, in the national minority areas, in the areas populated by several nationalities, in areas stricken by natural calamities; that it was easy to form a co-op but hard to make it strong; that the peasants were too poor and had no way of raising funds; that the peasants were uneducated and so lacked people who could act as book-keepers; that the greater the number of co-operatives, the more blunders they would make; that co-operatives were growing too rapidly for the political consciousness of the people and the level of experience of the officials; that the Party's policy of unified purchase and supply of grain and its policy on co-operatives were causing the peasants to lose

enthusiasm for work; that unless the Party immediately backed down on the question of co-operation, the worker-peasant alliance would be endangered; that the spread of co-operation would produce a vast pool of surplus labour for which there would be no outlet; and so on. Many more similar ideas could be cited—illusions, every one.

All of these illusions were completely shattered by the criticism of the Sixth Plenary Session (Enlarged) of the Seventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in October 1955. Now, a high tide of socialist transformation is sweeping the nation's rural areas, and the people are dancing for joy.

This should be a serious lesson to all Communists. Since the people have this enormous enthusiasm for socialism, why were many of the leading organizations completely unaware of it, or only slightly aware of it, just a few months ago? Why was there such a difference between what the leaders thought and what the great mass of the people thought? Taking this as a lesson, how should we handle similar situations and problems in the future? There is only one answer. Don't lose touch with the people; be adept at recognizing their enthusiasm from its very essence.

— EDITOR

Several days ago we made an inspection tour of Chao-liangtze Village, Chengteh County. It was known as rather slow in its development of agricultural co-operation and showed a number of weaknesses in various fields of work. We used to think that such a village must go through a long period of reform before new co-ops could be organized. Investigation on the spot proved that we were wrong.

WHERE WAS THE WEAKNESS?

There was only one agricultural co-operative in this village of 190 households. Its members came from 30 households, about 15.7 per cent of those in the village. The local Party branch was weak. It had eight members, half of them active, the other half rather backward. Some of the backward members lagged so far behind the situation that they became stumbling-blocks to the co-operative movement, while some individual members habitually violated discipline.

Other organizations in the village were also weak. For instance, only four of the nine members of the village people's council were able to do their work. Of the 27 members of the Youth League only nine could be regarded as competent. As a result, it had not been possible to carry out various Party policies successfully. The most striking example was the repeated failure of the village to fulfil its quota of grain sales to the state, resulting of resistance caused by the spontaneous tendency towards capitalism among the peasants.

The answer to all this was not far to seek. The trouble rested mainly with the leadership. The members of the Party, the Youth League and the village council, with a few exceptions, were honest and hard-working. Their family backgrounds were good. However, they had gone without education for a long time. They had been given work without the necessary instructions on how to do it, and those who normally showed more enthusiasm in their work had the work piled on them. Those who were politically backward had not been educated or criticized, and as a result they had deteriorated. The few bad elements had not been held in check, and so had been able to sabotage the village work with impunity, to cause trouble between the local officials, throw cold water on the active elements, and so on. The Party and Youth League members and village officials who worked hard got no support. Lacking resourcefulness, some inex-

perienced officials were apt to resort to simply issuing orders, which isolated them from the masses. Those who were found to have a shortcoming were not given timely advice. The only way of dealing with them had been to point out all their mistakes in a lump and throw them out. Nine village heads had been dismissed since 1949. For fear of committing mistakes and being sacked, many once enthusiastic leaders became hesitant in their work. Under such circumstances, the village gradually became "weak spot." As it was difficult to get anything done in such a village, no one was interested in coming to work there, and this led to further weakening.

THE PEASANTS' MORALE IS HIGH

From the above we can see that the backwardness of the village was due to the weakness in leadership. The poor and less well-off peasants, constituting over 60 per cent of its people, were not backward at all. They wanted to set up new co-ops. This desire was particularly strong among the more advanced of the poor peasants and the lower sections of the new and old middle peasants. Early in the summer of 1953, quite a number of poor peasants had wanted to organize co-ops. But the district government considered the village backward, had no capable leaders and therefore could not set up co-ops. No leadership was given. Nevertheless, the peasants' enthusiasm for co-op farming continued very high.

In the autumn of the same year, 17 forward-looking peasants of Chaoliangtze Village took the initiative in setting up a co-op which grew to include 30 households in the spring of 1954. Seeing that many co-ops were being organized in the neighbouring villages, five mutual-aid teams started to make preparations to change over to co-ops in the summer of 1954. In the autumn four co-ops were set up on the basis of six mutual-aid teams. Some 50 households hoped to join them. The peasants were very keen indeed at that time. The poor

peasant Li Yung-lin, for example, put aside his best soya-bean seed, planning to take it to the co-op next year. Yet the district government still thought that the village lacked the necessary personnel, and that conditions were unripe. When the 1955 spring ploughing came along the four co-ops collapsed. The reason was that no one helped them to settle their problems, and this caused much dissatisfaction.

But the peasants were not easily discouraged. To pave the way for co-operative farming this autumn, the five mutual-aid teams led by Wei Feng-tung, Wei Yung-chen and others secured the approval of the district government to plant more than one thousand fruit trees. The poor peasants and the lower sections of the old and new middle peasants were particularly eager to begin co-operative farming. Their eagerness became all the greater when they saw that nearly all the peasants in the neighbouring villages had joined co-ops and were living better as a result of their good harvest in 1955. So in the autumn, during the harvest season, they too discussed going over to co-op farming.

At present, some mutual-aid teams have already drawn up plans as to who should be admitted into their future co-op, who should be the chairman, the book-keepers, members of the management committee and so on. The latest information is that 94 households are ready to join the co-ops after the autumn harvest, and 61 of them are particularly firm in this resolve. Of the 94 households poor-peasant households number 28; lower middle-peasant households, 50; upper middle-peasant households, 16.

The fact that over 60 per cent of the peasants long for co-op farming is a stimulus toward it. As for the Party branch in the village, it must be noted that the great majority of its members are good. A drive to rectify wrong ideas was carried on among them after they heard the directives of the Central Committee of the Party and Chairman Mao Tse-tung on the question of agricultural co-operation. The advanced members were commended, the backward criticized,

the very bad ones expelled. As a result, nearly all the Party members became active. Those who had been backward criticized themselves at the general membership meeting. One said, "In the past I only thought about myself. The idea of building socialism never entered my head."

Many active peasants came to the forefront from among the rank and file, when they understood the spirit of the directives issued by the Central Committee. We found, after investigation, that there were 32 peasants who, apart from their unswerving determination to join the co-ops, were potentially good leaders. They could form the nuclear force for the rapid growth of co-operation.

All this proves that a weak village in the course of the development of co-operatives can be made stronger. This can be done provided that we draw our strength from the Party branch in the village, and from rank-and-file peasants who are enthusiastic about co-operative farming.

It cannot be said, however, that everything was all right in this village, even though, as we have mentioned, it had fairly good conditions for the development of co-operative farming. As the movement expanded, many problems came up:

First, while most of the poor peasants and the lower sections of the old and new middle peasants were plunging into this movement, the well-to-do peasants became uneasy. They had doubts and worries.

Secondly, as the training of leaders had been rather neglected up to then, the high tide of agricultural co-operation found them insufficient in number and low in quality. Moreover, the leaders were not well distributed. Some mutual-aid teams were even controlled by people with strong capitalist ideas.

Thirdly, the mutual-aid teams were poorly organized. Of the 13 such teams five were dominated by well-to-do peasants. Former landlords were found in some of the teams.

Fourthly, in order to meet the requirement of the co-operative movement, it was necessary to consolidate the Party branch and strengthen its leadership.

In view of this situation, it is necessary to draw up, as quickly as possible, an over-all plan for agricultural co-operation for the whole village. Without such a plan, sham co-operatives, or co-operatives made up exclusively of middle peasants or poor peasants, may emerge. Too many officials might be concentrated in one co-op and while others are left with no capable leaders. Such co-ops would be hard to consolidate and more difficulties would crop up. Therefore, the leadership must keep abreast of the situation, and divide their work. It must see that all current jobs are well done, and that the over-all plan for agricultural co-operation is drawn up in good time. The peasants must have good leadership in such jobs as collecting manure and ploughing up the fields after autumn harvest. The 1956 crop will depend largely on this.

EVERYTHING ACCORDING TO PLAN

On the basis of the eagerness of the peasants to organize co-ops, and the condition as regards officials and leaders, the village Party branch has drawn up a plan to set up three farming co-operatives after the 1955 autumn harvest. It plans to draw in 71 peasant households of the most active poor peasants and the lower sections of the old and new middle peasants. Meanwhile, seven households will be added to the existing co-op with its 30 households. Thus the total number of households that will have joined the co-op in the autumn of 1955 will be 108, or 56 per cent of all the households of the village. The 32 households of poor peasants, or belonging to the lower sections of the old and new middle peasants, who are still outside the co-ops, will be drawn in by the autumn of 1956. By then, there will be 140 households in the co-ops, over 73 per cent of all those in the

village. Of the 36 households of upper middle peasants only those who are really willing to join co-ops will be drawn in after the 1956 autumn harvest. The rest will be allowed to remain in the mutual-aid teams. It is expected that most of them will also join the co-ops after the autumn harvest of 1957. As for the former landlords and rich peasants, 14 households in all, they will in no case be admitted into the co-ops before 1958.

To pave the way for formation of co-ops in 1956 it is necessary to train enough key personnel. This should be done right now, through the medium of the mutual-aid teams and existing co-operatives. Twenty persons to take up key jobs in co-op farming are to be trained by the teams and co-ops within a year. To strengthen the ranks of the Party, active peasants tested in real work will be admitted as members. Capable persons will be assigned to strengthen the leadership of the mutual-aid teams.

The village Party branch, in line with the above plan, has first of all carried out a division of responsibility among the leadership. The village head is responsible for leading the autumn harvest work and for seeing that the fixed quota system for producing, purchasing and marketing grain is carried out. The secretary of the village Party branch is responsible for leading the work of the co-operative movement and speeding up the training of 31 active workers which it needs. These workers are to be given proper jobs — they will do propaganda among the peasants, playing an active role in the autumn harvesting and subsequent ploughing.

Secondly, the peasants' enthusiasm for organizing co-ops should be directed into the proper channels of current work — they should devote themselves to preparing for the 1956 crop. In the first place, they must be persuaded to keep enough seeds for the next year and to plough up the fields well after the autumn harvest. The peasants who are prepared to join co-ops must be told in a clear-cut way that they

must plough up their fields well after autumn harvest. They must not muddle through this work just because they are going to join co-ops. It should be pointed out beforehand that those who have not turned up their fields after autumn harvest, or have done it in a slipshod way, will have work-points deducted when they join. In addition, the peasants should rear pigs and shut them up in pens to accumulate manure, so that there will have enough manure for the co-ops in 1956.

Thirdly, the Party branch must study carefully the directives on the question of agricultural co-operation put out by the Central Committee and Chairman Mao Tse-tung. That is because it must explain government policies to the peasants and help them overcome their doubts and worries, so that the peasants will not sell their draught animals before they join the co-op.

It is up to the peasants — those who really want to join the co-ops — to decide whether they want to sell or rent their draught animals to the co-ops when they are formed. In the purchase of farming animals from the peasants the co-op should not pay less than the market price, and the terms of payment must not be unduly long. Fair terms should also be given when the co-op rents animals from its members. The owners of animals should be given enough fodder when the co-op shares out its grain stalk.

All these measures have already yielded good results. For example, the well-to-do peasant Chi Kuang-teh, who had wanted to sell his animals, changed his mind when he was told about these things.

Fourthly, the key personnel of a new co-op should be checked carefully and given proper jobs to do. Two co-ops should be set up this November. The book-keepers of the existing co-op who have gained experience should train new ones during the winter.

OPPORTUNISM IS FALLING, SOCIALISM IS ON THE RISE

(By Li Yi-chun, October 7, 1955)

In many localities there is a practice prevalent almost to a point of being universal — right opportunists within the Party, working hand in glove with the forces of capitalism, are preventing the great mass of poor peasants and lower middle peasants from taking the road to co-operation. This article describes the situation with particular aptness. The writer furiously attacks the opportunists and stands up for the needy peasants.

Some individuals, although they call themselves Communists, show little interest in the socialism we are now building. Not only do they fail to support the enthusiastic people — they throw cold water on the people's heads.

In China, 1955 was the year of decision in the struggle between socialism and capitalism. This decisive struggle was reflected, first and foremost, in the three conferences called by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in May, July and October. The first half of 1955 was murky and obscured by dark clouds. But in the latter half, the atmosphere changed completely. Tens of millions of peasants swung into action. In response to the call of the Central Committee, they adopted co-operation.

Over 60 million peasant households in various parts of the country have already joined co-operatives as

the editor writes these few lines. It is as if a raging tidal wave has swept away all the demons and ghosts. Now we can look at every member of society and see exactly who is who. It is the same in the Party.

By the end of this year the victory of socialism will be practically assured. Of course, many more battles still lie ahead. We must continue to fight hard.

— EDITOR

The upsurge in the agricultural co-operative movement began to reach Hsinching District on the outskirts of Shanghai in the autumn of 1954. The poor peasants were saying, "Our families are poor. If we don't organize co-ops, we'll never straighten our backs." So they took an active lead in preparing to set up co-ops. Those who did a bit of petty trading as well closed down their business and asked to join. Some of the middle peasants followed suit. In Hungnan Township, which goes in for cotton and market gardening, there wasn't a single exception. Before autumn, eight agricultural producers' co-operatives were set up. All who had not yet joined the co-op set out to "herald co-operation" by making a success of the mutual-aid teams and amalgamated their 45 mutual-aid teams into eight. These teams, with their larger membership and greater scope, quickly accumulated common property; after one summer harvest, they bought 47 sprayers. The mutual-aid teams, people said, were already "practically as good as a co-op," and it wouldn't take much to reorganize them into one. After the autumn of 1954, twenty mutual-aid teams in ten villages asked the Party branch in Hungnan Township to be allowed to form co-ops. The branch took notice of the popular demand, looked into the local conditions and planned to set up seven co-ops in the winter and spring of 1954-1955, with 50 per cent of the peasant households organized into them. But the district Party committee, influenced by the policy laid down by the suburban working committee

— to "compress" the original plan for the growth of co-ops, gave the people of Hungnan, who were so keen and enthusiastic about taking the socialist road, neither support nor guidance. So a fierce struggle started between the masses, who wanted to push ahead, and the conservative, timid, and bureaucratic leaders.

The Hungnan villagers were against this delaying attitude from the start. "If you don't help us to set up a co-op, we'll set it up ourselves." And they did! The peasants of Pailoutou, a village which grew mainly cotton and rice, were the first to set up a co-op on their own initiative. They presented the district Party committee with a *fait accompli*, and the committee had to ratify it as an exceptional case. That made the masses more enthusiastic than ever. Ignoring the three strict conditions for establishment of a co-op imposed by the district and township leaders, the poor and lower middle peasants stepped up their preparations. They called mass meetings, went into conditions in their villages and studied the policy regarding the setting up of co-ops. Yachanglang, Yaolang, Yaopinlang and three other villages started market-gathering collectively. In Hsuchiatang, Nanshenhsiang and other villages, they collectively raised 36 piglets and four sows. Groups of peasants in the villages sent in detailed reports on their discussions and their plans to establish co-ops to the township official—reports brimming over with enthusiasm and confidence.

Chai Chung-chin and two other poor peasants in Yachanglang Village, for example, wrote in a report dated December 21:

"After the enlarged meeting of the people's congress which the township authorities called, we went back to our village and called a mass meeting to tell people all about it. Everybody was in high spirits. We discussed the advantages of a co-op, and everyone voted for starting one and joining. It was too good an opportunity to miss, so we began enrolling them there and then. At this first meeting eight households put their

names down. At the second, after some members of mutual-aid teams had held family councils to settle the doubts and worries in their families, ten more households joined. We have held several meetings since then to discuss what needed doing if we formed a co-op. At the first we discussed our market-gardening plans. We decided that we should first have to get together plenty of glass. There were sixteen crates of it lying around. Second, we discussed setting up reed or straw wind-breaks, started them on the 4th, and have now finished nine. We have just over a catty and a half of tomato seed which will do for fourteen rows, and we shall have one row of unstaked tomatoes. We have a catty and a quarter of sweet pepper seed which will make four rows. Next spring, we reckon to have about 25 *mou* of tomatoes, 10 *mou* of spring cabbage and 320 head of cabbage for seed. We shall have early kidney beans transplanted. We are getting other seed ready. As for the task of unified buying assigned us, in fulfilling the state's planned purchase plan, we guarantee that it will be fulfilled on the 26th. We have practically collected all the tax in kind for the autumn, and nearly all the households working on their own have paid up. Two more families have joined, so we now have 20 families, with 27 men and 33 women counted as full labour power, 40 boys and girls and 2 persons without labour power. We have 163.252 *mou* of land, including small plots. We ask for the co-op to be formed in the spring of 1955."

But although the peasants in the villages which make up Hungnan Township showed themselves so keen to take the socialist road, the district leadership still couldn't come to a decision. On the contrary, in view of the fact that a few upper middle peasants who had joined the co-op because everybody else was doing so were peevish, the district leaders got the idea that "the situation was tense" and adopted the foolish policy of retreat—the policy rationalized as "concentrating all efforts on consolidation, and waiting till things are better before going on." Four or five times in succession

they cut the number of co-ops which it was intended to set up. In the autumn of 1954 they had given their word that new co-ops could be set up in the spring of 1955. Now, equally definitely, they said that no co-op would be set up in the market-gardening areas in the spring. The villagers of Hungnan had asked at the end of 1954 for co-ops to be formed, but not till February 14, 1955, was the formation of two approved. As a matter of fact, Yachanglang Co-op had already collapsed by the time the district Party committee approved it.

The wrong-headed tactics adopted—first letting the matter drag on, and then cutting down the number of co-ops to be sanctioned—were actually just what the rich peasants wanted—to follow the capitalist road. Because the district leaders took such a long time to agree to form and help Yachanglang Co-op, the wavering upper middle peasants spoke up and said they didn't want it set up at all. Three such families actually withdrew. Then five more followed suit, so that when the approval of the district Party committee did come through, there were only twelve households left. The rich peasants seized the opportunity and made the most of it. They got up to all sorts of tricks, such as pretending to be poor, giving bribes, "marrying" a dead daughter to the dead son or brother of poor peasants, to get on the good side of the poor peasants and other live-wires so as to be able to put a spoke in the wheel of socialist transformation of agriculture. In Haoshang Village, where a co-op had been set up, four out of nine rich peasants carried out overt acts of sabotage. Chen Po-yu, calling himself "a wronged rich peasant," pretended to be poor so as to gain public sympathy. Chu Chin-hsiang got round the mother of Chao Lin-ken, a poor peasant who was vice-chairman of an old co-op in Haoshang Village, by sending her gifts of food. Chu Chin-tu, another rich peasant, shamelessly cajoled Shih Lin-ti, vice-chairman of Chungtung Co-op, by marrying his dead daughter to the latter's dead elder brother. A rich peasant's daughter, the wife of Ho Chi-jen, an upper middle peasant of Yachanglang who wanted to see the co-op

set up, said to her husband, "They don't want to set it up, so what are you fooling around for?" If Ho went off to meetings in the evening, she wouldn't let him in again to sleep: she even threatened to split the family. And all the time she kept pressing Ho Chi-jen to go and work for her parents who were rich peasants. In the long run, Ho gave in and stopped working in the mutual-aid team. All this properly damped the enthusiasm of a few of those who had earlier demanded co-operative organization. "They say we'll reach socialism in a few years," they said. "Actually it'll take ages."

But the overwhelming majority of poor and lower middle peasants of Hungnan were still prepared to fight to get co-ops set up. Hsu Lung-ching, a poor peasant of Hsuchiatang Village, when he heard that the township officials would not let co-ops be formed, asked, "Why can't we have them? Everybody wants them, the mutual-aid teams have had three years' experience, and the pigs have all been brought together." The officials first tried excuses, saying that they "hadn't enough people to do the job and hadn't enough experience of giving guidance." But the peasants were not standing for that. "If you can't lead," they said, "just help. If you can't help, we'll ask other townships to give us a hand." At last the officials were driven to finding a new excuse that the district hadn't given the O.K. But the peasants cared little about O.K.'s. Some said, "Let us start the co-op first and talk about O.K.'s later. Let them do the O.K.-ing, we'll do the organizing." Others said, "All right, let it be an 'illegitimate' co-op. Let's merge the land, and we'll call it a co-op ourselves, though we don't have to tell outsiders it is." Many villages wouldn't budge and insisted that property publicly owned should remain so. In Hsuchiatang and Yachanglang, they still kept their pigs collectively. In Hsuchiatang, they put 350 yuan of public funds derived from the selling of pigs in the credit co-op and firmly refused to share it out. In Yaopinlang and Kaochiatang, land was still kept under com-

mon management. In certain villages the peasants, fearing that the township wouldn't let them set up co-ops, held discussion meetings in the evening so as to stop the local authorities knowing about it. Wang Kuo-hsiang, a poor peasant of Wangchialang Village, said, "If you disagree, we'll ask Paopei Township to show us how." Several times he went to Hsiao-pinlang Co-op in Paopei to get the benefit of their experience, and finally the villagers set up a "spontaneous co-op" on their own.

All this time, the Party branch in Hungnan Township, under the influence of the district leaders, had been hesitating and wavering, and did not dare to support the masses. Originally ten villages in the township had demanded to organize co-ops. The Party branch, however, planned to set up only seven. The plan was submitted to the district leaders, and two more were lopped off. It was not that the township people were convinced by the instructions of the district leaders, but as they were so unsure of themselves, the only thing they could do was carry them out. However, the peasants criticized them repeatedly, and they were forced to reconsider the problem, and finally started to come down on their side. In April 1955, taking up the case of one of these "spontaneous co-ops" in Wangchialang Village, the district Party committee told the township officials: "If you can talk them into stopping it, do. If you can't, try wielding the big stick." The officials refused, and told Wangchialang Co-op that if they carried on, they'd have their full backing. Dying in the last ditch, as it were, the district Party committee was forced to agree, only stipulating that Wangchialang Co-op should be given the strange name of "co-operative team." But on the day the name "co-operative team" was sanctioned, its members prominently labelled all their vegetable baskets "Wangchialang Agricultural Producers' Co-operative"!

From then on nobody or nothing could hold back the tide of agricultural co-operation in Hungnan. Beginning in August 1954, the peasants who had pressed so strongly for

co-ops, who had broken through all obstructions from above — all the dithering; delaying, dictation and damping down — at last managed to set up three. In September 1955, there reached Hsinching District the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee's directive and Chairman Mao Tse-tung's speech, saying that the peasants were to be given the full support in their drive ahead with the agricultural co-operative movement. After that, the wrong attitude of the leaders of the district Party committee, their habit of looking backward and forward, hesitating and being timid, was put right. Poor peasants who had so eagerly demanded a co-op but had been kept out ran round excitedly telling each other the news. Chu Jen-ti, a poor peasant of Yaopinlang Village, mentally counted up all the households in the village, and grinned: "We shan't be long now," he said. "Everybody except Shao Miao-lin (an upper middle peasant — *Ed.*) is longing to join." Another poor peasant Shen Pao-ti of Kaochialang looked at the fields and said, "The kidney beans have been picked and the radishes are filling out. If we are going to set up this co-op, the sooner we do it the better." The twenty households of Luchiafenshan couldn't wait any longer. Wang Cheng-hua and other poor peasants got cracking of their own accord, met four times, worked everything out and formed their co-op. The co-op in Yachanglang Village had been dissolved, but it had funds still not shared out, so the members decided not to share it. The co-operative movement is going strong all round here now. The Party branch in Hungnan Township got all its members discussing an ambitious plan to bring the whole township into co-ops. Everybody was in high spirits. Pan Fu-ti, who lived in Tientu Village, said: "They say our village is backward. But we're not, or not all of us. We want, we insist on taking the socialist road too." And he went on to suggest that a co-op should be set up in Tientu in 1956. As a result of the Party discussions, the plan for the formation of co-operatives in the winter of 1955 and

the spring of 1956 was extended. By spring, there should be 25 co-operatives in the township instead of 11, and 72 per cent of all peasant families will have joined them. Thus, semi-socialist co-operation shall be completed basically in Hungnan Township in six months' time hereafter.

THE CO-OP THE LEADERS DIDN'T WANT

(By Chen Tai-chih, *Shensi Daily* reporter, August 31, 1955)

This article tells a moving story. We hope every reader will study it carefully. We especially invite those comrades who do not believe that the people are eager to take the road to socialism, and the comrades who are always ready to grasp their knife and "cut down" co-operatives, to give this article their closest attention. Daily and hourly throughout the countryside the socialist factors are increasing. The great majority of the peasants are demanding the formation of co-operatives. A large number of intelligent, capable, fair-minded and enthusiastic leaders are springing from the midst of the people. This is a very encouraging situation. Our most serious failing is that Party leaders in many places have not bestirred themselves to keep up with it.

Our present task is to get the local Party committees at every level to take a positive Marxist-Leninist stand on this matter and assume responsibility for the entire agricultural co-operative movement, and lead it enthusiastically, gladly and wholeheartedly. They should not re-enact the story of Lord Sheh who loved dragons but was frightened out of his wits at the sight of a real one. They have been talking about socialism for years, but now that socialism has come looking for them, they are afraid of it.

— EDITOR

In the winter of 1953, an agricultural producers' co-operative was set up in Shangtsun Village, Kuotu District, Changan County, Shensi Province — the first one in the district.

Only about four *li* away lies Yangtsun Village. Its leading people, Wei Ting-tung, Wei Yao-nan, Chang Ke-hsin, and many other peasant activists, often inquired how the co-operative in Shangtsun Village was getting on with its crops.

After the co-op had shared out its autumn harvest, Wei Ting-tung called on its chairman, Tan Chung-chih, and had a talk with him about the increase in the income of the members. Peasants in the mutual-aid teams in Yangtsun also learned about the co-op from their relatives and friends in Shangtsun. Seeing that the co-op had a promising future, that its output of farm products was greater, and the income of its members higher than in the mutual-aid team, many Yangtsun peasants became eager to set up a co-op themselves.

In the winter of 1954, all the neighbouring villages were talking about the same thing. In order to prepare the people of Yangtsun for co-operative farming, the district committee of the Communist Party invited them to hear reports on how co-ops were being formed in some neighbouring villages. In addition, the leading peasants in Yangtsun often organized their fellow villagers to study the subject. The snow was knee-deep in the fields and long icicles hung from the eaves. Yet the peasants, without needing any persuasion, flocked to the village meeting room every night when the bell for studies was sounded.

The surging tide of agricultural co-operation was a great stimulus to the people of Yangtsun Village, particularly to those poor peasants who burned to join a co-op. Later that winter, after the first group of co-ops had been set up, new co-ops mushroomed in all the surrounding areas. Even tractors were expected in the locality soon, as a plan had been worked out for a tractor station in Shangtsun.

Inspired by a general enthusiastic desire to take the socialist road, the Yangtsun peasants asked again and again to found a co-op. Some complained: "It is about three years now since the mutual-aid teams were set up in our village. What conditions are lacking for a co-op?" The leaders—Wei Ting-tung and others—saw that the peasants were really very enthusiastic. Besides, they themselves longed to see a co-op in their village as soon as possible. So they decided to prepare for it by setting up a combined mutual-aid team—a large team made up of several small ones. This method had been employed in Tungfu and Hsifu Villages where co-ops were being formed at the time.

A BIG COMBINED MUTUAL-AID TEAM WITH EIGHTY HOUSEHOLDS

Their proposal was supported by the township head. But several key people feared that some mutual-aid team members might not be willing to join. It was decided, therefore, that those willing to join should apply for membership individually. When this was announced at a mass meeting, the peasants were so quick to respond that it was as if someone had set off a string of firecrackers. That very night, more than fifty of the ninety-odd households of the village applied to join the combined team. Early next morning more peasants knocked at Wei Ting-tung's door, telling him that their households would join. They had made up their minds, they said, when they had gone home and talked the matter over with their families, after the previous night's meeting. Later that morning, still another thirty households applied, bringing the total to over eighty.

Earlier, something else had happened in Yangtsun. Wei Ting-tung, Wei Yao-nan, Chang Ke-hsin and others had proposed to merge the five mutual-aid teams they led, and to persuade any members who disagreed to withdraw. In their

plan, the amalgamation would include only these teams. But when this was made public, it met instant and wide opposition. Many peasants criticized those leaders who had proposed it. "Can't we all take the path of socialism?" the peasants said. "Why should your teams do it alone? We are for the voluntary principle; anyone who wants to take the road can do it. It is unfair to keep us out." Seeing the peasants' brimming enthusiasm, the leaders had to let them apply their way.

On the fifth day of the first lunar month of 1955, just after the Spring Festival, the combined mutual-aid team started moving manure to the fields. Although organization was not good, working spirit was so high that the peasants were already at their job, lanterns in hand, before dawn broke. In the course of the work, however, a difference of opinion arose. One man complained that his manure had been moved too late; another protested that his ox had been loaded too heavily. There was a mass of different opinions. Men who had joined the team in a flash of enthusiasm began to waver. The combined mutual-aid team had rushed forward too hastily; now it was bursting at the seams. Soon afterwards, it broke up.

SECOND APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP

In the second lunar month, new co-ops began to be set up again in Kuotu District. When the district Party committee sent some cadres to Kungchang Village for this work, those Yangtsun peasants who were bent on having a co-op raised their demand once more. The committee began to help them to achieve their desire. But when the peasants had heard three reports on how to organize a co-op and were expecting the last one (on how to solve the concrete problems), the committee decided to stop work in Kungchang and Yangtsun Villages.

The peasants were very critical of this. They asked why the committee workers should substitute a "cold water bath"

for Chairman Mao's policy of "active leadership." Some suggested that they should set up a co-op themselves. Wei Ting-tung asked the Party branch secretary whether it would be possible to set up a co-op in the form of a combined mutual-aid team. The secretary disapproved of this proposal, but the branch committee made a thorough study of the situation. It suggested that the peasants grow their autumn crops on one continuous tract of land, to lay the foundation for establishing a co-op after the summer harvest.

Seeing that the Party branch had made this suggestion and that the peasants were eager for a co-op, Wei Ting-tung and other leaders in the village set four conditions under which members of the existing mutual-aid teams could join the new combined team. They were: 1) cotton must be put under a unified management; 2) autumn crops must be grown on one continuous tract of land; 3) vegetable plots must be reserved after the standard of a co-op; 4) all members must invest enthusiastically in the team's production.

Many poor peasants and new middle peasants supported these conditions. The evening they were announced, 36 households applied for membership. Then, just as it was happening in those villages where regular cadres were leading the setting-up of co-ops, all applicants were examined to find the degree of their socialist consciousness, and whether their families were all willing to join. The proposed staff of the combined team were also examined one by one, their merits and demerits being considered fully. Some of them even made self-criticisms at the meeting.

As a result of this examination, four households withdrew from team participation while five others applied to join. Finally, an agricultural producers' co-operative came into being, with the poor peasants occupying a dominant position (of the 37 member households, 28 were poor peasants). But they still called their co-op a "combined mutual-aid team" in dealing with the outside.

COMBINED MUTUAL-AID TEAM IN NAME; AGRICULTURAL PRODUCERS' CO-OPERATIVE IN FACT

After the formation of the "combined mutual-aid team," with the general agreement of the members, the summer crops continued to belong to the peasants owning the land on which they were grown. Just as in an ordinary mutual-aid team, peasants had to make up by paying wages any difference between the amount of work they did on others' land, and what others did for them. The summer crops were harvested very smoothly, without a single dispute arising among the members.

As for autumn crops and cotton, they were apportioned in the following way: 52 per cent went to pay for labour, and 48 per cent was paid as dividends on land shares. In order to protect the interest of members who had more cotton fields than others, the dividends for cotton were distributed only among members who owned or worked in the cotton fields.

In deciding the payment for the work done by draught animals, the method was first to make a rough estimate of the work each ox or other animal could do, and then to record the work it had actually done on that day. Before the summer harvest, the "team" members wanted to pool their draught animals into the "team" for collective rearing. But when Wei Ting-tung, its leader, told this to the head of the construction section of the county people's council who stopped briefly at Yangtsun on an inspection tour, the latter did not agree.

"Even agricultural producers' co-ops don't encourage their members to pool their draught animals into the co-ops," he said. "Still less should a mutual-aid team. You haven't gathered your summer harvest. If your team pools the animals, what will you do if you meet trouble in the summer harvest?" Accepting his advice, the leading members of the "team" decided that the payment for work done by the mem-

bers' draught animals should be made on the work-day system.

As for land, the members' fields were evaluated and contributed as shares to the "team." A land share represented either a section of cotton field with a normal yield of 70 catties of raw cotton or a section of land which could normally produce 300 catties of wheat.

Like an agricultural producers' co-op, this "combined mutual-aid team" had a management committee and production brigades. It had no stockmen's section, because the draught animals were still fed by the members; no storekeepers' section because the farm implements had not been pooled; and no section for subsidiary occupations because the "team" still managed none. But it had all other sections of an agricultural producers' co-op; such as those for culture and education, technique and inspection.

LEARNING FROM NEIGHBOURING CO-OPS

Naturally, such a co-op, which had been set up only through the persevering efforts of the peasants themselves, could not expect its difficulties in farm management to be few. Fortunately, however, its members were able to solve many problems by learning from good friends and close relatives who held key positions in co-ops in the neighbouring areas.

They received great help, for instance, from the Tungjuchia Village Agricultural Producers' Co-operative, farming land that borders on Yangtsun Village. When members of the two co-ops rested after field work, they often sat together and talked about co-operative farming.

When the members of the Yangtsun Co-op did not know how to draw up plans for reaping their summer harvest and sowing the autumn crop, they invited a book-keeper from the Tungjuchia Village Co-op to guide them.

When some skilled members did not know how to calculate the work-days due them after they had worked for

other people, Wei Ting-tung solved the problem by seeking advice from the chairman of the Hochihpei Agricultural Producers' Co-op. Now that the autumn harvest and sowing are approaching the Yangtsun Co-op is carefully studying the harvesting, sowing and wheat-growing plans of the May Fourth Co-op in Shangtsun.

This was why the secretary of the township Party branch said in explaining the reasons for the good production of the co-op: "First, the members do their jobs voluntarily; nobody has been forced to do anything. With the voluntary spirit, many kinds of work can be done well. Second, the leading co-op members are eager to study. If there is anything they don't understand, they ask others for explanation." Telling about how the co-op had kept going, Wei Ting-tung said: "The Party's policies are good. If you don't understand, you must learn from others."

THE DISTRICT AND TOWNSHIP CADRES ALSO GAVE SUPPORT

In the later days of the "combined mutual-aid team," when the district Party committee and township Party branch saw the fairly good results it was getting, they began to give it considerable help. The district Party committee ordered its cadres staying in the neighbouring villages to help the "team." The township Party branch frequently sent its cadres to the "team." Leading "team" members were also invited to attend conferences of co-op chairmen called in the district and the township.

At one time, for instance, the "team" lacked a system of responsibility in transporting compost. The work was computed according to the number of parts into which it had been divided in a day, and which the members had done, no matter whether the manure had been carried far or near and whether the work had been done well or not. When this caused dissatisfaction among the members, the "team" lead-

ers asked the secretary of the township Party branch for advice. He told them that they should first find out how much time it would take to bring a cart of manure to the far fields and how much to the near fields; then compute the work on this basis.

When the wheat fields were being harrowed, some leading members of the "team" proposed to draw women into the work by giving them more work-days than were their due. Hearing this, the secretary of the township Party branch thought they had misunderstood the principle of equal pay for equal work. He told them that the women's work-days should be computed by the exact amount of work they had done; that it was improper to give the women more than the right number of work-days. They should prompt the women to work, he explained, by raising their outlook on life, not just by crediting them with more work-days.

SUCSESSES ACHIEVED IN PRODUCTION

After the peasants themselves had formed their co-op, they began to produce with unstinted enthusiasm. As soon as the "team" came into being, they dismantled the city wall and with the money they earned they bought manure. In 11 days they tore down 41 battlements and were able to buy more than 1,400 cartloads of manure which they applied to all their cotton and autumn crop fields. Now, both their cotton and their autumn crop are growing much taller than those grown by villagers outside the "team." This is one of the important reasons why the "team" members feel confident.

When Wei Cheng-fu, one of the members, saw the crops in his field, he said: "Crops never grew so well in my fields before. It's since I joined the team that they have become so abundant." Another member, Nan Chih-chieh, a poor peasant who had migrated from Shanghsien County, said: "With such good crops, I'll have enough grain to eat from

my land shares alone, not to mention the earnings I'll get for my work-days."

After careful investigation, the Kuotu District Party Committee found that Yangtsun Village had all the conditions for setting up a co-op. It decided that an agricultural producers' co-operative must be formally established there before autumn harvest. It has now sent cadres to make a check of the "team" and solve some practical problems for it.

TOWNSHIP AND VILLAGE OFFICIALS CAN LEAD THE FORMATION OF CO-OPERATIVES

(By Yeh Han in the Sinkiang Tien Nan Daily,
October 16, 1955)

This is a good article. One can see from it that the Uighur peasants are very eager to take the road to co-operation. They have already trained the personnel they need for putting semi-socialist co-operation into effect. Some people claim that co-operation cannot succeed among the national minority peoples. This is not so. We have seen that the Mongols, the Huis, the Uighurs, the Miaos, the Chuangs, and other minority peoples already have quite a few co-operatives, some of which are composed of people of various national minorities. Moreover, all very successful. This fact demolishes the erroneous viewpoint of those who look down on the national minority peoples.

— EDITOR

IN THE FACE OF DIFFICULTIES

In the spring of 1955, the Seman District Party Committee (Shufu County, Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region) drew up a plan and started getting ready to set up thirty agricultural producers' co-operatives in the winter of 1955 and spring of 1956. When the summer crops were distributed, the district committee found itself in difficulties. Members began to be dubious about whether the plan was feasible. But this

passed. As harvest time approached the peasants got really keen on joining the co-operatives. Members of mutual-aid teams on their own initiative visited co-ops and asked the members to tell them how they had increased production and how the co-op's income was shared out. Many members of mutual-aid teams and individual peasants applied to join the existing co-ops. Members of the permanent mutual-aid teams which had been preparing to turn themselves into co-ops came to the district committee and said they wanted to make the change before winter wheat sowing. The district committee looked into the situation and decided that the peasants were in the right frame of mind and that the time was ripe to go ahead with co-operatives. But though the committee was now more confident, they were still chary of letting them develop freely, because some of the leading members of the committee were pondering over a very important question—how were they going to find people to take the lead in setting up the co-ops and getting them going. It was work that would take a lot of people when such a number of co-ops were to be set up, and it still take people to put them on a sound footing after they were set up. There were only sixteen people on the district committee all told. Take away those who had to do the ordinary office work and one or two others who had to be left free to look after the affairs of the whole district, and you only had about ten people who could actually go down to the township to give a hand in the work. The committee was already short-staffed because the South Sinkiang Regional Committee of the Party had taken some of its members from its work team, some before and some after the summer harvest. There was plenty of work to be done among the 26 existing co-ops—preparations for distributing the year's income and giving these co-ops a proper check-up. They turned the matter over and over again, but there didn't seem to be any way of getting round the shortage of people to do the job. What were they to do? The only way to solve this problem would be to ask the high-

er authorities for more. "If more people are made available 'from above,'" thought the comrades on the committee, "we'll set up more co-ops. If we can't get any, we won't set up so many." They went even further than that, saying: "Even if co-ops are set up, they can't be put on a firm basis unless there are the people to do it. Perhaps it's better not to set them up at all."

The reply from above came back quickly: Not one more for the district, so that was that. The comrades on the committee could see only one thing for it: to cut the number of new co-ops to be formed. They tried to cut the plan by proposing to set up 12 co-ops, either before or after autumn harvest, saying that it wasn't really such a small number, considering how few people they had. But the peasants went on clamouring louder and louder for more co-ops to be set up. And the directives from the higher authorities which reached the district committee one after another also demanded a greater growth of the co-operative movement. This forced the comrades on the committee to reconsider things. Was there any good reason to alter the plan when preparations to set up 30 new co-ops had been going on ever since the spring? Was there any reason for a pace-making district which the regional and county committees had been nursing and encouraging for a very long time to slow down the pace of the co-operative movement? Ought we to let the co-ops develop to the full, as the peasants were demanding? Or ought we to "drastically compress" the plan because there weren't enough officers? If the former, how were we to get over the question of leadership? These were the difficulties the comrades on the district committee were up against.

LOOKING FOR THEM "DOWN BELOW"

The higher authorities were adamant. The regional and county committees knew the situation in Seman District, and were convinced that compression of the district plan was out

of the question: they must let the co-ops develop to the full. Difficulties had to be overcome. If it wasn't possible to set up the co-ops by the existing methods or leadership, the methods had to be changed. They told the district committee bluntly that they must turn to full account the enthusiasm of the peasants, and the capabilities and understanding of policy of the officials actually in the township and village. In mid-August, the regional committee relayed Chairman Mao's report on agricultural co-operation to the comrades on the district committee. It was a great inspiration to them. It was only then that they began to turn their attention to the township and village officers and decided to let them take the lead in forming the co-ops. Going further into the matter, the district committee found that they were perfectly capable of taking on the work. They'd been hardened in the course of many political movements over a long period. They had a pretty high level of political understanding and most of them had the makings of leaders. There was a Party branch in each of the nine townships in the district with more than a hundred Party members all told. Still more important was the fact that the mutual-aid and co-operative movement in the district had started early. Every township had its co-ops, and most of the township and village officials had taken part in running the co-ops. In every township the Party branch had organized beginners' courses and this stood them in good stead. And as they were already quite familiar with the policy governing the setting-up of co-ops and how they were to be run, they were, for the most part, quite capable of giving the peasants a lead without outside help. Moreover, the best of the people who had been running the existing 26 co-operatives and gained some experience, could also take the lead in forming new ones. The peasants who were preparing to form themselves into co-ops had been turning the idea over in their minds for a long time, and had been helped and educated by the district and township authorities for quite a while, so conditions for forming co-ops had never been

more favourable. The township and village officials had another advantage: they knew what the actual conditions were, and were on good terms with the peasants. It was far easier for them to tackle problems than anybody "imported" from outside. If you could use them, there was the question of leaders to set up the new co-ops settled. All this made the comrades on the district committee feel far more sure of themselves. They drew up a bold plan to set up 36 co-operatives in the autumn and winter of 1955, the first 22 to be formed before the autumn harvest and winter sowing. Then, after further investigation in all the townships, they made the latter figure 25. Township and village officials plunged into the job with confidence. In a fortnight — from September 18 to about October 1 — the work of establishing the new co-ops was practically finished. In fact, besides the original 25, an extra co-op was set up at the demand of the local officials and peasants. That meant that, counting three co-ops which were affiliated to other co-ops, there were now 29 new co-ops in the district, embracing over 700 peasant households. To establish them it took 26 township officials, 29 from the villages and 28 from the older co-operatives. The new co-ops were all well up to standard: they got the peasants quickly off their mark; they tackled problems as they arose; and the members were really keen on boosting production. From the time the village co-ops started to be formed slackness in farm work stopped. A new spirit took its place — the desire to do a real good job. This winter (1955) 80 per cent of the co-ops will be in a position to use up to 35 bags of compost *per mou* on their wheat fields. That is more than middle peasants normally use. Things like this are, of course, mainly the outcome of the whole year's preparation, but it must also be put down to the work put in by the local officials who gave the lead. True, concrete problems were not solved as carefully as they might have been when the co-ops were being set up, and proper regulations have still not been drawn up, but what shortcomings there

are can be cured. All this shows how wrong those comrades on the district committee who weren't prepared to trust the local people were, and the way the work actually developed has been a lesson to them.

GIVE THEM A FREE HAND

The local officers were able to do this important job because, trained and helped by the district leaders, they drew on previous experience in organizing co-operatives, took a proper attitude to their work as leaders and grasped the proper way of giving leadership. This is how the Seman District made sure that the local officers did carry out this work energetically and well.

First, the district committee, because it wanted to give the local officers a clear understanding of the way to set about forming co-ops and make them more able by learning from such work as had already been done, had a thorough discussion with the township officers about how to select the most suitable areas, how to turn the enthusiasm of the peasants to good account, and how to select and train people for key jobs. This it did before the organization of the co-ops started, and when committee members were visiting townships for a final check over the situation. In mid-September, the district committee called a meeting of the township officers to go over with them the proper procedure and methods of work in the light of the actual situation, and help them clear up an important question: how to avoid interfering with production while the co-ops were being set up.

Secondly, the district committee clearly explained the policy and methods to be pursued in forming the co-ops. Before new co-ops were formed, it issued a pamphlet based on the experience of the older co-ops and opinions expressed by the peasants and taking into consideration the ability of the township comrades. This pamphlet gave in plain words the committee's views on how best to solve various practical problems.

After the pamphlet had been distributed in the townships, the district committee summoned the principal township comrades to the district office to discuss it item by item. They did this in order to give them a better understanding of the Party's policy towards the different classes in the countryside, to ram home the point that membership of the agricultural co-operative movement had to be voluntary and based on mutual benefit, and to show them how to apply this policy and this principle whenever problems cropped up. After they went back the district committee did everything it could to settle any doubts and problems they had, and to nip any misconceptions about how policy was to operate in the bud. It also gave them a copy of the regulations of the Kuang-mang Agricultural Producers' Co-operative in the same district, a pretty good one, for reference. These were all steps intended to make sure that the township and village comrades understood what the policy was and applied it in their work.

Thirdly, the district committee helped the Party branches improve collective leadership. To leave the formation of a co-op to a Party branch secretary or to leave a single township officer or Party member in charge in a village or co-op, would inevitably result in questions being shelved or not fully recognized, and that was bound to lead to shortcomings and errors. That is why ever since preparations to set up the co-ops started in 1955 the need for collective leadership had been so much stressed. Party branch meetings made a close study of the areas chosen and the comrades picked to lead the work. The question of mutual-aid teams also came up for discussion at the Party branches every so often, and they chose suitable people to give the teams a hand. When they actually started forming the co-operatives, the Party branches took further steps to improve collective leadership. First, they studied and took collective decisions on the way work was to be done, the individual plan for each village, and how work was to be shared out between Party members and town-

ship officials. At the time when the co-ops were being formed, the village and Party officials put in a record of the number of households in each co-op and their class status, lists of candidates for the co-op management and supervisory committees, and their proposals for solving certain problems. These were then examined by the Party branch committees, and finally discussed and decided on at co-operative members' meetings. Any particularly important questions which cropped up during the work were put before the Party branch at the first possible moment.

Fourthly, the district committee took steps to see that frequent tours of inspection were made to ensure a more timely exchange of experience, to correct shortcomings and to give special help to the weak links. After the work of forming the co-ops was started, three members of the district committee responsible for the job made daily rounds of the township and villages to see how things were going. It used to take them about a couple of days to inspect the whole township. When problems were found and solved the district committee members used to come together to exchange experience, form a considered opinion about how to improve the work, pass it on to those concerned, and then continue with their rounds. Sometimes, when quite a lot of problems cropped up in one township, they would go there, call meetings of members of the Party branch or of the township officials and give them tips and clear up doubts in their minds, so that they knew the principles, policies and intentions of the higher authorities, and became better fitted to carry them out. In this way they gave the local people a great deal of help in solving problems as they arose, and also made sure that serious errors were avoided. Because it was real hard work, because the area was big and there were not enough district officials to be sent to the townships and villages to give leadership during the establishment of the co-ops, the district committee found this collective study of problems and

these tours of inspection an extremely important way of guiding the work once the co-ops were set up.

Lastly, the district committee took steps to deal with the mistakes and shortcomings the township and village officials made in setting up the co-ops. The mutual-aid and co-operative movement grew so fast that of course mistakes were made — things like going all out for large co-ops and large numbers of co-ops and forgetting all about quality. There were cases, too, where individuals took action which ran counter to policy, like ordering and forcing peasants to join the co-ops and interfering with the interests of the middle peasants. These errors had to be quickly put right, and they were corrected mainly by education, not by reprimands, because mere reprimands were likely to discourage officials from showing initiative. In the initial stages, quite a few of them did not fully understand the principle of advancing steadily and setting up co-ops batch by batch. All they wanted was to get more and more people into the co-ops, not realizing how harmful it was to drag in those who weren't politically ready to come in. There were others who showed a tendency to drag well-to-do peasants in against their will and keep the poor peasants out. In such cases the leading comrades on the district committee always patiently explained to them and made them clearly understand the policy and principles of the Party. For example, in one of the villages a really serious mistake was made: Peasants were actually lined up to sign for membership. To put this right the Party branch did not reprimand the local officials as a group, but button-holed every one of them singly, clearly explained policy, and let them correct their own mistake. In that way the Party branch not only righted a wrong, but preserved their confidence and initiative. We think that is the proper way of doing things.

MY EXPERIENCE AS CHAIRMAN OF A LARGE CO-OPERATIVE

(As told by Liang Hsiang-sheng, Chairman of the First Masses' Co-operative, Chungshan County, Kwangtung Province, to a work team sent by the county authorities; first published in "Strengthening Co-operatives in Chungshan County," May 1955)

Do not think that the co-operative movement can advance on a large scale only in the old liberated areas, but not in the areas liberated later. This view is not in keeping with reality. Co-operation can be introduced on a large scale in the later liberated areas too. Some counties, districts and townships which were liberated relatively late will probably achieve co-operation at the same time as, or even sooner than, the localities liberated earlier. There are already a number of cases which prove this point. It all depends on whether the Party leads the movement properly, whether it can keep mistakes down to a minimum.

This article is the record of an interview with a co-operative chairman in Chungshan County, Kwangtung Province. Judging by what he tells us of his work, he is in no way inferior to co-op chairmen in the old liberated areas. In fact some of them are probably not up to his standard.

— EDITOR

UNTANGLING MYSELF FROM ROUTINE

Our co-op was originally only a little one — 16 households — till in the autumn of 1954 it was enlarged to 130 households. I had been chairman for a year. In my endeavours to lead a co-op of this size well I ran into a good deal of difficulties. A turning-point in my work came in the spring of 1955 when our co-op started getting ready for ploughing.

When our large co-op started work, everything was chaos. Every day, morning, noon and night, I was besieged by crowds of people all demanding that I should solve their problems, big and small. One would ask, "How many boat loads of silt should we put on this plot of land?" Another would say, "Today we hauled the silt further than yesterday. How many work-points does it rate?" A production brigade leader would ask, "Who's the best man to send to handle the scoop on the silt hauling?" The cashier would ask, "What shall I do? There's no money for oil for the capstan." All this flustered me so much that I got all of a daze.

At the time I wasn't at all clear about my own duties, so I just dealt with whatever business came to my attention. I even took it on myself to go from house to house to fetch members when they failed to turn up for work. As soon as I got up of a morning, I started rousing people and getting them out to work. I did a lot of work but very little thinking. As the saying goes, I was so busy picking up sesame seeds that I neglected the water-melon. Muddling along like this only made things worse, and my work became less and less systematic. I couldn't get a moment to spare to sort things out.

Then I asked myself: What is the most important thing for a co-op chairman to do? What are the key things to concentrate on?

My experience as chairman of the small co-op taught me that first of all I must get a grip on production so that the co-op could go about its work systematically. That meant I

must devote myself to the production plan and the proper organization and use of labour.

Remembering this, I did my best to concentrate on these important problems and leave other work to the other co-op officers. For instance, I asked the book-keeper and cashier to handle the financial side of the co-op, although in the past the bank always paid out on my private seal alone. I also made the vice-chairman responsible for such work as buying and hiring boats. As for seeing that members turned up for work and giving out jobs, I made this the responsibility of the leaders of the production teams and groups, though I always discussed the matter with them beforehand. In this way, I left myself enough time to consider how best to arrange the production work of the co-op and really guide it along the right channels.

A LEADER MUST DO MORE THAN SET AN EXAMPLE OF KEENNESS

Although I realized that my first duty was to see to production, there still remained the big problem of how to do it and provide good leadership. The way I'd led the small 16-household co-op was to take part in farm work myself and set a good example on every job we did. In those days, I used to plan how to arrange the work of the co-op while working in the fields. At the most I only left a bit earlier than the others to look over the work done on other plots of co-op land. In this way I always had a good notion beforehand of what production problems had to be tackled, what we were to do next and when members were to be given new jobs. In those days, I was simple and thought I could lead production by taking part myself and doing everything well. For instance, when we were doing the summer cultivation and the sun was blazing down and many of our members thought it was too hot to work, I set an example by keeping going.

The other members followed suit, and we got the cultivation finished.

But this method of leading didn't work at all after we turned into a large co-op. At first I continued to work in Group 1 of Brigade 1. I even went so far as to get up extra early every morning so as to chase the members out of bed and get them to work. But nobody could get 300 members of 130 households moving this way. On the contrary, by burying myself in one group of one production brigade I didn't know what was going on in the co-op as a whole. I didn't know how much progress was made with the work, how much silt had been put on, or how much land had been turned. I hadn't an idea how many members were turning up or not turning up to work, how work was allocated or how efficient the members were. In the evenings when I got together with the vice-chairman and the production brigade leaders I found them in the same fix. They were all too busy setting an example in one particular group to discover how the whole production brigade was getting on. This made planning of work quite impossible.

Only then did it dawn on me that when I went to the fields to lead the work, I must have something specific in mind. I should go there to find out how things were and discover problems, but not just to set an example. With this in mind, I left off burying myself in one particular group of one particular brigade, and started making the rounds of the fields. Every day I toured them, finding out how each production brigade was getting on, talking things over with the leaders and members of the brigade and finding out what the general situation was.

GOING TO THE FIELDS

In the very first few days in the fields I discovered many problems.

First of all, a number of brigade leaders and group leaders simply had no idea of how to hand work out and show the

men how to do it. They couldn't see that it was necessary to divide the men into temporary working groups according to the needs of the moment. For instance, spreading silt was originally a job that seven people could manage easily: one to handle the spade and five or six to carry and spread the buckets of silt. But some of our brigade put 14 men on to this job, and Group 2 of Brigade 2 had all 22 group members on it. Of course everybody got in everybody else's way and someone was always standing around waiting idly. . . . It was a sheer waste of labour. I promptly discussed the matter with Wu Jun-kuei, leader of the brigade. He'd already noticed that some of his men were standing idle but couldn't think of a better arrangement. Besides, he wasn't bold enough to suggest a new method of work. In a short session on the spot I pointed out that doing it in the old way was just wasting time, and we decided that he should split his men into temporary working groups. The 22 members of Group 2 were therefore split into three small groups, who did a far more efficient job.

The second thing I discovered was that some of our members were so eager to get a lot done that quality suffered. I found that Lu Chuan-hai in Group 4, Brigade 1 made a very poor job of hoeing, hacking up one row of stubble and leaving the next, covered by the soil thrown up, untouched. I made the members of his group come and look at his work, asked them whether this way of hoeing would increase the yield, gave the culprit a telling-off, asking him if he realized who'd suffer from his rotten work.

The third thing I discovered was that the way we calculated work-points wasn't at all fair. In brigades with leaders who weren't particularly forceful, members often found it difficult to decide what work-points should be given to each person. Usually, at the meetings to decide the work-points nobody said anything, so after a while they stopped having them, and the work-points weren't properly discussed at all. The result of that was a falling-off of enthusiasm among the

members. I explained to the brigade leaders how to fix a standard individual norm for each job done by the group and decide the work-points due to the individual by comparing his work with the norm. Still the members couldn't get used to it and thought it far too complicated. So I had another talk with the vice-chairman and we worked out piece-rates based on a fair level of individual skill.

In my daily rounds I also discovered other problems such as absenteeism.

I came to see that this way of touring the fields was a good way of getting to understand things in the co-op and unearthing problems. It was far better to get down to the fields myself and have short sessions with the brigade leaders on the spot than to wait till the evening and get them to report to me at a meeting. I found out far more, and my officers weren't tired out by late evening meetings. Besides, in my trips round the fields I took in at a glance the number who'd turned up, the mood of the members, how efficiently they were working and the quality of the work done. The problems I discovered on my rounds I brought to the attention of the vice-chairman and the brigade leaders when we got together for a few minutes in the evenings.

I gradually found out too, as the months went by, that I must know what I wanted before I went on such tours. It was no use roaming round at random. By this I mean two things: First, I had to know whatever was specially important at any given time. For instance, when it was getting on for time to transplant seedlings, I concentrated on keeping track of the brigade and group plans—when and where they were going to start, whether they had enough people to finish it in time and so on. When transplanting started, I looked into the way work was arranged and divided among the members, for instance, to make sure that the number of people lifting seedlings and the number transplanting them were about right, so that neither group was kept waiting. Then I paid special attention to setting the correct piece-rate

and seeing that it was applied. The second thing was to know when to concentrate on areas needing extra care. As a rule, I went to the production brigade which had run into trouble or had the biggest problems to find out the situation for myself. For instance, when we finished transplanting in the ordinary fields and switched to transplanting in the tidal fields (that is, fields which are flooded by tidal rivers when the water rises and drained when the water ebbs), Brigade 1 could only work half time because the land they were working on was flooded. I went to the field where they were working and got them to build up the embankment round the field and this stopped the tidal water flowing in. Then they were able to work full time again.

KNOWING THE FIGURES

If you wanted to lead our large co-op well and see that its production plans came off, you couldn't just depend on impressions and do things on the spur of the moment. I certainly couldn't get a proper picture of what was happening in our co-op by merely trusting to impressions. You had to get down to figures—to know, for instance, how many members turned up for work every day, how much work they did, how efficient they were, how work was progressing and whether we could finish our jobs in time. Once I had such facts at my finger-tips I was able to tackle a host of problems.

When we first started getting ready for spring ploughing in 1955 we still didn't realize that to lead the work of the co-op one had to master the important figures. We learned this from bitter experience. At that time I didn't even have accurate figures of the number of households, the number of people in them and the manpower we had in the co-op. As for the number of people who'd turn up for work every day, that was also an unknown factor. Sometimes so many turned up that we hadn't got the tools to go round and didn't know what to do with them. Sometimes so few turned up there

were not enough people to man the boats, and we'd paid for the hire of boats we couldn't use. It was all a terrible mix-up.

Later, we took a rapid census of the households, the number of people and estimated their labour power. We set the strong ones — those who could be counted as "full manpower" — to dig up the silt while the others were set to hoeing or spreading the silt. In the evenings we went over the number of absentees. If we found the figure on the high side we looked into it and did something about it. In this way we gradually learned the importance of figures. For instance, at first, efficiency in dredging up silt was quite low. Then we started recording the amount dredged up by individual boat teams and discovered that one boat, manned by Wu Lien-shen's team, was able to do 480 loads a day. Most of the teams were doing about 300, and the weakest no more than 270. Now, why did they vary all that much? We tracked it down and found that most of the boat teams started out pretty late in the morning and left off rather early. Also, people in a team didn't work in step with one another — some were slow and some were fast. But Wu Lien-shen's team was different. They not only worked longer, but they worked at an even speed, and the men handling the scoop, the capstan and the boat worked well with one another. That was why that team was so efficient. When we found this out, we promptly passed on their experience to the other boat teams, and so they were able to do better. On another occasion it was nearly time to start transplanting and I wanted to check whether the production brigades and groups would be able to get ready in time, so I asked each group to estimate the number of work-days they'd need to complete their preparations. Group 2 of Brigade 1 had been taking it easy and going ahead leisurely. I went to them myself and with them calculated the number of work-days they'd have to put in before spring ploughing. When they saw that they couldn't possibly start transplanting in time if they went on working like that, they

got busy immediately. They began to start early and leave off late, split up the work better and speed up so much that they finished their preparations in good time.

My experience over the past few months has shown that before I can direct production according to plan and organize and make rational use of labour I must first have plenty of facts and figures. I'm no scholar, but I usually tried to take down as many figures as I could. Sometimes I enlisted the help of other people and asked them to make an entry in my notebook. Sometimes I got the book-keeper to help me take down the figures quoted by the brigade leaders when they came to report on the work.

But this was only a beginning. Lately we made a few bad mistakes in our work because we hadn't the right figures to help us. For instance, because we didn't work out beforehand how many work-days it would take to transplant seedlings to a stretch of land, how long the work should take and when it would have to be finished, we went about it leisurely and took longer over transplanting than peasants working on their own and in mutual-aid teams. Another thing was that we didn't have a clear idea how many seedlings were needed to the *mou*. When we were transplanting we made a rough estimate and thought that we had too many, so we sold some. Then in the end we ran short of seedlings for a hundred *mou* or so.

GETTING MORE ASSISTANTS

To lead a co-op as big as ours well naturally called for the efforts of more than one person. The job had to be shouldered in common by all the officers of the co-op.

At the start, however, we were all inexperienced and often fell down on the job. For instance, at the meeting of officers, Liang Chi-an, our vice-chairman, was given the job of leading the work of hauling silt, but he didn't know how to do it. He hadn't the faintest idea how many people turned up

for work every day, how much silt they got, how efficient the teams were, or what his members thought about it all. Once when some of them failed to come to work, instead of finding out why they were getting slack he pitched in himself. He was so busy standing in for someone else that he had no time to look after other things and clean forgot to tell people that a low embankment round the paddy field wanted repairing. One night all the water in the paddy field seeped away and silt hauling was held up for a whole day.

When accidents like this happened I felt I must give my comrades the benefit of my experience. "You can work yourself to the bone," I told Liang, "but it's not half as good as when you persuade all the members to give a hand. An officer can't just depend on what his own two hands can do; he must use his brains too. Now, you lead the work of hauling silt, so you ought to have all the necessary figures and see from them where the problems lie. For instance, you can find out just what Wu Lien-shen's experience in scooping silt is and get the other teams to use his method. Isn't that far more sensible than just working your own guts out?"

Ordinarily when I got together with my officers and brigade leaders the first thing I asked them was, "Now what's the main problem you're up against these days?" or "Look now, what are the duties of a person in charge of supplies?" My intention in asking such questions was to get them thinking and making them work out ways and means for themselves.

In training officers, the important thing is not only to improve their skill but to help them develop politically. Some of our officers were vague about what their work meant, some were easily daunted by difficulties. It's up to me to help them and give them encouragement. Take the case of the leader of our Brigade 5 for instance. The members of Brigade 5 are a very mixed batch, quite a few of them used to be pedlars and poor vagrants. They weren't used to hard work and were difficult to lead. The brigade leader lost

confidence more than once and wanted to give up being an official. "On your shoulders," I said to him, "rest the rice jars of scores of households. How can you pack up and leave the job half-done?" Afterwards I gave him some advice on the best way to lead his members, and we talked about the best way of arranging work and settling work-points. That's how I helped him to gain confidence in himself.

A PARTY BRANCH LEADS THE MUTUAL-AID AND CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT CORRECTLY

(In *The Work in Shensi*, No. 18, July 6, 1955)

This is a useful article. All rural Party branches should follow the examples it cites.

Reports from a number of places confirm the need for the co-op management committees to elect one of their members to take charge of political education. Such persons should be elected in all co-ops and devote themselves to political work under the leadership of the Party branch.

The establishment of a "mutual-aid and co-operative network," or a "joint management committee of co-ops," like the one in Yanghopa Township, Shensi, obviously is a good idea.

Of one thing we may be sure — working people, given proper political education, can overcome their shortcomings and correct their mistakes. As the reader can see, thanks to the political work done in this township, co-op members who had been privately trading in pigs gave it up, while those who had been starving the co-ops' oxen soon fed them fat and sleek.

— EDITOR

Established in 1952, the Communist Party branch of the Yanghopa Township, Hsihsiang County, Shensi Province, now has 22 members. All of them play active and leading roles in local mutual-aid and co-operative organizations.

Led by the Party branch, 72 per cent of the township's peasant households are now organized. There are nine agricultural producers' co-operatives in the township, to which 40 per cent of its peasant households belong.

The experience of this Party branch in leading mutual-aid and co-operative work is as follows:

1) Intensify political education, carry out regular criticism of bourgeois ideas, and raise the socialist consciousness of Party members.

Party members get education as they pass to full membership at the completion of their probationary period, and also through a system of "study days." In 1952, when the Party branch had only seven members, three of them were buying young crops (making forward purchases for personal profit), hoarding grain and lending money on interest; one was preparing to go into business to make money; and another, with backward ideas, intended to quit the co-op work. Meeting the situation squarely, the Party branch put through a programme of education, during the transference of the probationary members to full membership, on the qualifications for Party members. There were also courses of study on two resolutions of the Party's Central Committee: on mutual aid and co-operation, and the development of agricultural producers' co-operatives.

Bourgeois ideology among Party members came under criticism, and was duly corrected. The central task of the Party branch was clarified. After discussions, the Party branch decided to adopt the system of "study days" which has been enforced from 1952 to the present.

Another method used was to unfold criticism and self-criticism while the year-end appraisal of members and the seasonal work check-ups were being made. In 1953 a certain unsatisfactory situation was revealed: criticism and self-criticism had been neglected; there was no unity in the Party branch; Party members did not speak out their views at the open meetings but made complaints behind each other's

backs; some stayed away from Party meetings on pleas of ill health; others felt "they had more shortcomings after joining the Party than before." For example, Chang Pang-wan, a probationary member, refused to listen to criticism because he thought that the Party branch deliberately wanted to "discipline" him. Confronted with this situation, the Party branch carried out criticism and self-criticism among the members, as a means of education during the year-end appraisal and seasonal check-ups. The responsible Party members led off by examining their own shortcomings. As a result, the members were greatly enlightened. Now the practice of criticism and self-criticism within the Party branch has become more extensive, and progress has been made in implementing the principle of democracy in Party life.

Personal talks also helped some members to straighten out their thinking. Chou Sheng-kuei, a probationary Party member, for instance, became depressed when he was criticized by the Party branch and the co-op for his conceit and self-complacency. The Party branch assigned a committee member to talk with him on several occasions, gradually making him see his own mistakes. Now he is working enthusiastically.

Because of the continuous efforts of the Party branch in giving political education to its members, the latter are setting good examples and play leading roles in all kinds of work. Their active influence and energetic work have virtually put on the right track the running of the seven agricultural producers' co-ops already set up, so that the co-ops grew better crops than the peasants outside. As a consequence, the Party's prestige has been enhanced and the peasants' desire to join the co-ops has become very strong. Many peasants have eagerly demanded entry, saying: "The Party members are more at home in the matter of policy. We'll do whatever they do," or "We'll certainly make no mistake if we follow the advice of the Party branch."

2) Practise collective leadership and division of responsibility, and strengthen the Party branch guidance in the work of mutual aid and co-operation.

Formerly, whatever happened in the township — important or otherwise — was brought by the village people to the Party branch secretary. A situation came about in which the secretary alone handled all the work, while other committee members had nothing to do and many things were left unattended to. Therefore the Party branch made a decision to carry out collective leadership and division of responsibility. The secretary was to be responsible for over-all leadership; the deputy secretary was to lead the key co-op; and the township was to be divided into four sections, each to be put under the charge of a Party branch member (or members), and each section was to have division of labour among Party members whose duty it was to render reports to the Party branch and make a study of the problems concerning mutual aid and co-operation at regular intervals. These arrangements righted the condition in which some committee members had too much to do while others had too little, and so gave full play to the role of the Party branch organization.

During the 1955 spring ploughing, for instance, Chang Michun, a Party branch committee member who had been assigned work in a co-op, initiated discussions with the co-op members about their jobs. They then subdivided their work on a responsible basis. The result was that, within seven days, they completed the hoeing of 16 *mou* of the co-op's land to be sown to rape-seed and 36 *mou* of wheat fields.

To enable the various township organizations to play their full role in making the mutual-aid and co-operative movement successful, the Party branch has applied the method of dividing responsibility among committee members for their leadership. Committee members concerned with organization are to be responsible for directing the work of the militia, the supply and marketing co-ops and the credit co-ops. Committee members concerned with propaganda are to be responsible for

directing the work of the Youth League, the Women's Federation and the propaganda network. Weekly meetings are held to discuss and settle questions arising in various organizations.

For different periods in the course of the establishment and consolidation of the co-ops, the Party branch sets different tasks for the Youth League, the Women's Federation and the militia. These organizations then map out their own annual or seasonal plans, in accordance with the plans and wishes of the Party branch. When a co-op is being set up, the Youth League branch, complying with the purpose of the Party branch, puts its members into action. Thus the Youth Leaguers have played an important part in helping organize the co-ops. For example, Youth Leaguer Liu Chun-lan, a country girl in Changchiatsui Village, persuaded her father to join an agricultural producers' co-operative, induced a mutual-aid team to join the co-op, and convinced three peasant families—living in the same courtyard with her, who had never wished to organize before—to join the co-op as well. She also helped Yang Jih-chen and four other peasant families to set up a mutual-aid team.

3) Intensify the political education of the co-operative and mutual-aid rank and file.

The Party branch helped the co-ops to set up the system of political education assistants. To these it gave guidance on how to understand the outlook of the co-op members on different questions, and enlighten them accordingly. In the spring of 1955 five co-op members in the co-ops—Shangying and Hsiangchiawan—were trading in pigs. Other members wanted to follow suit, saying, "If they can do it, we can too!" So the Party branch directed the co-ops to organize their people for studying the co-op regulations, so that they could better understand the character of an agricultural co-operative. The result was that their mistaken notions and deeds were quickly corrected.

Li Chia-sheng, a member of Hsiangchiawan Co-op, was in charge of feeding cattle belonging to the co-op. He gave better treatment to his own cattle to the neglect of those which were co-op property, so that, within a month, the latter lost weight. Li Ta-cheng, the co-op's vice-chairman and political education assistant, had several talks with the stockman to make him see his mistake. Realizing he was in the wrong, Li Chia-sheng began to feed the co-op's cattle as carefully as he did with his own, and all of them grew fat. This was a typical case which the Party branch used to educate the stockmen in all co-ops. Those who had lacked a sense of responsibility in caring for co-ops' cattle changed their attitude.

4) Recruit new Party members, side by side with the training of active elements in the co-ops and mutual-aid teams.

As soon as the work of setting up co-ops began, the Party branch paid attention to the selection and training of activists. Altogether 42 activists were trained, of whom 40 became co-op officials. From among these officials the Party branch has, from time to time, enlisted some Party members; and now 20 possible candidates are under consideration. The possible candidates selected from among the active elements in the mutual-aid teams and co-operatives were people who had distinguished themselves in different kinds of movements. Party members were then assigned by the branch to be responsible for different tasks in the practical training of these candidates, for observing their work, inducing them to attend Party lectures, and giving them specific assignments to test them in practical work. When they fulfilled the conditions for joining the Party, they were individually admitted to its ranks.

5) Guide the mutual-aid and co-operative organizations in reforming agricultural technique.

On the basis of mutual aid and co-operation, the Party branch popularized advanced experience in close planting of rice and sowing wheat in rows. Through demonstrations and

inspection trips which it arranged, the peasants, when convinced, willingly adopted the new technique. In 1954 when close planting of rice (at 10.5 inches' intervals in each direction) was first introduced, most of the peasants were not convinced of its advantages. Some said, "This won't work in Yanghopa. If we adopt such a way, we won't even get straw, not to say rice!" Others said, "These Communists are queer people. They meddle in other people's business, and even butt into our farm work!" Seeing these worries among the peasants, the Party branch first summed up the experience of Chou Sheng-kuei, who had reaped a rich harvest of rice from close planting on his 3.2 *mou* of land. Then it arranged a visit to his field by the mutual-aid team heads, Party members and Youth Leaguers. This example was widely publicized. With the Communists and Youth Leaguers in the lead, the method of close planting (10.5 inches apart) was put into effect on three-quarters of all the rice fields in the township in 1954. The result was that the average yield per *mou* reached 520 catties.

6) Strengthen the guidance of the mutual-aid teams and co-ops through the joint management committee of co-ops.

Under the guidance of the Party branch, a joint management committee of all agricultural producers' co-operatives in the township was set up in December 1954, with the secretary of the Party branch as its chairman. The committee's first job was to train co-op officials and organize inter-co-op emulation, thus making the officials more confident and the rank and file more enthusiastic. In the spring of 1955 the joint management committee established a system of regular fortnightly meetings, on the first and the fifteenth of each month. It also intensified the political education of the co-op officials and organized them to study the management of the co-operatives, as well as experience gained in the rational close planting of rice and cotton. These studies gave the co-op officials confidence. They said that these regular meetings really solved

problems and should be held more often in future. Furthermore, the committee organized a competition among six co-operatives. It also sponsored a cattle show. These activities did much to consolidate and improve the agricultural producers' co-operatives in the township.

HOW CHUNGHSIN TOWNSHIP LAUNCHED A MUTUAL-AID AND CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT

(By Liu Yao-hua, in issue No. 82 of *The Work in Kweichow*,
May 13, 1955)

The line followed here is correct. This township has five co-operatives, seven combined mutual-aid teams, three year-round mutual-aid teams and fourteen seasonal mutual-aid teams. Their total membership amounts to 98.4 per cent of those peasant families which ought to be organized.

Prior to December 1954, the Party branch of the township had not placed the main emphasis on leading the mutual-aid and co-operative movement; Party members were afraid that leading the mutual-aid teams would prove too difficult. Instead of relying on the method of "The Party secretary takes the lead and all the Party members help run the co-operatives," the Party branch leaned heavily on the work team (sent to help them by a higher organization, apparently).

Rural Party branches in quite a number of places show this spineless attitude toward agricultural co-operation. Not only the Party branches—it is possible that even some of the higher committees of the Party do the same. This is the crux of the problem. Whether the socialist transformation of our agriculture can keep pace with the speed of our national industrialization, whether the co-operative movement can develop in a healthy way with few flaws and

guarantee an increase in production, hinges on whether or not the local Party committees at all levels can quickly and correctly shift the emphasis to where it belongs. Work teams should be sent, but—and this must be made clear—they go to help local Party organizations, not to replace them, not to immobilize their hands and brains, not to let them rely on the work teams for everything.

This Kweichow township achieved outstanding success in only a little over five months from the time it changed its attitude in December 1954. They didn't rely on the work team there, but pitched in themselves. And the Communists were no longer afraid of difficulties.

A change of this sort depends first and foremost on the secretaries of the Party committees at various levels—province, autonomous region, region, autonomous chou, county, autonomous county and district—and on the Party branch secretaries. They must assume their full responsibilities in agricultural co-operation. If they are afraid of trouble, of difficulties, if they do not throw themselves personally into this great task confronting them but merely pass it on to the rural work departments of the Party or to the visiting work teams, not only will they be unable to complete the job—they will cause a great many mishaps.

—EDITOR

It was in 1952 that a Party organization was first set up in Chunghsin Township, Fengkang County, Kweichow Province. There are at present 20 Party members in the township. A local Party branch committee with five officers has been formed, and the members are divided into four groups, with due consideration to the place where they live. During the spring

ploughing this year, the movement for mutual aid and co-operation in agriculture made further headway. An additional 30 peasant households working on their own joined the mutual-aid teams. Since spring the co-operatives have been further consolidated. Through the study of co-op regulations by its members, management has been improved, the responsibility system introduced, the members' enthusiasm for production increased and the previous lack of unity among the members overcome. At present, 98.4 per cent of the peasant households in the township that can be organized have either joined the mutual-aid teams or the co-ops. There are now five agricultural producers' co-ops, seven joint mutual-aid teams, three permanent and 14 temporary mutual-aid teams.

The main reasons why it has been possible for mutual aid and co-operation in agriculture to develop on a sound basis in this township are as follows:

- 1) The Party branch has improved its method of work and has made great efforts in giving concrete leadership to the expansion of mutual aid and co-operation. After the county Party conference in December 1954, the local Party branch committee examined its own work in the light of the decisions taken at the conference. It found that it had not yet centred its attention on developing mutual aid and co-operation, but relied too much on the work teams sent by the higher authorities to do the job. The education of its members was also found to be not thorough enough, and, as a result, some Party members shirked their responsibilities in leading the mutual-aid teams for fear of difficulties; some of them had not even joined mutual-aid teams. It was recognized that all this ran counter to the spirit of the Party directives. In view of the conditions and problems existing in the branch, education by the Party showed its members that two paths were open to the peasants: they had to choose either the socialist path or the capitalist path. The Party members were also taught what the basic tasks of the Party in the rural areas were. All of them were asked to join mutual-aid teams or co-ops,

and to do their best to make a success of the organizations they joined. Then the Party committee officers drew up a plan for a clear division of labour. One officer was to be responsible for administrative work. The Party branch secretary was made responsible for leading the five co-ops, with the Chunhsing Co-op as the key co-op. The deputy secretary and another officer of the branch committee (who was the township head) took charge of the mutual-aid teams, the key team being that led by the peasant Chu Ke-chih. Furthermore, mutual aid and co-operation were made the central tasks of the Party branch. Through the development of criticism and self-criticism around this central issue, Party group meetings were made richer and became closely linked with the conditions in the countryside. These measures guided the 20 Party members in the township to work whole-heartedly for the expansion of mutual aid and co-operation. They carefully studied the Party policy and strengthened their leadership of the mutual-aid and co-operative movement.

- 2) Through the networks of mutual-aid teams and co-operatives, the Party branch achieved all-round leadership of the mutual-aid and co-operative movement. As early as 1954, a township committee for the expansion of mutual aid and co-operation was formed, which organized eight mutual-aid and co-op networks. But because the Party branch did not offer much help in the way of providing leadership, meetings of the mutual-aid and co-op network were seldom held and this organization therefore did not play the role it should have done. The Party branch committee strengthened its leadership of this organization in order to give all-round leadership to the mutual-aid teams and co-operatives. The decision was made to hold a meeting once a month at which the experiences of the key co-ops or teams would be popularized, the Party policy on mutual aid and co-operation explained and studied, the method of leadership discussed, etc. Before each meeting, adequate preparations were made to ensure its success: the Party branch committee made it a point to seek advance

help from the personnel of the work teams sent by the higher authorities in analysing the situation in the co-ops, summing up experience, discussing existing problems and finding their solution.

3) A sound method of leadership was adopted. This method was to have the good co-ops influence and lead the mutual-aid teams, so that the co-ops and teams in turn could influence and lead the individual peasants, and to establish key points in an area so as to influence and lead the entire area. The five agricultural producers' co-ops were set up in five different areas of the township, with the Chunhsing Co-op as the key co-op to guide the work of the mutual-aid team led by Li Fashiang. The other four co-ops all used the method of exchanging personnel to guide the mutual-aid teams. The whole township was divided into eight areas, each with its own key point. Under the unified guidance of the Party branch, and led by Party members, experience was exchanged through the mutual-aid and co-op networks.

4) The peasants were educated by the example set by the "key points" which were given full attention and set up as models for the others to study and emulate. This method was used whenever anything new—particularly any innovation in farming technique—was introduced. For example, in accumulating compost, selecting seeds, improving seed beds, etc., the Party branch always used the Chunhsing Co-op as the "pilot plant" to gather experience before carrying it out on a large scale. The mass movement to accumulate more compost, for example, was organized after the peasants were invited to see for themselves the good results obtained by the Chunhsing Co-op.

The main problem that still remains in the leadership of the local Party branch regarding mutual aid and co-operation is that it does not give enough attention to the temporary mutual-aid teams, and that it does not persist in doing its work in accordance with the system it has adopted.

THE CO-OP NETWORK SYSTEM SHOULD BE PROMOTED NATIONALLY

(By the Rural Work Department of the Chekiang Provincial Committee, Chinese Communist Party, October 23, 1955)

This is a fine article, well worth introducing. Co-op networks should be set up everywhere and become a regular system. Now most of our co-ops are small and it is necessary for the townships to link them together in networks. The districts should also have co-op networks. In the future, when most of our co-ops become medium-sized and large, district-wide networks should be particularly stressed.

We hope that in 1956 there will be co-op networks in every district and township. Of course, in those townships where all the peasant households have joined together in one or two big co-ops, it is not necessary to form networks.

—EDITOR

NEW PROBLEMS

Lungnan Township in Yuyao County, Chekiang Province, is partially mountainous. It consists of 12 administrative villages with 1,369 households. In the spring of 1954 two agricultural producers' co-operatives were organized there. The district Party committee attached one of its functionaries to these co-operatives to give them guidance. In winter of the same year, 15 more co-operatives were set up while the two old ones were expanded. At this juncture, 47.6 per cent

of the total number of the households in the township had joined co-ops.

But at about the same time the Party committee functionary stationed in the co-ops was transferred elsewhere. A new problem arose: there were now many co-ops but too few trained people to lead them in their work. The four local functionaries tried to lead by dividing the work, each taking charge of a part, but it was not long before they found themselves unable to cope with the many questions that came up. For instance, the head of the township peasant association, while on his way to Co-op No. 6 to help settle problems, was stopped by officers of the Co-op No. 12 who requested him to help them overcome a bit of trouble. Then, at midnight on the same day Co-op No. 5 asked him for help because its production officer wanted to walk out of the co-op. The few township functionaries rushed back and forth from morning to night, and had their hands full all the time. Five of the co-ops, in fact, had never been visited by a single one of these men in all the six months since they were established. Other co-ops had been visited, but there were many questions which the functionaries were unable to settle, or "settled" in a wrong way. The co-op members complained that the functionaries "can only give birth to co-ops, but not bring them up."

The functionaries, on their part, felt that rushing around to fill gaps and meet crises as they arose did not work. They therefore adopted another method: to arrange a division of labour among the functionaries so that each of them could lead one co-op as a key point, while making himself available to help a few other co-ops. This worked out somewhat better. But it led to tendencies to overstress the key co-op and overlook the others or vice versa. About this time, the township functionaries and leading co-op members were called to work on the agricultural tax collection, on the planned purchasing and distribution of grain and other tasks. Some officials of agricultural producers' co-ops also held concurrent posts as directors or supervisors of credit or supply and marketing co-

operatives. Their leadership over the producers' co-ops therefore became lax. As a consequence, more and more problems came up. Most of these co-ops had no production plans and the division of labour among their members was haphazard. Each morning the peasants rushed to see the co-op chairman and consulted on what jobs had to be done. In the evening they assessed the work the members had performed, and decided on the work-points credited to each of them until midnight. Five of the co-ops had no fixed working area; their financial problems had either not been dealt with or had been dealt with badly. Seven co-ops in the mountainous area fixed their quota for forest products in the same way as the quota for rice. This resulted in the members felling large quantities of timber (Co-op No. 6 alone felled 100,000 catties). By early April, very little had been done to prepare for the spring sowing. Four co-ops were short of rice seeds, of which they had 1,200 catties less than they needed. Farm tools, generally speaking, had not been repaired.

For fear of difficulties, the township Party branch requested the district Party committee to send people to assist it. The co-op leaders too asked the township to find ways and means for them. They complained that there were too many meetings which interfered with work but still left many problems unsolved. The co-op rank and file were dissatisfied too, saying that if things went on that way, they wouldn't have anything to eat by next year. People who had not joined co-ops were sarcastic at their expense, "Before the functionaries come, all you can do is cool your feet. When meetings run into the middle of night you get hungry and the next morning, your eyes are sore. When problems are not settled, you are worried to death!"

THE CO-OPERATIVE NETWORK

The township Party branch, under the leadership of the county and district Party committees, and after discussing local experience and studying that of other areas, decided to

organize pivot co-ops, and integrated mutual-aid and co-operative networks. Existing agricultural producers' co-ops were divided into three groups according to their geographical location. In each such locality a mutual-aid and co-operative network was set up. In each network, one co-op, centrally located and staffed with capable and active leading personnel, was chosen as the pivot. Three members of the Party branch took personnel charge of the three networks. In each network, a Party group was set up as the leading core.

The first question which came up when this system was established was to remove the doubts in the minds of the township functionaries. They had believed up to then that, to get the work done, one functionary should handle only one co-op. For example, Sun Tien-feng, deputy chief of the township administration, had said, "You can never stop eight bottles with seven corks!" People who spoke in this way could not see the wisdom and strength of the masses. They did not understand how to rely on the masses in their work. When the co-operative networks encountered early difficulties, the township functionaries tried to do everything themselves. They opened every meeting with a lengthy report, and concluded it with a summing-up speech while the others present said not a word. Everything hung on the township functionaries.

But later they themselves, through practical experience, came to see the importance of taking the mass line. The secretary of the township Party branch attended a meeting of the co-op chairmen called by the first of the three pivot co-ops to discuss questions such as the search for new sources of manure, pig-rearing, composting, etc. He found that the questions discussed were real and solutions suggested were practical. He was impressed, saying that a discussion among co-op officers was much better than the speech-making of the township functionaries. The head of the township peasants' association became convinced when he learned about the ex-

perience of this co-op in working out a seasonal system of responsibility. "One man rushing back and forth can only solve one question in one co-op," he said. "The network is much better; it can solve many questions at once."

In grouping co-ops into networks, attention must be paid to geographical proximity and similarity of production activities. To illustrate, all the six co-ops in the second network were located near each other in the partially mountainous area and their co-ops were much the same. Because of this, the network was able to work in a regular way. But in the first network, two co-ops were located in the partially mountainous area while four others were on the plain. When a meeting of the network was held, the co-ops farming in the hills wanted to talk about strawberry-picking while the plain area co-ops wanted to discuss the reaping of the early spring crop. Neither took any interest in the other's problem.

As to the question of selecting the pivot co-ops, these were at first designated by the Party branch without asking the opinion of the masses. There was one pivot co-op which did not come up to requirements, and the other co-ops in its network were not satisfied. It was only when a new pivot co-op with a sound foundation, capable and active leading personnel and central location was selected that the masses were satisfied. A pivot co-op must learn with an open mind from the experience of other co-ops in its network, and it must guard against conceit and complacency. The one in the second network temporarily committed the mistake of ignoring the opinion of its associated co-ops, with bad effects on co-operation and unity. The situation was remedied when they were called upon to "learn from each other, and exchange experience with each other." After this, meetings took the form of informal discussions at which experiences were exchanged and opinions were freely expressed, and questions were discussed in a more lively and penetrating way.

ACTIVITIES OF THE NETWORKS

The principal activities of the mutual-aid and co-operative networks in Lungnan Township were:

1) The meeting of co-op chairmen. Popularly known as the "network meeting," it was held at five to seven days' intervals, mainly to exchange experience and answer questions. There was a central topic for discussion at every meeting. Sometimes it concerned the assignments of work by the township functionaries, at other times it popularized the experience of the pivot co-op. It was also popularly called "the meeting of wise men."

2) Meetings on special subjects. These were not held regularly but depended upon the needs at various seasons, e.g. some meetings dealt with production technique, accounting, pig-rearing, etc.

3) Field visits and inspections. This method was adopted when it was necessary to popularize advanced production experience, check over production and promote emulation.

4) Individual contact. This was done when it was necessary to settle certain specific problems of different co-ops or to exchange views on different ways of thinking.

Through such activities the 17 co-ops in the township were checked over and consolidated. In 1955, their production was 20 per cent greater, on the average, than in 1954, and 98 per cent of the co-op members were enjoying high incomes. A peasant saying arose: "The mutual-aid and co-operative network is like a polyclinic; it has departments of both internal (meaning the discussions and meetings) and external (meaning field visits and inspections) medicines."

The system of pivot co-ops and the co-operative networks overcame the difficulty of "few personnel for many co-ops." Questions in separate co-ops were settled by following the examples set by the pivot ones, with the encouragement of the whole network. When spring cultivation began, one of the pivot co-ops introduced its experience in working out produc-

tion plans and carrying out the system of definite responsibility for each job. This helped the co-ops in stopping the confused situation in which there had been no production plans, division of labour had been haphazard, and labour power had been wasted. At sowing time, and during the transplanting of rice seedlings, the pivot co-op also set examples. It arranged for field visits and popularized better ways of seed selection and close planting.

Seven co-ops in the mountainous area, benefiting from the experience of their pivot unit, dealt correctly with the question of pooling trees in co-ops, thus setting their members' minds at ease and stimulating them to plant 75,000 pine trees.

Lack of experience on the part of the township functionaries was also remedied. Their opinion can be summed up as follows: "We used to rush back and forth, looking here and there; we had only a rough idea of things but were never well informed in detail. Now that we take part in the work of the pivot co-op, our knowledge increases with every problem handled in practice. The co-operative network is a school in which we can learn how to run co-ops." The leading personnel of the co-ops also found the right way. Their opinion is: "We used to ask the township to help us out when we were in trouble. We couldn't do anything else. Now, when we have problems, we bring them to the network meeting for discussion."

The active elements in the co-operative grew in number and fewer people held concurrent positions. This was brought about through the appointment of assistants and discussion meetings of book-keepers and technicians. In the summer of 1955 while the work of planned distribution of grain was at its high tide, the Party branch and the leading personnel of the co-op arranged a suitable division of labour among themselves, ensuring that leadership in co-op affairs was exercised continuously and normally. One of the active co-op leaders said: "Formerly, we were both officials and messenger-boys. The co-op chairman did everything; the committee members

depended on the chairman; the co-op members didn't care. Now everybody has something to do and in every line there are people who know their job well."

REMAINING PROBLEMS

The pivot co-ops and the mutual-aid and co-operative networks have done much in the exchange of experience. But they still have not done enough in the way of checking, speeding their work and giving practical assistance to the co-ops. Hence, certain co-ops are still lagging behind.

There are not as many inter-network activities as there are within each network; the contact with the mutual-aid teams and individual peasants is still less.

The township Party branch has not yet fully solved the problem of how to deal satisfactorily with other tasks while still centring its main work on mutual aid and co-operation. It often happens, at meetings of the pivot co-ops and the co-operative network, that the functionaries assign to the co-ops some general administrative work which interferes with the network's regular activities.

NEW SITUATION, NEW PROBLEMS

(By Chang Tien-chu, Fu Yen-lung, Hao Ching-min and Sun Jung-sheng in the *People's Daily*, May 22, 1955)

This material is useful and well worth attention everywhere. It describes the attitudes taken by the various categories of peasants in the countryside.

The poor peasants are the most enthusiastic about co-operation. Many middle peasants want to "wait and see a little longer." They enjoy "taking their ease outside." Actually what they want to know most is whether or not it would be profitable for them to invest their means of production in the co-op. This will determine whether they act one way or another. Many of the well-to-do middle peasants are very much opposed to co-operation. The worst of them sell off their means of production, pull out their capital, or organize fake co-ops. A few even tie in with former landlords and rich peasants and do bad things.

We hope all comrades working on rural problems will make sure to observe and analyse the attitudes taken by the various categories of peasants in their own particular localities, and adopt policies appropriate to the situation.

The material points out an incorrect tendency to slight the mutual-aid teams, while paying close attention to the co-ops. It recommends that over-all plans be made for both, and that both be given suitable consideration. This is correct. The "mutual-aid team and co-op network" method is good because it

takes both the co-ops and the teams into consideration. The co-operatives must really help the mutual-aid teams and the peasants farming individually to solve their current production difficulties. The fund which has been allocated by the government for poor peasants who lack the necessary capital to invest when they join co-ops must be sent to the villages at once. Those poor peasants who have not yet joined co-operatives should be told that they can draw on this fund any time they are ready to become members.

—EDITOR

Pingfang, Shuangchuan and Wufu are three villages in Naho County, Heilungkiang Province, which made tremendous progress in agricultural co-operation in 1955. Pingfang has ten co-operatives comprising 67 per cent of its peasant households; Shuangchuan has eight, comprising 49 per cent of its households, and Wufu, four, with 27 per cent of its households. Fifty-seven per cent of the households in the three villages have not yet joined; they have 49.3 per cent of the total labour force available and own 45.3 per cent of the draught animals. Of the land they own, 42.7 per cent is dry land and 53.4 per cent paddy fields. These peasant households outside the co-operatives are organized in 61 mutual-aid teams.

A number of changes have taken place as a result of the big increase in the number of agricultural co-operatives in the spring of 1954.

1) **Change of attitude.** Every social group in the countryside has felt keenly the impact of agricultural co-operation. The question of which way to go has become a central topic of discussion in the villages.

Two hundred and sixty-five poor-peasant households have not yet joined the co-operatives. But the overwhelming majority of them have long wanted to farm co-operatively,

so they have given a pledge that they will run their mutual-aid teams as well as they possibly can so as to create conditions in which co-operatives can be started. To equip themselves to do so, in the autumn of 1955, six poor-peasant households in Chang Hsi-kuei's team in Shuangchuan who had no horses bought some at the time of spring sowing. They are up in arms against anyone who makes disparaging remarks about the co-operative and relentlessly unmask any act of sabotage on the part of the rich peasants. But at the same time they still show a certain dissatisfaction with and have misgivings about the existing co-operatives. They are far from satisfied with the rule that a new member must, regardless of circumstances, contribute a sum to the co-operative as investment, based on the manpower in his household. (In the six co-operatives started in 1955, almost every member made his contribution on this basis in the form of seed grain and fodder to the share fund.) They see too that the co-operatives as at present constituted operate on too narrow a basis and that the things they produce are too simple and too much of a muchness to give full rein to the abilities of people with special skills. They wonder how they will be able to make a living if they get no work after joining the co-operative. Besides, some of them are single men who do not want to join because they are used to moving from place to place and are unwilling to tie themselves down.

There are 32 middle-peasant households who have not joined the co-operatives. They hold varying views, because the growth of co-operation varies from village to village and each co-operative has its own method of dealing with means of production. In villages where there is only a small amount of co-operation the middle peasants are inclined to put off joining as long as possible, and do not want to produce more than they had in the past. Their attitude is to wait and see, and they say: "There's more freedom outside than in." In villages where there is a large amount of co-operation a general feeling springs up among the middle peasants that

they should lose no time in building their fortunes. Their method is extensive farming — cultivating as much land as they can and growing more crops which will fetch a higher price. Five co-operatives in Pingfang stopped paying out dividends on land before the time was ripe and paid too little for other means of production. The peasant households who have not joined the co-operatives think it is not worth while cultivating their fields to the best of their ability or buying any means of production. A middle peasant in Hsiping called Sun Ching-yun used to store up each year enough manure for four or five *shang* (a *shang* is 15 *mou*). In 1955, however, he only stored enough for three. Moreover, there are some individual households who muddle through their work and go in for feasting and drinking. Eight households sold fourteen *shang* of their land. They won't have much more time, they say, to roam outside the co-operatives. On the other hand, the co-operatives in Shuangchuan deal with land and other means of production in a proper manner, and so the peasants outside them go about their work without anxiety, accumulating and carting manure and buying means of production with good heart. The way they look at it is this: Any means of production they buy now can not only be used to work their fields, but when they join the co-operative they won't be on the losing side either.

Some well-to-do individual households in which capitalist tendencies are deeply ingrained, adopted an attitude of passive resistance towards the co-operative movement and made every effort to free themselves from restrictions. They sold their cattle and other means of production, concealed their capital, and set up sham co-operatives or mutual-aid teams. Liu Yung-ho in Shuangchuan mortgaged his eleven *shang* of land and sold his three horses. Yang Fu-tien in Wufu sold all his seven cattle. And they do not conceal their opinion that by acting in this way they are saving themselves trouble when they join co-operatives and sparing themselves the sorrow of seeing *their* property turned into common property. Wang

Sheng, a new rich peasant in Pingfang, started a sham co-operative in collusion with seven landlord and rich-peasant households, an expelled Party member and a few peasants who fell into his trap. When he was exposed he sheered off to another place which is backward in the matter of co-operation and set up a sham mutual-aid team. Shih Nai-tsai in Shuangchuan played a thousand tricks to stop twelve households which had newly moved into the area forming mutual-aid teams, and tried to get them to join a sham one. There are plenty who have moved to backward villages to go on exploiting people there.

2) **Change in the composition of mutual-aid teams.** The composition of a number of mutual-aid teams underwent a great change because at the time new co-operatives were set up, their best people were taken away from them and part of the members joined co-operatives. Figures for the 61 teams in the three villages show that 16 teams are new ones consisting of scattered households, 30 have changed half their membership, and a mere 15 retain their original members. This change brought with it many new problems in the course of consolidating and improving mutual-aid teams in 1955.

Keeping down the size of mutual-aid teams does not make for better farming technique. Among the teams in the three villages, those with three to five households number 21, those with six to ten, 33, and those with ten or more, a mere seven. The teams with over ten households are mostly those which are all set to establish co-operatives in 1956. They have more horses, plenty of labour and capital, and they run their production well and in high spirits. As for the teams with six to ten households, not a few of them are "strong-with-strong," well-to-do teams. Generally they are not short of means of production but of labour. Some of them have enrolled poor-peasant households, but such households are scared that the well-to-do households will throw them out as soon as they have no use for them. The teams with three to five households are mostly composed of poor peasants, with few horses,

few capable hands, little capital, who find it hard to produce much and show little enthusiasm in their work.

In economic position members of teams may be poles apart. A situation has arisen where the very well-to-do households and the very poor both keep away from the co-operatives. The make-up of some mutual-aid teams is pretty complex. This is not so striking in villages where there is only a small amount of co-operation as in those where co-operation is widespread. In Pingfang seven of the twelve households in the mutual-aid team led by Chao Yu-chi are well-to-do peasants, five are poor peasants who have little land and such horses as they have are sorry jades. The poor peasants are feeling low-spirited, and have no confidence in their future while working in the team. "I want to join the co-op," said Sung Tien-ching, one of its members, "but I can't afford to pay the contribution to the share fund, and probably I shan't be given the right kind of work anyhow. Even in the team, they (the well-to-do households) have never asked me to join their meetings. There's really no way out." In certain teams you still find landlords, rich peasants and persons under surveillance. Such circumstances make it more complicated and difficult than ever to carry out the correct class policy in mutual-aid teams.

Mutual-aid teams have not enough active people to exercise leadership. Most Party members and live-wires have joined co-operatives, and those who have not are all with those mutual-aid teams which are all set to form co-operatives in 1956. There are 69 Party members in the three villages all told. Eight — 11.6 per cent of the total — are in mutual-aid teams. There are 112 members of the Youth League all told, with 28 in mutual-aid teams — 25 per cent of the total. As regards team leaders, 27 of them, or 44.3 per cent, have been on the job for two years; 34 of them, or 55.7 per cent, took up the job only recently. Among them, 19 — 31.2 per cent — are active, fair-minded and capable; 11 — 18 per cent — are active, but less fair-minded; 31 — 50.8 per cent — are not

active at all. In villages where co-operation has become more general, many team leaders complain that "to be a team leader won't get you very far. The longer you lead a team the smaller it gets and the harder it is to get work done."

3) **The question of leadership.** Many cadres down in the villages have not yet fully understood the new situation brought about by the growth of the co-operative movement; they have not learned how to solve the new problems facing the mutual-aid teams. In their present mood they would rather see ten mutual-aid teams go down than let a single co-op fail. For this reason, a number of mutual-aid teams run their production less satisfactorily than they ought to. In the three villages 45 teams — over 70 per cent of the total — have no production plans at all. As far as mutual benefit is concerned, only 17 teams — 28 per cent of the total — have made any definite provision in this matter, while 44 teams — 72 per cent — have done nothing at all. It is true that the three villages have already made preliminary comprehensive plans for the mutual-aid and co-operative movement and have set up "networks" to link the two forms of co-operation. Nevertheless, when it comes to the actual operation of these networks, too much time is spent on swapping experiences about the work of the co-op, and such questions as how the co-op should give a lead to the teams, and what is the best way of helping them, have been neglected. Theoretically arrangements have been made for the co-op to keep contact with the teams, but such contact is more apparent than real. The officials on the spot have not done enough to educate the team members patiently or to give them whole-hearted help. In directing the work of the team they are hot-tempered and arrogant. Sometimes they go so far as to scoff at and scold the members.

That being the case, if we are to give full rein to the peasants' enthusiasm for production and launch an all-out movement for higher yields by expanding mutual aid and co-

operation, we must take steps, in more ways than one, to give effective leadership to the mutual-aid teams.

First, it must be clearly realized that questions having a direct bearing on the economic interests of co-op members not only concern the co-ops themselves but have immediate impact on the attitude of the peasants outside of the co-operatives. To improve the work of mutual-aid teams and consolidate their position, it is, therefore, necessary, at the same time as the co-operatives are being given a check-over, to make the masses who are not members fully acquainted with the way in which the co-operatives deal with questions affecting the economic interests of their members, and to popularize the voluntary principle and the idea of mutual benefit and the actual steps leading up to their formation. When plans to expand co-operatives are found impracticable they should be amended or new over-all plans drawn up in their stead.

Secondly, contacts between the co-operative and the mutual-aid team must be made more practicable and the purely formal approach to the question scrapped. The better-run teams should forge closer working relations with "average" ones. In particular, those which are prepared to come together and form a co-operative some time in the future should, starting right now, see that their contacts are closer than before, support each other, work together harmoniously, and organize productive work well at every season. Teams which are far too small should be helped to pool their productive efforts at certain seasons, always voluntarily. Those teams which are too weak to get a decent output on their own should also be persuaded to merge voluntarily with other teams.

Thirdly, it is necessary to make unremitting efforts to prevent rich peasants from corroding the mutual-aid teams in a disguised manner. Village cadres must be educated to recognize the rich peasants for what they are and what they are likely to do in the new situation, to protect themselves from being taken in or falling into their trap. That is the way

to keep undesirables out of the mutual-aid teams. It is also necessary to do much more to educate people on unity between poor and middle peasants, and get both to understand the reasons why co-operation would be mutually beneficial and why estrangement would harm both. On that understanding and in the light of actual conditions in the localities concerned, mutual-benefit arrangements should be drawn up. Something should be done to prevent mutual-aid teams throwing out during the busy farming season households which have no horses. It is also necessary to stop them using horses and paying little or nothing for their use.

Fourthly, for the benefit of the cadres down in the villages it is necessary to make an analysis of the present situation as regards mutual-aid teams. The purpose of this analysis is to get them to realize how important it is to give the mutual-aid teams better leadership so that they can fulfil plans for higher output, and to give an impetus to the co-operative movement as a whole. It is to make them realize, too, that in 1955 the question of mutual-aid teams is more complex than in any previous year, and that this calls for a new approach and new methods to study and solve the problems that face them.

THE LESSON OF THE "MIDDLE-PEASANT CO-OP" AND THE "POOR-PEASANT CO-OP"

(By the work team in Louhsia Township, *Fukien Daily*,
August 16, 1955)

The problems stated here are of nation-wide significance.

We must try to win over the middle peasants. Not to do so is wrong. But on whom must the working class and the Communist Party rely in the countryside in order to win over the middle peasants and socialize all of rural China? The poor peasants, of course. That was the case when we struggled against the landlords and carried out land reform, and that is the case today when we are struggling against the rich peasants and other capitalist elements so as to bring about the socialist transformation of agriculture.

In both these revolutionary periods, the middle peasant wavered in the initial stages. It is only after he sees the irresistible trend of events and the revolution is about to triumph that the middle peasant decides to join forces with it. The poor peasants must work on the middle peasants and win them over, so that the revolution will continue to grow stronger by the day, right up until final victory.

Like the peasants' associations in the old days, the management committees of the co-ops should also take in the old lower middle peasants and some representative both old and new well-to-do middle peasants—provided they have a relatively high

level of political consciousness. They should be allowed to participate in the management committees, but should not constitute more than about a third of the committee membership. The other two-thirds should be poor peasants (meaning those who are poor peasants today and former poor peasants who have moved up to become lower middle peasants).

Except for lower middle peasants and certain of the old and new well-to-do middle peasants who have a very high level of political consciousness and are really fair-minded, capable people, generally speaking, only poor peasants should hold the key posts in the co-ops. (To repeat—"poor peasants" includes the poor peasants of today and all of those former poor peasants who have become lower middle peasants since land reform.)

In Fuan County, Fukien Province, the co-op led by the poor peasants and the co-op led by the middle peasants manifested two different attitudes toward the cause of socialism. This kind of situation should not be regarded as exceptional. It is quite commonplace.

—EDITOR

Everybody who has worked or is working in Louhsia Township, Fuan County, Fukien Province, knows that it has two agricultural co-operatives of equal size, one a "middle-peasant co-operative" and the other a "poor-peasant co-operative." Why are they so styled? Partly because the members of one are quite poor and those of the other are pretty well off. But more important is the fact that the leaders of one co-op are poor peasants and those of the other are middle peasants. The "poor-peasant co-op"—its proper name is the Hsinfu Agricultural Co-operative—has 17 households, only three of

which are middle peasant; of the poor-peasant households, two are now actually new middle peasant. Li Lao-tung, the chairman, and the other officials are all poor peasants. The co-op has neither cattle nor a harrow. The "middle-peasant co-op" — its proper name is the Hsinkang Agricultural Co-operative — also has 17 households, of which six are middle peasant, seven poor peasant, and four new middle peasant. Cheng Chien-chang, the chairman, and the other officials are all middle peasants. The co-op has four head of cattle and plenty of means of production. The members live fairly well.

When they were first organized, each of these two co-ops had its own production difficulties.

The Hsinfu Co-op which had no oxen hired one; it had to borrow a harrow and, with a loan it raised for the current year, bought a plough. When the plough was in use, the peasants used to say, "Take good care of it. It's the only one we have. If it's spoilt, we won't get another!" Three member households had no hoes. In 1954 a blacksmith on a visit happened to stay at Chairman Li's. It was then that the co-op collected some scrap iron and asked him to make three hoes. There were only four matting raincoats for twenty working peasants, so it was difficult to work on the farm when it rained.

With the Hsinkang Co-op, things were different. Its 17 households had four head of cattle, two used for ploughing its own land and the other two rented to a mutual-aid team, four ploughs and three hoes. Two of the ploughs and one hoe were not in use. Because they had cattle, they got more manure. Actually they now have over a hundred piculs of spare cattle dung for 1956. The owners of the cattle which were hired out were thinking of selling them together with the extra ploughs and hoe which the co-op had no use for.

As conditions in the two co-ops varied, so did the enthusiasm with which the members ran their co-op and the way they worked. The Hsinfu Co-op had nothing to fall back on. It had a lot of troubles. But the members were all convinced

that the only way to get rid of poverty was to run the co-op well, so enthusiasm ran high. As Li Lao-tung, the chairman, said: "Chairman Mao has led us to stand on our own feet. No matter how high the mountains are, our determination's even higher. We may suffer a bit now, but everything will be all right in future." Whenever a member had any trouble, the officials immediately made suggestions and found a way out. Last March, Li Shih-hsin, Wang Yu-ming and six other households ran short of food grain. The co-op officials at once took the matter up with the Party branch, which recommended them to sign a contract with the supply and marketing co-operative for felling and chopping firewood. But even felling and chopping firewood needs some outlay, and the members had neither grain, nor axe, nor saw — some of them had not even straw sandals. The management committee talked the problem over and suggested that the co-op should first scrape together some food grain and lend it for the time being to the members who were going to do the felling and chopping. The chairman was the first to produce forty catties of dried potatoes. Cheng Cheng-ling, Chen Yung-ti and some other members also gave something. The chairman then borrowed axes and saws, and bought straw sandals for six members who had none. In three days they felled and chopped over two hundred piculs of firewood and received 45 yuan from the supply and marketing co-op according to the terms of the contract. That solved the shortage of food.

Although the Hsinfu Co-op produced no more than others, the members were devoted to it. In the spring of 1955, when the wheat field was short of manure, the members scraped together five yuan and used it to buy fertilizer to give the crops an extra dressing. As a result, the co-op reaped 23 piculs of wheat, from which each household received over a hundred catties. In 1954 Li Lao-tung and Li Yung-ti, a middle peasant, were the only ones who had grown beans on a few *mou* and they had weeded only once and applied fertilizer only once. In 1955 the co-op went in for beans and got a

yield of 12-13 piculs; they weeded twice and applied fertilizer three times. The rice field, too, was hoed and fertilized once more than usual. In the same year after the bean crops were reaped, they derived another income of more than 100 yuan from the sale of firewood. The receipts from these two sources helped to tide the co-op members over till the early rice was harvested. So their difficulties were solved.

The chairman got the full support of the members. Even people who didn't belong to the co-op used to say: "Li Lao-tung really is a fine chap — so polite and so fair in his dealings." At times, when Li Lao-tung was up against something really tough, he would wonder: "Can a co-op like this keep on?" But when he recalled the past, his enthusiasm came back. He remembered that during the Kuomintang reactionary regime when he and his five brothers had had to part company, he had worked for twenty years in Hsiapu as a hired labourer, often late into the night making sugar for a landlord. Now, in the co-op, the land he manages and the grain harvested all belong to the members themselves. What does a little hardship matter? Since the land reform five years ago life has become better and better. If the co-op does well this year, if all difficulties can be overcome, next year will be better still. When he has straightened his own ideas out, he always explains things to the members, so the whole co-op, as one man, tackles its difficulties to make it a success.

In Hsinkang Co-op, where middle peasants run the show, the picture is different. In spite of the many advantages it possesses, it has not done good work in getting everybody pulling the same way, in organizing mutual assistance among the members or in overcoming difficulties so as to make the co-op successful. The members who were poor peasants moaned about the middle-peasant officials, saying they were biased in the way they handled questions and did not help members who were in trouble. The mother of Cheng Cheng-yang, a poor peasant, said: "It's a good thing that the government calls for the organization of co-ops, but a chairman

must be fair in his dealings and pay attention to his members' troubles. Our chairman doesn't understand the difficulties poor peasants have as well as Li Lao-tung." She has good reason to say so. In early July, when her son fell ill, she could not draw any money from the co-op as the chairman and cashier had both gone off to attend a meeting and nobody was taking care of the co-op's business. She had to go to Li Lao-tung's for help. Li's brother lent her a yuan and Li urged her to see that her son got medical treatment. Three days later the chairman and cashier of her own co-op came back. Off she went again to borrow some money, but the cashier told her that the question would first have to be discussed. Another three days and still no money! Then the other members got impatient too and went to complain. "Even if it means you've got to go a-begging you've got to give something, when she has been begging for three days," they said. Only then did the co-op lend her 15 catties of unhusked rice.

Hsinkang Co-op had a rule that the members' contributions to its share fund should be based half on the amount of land pooled and half on labour. All the middle peasants paid their contribution in manure. The poor peasants could not afford to do so. Another rule said that if any member dug a root of young potatoes, he must repay the price of the best root lifted when the crop was dug in autumn. The well-off middle peasants had no need to dig potatoes while they were small, so this rule did not worry them, but on the poor peasants, it weighed pretty heavily.

After they'd heard all about conditions in these two co-ops, the Louhsia Township Branch of the Chinese Communist Party and the township officials all agreed that it was just like attending a lecture on policy in regard to the different classes. They saw how valuable and how immensely important was the Party's policy of promoting mutual aid and co-operation by banking on the poor peasants and solidly uniting the middle peasants. A study of conditions in these two co-

ops has convinced them that in the movement for co-operation it is indispensable to rely on the poor peasants and unite the middle peasants; that it is to the mutual advantage of the poor and middle peasants alike to come together and mutually disadvantageous to split. They are convinced that political and economic unity between the poor and the middle peasants is the only way of creating a tremendous force. They see that the poor peasants must keep the lead in the agricultural co-operative, while at the same time making every effort to rally the middle peasants. If a co-op does not have enough poor peasants as its core, it can easily slip into the ways of the Hsinkang Agricultural Co-operative which discriminates against poor peasants. That is not the sort of things which co-operatives are set up for.

HOW CONTROL OF THE WUTANG CO-OPERATIVE SHIFTED FROM THE MIDDLE TO THE POOR PEASANTS

(By Chou Ching-wen in issue No. 9 of the *Hunan Mutual Aid and Co-operation*, July 26, 1955)

This is a common and serious problem. Party committees at every level and the comrades sent into the countryside to direct the work of co-operation should give this problem their fullest attention. The co-op management committees must see to it that the present poor peasants and the new lower middle peasants have the decisive voice in their councils, with the old lower middle peasants and the well-to-do middle peasants — whether old or new — serving as a subsidiary force. Only thus can unity between the poor and middle peasants be attained in accordance with Party policy; only thus can the co-ops be strengthened, production increased, and the socialist transformation of the entire countryside be correctly accomplished. Otherwise, there can be no unity between the middle and poor peasants, the co-operatives cannot be strengthened, production cannot increase, and the socialist transformation of the entire countryside cannot be achieved.

Many comrades do not understand the reasoning behind this. They agree that it was necessary for the poor peasants to have been dominant during land reform because the poor peasants then constituted

from 50 to 70 per cent of the rural population and had not yet risen to the status of middle peasant, while the middle peasants at that time wavered in their attitude toward land reform. These comrades agree, therefore, that it was absolutely necessary then for the poor peasants to play the decisive role.

But say these comrades, now we are socializing agriculture, most of the former poor peasants have already become middle peasants, and the old middle peasants own a good part of the means of production. Unless the old middle peasants take part, they say, the co-ops' shortage of means of production cannot be solved. And so, these comrades believe, the slogan "Rely on the poor peasants and establish their control over the co-ops!" should not be raised now, that slogans of this sort are of no benefit to co-operation.

We consider this line of reasoning all wrong. If the working class and the Communist Party want to use the spirit of socialism and the socialist system to completely transform the system prevailing throughout the countryside of private ownership of the means of production in small peasant holdings, they can do so relatively easily only by relying on the great mass of the former semi-proletarian poor peasants. Otherwise the transformation will be very difficult.

The rural semi-proletariat are not so insistent on private ownership of the means of production in small peasant holdings; they accept socialist transformation fairly readily. Most of them have already become middle peasants; but compared with the old middle peasants, except for a few poor peasants who have become well-to-do middle peasants, the majority are of a relatively high level of political consciousness and often recall the hard life they led in the past.

Furthermore, the lower ranks of the old middle peasants are fairly close to the lower ranks of the new middle peasants, both in economic position and in political outlook; but they are different from both the upper ranks of the new and the upper ranks of the old middle peasants — that is, the well-to-do and comparatively well-to-do middle peasants.

In the process of achieving co-operation, therefore, we must pay close attention to: (1) the poor peasants who are still having difficulties, (2) the lower ranks of the new middle peasants and (3) the lower ranks of the old middle peasants.

The people in these three categories accept socialist transformation fairly easily and should be brought into the co-ops first, a group at a time and at various intervals. We should select some who have relatively high levels of political consciousness and good organizing ability and train them to become the core of leaders of the co-operatives. We should particularly stress finding this core of leaders from among the present poor peasants and from the new lower middle peasants.

This is not to say that we will have a re-division of rural classes. It is, rather, a statement of the principle which Party branches and comrades sent to guide the work of co-operation in the countryside should make sure to grasp, a principle which should be proclaimed publicly to the peasant masses.

Nor are we saying that the well-to-do middle peasants may not join the co-ops, only that we should wait until the level of their socialist consciousness has been raised, until they show a desire to join and are willing to accept the leadership of the poor peasants (including the present poor peasants and all the former poor peasants who have become lower middle peasants). It is then that we should allow them

into the co-operatives. Don't force them to join before they are willing just for the sake of obtaining the use of their draught oxen and their farm implements. Those who are already in and want to remain in may continue to do so. Those who want to withdraw, but change their minds after a bit of persuasion should also be allowed to stay. In any event, people who are a little short on the means of production can organize co-ops too. Many co-operatives formed by poor peasants and lower middle peasants have proven this.

Nor are we saying that not a single well-to-do middle peasant may become an officer of a co-op. Individual well-to-do middle peasants with a high level of socialist consciousness, who are fair and capable and have won the respect of the majority of the co-op members, may also become officers. However, the co-operatives must see to it that control is in the hands of the poor peasants (to repeat once more, including the present poor peasants and all of the former poor peasants who are now lower middle peasants. They are the majority or, in some places, the great majority of the rural population). They must comprise about two-thirds of the co-operative's membership. The remaining one-third should be composed of the middle peasants (including the old lower middle peasants and both the new and the old well-to-do middle peasants).

As to the guiding principles of co-operation, we must carry out a policy of mutual benefit to both poor and middle peasants; no one should be allowed to suffer a loss. For this purpose too we must put the poor peasants in control. In those co-ops where the middle peasants predominate, the poor peasants are always being hurt and squeezed out. The experience of Kaoshan Township, Changsha County, in the prov-

ince of Hunan, tells us plainly: It is both necessary and possible to give control to the poor peasants, and go on from there to strengthening unity with the middle peasants; that any other course of action is dangerous.

The writer of the article understands the Party line thoroughly. His action was correct too — first completing the urgent task of increasing production, then establishing the dominance of the poor peasants as leaders. As a result, the poor peasants were relieved and happy and the middle peasants willingly complied.

Another important thing the writer tells us is what to do about a co-op that is in a chaotic condition. Should it be dissolved? Or should it be reorganized so that it goes from a state of chaos to a state of health? Is it possible to reorganize and strengthen such a co-op? The writer tells us very convincingly: Do not dissolve the "third class" co-operatives; reorganize them. After they have been overhauled there is not the slightest doubt that third class co-ops can become first class.

There is already considerable experience of this kind all over the country, not only in Kaoshan Township, Changsha County.

— EDITOR

I

The Wutang Agricultural Producers' Co-operative, Kaoshan Township, Changsha County, Hunan Province, consists of 21 households (14 poor-peasant and seven middle-peasant households) and possesses 208 mou of land which its members pooled as shares. It was formed by three mutual-aid teams in January 1955, and two of them were seasonal teams, rather weak. While the co-operative was being set up, the mem-

bers were not fully educated in the spirit of co-operation and the class policy was not strictly followed. This gave rise to subsequent problems in running the co-op. After the establishment of the co-op, there had been too much in the leading personnel of the co-op. As a result, very few of them had a systematic and deep understanding of the situation. Their bureaucratic leadership not only failed to solve existing problems, but allowed the situation to deteriorate. The problems manifest themselves in the following:

1) The poor peasants did not gain ascendancy, especially in leading the management and supervisory committees. The management committee had seven members. The co-op chairman was a poor peasant, but he was also chairman of the peasants' association in the township. He did not spend much time running the co-op and was on very friendly terms with a middle-peasant vice-chairman on whom he relied to do a great part of the work of the co-op. Another vice-chairman, a poor peasant, had difficulties in maintaining his family and had a compliant personality. He was ignored, cursed and ridiculed by the middle-peasant vice-chairman. His prestige among the co-op members was low and his opinions did not carry weight. The book-keeper was an eloquent, literate middle peasant. Having a certain amount of ability, he had rather high prestige among his fellow co-op members. The supply-clerk for the co-op's property was an honest and reliable poor peasant. By and large, he could do the work assigned him with credit. But he lacked the courage to criticize others, and therefore his ability to improve the general situation was very limited. The committee members in charge of youth and women's work were all from poor families, but they were young and not good at farming. They said little at meetings, and did not take any active part in helping run the co-op. The supervisory committee had three members. The chairman and another member were poor peasants. But one had risen to the status of middle peasant economical-

ly after land reform. All he said and did tended to the side of the middle peasants. The other was not keen on his work and paid little attention to co-op affairs. Neither satisfactorily fulfilled their duties in controlling and supervising the management of the co-op. The third member, a middle peasant, had a closed mind, and did as he pleased. Sometimes he even abused his authority and nullified resolutions adopted by the management committee and grabbed profits for the middle peasants in violation of all established principles. From all this, it can be seen that to all intents and purposes, it was the middle peasants who were running the show both in the management and supervisory committees of the co-op. Tien Ming-teh, the middle-peasant vice-chairman, said: "We middle peasants won't do anything for the co-op if we're not in power."

2) Production work was poorly managed. The possibility was always present that the plan to increase output might not be fulfilled, and even that production might decrease. This could be seen from two instances: a) The most important way adopted by the co-op in 1955 to raise output was to plant a double-crop rice, which accounted for 76 per cent of the co-op's total projected increase in output. But the plan was not fulfilled. The original plan was to plant 55 *mou* to the second crop in between the rows of the first. This was actually done on only 43.6 *mou*. They planned to set aside 15 *mou* of land which would be planted with two crops, one after another, but only 13 *mou* were so planted. b) The seedlings did not grow very well and some were particularly bad. Inspection on the spot revealed that: the seedlings that were tolerably good and promised a possible increase in output occupied 112.6 *mou*, 54.13 per cent of the co-op's total land. Those that were just tolerable and could be expected to reach the level of 1954 occupied 54.86 *mou*, 26.37 per cent of the total. And those that were bad and threatened a lower output occupied 40.54 *mou*, 19.5 per cent of the total. What

was the root of the trouble? The poor peasants in the co-op had not been mobilized and the middle peasants had the upper hand. When the middle peasants joined the co-op, they generally wavered, had no firm intention of running the co-op well and did not try to take an active part. When they planned production, they would leave a way out for themselves, which consequently harmed the co-op's production. For instance, they did not like planting a double-crop rice, which, they were afraid, would exhaust their land (middle peasants generally had better land suitable for a double-crop rice). So they deliberately did not prepare enough seeds in time. As a result, the seeds were sown too late and in too small a quantity. The plan for a double-crop rice could not be carried out very well. They felt that the centralized plan to apply fertilizer to the co-op's land would benefit the poor peasants' land but undernourish their own. Therefore they put more than 20,000 catties of dung on their own fields, while more than 80 *mou* of unfertile land owned by the poor peasants were given a small portion of the manure, and were mostly fertilized only by silt dug from ponds. Therefore the seedlings in the poor peasants' fields could not grow very well. Having no confidence that the co-op could be managed well or crops in the co-op be reliable, the middle peasants kept more "private land" than was allowed by the regulations right when the co-op was being set up. They also secretly worked on rented land. During busy seasons, they did their own work first and regarded co-op production as of secondary importance. As a result, the co-op's farm work was put off. The transplanting of seedlings was about a week later than in 1954. The work of weeding and adding manure was started only about a month after the seedlings were transplanted. These all were, without doubt, important causes for the co-op's poor output.

3) The policy of mutual benefit was not strictly carried out, with the middle peasants enjoying great advantages at the expense of the poor peasants. This can be seen from the

following: a) The price of homestead manure was too high. For instance, the hog-dung of co-op members was sold to the co-op according to three classes of quality: first class 0.6 yuan a picul; second class 0.5 yuan a picul; and third class 0.3 yuan a picul. In other co-ops, there were also three classes: generally, first class 0.4 or 0.5 yuan a picul; second class 0.3 or 0.4 yuan a picul; third class 0.2 or 0.3 yuan a picul. So, the prices paid by this co-op were 0.1 or 0.2 yuan higher per picul. But the prices set in other co-ops were close to local market prices. This showed that the price for homestead manure was set too high in this co-op. And since homestead manure was mainly the dung of hogs or cattle, as a rule, the middle peasants had more such manure than the poor peasants. Some poor peasants had no domestic animals, so they had no animal droppings to sell. Setting the price too high was mainly in the interest of the middle peasants, not the poor peasants. b) The price for green manuring crops was also set too high. When the co-op was being formed, the green manuring crops were not growing very well, so they were sold to the co-op according to three classes of quality, when this land was pooled in the co-op. First class was 1 yuan a *mou*; second class 0.8 yuan a *mou* and third class 0.6 yuan a *mou*. The prices set were reasonable by and large. After the co-op was formed, the crop began to grow well. The middle peasants went back on their word, and threatened to take the green manuring crops back. They wanted to bully the poor peasants into agreeing to a higher price. They won—it was agreed upon that first class would be 2.0 yuan a *mou*; second class 1.6 yuan a *mou*; and third class 1.2 yuan a *mou*. Since green manure fields were also mostly owned by middle peasants, the higher prices also served their interests and were disadvantageous to the poor peasants. c) Wage for tending cattle was set too high and the assignment of households for this purpose incorrect. The co-op had two water-buffaloes and three oxen. All had been sold by its members to the co-op as common property. The wages for tending cattle

were: 75 catties of grain a month for tending a buffalo and 60 catties of grain a month for tending an ox (from April to October). This was higher than the customary local wage. Such being the case, the original owners (the middle peasants) of these animals vied with one another to tend the cattle and refused to let the poor households with weak labour power or old men and children having only half labour power do the job. After repeated discussion in the management committee, the middle peasants tended two of the animals and the poor peasants three. But one middle peasant would not accept the management committee's decision and doggedly took away an animal which the committee had assigned to a poor-peasant household, and locked it up in a private stable. This middle peasant wanted to keep the animal so as to get the high wage. d) The work fixed under the responsibility system was calculated unequally. Work with no fixed quota was assigned to middle peasants and work with high quotas was assigned to poor peasants. Technical work like ploughing or hoeing was generally done by the middle peasants. Such work had no set quota and work-points were calculated in terms of days. Ploughing or hoeing the land by driving a water-buffalo would get 10 points a day, ploughing or hoeing the land by driving an ox 9.5 points a day. For instance, a middle peasant Hu Tzu-fa left home late and returned early, and in two days hoed only 4.2 *mou* of land by driving an ox (under ordinary conditions he should have done that amount in a day), but he got 19 points. Miscellaneous jobs like building balks between fields and sinking pits to decompose manure were usually done by poor peasants. Such work had set quotas and the calculation of work-points was very strict. No matter how hard a peasant worked, he could never get seven or eight points a day. For example, the building and repairing of balks between fields (including trimming ragged edges and repairing the banked sides) was so unprofitable a job that only one point could be earned for every 6.5 feet worked. The facts showed that an average worker could

earn only five or at most six points a day. Furthermore, the middle peasants lived better, so they had more time at their disposal to work in the co-op, while the poor peasants were as often as not handicapped by their hard life, and did not have as much time to work in the co-op. So there was a big disparity between the work-points earned by the middle and poor peasants. From November 1954 to April 17, 1955, the work-points of the members of the co-op totalled 14,418.8. Of this, 7,216.13 went to seven middle-peasant households, each of them averaging 1,030.87. The highest number of work-points got by one of them was 1,539.18. The 14 poor-peasant households received only 7,202.67 points, averaging 514.48 points each. The lowest number of points for one poor-peasant household was 101. Such a situation was bound to be a source of trouble when the final distribution of earnings was carried out in the autumn.

Because of these problems, in the four months of production after the formation of the co-op, there was much confusion and vacillation among the co-op members, and seven households one after another wanted to pull out. The organization of the co-op was loose, meetings of team members and co-op members were often poorly attended and did not achieve any positive results. At the meetings, co-op members did not see eye to eye and some made a fuss about wanting to leave the co-op. The leading members in the co-op were often at wits' end to deal with the problems. It was clear that the problems were quite serious. There was a need to check up, consolidate and improve.

II

In view of the serious situation, the work team sent by the Hunan Provincial Committee of the Communist Party working in Kaoshan Township, Changsha County, dispatched Tang Tung-sheng to make a thorough study of the problems of the Wutang Agricultural Producers' Co-operative and took

a series of steps to check up, consolidate and improve it. He has great achievements to his credit. His methods of work and experience were the following:

1) In checking up on two matters and taking stock of three problems he helped the co-op members overcome two extremes in outlook and adopt effective steps to make up for the negligence in production. The work of checking-up started just on the eve of cultivating the rice fields. Two extremes of attitude were prevalent among the co-op members. One was pessimism and despair. The people with this attitude were baffled by the sheer number of problems and disheartened by the prospect of a bad harvest. They complained and grumbled, seeing no way out. At the other extreme was blind optimism. Such people thought there were no serious problems and that production was "pretty good." They took it easy and made no earnest efforts to mend the state of affairs. Both extremes were equally harmful and had to be overcome. The methods adopted for this purpose were checking up on two matters and taking stock of three problems. They started with checking up two matters: the production plans and the seedlings. All were agreed that the production plans had for the most part been fulfilled and that there were certain favourable conditions to raise the yield. What they had already achieved was big. But some of the plans had been fulfilled badly (for instance, the lack of enough seed, sowing too late, fertilizing the fields improperly, etc.), the seedlings were growing poorly and some were particularly bad. If they did not add more field-work and manure and make great efforts to help the seedlings grow well, the plan to increase output would fail and there was even the threat of decreased output. Then they took stock of three problems: the number of days they had to make up for their negligence, the amount of labour power, and the manure available. It was then some twenty days from the summer solstice, and just the time when seedlings would do well. If they wanted to add more field-work and manure, there was still much time

that could be turned to good account. From that day to the summer solstice, the men and women members of the co-op could contribute 800 work-days, so there was no shortage of labour. And there was plenty of manure available. The manure stored and newly collected by 21 households in the co-op, was estimated at 80 piculs of ox-dung, 100 piculs of ditch waste, 20 piculs of peat, ten piculs of human excrement and 30 piculs of sediment from puddles in which dish-water and slops were disposed of. Besides, they had ready cash of 80 yuan with which they could purchase 430 catties of ammonium sulphate and 200 catties of bone meal. By the check-up and stock-taking, all co-op members were helped to understand the importance and possibility of seizing the good opportunity to make amends for their negligence in production. They also had the material conditions that could be turned immediately to advantage. In this way, the two extremes in outlook were effectively combated. Many leading personnel and members of the co-op said this: "After checking up on two matters and taking stock of three problems, we now have a clear idea of our situation, we see things better and we have a way out. We're sure that we'll make up for the negligence in our production." Under these favourable circumstances, a resolution was adopted by the co-op management committee which raised the call for action: "Make the best use of the time at hand to increase field-work and manure, and work to carry out the co-op's plan to increase output." Effective measures were put into force: every household contributed labour power, every field plot was worked over, everybody collected manure and every plot had manure added. All co-op members were mobilized to make up for the past negligence in production. In a matter of some twenty days, all the co-op's fields were weeded twice or three times and manured as planned. Water conservancy work was also undertaken and insect pests exterminated. The seedlings shot up before their very eyes. A check-up made not long ago revealed that: 171 *mou* of land, 82.45 per cent

of the total, seemed very likely to show an increase; 32 *mou*, 15.38 per cent of the total, was expected to show an increase or reach the 1954 level, and 4 *mou*, 2.17 per cent, probably would have a decrease. As the young plants looked quite sturdy and everyone was pretty sure of bigger yields, the leading personnel and all co-op members were buoyed up with the hope of a better co-op. Chang Chun-fa, the co-op chairman, said: "Twenty days ago, we were sad when we looked at our seedlings. Now we're happy when we see them. With the crop coming along well we're more confident. We'll certainly have a better co-op."

2) Through deep-going education and the policy of mutual benefit, the unity of the co-op members was strengthened and the co-op's organization consolidated. Because of bigger output, the co-op members had more faith in the co-op and no longer wavered so much in their opinions — they became eager to solve problems that still hindered their progress. At this juncture, the problem of non-mutual-benefit was rightly placed on the agenda. This problem not only widely affected the economic interests of the co-op members, but would also have a great influence on the consolidation and development of the co-op. Therefore it had to be handled correctly and with great care. Not all co-op members shared the same opinion or attitude. The poor peasants were unanimous in their demand that this problem be solved. They were afraid, however, of offending the middle peasants and making management of the co-op a difficult business, or they found themselves in an awkward position, a bit too diffident to say straight out what they thought about the matter. The middle peasants, for their part, found all sorts of lame excuses to put the matter off. For instance, they said the question was hedged in with difficulties, or there was no accurate statistics, or their situation differed from that of other co-ops, etc. They arbitrarily insisted that the matter be left alone. Or they would not attend meetings to discuss the question, trying to delay it for good. So a real education was needed to

get both parties to investigate the matter without prejudice. The methods adopted for this education were mainly small meetings of co-op members and personal talks with individual members. Concrete instances were cited, discussed and analysed: why and how there was no mutual benefit and what problems had been created. Gradually all saw the matter in its true light and understood the situation better. So they started to take a different attitude toward the question and consciously and willingly came to grips with it. After repeated democratic consultation in the management and supervisory committees, a proposal was made. It was submitted to a general meeting of co-op members for further discussion, revision and final sanction. By this process, the problem of non-mutual-benefit was settled in a fair and satisfactory way. For instance, the price for hog-dung was cut from 0.6, 0.5 and 0.3 yuan for the three different classes to 0.5, 0.4 and 0.25 yuan respectively. The price for green manuring crops dropped from 2, 1.6 and 1.2 yuan a *mou* for the three different classes to 1.6, 1.3 and 1 yuan a *mou*. The wage for tending a buffalo was cut from 75 catties of grain a month to 60 catties and that for tending an ox from 60 to 45 catties a month. And all five of the co-op's draught animals were tended by the poor households which had old men and children, so as to give them a chance to increase their income. Only the problem of work-points — some calculated too strictly and some too loosely — still remained, for the past figures were in quite a mess. Immediate readjustment seemed impractical and this question was left to be solved later. The responsibility system and estimation of work done by each person was put on a sound basis, for the most part, and there was no discrimination against the poor peasants. With the problem of non-mutual-benefit solved, both the middle and poor-peasant co-op members were satisfied. There was no longer any misunderstanding and they became united for the common good of the co-op. Thus, the co-op's organization

was consolidated. Hu Shou-shan, chairman of the supervisory committee, said: "To tell the truth, only now are things being decided fairly, as if they were weighed on a scale. The middle peasants as well as the poor peasants are now satisfied."

3) The class policy was put into practice — poor-peasant leaders were helped to form a leading core and they assumed ascendancy in the co-op. As was said, the co-op had failed to fulfil its production tasks well and its operation of the policy of mutual benefit was poor. The root cause was that the poor peasants were not leading the co-op. So in the process of checking-up, apart from making up for the negligence in production and solving the problem of non-mutual-benefit, close attention was paid to the class policy, by promoting poor peasants to leading positions and ensuring the hegemony of the poor peasants. The methods adopted were: a) Through discussions and personal talks the class policy was explained to the poor peasants, who were also educated in the spirit of socialism, helped to overcome their feeling of inferiority and enhance their class consciousness and active desire to run the co-op well. For instance, Fan Yu-fu, a poor peasant, considered himself poor, incompetent, inferior and hopeless, and therefore he paid no attention to anything in the co-op except his own specific field of work. After attending several discussions and having several heart-to-heart talks, he began to become aware of his responsibility as a poor peasant and became enthusiastic in running the co-op. He attended all meetings, displayed great moral courage to express his ideas and took a lead in production. In short, he became a really active poor peasant. b) In all meetings, support was given to the correct opinions of the poor peasants and their exemplary deeds were commended. Gradually the erroneous ideas of the middle peasants who had looked down on the poor peasants were put right. Efforts in this respect have proved successful. Now the poor peasants in the co-op speak out and go about their work with

great confidence. They are no longer thrust into the background and their prestige is no longer undermined by the middle peasants. Some middle peasants, who used to make light of the poor peasants, have now changed their ways of thinking to a great extent. Middle-peasant vice-chairman Tien Ming-teh often elbowed aside and treated contemptuously the poor-peasant vice-chairman. After the co-op started its check-up, nothing of the kind has happened. He criticized himself in the management committee: "In the past, I looked down upon the poor peasants, because, to my mind, they were incompetent and didn't keep their word. Now I know I'm wrong. I'll rely upon the poor peasants to run the co-op well."

c) In the management and supervisory committees, the poor peasants were given full support and full confidence was placed in their ability. They were trained in actual work and helped to do their work well, so that they could become more competent and their prestige as leaders enhanced. This has also proved successful. Now the poor-peasant chairman handles both the affairs of the township and the co-op. The poor-peasant vice-chairman is now a well-trained administrator. He is resourceful in work and is becoming popular with his fellow co-op members. Other poor-peasant committee members are also more class-conscious and have greater faith in the co-op. Now a leading core has been formed by the poor peasants which has the dominant position in leading the co-op. The middle peasants no longer have the upper hand. In the supervisory committee, the poor-peasant chairman and committee member are quite competent at present. They show great concern about the affairs of the co-op and are bold in criticizing. No longer influenced by the middle-peasant member, they are playing a decisive part in the committee. d) The poor-peasant co-operation fund, government loans and relief fund have been properly used to solve the difficulties of the poor peasants so that they can concentrate on doing their production tasks and assigned work. This has proved to be very important. For instance, a leading

member of the co-op, a poor peasant, expressed himself in a little jingle:

*"With money and rice, things are easily done,
With no money or rice what can I run?
Just see what government help has done,
Through thick and thin I have really won!"*

From what has been described, it can be seen that the co-op has taken on a new appearance since the check-up and the solution of a number of the chief problems. Now it is on its feet and what it has achieved is noteworthy. But it should be pointed out that if the leadership is not strengthened or work is halted at this stage, many problems may reappear. We cannot rest on our laurels. We must maintain firm leadership to consolidate and improve the co-op by keeping in close touch with the actual production tasks.

STRENGTHENING THE CO-OP—A GOOD EXAMPLE

(By the Department of Producers' Co-operation of the
Lungchi Regional Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party, July 9, 1955. See the *Fukien Rural Work
Bulletin*, No. 13)

This is a very good account of how a co-operative was strengthened. It deserves to be studied widely.

The birth of a new social system is always accompanied by a great uproar and outcry, proclaiming the superiority of the new system and criticizing the backwardness of the old. To bring our more than 500 million peasants through socialist transformation is a project of earth-rocking, heaven-shaking dimensions which cannot possibly be achieved in an atmosphere of calm seas and gentle breezes. It demands of us Communists that we patiently educate the great mass of the peasants—who are still burdened with many of the habits and ideas of the old society—and explain things to them in vivid terms which they can easily understand.

This work is now going forward in every part of the country. Many comrades in the rural areas have turned out to be excellent teachers. The method described in this article—"Make four comparisons and five calculations"—is a very useful way of showing the peasants clearly which system is good and which is bad. They understand the moment they hear it.

Such methods are extremely convincing. They are a far cry from the sort of thing done by the incompetent teachers, who over-simplify the problem with such so-called slogans as "Either you follow the road of the Communist Party or you follow the road of Chiang Kai-shek." This is just labelling people to cow them into compliance instead of coming forward with something positive and stirring.

But taking the peasants' own experiences and analysing them in detail — now there is a method that is really effective.

— EDITOR

The "Pioneer" Agricultural Producers' Co-operative in Lungfeng Township, Hua-an County, Fukien, is a big one with 75 households. It has done quite well in production, and early rice crops in 1955 were expected to be some 20 per cent better than that of 1954.

But the co-op had many problems. For one thing, it had been badly hit by natural calamities in the early months of 1955 — of its 320 *mou* of paddy fields, 220 *mou* had been transplanted on time, 40 *mou* had been planted out after the rains, and the remaining 60 *mou* had not been planted out at all. The cost of production was high. A great deal of manpower was used. The farm work extended over too long a time owing to the drought. The relations between the poor and middle peasants in the co-op were rather confused. The leaders of the co-op were out of their depth when it grew to a considerable size; none of their experience had prepared them for work on such a scale.

Thirty of the member families doubted whether they would get a higher income when the summer harvest was over, so they fretted and worried. They weren't sure they had been wise to join the co-op. A few other members had also lost their enthusiasm for one reason or another.

Lin San-hsiang, for example, had a land share in the co-op, but took no part in any of its work, preferring to reclaim land and grow sweet potatoes on his own. Some members carried on subsidiary occupations for their own benefit and did not join those organized by the co-op. Participants in the latter were credited with one work-point for every ten *fen* earned. But many doubted whether they would actually receive ten *fen* when the co-op worked out its distribution of gains.

Other members felt that the co-op restricted their activities, that they were not "free" in it. Lin Ta-teh, a middle peasant, said: "I can work and I have my own ox. On my own. I could carry my rice seedlings and plough to the fields and transplant two *mou* a day. What was the use of joining a co-op and being tied hand and foot?"

For such reasons, seven families were preparing to pull out of the co-op in the autumn. As for many of the new members, though they worked hard, they had their own worries. Their feeling was, "Let's see what the autumn harvest is like, then we'll know if the co-op is worth anything."

Other problems concerned the arrangements made for mutual benefit. The middle peasants complained that the fodder rations for the oxen were too small, that the animals weren't getting enough to eat, and that the co-op wasn't paying enough for their use. The price paid for fertilizer — twenty *fen* a hundred catties for first-rate animal manure and for the same amount of night-soil four *fen* a "degree" (a measure of density) — struck the middle peasants as somewhat low. They also considered it unfair to collect share fund on land and manpower on an equal basis. (Thirty per cent of the co-op's earnings were paid out on land shares.) A few members reclaimed land on their own to grow sweet potatoes, extending their personal holding and upsetting the running of the co-op as a whole.

What steps did the co-op take to strengthen itself?

1) It put its trust in the Party branch. It trained a core of functionaries from among the membership. It cleared up incorrect ways of thinking and clarified the method of work.

Before anything else was done, the Party branch reviewed the existing situation. It found that only a few work teams had been sent by the county government to the township. The township officials failed to devise enough ways and means. The co-op spread its energies in too many different directions. The mutual-aid teams needed a check-up to put them on a sound basis.

As to what remedies should be adopted, the Party branch reached the conclusion that it was necessary to begin with correcting wrong ideas and attitudes toward the check-up among the co-op officials and taking steps to strengthen the co-op. At the start, the Party members and the co-op officials differed on the question of the check-up. Only a few of the latter took it seriously and were willing to play an active and responsible part in it. Most of them didn't think there was any way out, and preferred to rely on the work teams from outside to solve their difficulties. Some were blindly complacent and thought "there aren't any problems left to be tackled." Some were even inclined to take hasty steps and to "strengthen" the co-op by expelling two or three "bad members."

Having understood this situation, the Party sub-branch in the co-op encouraged the co-op officials to attend training courses organized by the township to train leaders for the consolidation campaign. The study helped them to a better understanding of what had to be done, and corrected their mistaken views. Further discussions took place at enlarged meetings of the Party sub-branch and the co-op management committee, and at other meetings. These also helped the co-op officials see their way to take the lead in the work of consolidation campaign. After adequate training, 23 out of the 25 officials of the co-op took the initiative in this work and functioned as its leading core from start to finish.

2) Production was pushed ahead by checking over the farm work and organizing labour emulation. Labour emulation had been going on rather smoothly from the time the co-op was enlarged. When the consolidation campaign was started, farm work was examined and production experience summed up. The close relation between strong organization and the work of the production brigades was made apparent. After democratic discussions, the first brigade was chosen as the best and received the red banner, while the fourth brigade was criticized for its inferior work. Then the membership was rallied for participation in the strengthening of the co-op. The aims of the consolidation campaign and the reasons why a more firmly based co-op could give higher yields were explained to them. Since all members were interested in the good yields, they became convinced that improvement was necessary.

3) The co-op carried out step-by-step educational work to give the members a proper outlook. By "making four comparisons and five calculations," the advantages of co-operation were made clear.

The four comparisons were:

- (a) Which is the best way of farming: co-op, mutual-aid team, or individual?
- (b) Which is better, socialism or capitalism?
- (c) Which system is better, one that involves exploitation or the one that doesn't?
- (d) Which is better, individual prosperity or common prosperity?

The five calculations were:

- (a) How much has been accomplished in beating natural calamities?
- (b) How much income has been derived from subsidiary occupations?
- (c) How many additional work-points were earned as a result of keenness in work?

(d) What were the benefits and how much did output increase, as a result of co-operation between the poor and middle peasants?

(e) What were the difficulties in production and living, and how to solve them?

The benefits of co-operation were enumerated at a general meeting of all members. In combating drought, single, centralized management combined with collective effort had enabled the co-op to transplant 220 *mou*. If the members had been working individually, no more than 170 *mou* could have been transplanted under conditions of natural calamity. With co-operation it had been possible to transplant 50 *mou* more. Considering that 350 catties of rice could be harvested from a *mou* of land, the co-op made it possible to get 17,500 catties more than individual peasants could have done in the same year.

The co-op had changed 110.67 *mou* that had been intercropped to single crops. Without the co-op, only 30 *mou* could have been changed over. Reckoning that the change-over meant an additional 200 catties per *mou*, output would increase by 22,134 catties.

Fighting drought under centralized management, and raising water to irrigate large tracts of land instead of small plots one at a time, saved much manpower. When farming individually each household had to spend an average of 30 work-days to irrigate the fields after winter cultivation. For the 75 households in the co-op this would have meant a total of 2,250 work-days. But for its early crop in 1955, the co-op needed only 400 work-days to carry water, push waterwheels and tend the irrigation channels. The saving was no less than 1,850 work-days. Reckoning a work-day at ten catties of rice, the total savings here were 18,500 catties.

With a big pool of manpower under its management, the co-op was able to get work done more efficiently. During the spring drought, when everything had to be done very quickly, over twenty members were sent to villages as far as 20 li

away to look for seedlings. About a dozen worked on the waterwheels day and night. All draught animals and seedling planters were organized for emergency works. As a result, 40.27 *mou* of rice fields were planted. It was reckoned 250 catties would be grown on each *mou*, raising total output by 10,067 catties. Scattered farming could not have solved such difficulties in seedlings, draught animals, manpower and irrigation, and only five *mou* could have been planted under such conditions.

When the co-op was still a mutual-aid team in 1954, sweet potatoes had been planted on 36.19 *mou* of paddy fields. In 1955, under the single, centralized co-operative management, ten *mou* of this land were hit by drought and thus left for the coming year's seedlings, while 26 *mou* were changed to terrace land. If each *mou* could give 200 catties more after this was done, the co-op could increase its yield by 5,238 catties.

Co-operation between the poor and middle peasants helped get better yields. Poor peasants in the co-op had 100 *mou* of land pooled in the co-op. Yield on their plots could increase by over 20 per cent on the average, and much more in some cases. The 1.67 *mou* of paddy field owned by Lin Chunmu, a former farm labourer, could yield 2,000 catties in the early crop season as against 800 catties. If an additional 140 catties could be harvested on each *mou* of land owned by the poor peasants, the total increase would be 14,000 catties.

The middle peasants also benefited from the co-op. They began to understand that if they stood together with the poor peasants both would share the benefits, while if they farmed separately both would lose. Some middle peasants had had the mistaken view that "joining the co-op means to slave for the poor peasants," but the facts caused them to give it up. In changing small plots into large tracts for cultivation, 27 boundary ridges between the fields were removed. The new land thus acquired could yield 540 catties, in addition to the savings in manpower.

Division of labour and specialization by trades brought higher income from subsidiary occupations. During the long period of the fight against the drought, the mutual-aid teams could not prevent all their land from being affected. The co-op not only saved its crops but managed to earn 1,545 yuan from side occupations. "In such a serious drought," said Lin Yu-tou, a middle peasant, "you'd have to work in the fields all day. If there was no co-op, how could we get anything from side-line production?"

These practical examples and calculations were a good lesson to the members. Unfounded ideas such as "there is more leisure in mutual-aid teams or individual farming than in the co-op," or "poor peasants gain from the co-op but not middle peasants," or "a poor peasant can't get much from the co-op because he has no ox, little manure and little labour power" were all dispelled. The result was high spirits and new confidence that the co-op could be strengthened and run properly.

Then, each production group as a unit, led by the core members, began to make its four comparisons and five calculations.

All the members, men and women, young and old, were encouraged to make these reckonings and compare their present with their past. One hundred and fourteen people from the 75 households in the co-op attended meetings on the subject, and learned much in the discussions. Among them, 102 members made comparisons and calculations based on their own experience.

Before the consolidation campaign started, Lin Chu-tou, a middle peasant, had intended to pull out of the co-op after the autumn harvest. He felt that the co-op had brought him troubles, forced him to work hard, and tied up his time. Of the 6 *mou* he put in the co-op, 3.9 *mou* could not be planted in the early season and he had been ill for two months. When he had been a member of the mutual-aid team in 1953, all members had had to turn out for the harvest under heavy

summer rains. Even though he fell sick, he had gone out to the fields to reap the rice crop. Apart from the fact that he was very ill himself, his ox was getting weaker and weaker from overwork, so he finally had to stop when there was a lot of work still left to do. If he had not joined the co-op, his income from the early crop in 1955 could not possibly have exceeded 1,000 catties of rice. After deducting wages and costs, that would have left him a net 700 catties. In other words, he would have gone bankrupt in 1956.

In the co-op, though Lin Chu-tou was ill himself, his wife and children could get suitable work. Following spring cultivation they earned 1,300 work-points, and they expected to get an additional 400 by June. Moreover, the manure he turned in was valued at 330 catties of rice. So he was able to get 1,330 catties more than farming by himself, even without counting his land-dividend. When Lin learned the result of the detailed accounting, he said, "If I were not in the co-op, my illness would have meant land unplanted, and my ox would have died of overwork. Joining the co-op is like taking the highroad and crossing a big bridge. Even if I were threatened with having my head cut off, I'd still stay in the co-op."

Lin Chin-ching, another co-op member, had a somewhat similar experience. While he was still in the mutual-aid team his family lived in poverty, and his father fell sick. So for some two years his 1.3 *mou* of land were left idle. His mother married again after his father died in 1955. He was the only one in his family who was able to work and he had no ox. If he had stayed out of the co-op, there would have been no way for him to overcome his difficulties in farming. But now, more than 700 work-points were credited to him in the early crop season and his land grew crops. He said about this: "Outside the co-op, poor farmers have poor crops and the sick leave their land uncultivated. Inside the co-op, your crop is no longer poor, even though you are not yet well off." Fifteen living examples of this kind were selected. The mem-

bers involved all spoke about their own experiences. This had a profound effect on the other members and raised their understanding.

Some peasants said: "Without these calculations it's hard to understand what it's all about. After them, you know what's what." Take the case of Lin Tien-teh, the middle peasant, who had been wavering all the time in the co-op, taking two steps back every time he took one forward. After the calculations he no longer repeated his old refrain: "My buffalo is strong and I can work hard. On my own I could carry my rice seedlings and plough to the fields and transplant two *mou* a day. Better pull out of the co-op and farm by myself." Instead, he was determined to stay in.

The middle peasant members also changed their former idea that "only the poor peasants gain a lot from the co-op but the middle peasants gain nothing." Of the eight member households that had decided to pull out, six changed their minds after the calculations, and the remaining two decided to think it over.

The steps for consolidation became a popular demand among the members.

4) Education was given on the co-op regulations and the principle of mutual benefit. Existing problems were found and settled.

The problems first dealt with included selfish behaviour and ideas among the members, stealing co-op property, cheating the co-op and shoddy work, violations of labour discipline and careless handling of common property.

Taking advantage of the higher awareness of the members, the co-op officials led them to examine these problems. Lin Tien-teh who had stolen four catties of bone dust from the co-op, and Lin Tai-wang who had stolen forty sweet potato seedlings, criticized their own faults. Selfish ideas were condemned and a good start was made in inculcating the concept of love for the co-op. Unity among the members was

strengthened and the meaning of labour discipline was made clear to everyone.

Problems in connection with policy and organization were grouped according to their nature and importance. Solutions were first discussed in the co-op management committee. Later they were adopted by a general meeting of all the members. They were:

A. Strengthening political leadership. A school for adults was to be established and political and general education groups organized. The dependents of co-op members would also meet twice a month when political courses would be given.

B. Encouraging members to conclude pledges incorporating the idea of love for the co-op, and to observe labour discipline.

C. Specific measures:

1. For farm work or the use of draught oxen, fixed standards were to be worked out, based on acreage, type of work, place, time and wages. The quality of ploughing and rational use of animals were to be ensured. Grass ration for both oxen and buffaloes (40 catties and 50 catties a day respectively in the past) were raised by ten catties a day in each case. The idea of protecting the oxen by better care was to be popularized.

2. Price of fertilizers. The price paid for first-rate animal manure was set at 20 *fen* per 100 catties, and for the same amount of night-soil four *fen* a "degree." The middle peasants thought the price was too low and below the actual value. After adequate discussion it was found out that the price set for animal manure wasn't low, but there were shortcomings in the rice husk market which should be improved. If the price of animal manure was raised, it would hurt the interest of the poor peasants. This problem had therefore to be approached in two ways. On the one hand, co-op members should be encouraged to use grass instead of husks in composting; on the other hand, suggestions for improving the husk

market should be referred to the departments concerned. The price set for night-soil was found to be really too low. It was raised from four *fen* per "degree" to five *fen*. Both the poor and middle peasants were satisfied.

3. Share fund. The previous practice of collecting 50 cents from every *mou* of land and from every worker was found to be not entirely fair. After consultation it was decided to collect one yuan from each share (100 catties) of the crop set aside for the payment of land-dividends.

4. Central management of subsidiary occupations. First a general review was made. It was found that subsidiary production by individuals, instead of within the co-op, had been due partly to the way of thinking of certain members, and partly to the rigid policy of the co-op. Now, it was decided that for every eight *fen* earned from transporting grain tax one work-point would be credited to the member who did the transporting. One work-point would be credited to any member earning ten *fen* in other transport, building, manufacturing soda, carpentry, etc. In all transport work, the co-op would receive 80 per cent of the income. The member who did the work would get the remaining 20 per cent.

5. The problems in management were mainly connected with contracted work and pledged yield. The output for which production brigades in the double-crop rice fields had contracted with the co-op had been set somewhat high. The fourth production brigade had agreed to a contracted quota requiring a 40 per cent output increase, and many members complained about this. It was therefore decided to cut down the average contracted output per *mou* by 5 per cent, so as still to provide for a general increase of some 20 per cent. Sweet potatoes and single-crop rice were not subject to the contracted-quota system. So they were to have their work and yield quotas worked out according to various standards. The output quota for sweet potatoes was to be converted into terms of rice for purposes of valuation.

Taking the 1954 output as the basis, the estimated 1955 output for different types of land was classified into four categories. Planned increases of yield over 1954 were set at 5, 10, 15 and 20 per cent respectively. The co-op, in the future, was to have "more work put on the contracted basis and less work with contracted cost."

A MESSY CO-OP IS STRAIGHTENED OUT

(By the Hsichou County Committee, Chinese Communist Party, in the *Yunnan Rural Work Bulletin*, No. 111, June 30, 1955)

This material highlights an established fact, namely, that any co-op can be put in order, no matter how chaotic its affairs may be. Because all co-operative members are working peasants, although various strata among them may disagree on many things, they all can ultimately be made to understand. At times, some co-ops fall into a really terrible state. The sole reason for this is that they cannot get the Party to lead them; the Party fails to explain clearly its policy and methods to the people.

"We know that co-ops are good things. But after we formed ours, the Party county committee, the Party district committee and the village Party branch all ignored us. Maybe they think our hamlet is too poor. We don't eat very well; our houses are crude. Maybe that's why they don't come."

It is precisely this sort of thing which is responsible for the so-called "mess." There is no other reason. If a co-op cannot get leadership from the Party, of course its affairs will be in confusion. The moment leadership is given, the confusion ends.

The article also raises the question of whether co-ops can be established in backward parts of the countryside, and answers with a definite affirmative. The writer describes a co-op in just such a locality.

About 5 per cent of China's villages are backward. We must build co-operatives in every one of them and, in the struggle to do so, wipe out their backwardness.

— EDITOR

The Tungsheng Agricultural Producers' Co-operative of Komu Township, Hsichou County, Yunnan Province, was organized within ten days in the autumn of 1954. Because it was set up in such a hurry, not enough had been done to prepare the peasants' minds for it, and mistakes were made in carrying out the policy. Besides, there were only a few people to lead the co-operative and not such capable ones at that. They did not know what to do about the production tasks in hand, with the result that production was in chaos and the co-op members were wavering.

1) After the co-op was formed, nobody was put in charge of production because cadres were inexperienced and the key personnel did not know how to give collective leadership. There were only two Youth League members in the co-op to help push the movement. The 21-year-old chairman was too young to give a lead. The vice-chairman only thought of working for himself and his family. The person in charge of supplies and the one supposed to look after subsidiary production did not trouble themselves about co-op affairs, but baked tiles together with villagers outside the co-op instead. The nine members of the management committee had met only once after the co-op was formed, and even then not all were present. Naturally the meeting didn't arrive at a solution of any problem.

2) There were neither long-term nor short-term plans for arranging production. Jobs were assigned haphazardly, and in a number of cases people did as they liked. Everyone scrambled for what was easy to do; the hard work was left undone. Members knew that they could collect pay for the

work they did. But they did not know how to calculate the work done and how to write down the work-points earned. At one time, the work-points were not put down for two whole weeks while people were quarrelling about them. The members were discouraged. Villagers outside had almost planted all their maize and rice when the co-op had not even completed its ploughing. In the months after the co-op was set up to February 1955 they accumulated a mere 10,000 catties of manure. The book-keeping was in a mess. No statement was published of work-points earned after the co-op was formed.

3) Payments for the use of members' draught animals and farm tools were most unreasonably set. The co-op had 11 animals at its disposal. Because the co-op's fields were scattered, an ox could work at most two shifts a day; in the majority of cases, an animal did one shift only. The amount credited for each shift was six points. The amount thus realized in a year was not enough to keep the animals in fodder, so all their owners could rear was gaunt and lean cattle. Only three animals were really strong enough to do any ploughing. The use of large farm tools was not paid for and the work-points were unreasonably fixed. For a shift of ploughing with an ox a co-op member could get at most four points, but a day's hoeing he could get eight or nine points. So the members preferred hoeing to ploughing. For all these reasons, the co-op had nothing to show that collective management was superior to that of peasants working on their own, and the members lost confidence. Some did odd jobs to add to their income, some were thinking of pulling out. The vice-chairman himself had applied for permission to withdraw from this co-op and to join another.

The chaos prevailing in the co-op was mainly due to the fact that the Party committee of the county had overrated the situation in Komu Township and thought that there was a good enough foundation on which to start co-operative farming. The fact that some of the villages were backward had

been overlooked. Chungkou, for instance, the village in which the Tungsheng Agricultural Producers' Co-operative was located was one of such villages. When co-ops began to be set up in the autumn of 1954, the most active people joined the "Starlight" Co-op. In order to complete its task, the county Party committee hastily turned two seasonal mutual-aid teams with only two Youth League members in them into the Tungsheng Co-op of 20 peasant families. It was felt at the time that the new co-operative would be off to a good start, with the co-operatives that had been established earlier giving the lead. But once the Tungsheng Co-op was formed, neither the local Party branch nor the cadres tried to understand what was really the matter, they simply acknowledged passively that the key personnel of the co-op was not as capable as that of others. Hence, for a long time they did not realize what the real snag was. On top of all this, certain abuses in the grain policy led to a lessening of the members' desire to make the land yield more.

Under the direct guidance of the regional Party committee, a member of the county Party committee came to Komu Township and gave it his full attention. As a result of his investigations, the problems mentioned above regarding production were brought to light. With a clear picture of the situation in his own mind, he proceeded to help the local Party branch study it and unify their estimate of it. Overcoming their apathy and conceit, he made it his personal business to lead the members of the Party branch in examining the affairs of the Tungsheng Co-op. While trying to organize production, he found where the snag was, got hold of the knottiest problems and proceeded to solve them. His way of working was to consolidate the co-op by means of organizing production, and to stimulate production by consolidating the co-op.

First and foremost, steps were taken to carry out the Party's class policy correctly in the rural areas, that is: to rely on the poor peasants, to ask them to air their views on co-opera-

tives and on production, in order to get a true picture. The comrade from the county Party committee and members of the local Party branch met with the co-op cadres for informal discussions. After this, a meeting of poor peasants was called at which the "New Life" Co-op (one of the older co-ops in the township) was held up as an example of the superiority of co-operative farming with its higher yields. It was explained that only by the co-operative road could the peasants hope to rid themselves from poverty and lead a prosperous life. As a result, the poor peasants began to show confidence in co-operatives and wanted to join. The comrade from the county Party committee and members of the local Party branch, for their part, made self-criticisms at the meeting for their past lack of concern for the Tungsheng Co-op.

They then threshed out the co-op's production problems and asked the assembled poor peasants to say all they had to say. The following views were then heard. "It's not that we haven't wanted to join. But the cadres didn't give the proper lead. We've seen with our own eyes that outside the co-op the planting of maize and rice is nearly finished and that all the ploughing is done, while the co-op hasn't done a thing, not even ploughed its 14 *mou* of non-irrigated land. It'll have a food problem, without ever being able to think of increasing its production. That's a terrible thing to look forward to..." And one of the co-op members said: "We do want to do well in production, but the co-op has only a few weak draught animals. We should buy some large, strong ones but we haven't got the money to pay for them." Others said: "The co-op is short of both fertilizer and seed. Where do we find the money for 500 catties of bean-cake residue and 25 catties of soya-bean seed?"

Once the comrade from the county Party committee had seen what the real situation was in the co-op, he expressed his readiness to help the members out of their production difficulties and suggested that the best way would be that they themselves found the methods and means to overcome them.

In the discussion, the suggestion was put forward to grow more green manuring crops to make up for the shortage of fertilizer. Part of the money for buying cattle should be paid by the members themselves. A small loan should be taken to enable the co-op to start its maize and rice planting. This would make everybody feel better and more confident towards increasing production. In accordance with these wishes, and after consultation with the co-op cadres, it was decided to raise a loan of 245 yuan from the state bank and credit co-op for the purchase of means of production. Then the various production tasks were assigned among the co-op members. Everyone got busy, so that all past anxieties were allayed. In the division of labour it was decided that the men were to plough, while the women in the co-op were to cut turf and green manuring crops and to plant maize.

In order to remove the causes for anxiety and to make the members more enthusiastic for higher yields, further steps were taken to find out what questions regarding policy still remained and to clarify them. First of all, the government's grain policy and the policy for co-operative farming were clearly defined. The policy on co-operation was explained as being based on the voluntary principle and on mutual benefit. The grain policy was explained as being one where, "if you have a greater surplus of grain, the state will buy more; if you have less, it will buy less; if you have none, you won't be asked to sell; and families short of grain are assured their supply from the government." To enable the peasants to have a better understanding of Party policy, and do away with their worries the "three fixed items" policy was publicized in accordance with a directive by the provincial Party committee, i.e. fixed quota of output, fixed quota of grain to be purchased by the government, fixed quota of grain to be supplied by the government. Originally, 15,590 catties of rice were to have been supplied to 31 households in the village where the Tungsheng Co-op was located. After the government's grain policy was fully explained, three of these

households which actually had enough grain of their own confessed that they did not need any extra rations, thus reducing the amount the government had to supply by 4,540 catties. One of the co-op members said: "If I'd known the policy as I know it now, I wouldn't have applied to the government for 200 more catties of grain." On the question of fixing work-points, it was decided after full democratic discussion that the original arrangement of crediting six points for the work of an animal and only four points for human labour in ploughing had to be altered, so that eight points were credited for the animal and seven points for manpower. The value of a day's hoeing was reduced by one point. When manure was contributed as investment in the co-op, it was to be graded according to value. Members were to contribute seed in proportion to the yield of their land. The interest paid on the members' investment in the co-op was to be at the same rate the credit co-op paid.

When all these problems were solved, the members forgot their worries and became quite enthusiastic, promising to put greater energy into their work. Two members told a co-op meeting that they would buy two big draught animals (which they have since done). Through the co-op members' better political understanding and their rising enthusiasm for production, a general membership meeting was called to sum up the work. The meeting discussed means to give greater stimulus to democratic practice, to perfect the systems of work, improve the leaders' style of work, reinforce the key personnel of the co-op, and heighten the members' enthusiasm to produce more and more.

At the meeting the chairman appraised the work done since the co-op was established, pointed out the problems that remained to be solved, and the reasons why they had arisen. He examined critically his own past conduct and encouraged the members to speak their mind. Their criticisms were very much to the point. "Chairman Mao tells us to set up co-ops and we know that a co-op is a good thing. But when we set

one up, nobody bothered about us, neither the county nor the district Party committee, nor the local Party branch. They haven't been here even once, perhaps because they don't think much of our poor little village, where they can't get good food and accommodations. . . . The co-op chairman hasn't taken a responsible stand. He rarely says anything and doesn't seem to care. Our book-keeper can make speeches that sound delightful, but he doesn't follow up his words with actions. . . . Our co-op ran into trouble not because we members didn't want to do our jobs, but because the cadres didn't give us a lead." After this, the cadres of the co-op made their self-criticisms and guaranteed to work better henceforth. On this basis, various systems were discussed and agreed upon for a rational distribution of the work. The management committee of the co-op was to meet once every three to five days to discuss production problems; production teams would meet once every three days to assess the work done by the members, to note down the work-points earned and to divide up the work for the next few days. A general membership meeting once a month was to sum up the work and publish accounts.

As a result of these measures taken, there was much greater enthusiasm for co-operative work among the members, so that the planting of maize and rice and the ploughing of the co-op's 14 *mou* of non-irrigated land were completed within three days.

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ON WIDENING THE SCOPE OF WOMEN'S WORK IN THE AGRICULTURAL CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT

(By the Democratic Women's Federation of Hsingtai
County, November 1955)

This is a very good article. We hope that all county Democratic Women's Federations will follow the example given and that county Party committees will improve their leadership in this matter so that—in accordance with the principle of equal pay for equal work—every woman who is able to work will take her place on the labour front. These things should be done as quickly as possible.

—EDITOR

In 1952, seven pilot agricultural producers' co-operatives were set up in Hsingtai County, Hopei Province. At present, after some three years, there are 812 co-operatives, constituting 66.8 per cent of the county's peasant households. These co-operatives have been set up in 397 villages which constitute 92.3 per cent of the total number of villages in the county. Women have taken an active part in various kinds of work in the co-operative movement, and many of them have become key personnel and activists. When Chairman Mao's directive on agricultural co-operation reached the county, the responsible cadres of the women's federation saw more clearly than ever the significance of the principle of "comprehensive planning, more active leadership." On the basis of the comprehen-

sive plan for agricultural co-operation drawn up by the county Party committee and the concrete conditions in local women's work, the county women's federation decided upon the main tasks to be fulfilled by women during the first five-year plan period. These were the tasks: go a step further in mobilizing and organizing the mass of women; actively support and participate in the agricultural co-operative movement and the campaign to increase production; promote the socialist transformation of agriculture; support the nation's socialist industrialization; and educate women to work for the fulfilment of the first five-year plan. The plan for women's work for the whole county and concrete measures to carry it out were made.

1) The county Party committee's plan for promoting the co-operative movement was as follows: "There are 66,040 households in the county, of which 7,544 poor-peasant households, 15,574 lower middle-peasant households and 4,243 upper middle-peasant households have already joined the co-operatives; and 270 ex-landlord and rich-peasant households should be expelled from the co-operatives. There are still 12,143 poor-peasant and lower middle-peasant households which have remained outside the co-operatives. It is planned to admit an additional 6,604 households into the co-operatives in 1955. In 1956, another 8,211 households, including a number of politically conscious upper middle peasants, will be drawn in, so that the membership will come to 90 per cent of all the peasant households. By 1957, it is expected that more than 92 per cent of all households will be members of co-operatives and the rich peasants eliminated as a class. Thus complete co-operation will be achieved." This plan requires that the women's federation should know what the women of all social strata think, at the various stages, about agricultural co-operation, and take appropriate steps to educate them in socialism constantly and thoroughly, so as to raise their political consciousness and enable them to keep pace with the development of the co-operative movement.

2) To develop production and increase income by all possible means, it is necessary to utilize the labour power of women in a planned and reasonable way, so as to bring their potentialities into full play. At present, 71 of the county's 812 agricultural producers' co-operatives have long-term plans and short-term arrangements for both men and women. All these are "Class 1 co-operatives," constituting 41 per cent of the 173 Class 1 co-ops or a little more than eight per cent of the total number of co-operatives in the county. Those which have reasonably arranged seasonal work for women are 521 co-operatives (i.e. 64 per cent of the total): 419 Class 2 co-operatives (the total in this category being 535) and 102 Class 1 co-operatives. There are, however, 220 Class 2 and Class 3 co-operatives which have not made proper arrangements for the utilization of labour power; rather than give the women work on ordinary days, they would call upon them suddenly for work. Some of these co-operatives, though very few, do not engage women in any kind of work at all. In view of this, it is necessary that, in 1956, more than 90 per cent of the Class 1 co-operatives should have long-term plans and short-term arrangements for both men and women; all Class 2 co-operatives should have seasonal arrangements, and as for the Class 3 co-operatives, 40 per cent of them should have seasonal arrangements, while all of them should have temporary arrangements and should engage women in work on a rational basis. By 1957, long-term plans and short-term arrangements should be the general practice in all co-operatives.

To achieve these targets, the women cadres in the co-operatives should be educated to take the initiative and suggest to the leadership that the labour power of women members be included in the over-all plans of the co-operatives. They should also take the initiative to help the Party committee understand the actual situation, and suggest that production achievements by women be summed up so as to get rid of the men's usual contempt for women's working ability. It

is also necessary to teach the women members to take up needlework during the slack seasons and inclement weather, to accept willingly any work given them in accordance with the principle of division of labour, and to take an active part in the co-operative's production. Where the soil is rich, attention should be paid to the proper division of labour for deep ploughing and intensive cultivation, general field work and the application of fertilizer. In land-short areas having ample labour power, both men and women members should be provided with adequate work, bearing in mind a proper division of labour and occupations.

3) To ensure success in division of labour and occupations, efforts should be made to enable women members to raise their scientific and technical level in agricultural and subsidiary production, and to mobilize them to participate in the movement for technical reform in agriculture. The women of Hsingtai County have been enabled to master the technique of seed selection, seed soaking, seed dusting, insect control, thinning by hand, artificial pollination of corn, cotton growing, etc. Besides this, however, different demands should be set upon women in different areas according to the varying conditions.

(1) In hilly and thickly-wooded areas where arable land is insufficient in comparison with the comparatively large population, the following measures are to be taken: raise per-unit area yield; grow fruit trees and plant trees in large numbers; develop animal husbandry in a planned way; energetically expand a diversified economy, beneficial to agricultural production, to include poultry-raising, sericulture and bee-keeping. So, apart from learning agricultural techniques and being able to do field work, women should also learn the techniques for raising poultry and pigs, breeding silkworms, and keeping bees.

(2) In semi-hilly areas with large stretches of comparatively level land, cotton is the main crop; but in these places irrigation facilities are inadequate. As most of the

men are out as traders or working on water conservancy projects, there is a shortage of labour power. In these areas, therefore, women should learn such modern cotton-growing techniques as pruning, thinning out side branches, cutting the terminal bud off the main stem, cutting the terminal bud off the side branches, general pruning, careful pruning and insect control. They should also take part in the main field work during busy seasons, and learn such techniques as full seed germination, preserving soil moisture, raising pigs, and accumulating compost.

(3) On the plains with vast fertile land and with irrigation facilities, it is suitable for growing food crops. In these areas the women's main tasks, besides participating in field work, are to raise large numbers of pigs and collect more fertilizer. Therefore, women must learn how to raise pigs, in addition to various kinds of agricultural technique. In those villages where reeds are grown, women should learn to weave mats and raise their quality.

Generally speaking, in raising the technical level of women, the specific requirements are as follows: Three to seven skilled women technicians are to be trained in the county. Five to fifteen women technicians are to be trained in every big or medium-sized co-operative, and three to seven women technicians in each small co-operative. These women technicians should help the mass of women master technique. It is also necessary to train a large number of women in the technique of using new-type farm implements to set the pace. When the mass of women have mastered production techniques, they can help promote the expansion of agricultural and subsidiary production. Luchia Village is the key place for raising pigs. The whole county, which has 10,000 pigs, should aim to increase the number to 18,000 by 1956, and 23,000 by 1957. Peikou Village is the key place for raising poultry. The target for the whole county is 132,080 fowls by 1956, and 198,120 by 1957. Shuimen Village is the key place for breeding silkworms. The whole county, with

its present 34,200 catties of cocoons, is to reach 35,000 catties by 1956, with no increase for 1957 because of the limitation of mulberry trees.

To achieve these targets, all women must first be brought to realize the significance of raising their technical level. Meanwhile, it is necessary to establish close connections with the agro-technical stations, and whenever a training class is run in the county, district or township, efforts should be made to ensure that 30 per cent of the trainees are women. In day-to-day work, the co-operatives' women cadres should help the women members study technique. Methods that can generally raise the women's technical level, such as teaching each other and learning from each other, men teaching women, and coaching apprentices, should be promoted.

4) To encourage women to take part in production and to protect the physical and mental health of their children, mutual-aid organizations to take care of the children should be expanded. The present 843 creches and seven nursery stations in Hsingtai County fall into these four categories:

(1) Small temporary creches. There are 398 such creches where neighbours and relatives act as nursemaids or the mothers take turns to look after the children. In most cases the nursemaids are paid in the form of exchanging labour.

(2) Seasonal creches. There are 363 such creches led by the co-operatives as a whole and run by separate management. They have regular nursemaids, periodic meetings and sanitation work. A fairly rational system is used to assess work-points, some assessed by production teams, some paid directly by mothers with work-points.

(3) Year-round creches. There are 82 such creches which were first established in 1952. They are directed by the co-operatives' special committees for the care of children and are formed by a production brigade or a production team. There are regular meetings, a system of assessing

work-points and sanitation regulations in these creches. The nursemaids are chosen by democratic election.

(4) Nursery stations. Children from four to seven years old are placed in these stations. One or two teachers teach them to sing and tell stories to them.

On the present basis, it is required that by 1956, 70 per cent of Hsingtai County's big and medium co-operatives set up creches, and 50 per cent of the big co-operatives organize nursery stations. At the same time, small co-operatives with favourable conditions should also set up creches when necessary. By 1957, all the big and medium co-operatives should have creches; all the big co-operatives and 50 per cent of the medium co-operatives should organize nursery stations; and 50 per cent of the small co-operatives should set up creches.

Before organizing creches, it is necessary, first and foremost, to look into the need and the possibilities. For instance, it should be known beforehand how many women are unable to take part in production because they have to look after their own babies, and how many old women are there who can look after babies. After thorough investigations, the women should be brought together to talk the matter over and see what problems or worries they may have. In the light of all this, they should then be persuaded to take part in production or work for the creches. While organizing creches, it should be seen that work-points are being assessed reasonably, so that all parties concerned are benefited. After the creches are formed, constant attention should be paid to the state of mind of the mothers and nursemaids; meetings must be held at regular intervals and problems dealt with in good time. Also, the nursemaids should be taught the rudiments of sanitation to protect the children's health. Only when all these tasks are carried out can the creches be run well, expanded and improved step by step.

5) It is necessary to have a plan for training a large number of leading women personnel for production teams and co-operatives. In the 812 co-operatives of Hsingtai County

there are now 2,871 key women workers (472 co-operative chairmen, 917 management committee members, and 1,482 brigade leaders). They may be classified into three categories according to their political consciousness and working ability:

(1) Under the first category are those who are concurrently chairmen of township women's federations and co-operative chairmen or management committee members. The majority of them are key personnel who took part in the land reform. There are 575 women under this category, more than 20 per cent of all the leading women. Just and impartial, they work actively and have a firm standpoint. They always take the initiative in guiding work according to plan. They are able to discover and solve problems in good time and overcome difficulties, and are therefore respected by the masses.

(2) The majority of women under this category are concurrently committee members of the township women's federations and co-operative personnel. They are for the most part key people who emerged in the movement to raise output before 1952. They number 2,008 which is 70 per cent of the total. Full of enthusiasm in their work, they are able to lead the other women members along and fulfil the tasks given them by the leadership. But when confronted with difficulties, they are not always prepared to deal with them. They are not tactful enough, and they rather tend to depend on the male personnel in the co-operatives to solve difficult problems for them.

(3) Under the third category are most of the key personnel who have come to the fore since the co-operatives were set up. There are 288 of them, over 10 per cent of the total. They lack experience and are not very capable in work. Some of them give guidance to the other women to take part in production only when their personal interests are not affected. In the face of difficulties, they easily become discouraged and start grumbling. A few only take into account their personal interests, and think that

to give too much attention to public affairs is detrimental to their own interests. These women, of course, cannot do much in the way of giving leadership to others.

The fostering and training of the aforementioned three categories of key personnel needs to be strengthened and their ability raised. By 1956, the efficiency of key personnel now in the first category will have increased. Seven members in this category will be given special help to learn over-all management of a co-operative, while 40 per cent of the existing key personnel will be raised to the level of those in the first category, and 55 per cent to the level of those in the second category. By 1957, 55 per cent of the existing key personnel should reach the level of those in the first category, and the number of those now in the third category should be reduced to the minimum or to zero. It is necessary to train more key personnel at all times and to send them to places whenever they are urgently needed. By 1956, all big co-operatives should have women chairmen (or vice-chairmen), committee members and brigade leaders; the medium co-operatives should have 80 per cent of the required women personnel, and even small co-operatives, where conditions are ripe, should have women chairmen (or vice-chairmen) or women committee members. By 1957, all big and medium co-operatives are to have women leaders (from chairmen to committee members, brigade and team leaders). As for the small co-operatives, those with favourable conditions are to have women chairmen (or vice-chairmen), and those with less favourable conditions should have women committee members. New co-operatives, big and medium-sized, are to be provided with women personnel as soon as they are established.

The training of women as key personnel should depend mainly on the township Party branch and the co-operative leadership. They should teach the women good methods in work and give them appropriate praise and criticism as the occasion may require, so as to improve their working ability gradually. It is also necessary to maintain close connections

with the county rural work department, so that whenever a training class for co-operative personnel is opened, it can be asked to draw in a certain number of women. In the winter of 1955, besides the 200 women trained by the rural work department, 350 others will be trained by the county women's federation.

6) Put the township women's representative conference on a sound basis so that, under the unified leadership of the Party branch, it will play a more active role in encouraging women to take part in the agricultural co-operative movement.

All in all there are 112 townships in the county. The women's representative conferences in 48 townships, i.e. 42.8 per cent of the total number of townships, have regular meetings and take initiative in work. The women's representative conferences in 43 townships, i.e. 38.39 per cent of the total, do not have any system or regular meetings and do not take any initiative in work. In the remaining 21 townships, the women's federations do not assume their responsibility and give no help whatsoever. These women's representative conferences should be given a thorough shake-up and strengthened accordingly. By 1956, 60 per cent of the township women's representative conferences, after having their organizations strengthened and their working system put on a sound basis, should take initiative in work. It is planned that, by 1957, all the women's representative conferences in the county will have good working systems and will be able to take initiative in work.

The strengthening of township women's representative conferences should be linked with the central tasks, and, through education and re-election, enough personnel should be trained and the organizations consolidated. The overwhelming majority of cadres in the township women's federations in Hsing-tai County are concurrently co-operative personnel. As for the few townships where personnel of the women's federations are not concurrently co-operative personnel, it should be proposed to the township leadership that they also become

co-operative personnel. This will help promote the work. (It is correct for co-operatives to have personnel from the women's representative conference, but whether they should all hold both posts concurrently depends on the concrete conditions in each place—All-China Democratic Women's Federation.)

To carry out, step by step, this plan for women's work, it is necessary for the county women's federation to improve its methods of leadership, to take the initiative in securing the Party's guidance and in maintaining close contact with all departments concerned in a planned way. The county women's federation must change its present method of giving only general leadership; it should pay special attention to key problems, sum up experience and promote work as a whole. Its collective leadership and its links with the lower units of the women's organizations must also be strengthened. As regards the various meetings to be held, the following is recommended: The committee of the county women's federation shall hold a conference every month; the county women's representative conference shall be held once a year; joint meetings of chairmen of township women's representative conferences shall be held twice a year, and meetings of their executive committees four times a year. It is advisable also to adopt the method of giving guidance by letter (i.e. before and after a certain stage in work, the township women's representative conferences should each write a letter to the county women's federation, which in turn should reply to each township women's representative conference). This method will serve to promote work and give information about the actual situation. Meantime, the women personnel in the basic units should help the Party branch mobilize women Party and Youth League members and activists to study Chairman Mao's directive on agricultural co-operation and, bearing in mind the comprehensive plans for each township, to map out plans for women's work and carry it out through concrete tasks.

WOMEN JOINING IN PRODUCTION SOLVE THE LABOUR SHORTAGE

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Prior to the spread of co-operation, many parts of the country suffered from a labour surplus. With the coming of co-operation, many co-ops are finding themselves short of labour. It has become necessary to get the great mass of the women—who have never worked in the fields before—to take their place on the labour front.

This is an important development. Many people never expected it.

People used to say: We are bound to have a labour surplus after the co-operatives are formed. We have too large a labour force already. What shall we do if it gets any bigger?

In a great many places when co-operation came into effect this fear was sent flying. There was not only no excess of labour power—there was a shortage. There seemed to be a labour surplus in some places for a time immediately after co-operation started. But this was because the co-ops there had not yet launched into large-scale production, had not yet begun additional money-making activities, had not yet started intensive cultivation.

In a considerable number of localities where the co-ops have gone in for large-scale production, increased the number of their side lines, extended their

exploitation of nature in every way and do their work more skilfully, they find that they do not have enough labour power.

This condition is only beginning to make its appearance. We will see more and more of it as the years go by. The same thing will happen after the mechanization of agriculture. In the future there will be all sorts of enterprises that people have never dreamed of, raising our agricultural output to several times, a dozen times, perhaps scores of times, its present level.

The development of industry, transportation and trade will go even further beyond the bounds of our ancestors' imagination. Science, the arts, education and public health will do the same.

China's women are a vast reserve of working power. This reserve should be tapped and used in the struggle to build a mighty socialist country. To encourage the women to join in the work, we must abide by the principle of equal pay for equal work, men and women alike.

All co-operatives can learn from the experience of Chienteh County in Chekiang Province.

—EDITOR

In the Chienho Advanced Agricultural Producers' Co-operative of Ankou Township, Chienteh County, Chekiang Province, there are altogether 77 households, with 87 males having full labour power, 28 males with half labour power and 88 females with full or half labour power. Located in a semi-upland area, the co-op has under cultivation 320 *mou* of irrigated rice fields, 302 *mou* of non-irrigated land and 200 *mou* of upland plots. Its main crops are rice and corn, followed by sweet potatoes and wheat.

Before summer, all the seedlings of the co-op turned withered, and 20 per cent had already shown their root. Originally the co-op had decided to accumulate over 260,000 catties of fertilizer, but only 90,000 catties were actually collected. In the fields of spring crops, 80 per cent of the weeds were left unhoed. The irrigation work had not been completed. Early crops had not been sown. Not enough firewood for cooking was gathered. When all this was discovered in the course of field inspection, concrete steps were immediately taken to remedy it. A fortnightly plan was drawn up, according to which 1,667 work-days were needed. That would be too much for the men in the co-op if they were working by themselves, and the more so when the time for summer harvesting and planting came. Thus, most of the women were got into the job to help carry out the plan. As a result, only in four days, 105 *mou* of rape had been reaped (this entirely done by women), more than 56,000 catties of ash compost collected, over 1,600 sprouts of edible amaranth and pumpkins planted on the 15 *mou* of land kept by the co-op members for their own use, and 55 plants of sunflowers grown beside the houses. In addition, 59 women and children gathered a week's supply of grass to feed the co-op's 50-odd pigs. In enrolling women for their service, the co-op stressed the following two points.

MOBILIZE MEN AND WOMEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

I. Through field inspection, the co-op found out where the shoe pinched in production. The next step was to draw up short-term plans, and make arrangements for the available labour power. This revealed how intensive the work should be and how far the shortage of labour power would go. Efforts were then made to point out to both men and women in the co-op why women's service was indispensable to production. The men were told to get rid of their usual contempt for the women's working ability, while the women were urged to give up their old idea that production was men's job only.

II. Attention was called to the possibility of increasing the yields by using more fertilizer. In 1954, the old co-operative had applied 460 catties of ash compost to each *mou* of land and got a bigger crop. But the land of Lo Kuang-tou (who was then not yet in the co-op), adjoining that of the co-operative, yielded 60 catties less per *mou*, because he had not been able to apply to his land ash compost three more times as the co-op did, although he had used other fertilizers as much as the co-op had done. This was used as an example to encourage the women to think by themselves how to collect fertilizer. They were told to pile up large quantities of compost by clearing the surroundings of debris, etc. This done, they would be able to ensure increased yields of rice, corns, sweet potatoes and other food crops, and thus to support the nation's industrial construction and to better their own living conditions.

III. The meaning of women's emancipation was reviewed. They were urged to recall their unhappy past, compare it with the present, and look forward into the future. They were called upon to play a more active part in production.

Through all these means, the women realized what their effort would bring about, and so became sure of themselves in work. Some of them said: "These are good times. We are no longer limited to the old routine of doing cooking, washing dishes and raising pigs," and "to collect more fertilizer in the spring means to harvest more grain in the autumn." Based on the co-op's over-all plan, each group mapped out its own fortnightly plan for 100,700 catties of compost in addition to reaping rape. The day after the plan was decided upon, most women got grass, chaff and slops ready for the pigs, so that they might have more time for field work.

HELP WOMEN SOLVE THEIR PROBLEMS

I. The co-op helped the women make the best use of their time and abilities.

(1) The division of labour between men and women was arranged in the following way: Men did such heavy work as building irrigation projects, fostering well-grown seedlings, tilling rape fields, and undertaking subsidiary occupations. Women took up lighter work like preparing ash compost, harvesting rape, and growing early crops.

(2) Work was likewise properly divided up among women themselves. Of the co-op's 88 females with full or half labour power, 32 were employed to reap rape, the rest to collect fertilizer and to cultivate early crops. Nursing mothers were allowed to work near their homes, while strong young women went to work in distant fields. For instance, there were three nursing mothers in the first group who were assigned to gather rape near their houses, so that they could go home to feed their infants three times a day.

(3) Family members also had a division of labour to settle both domestic duties and field work. Take the example of Hung Shui-hua. There were five members in her home. Her 22-year-old daughter-in-law worked for the co-op regularly. Her daughter, aged 17, reaped rape and gathered fertilizer, in addition to cutting grass to feed the pigs. She herself, being over 50 years old, stayed at home cooking, washing, feeding pigs, tending the cattle in the pasture occasionally, and looking after a neighbour's child. Both her husband and son took part in the co-op's field work.

II. The co-op saw to it that the rule of equal pay for equal work for men and women alike was observed, and that the work done by each was properly appraised and paid for. Formerly, the co-op paid its members according to a "fixed rates with flexible assessment" system. It had turned out that women got only four to six work-points each for a day's work while a man used to get ten—an unfair treatment for women. Besides, ash compost and products of side occupations were not paid for in terms of work-points. The co-op bought them in cash, thus depriving the women doing such work of the right to sharing the benefits derived from

the autumn harvest. The payment set by the co-op for such work was not reasonable either. For instance, ash compost was fixed at only 15 *fen* per 100 catties (this was afterwards increased to 22 *fen*). Naturally, the women refused to collect it. They all complained: "Even we work ourselves to death, we get nothing out of the increased crops."

So the leading personnel of the co-op put such problems before the members to consider, and necessary remedies were made. Since then, compost collecting and subsidiary occupations were, among other things, assessed and given work-points according to the quantity and quality of the work done. The number of work-points assigned to women was also properly readjusted. Take, for example, brick-and-tile maker Liao San-hao, who worked intensively like a man. Her average work-points for three days were raised from the original 6 or 7 to 12 or 13. Wu Shu-ying at first refused to work out a plan for collecting fertilizers. But the next day after the work-points were readjusted, she went out before dawn to shovel sod for preparing compost. Su Lien-chu's mother used to mow grass for pigs only, now she gathered fertilizers as well.

III. Due attention was given to women's special problems arising from their participation in farm work. Experimental nurseries were set up in groups Nos. 1, 2 and 3. The members of these three groups had 16 children, but only four of them were looked after by their grandmothers when their parents were out in the field. So arrangements were made for the care of the rest. Besides talking the mothers round to continue to work, the co-op tried its best to convince them of the advantage of leaving their children to a nursery. It also got to teach the new nursemaids to do their work well and to be worthy of the task entrusted to them by the co-op members. As for the payment, the mothers and the nursemaids came together and fixed it in a way beneficial to both parties. The agreement was as follows: (1) For each child of one or two years old, 13 *fen* was charged per day, for such child was most difficult to handle and needed feeding by the

nursemaids (but the food was provided by the mother). (2) For each child from 4 to 12 months, 12 *fen* was charged per day. The child was taken twice a day to the mother working in the field for breast feeding, while the mother went to the nursery to milk the child once. (3) For each child under four months, 10 *fen* was charged per day. The child was taken three times a day to the mother working in the field for breast feeding. (4) For each child between two and three, 8 *fen* was charged per day. (5) For each child between three and five, 4 *fen* was charged per day. (Nursemaids working for the co-op members should be paid by work-points like the co-op members themselves — Editor of the *Chekiang Rural Work Bulletin*.)

Only when the problem of child care had been thus settled could the mothers attend to their work whole-heartedly. Hu Shou-chu had to take care of her four-month-old infant baby herself that she was unable to go out to gather grass for pigs. But now she was there reaping rape or busied with other subsidiary production. Statistics for April 24 and 25 show that of the 18 women engaged in reaping rape, eight had more than two children each, and four had a baby under four months. Some of the mothers said: "When the nurseries have been set up, we can work with all our heart."

A YOUTH SHOCK BRIGADE

(By a work team of the regional working committee of
Central Kwangtung, New Democratic Youth League.
See *Youth of South China*, No. 16, August 25, 1955)

This is a very good article. It can be used as a reference everywhere. The youth are one of the most active and vital forces in society. They are the most anxious to learn, they are the least conservative in their thinking. This is especially so in the era of socialism.

We hope that the various local Party organizations will help and work with the Youth League organizations in determining how to bring the power of our youth into the fullest possible play. We must not lump them together with everybody else and overlook their special characteristics.

Of course the young people must learn from the old folks and adults. With the consent of the old folks and adults they should engage in all sorts of useful activities as much as possible.

Old people and adults are relatively conservative. They often retard the progressive activities of the youngsters. Only after the young people make a success of something are their elders willing to concede.

This article describes that situation very well. Naturally, no compromise should be made with con-

servative ideas. All right then, let's see what we can do about it. If we are successful, the conservatives will have to give in.

—EDITOR

The youth shock brigade of the No. 9 Agricultural Producers' Co-op in Hsinping Township, Chungshan County, Kwangtung Province, was formed in the spring of 1955, when the whole township was preparing for the spring ploughing. First proposed by the local group of the Youth League, the brigade was set up with the help of the local Party branch.

At present, the brigade has 36 members. Under the direct leadership of the Party branch and the management committee of the co-op and with the encouragement of the local Youth League group, it not only has stood in the forefront in combating natural calamities, but has also been active in all types of daily farm work. The brigade achieved remarkable success and helped raise production. Thus it has become an active force in the co-op. Speaking of the brigade, Liang Wu-tse, the vice-chairman of the co-op, said: "With such a shock brigade always on the go, there is nothing that can stop us now."

Such high praise from Vice-Chairman Liang was not given out of politeness.

On the very day the brigade was formed, it threw itself heart and soul into preparations for the coming ploughing. At that time, the co-op was engaged in mud-digging work. An important measure in the co-op's plan to raise production, this was no easy task since it involved dredging some 60,000 boat-loads of mud from the nearby river in the short span of 80 days. And at the time there was shortage of both manpower and food. At first some of the co-op members did not see the point of the mud-digging work. "It is a nuisance, this mud-digging," they grumbled. "You get a backache digging all day long, and your hands ache poling a boat. And the weather is bitter cold. We are not going even if you gave us gold." The result was that only 30-odd co-op members

showed up for work and the average per day was only a little over 400 boat-loads of mud, or half the planned amount. This was the state of affairs when members of the brigade accepted the assignment from the co-op management committee. They were told that their job was not only to mobilize the co-op members to go out in full strength, but even more important, to raise efficiency themselves to bring more mud back. The brigade members vied with each other in asking to be assigned the most difficult job. They raised the slogan "Let's do a good job, don't fight for work-points, don't take the boat back unless it is fully loaded." On the first day, 17 of the 23 youth brigade members who went out, fulfilled the co-op production target, five overfulfilled it, and only one, who was younger than the others, fell behind. Their success was a stimulus to the others. In no time, the whole co-op was involved in an emulation campaign to get more mud in, with more and more people taking part in the work. Through its collective efforts, the brigade developed a new method to collect mud which pushed the daily collection up from 280 to 410 boat-loads. When this method was popularized, the efficiency of the co-op members increased as a whole: the daily average was raised from 660 to 1,030 boat-loads. In this way, the mud-digging work was finished on time.

In the spring-sowing season, Hsinping Township was hit by a drought more severe than the peasants could recall for many years. The seed beds were crusted with alkali. This seriously threatened the timely sowing and transplanting of the seedlings. Faced with this menace, the co-op management committee adopted an emergency measure. It decided to borrow some land in Tunglung Township, some 40 li away, to use as seed beds. But this was more easily said than done, for more than 2,000 catties of seeds had to be transported to Tunglung Township to plant the 26 mou of seedling plots and people had to be sent to Tunglung Township to take care of the paddy fields. Some of the co-op members opposed this decision. Some said: "Nature always

provides a way out. It won't be long before it is raining cats and dogs. Why make such a fuss and waste so much labour for nothing?" Others said: "Let those who are willing to go that far for seedlings do the transplanting themselves." The youth brigade was the first to respond to the call of the co-op management committee. A score of brigade members undertook this laborious work, guided by some experienced older peasants. They worked four days and nights straight in Tunglung Township. Neither their unfamiliarity with the land, relative lack of skill, lack of sleep, nor any other difficulty stopped them. The 26 mou of seedling plots in distant Tunglung Township were finally planted and the threat of alkali destruction was averted. Two weeks later, the seedlings grew up, full and green. All this time the alkali menaced their own village of Hsinping Township. This stubborn fact taught all members of the co-op something. They began to see that the co-op management committee had done the right thing, and so had the youth brigade. "The sooner we shake off our conservative outlook, the better!" many co-op members admitted. Others said: "With such dogged determination, we can overcome any difficulty."

However, the battle was not yet won. After the threat of drought was defeated insect pests came. These insects were rice borers and they attacked seed beds. Unless they were wiped out quickly, the seedlings would be seriously damaged. The co-op decided on a campaign to wipe out the insects, but here again a conservative attitude born of superstition came out: "Dragons in the sky, insects in the paddies, there is nothing unnatural about that." "The insects come by themselves and die by themselves; they will be all finished after a storm, why worry about them?" These were some of the sayings of the village wags. But not so the youth brigade. Led by the Party, the 23 members of the brigade got together to study the life cycle of the insect and the damage it does. They proposed a method to kill off the insects right in the seedling plots, and were the first to spread "666" insecticide

powder in the nursery. They also brought back from the seedling plots a lump of larvae laid by the insects. Through their actions, they taught the masses that it was not a difficult or impossible thing to wipe out the insects in the seed beds as many had believed. They showed that the insects would not die off by themselves. On the contrary they would tend to spread all over if left alone. What was more important, it would be even more difficult to wipe out or even prevent the spread of the insects after the seedlings were transplanted to the paddy fields. Inspired by the brigade's example, a campaign to wipe out the insects was started in the co-op and thus the insect menace was checked in good time.

When the farming season for the co-op came, the brigade again faced a difficult problem. Since its members were scattered among the various production brigades, and since these teams had different work and their own problems, how would the brigade remain active as a group all the time? How could the initiative of the brigade be fully used in the regular production season? The problem became very complicated. After consulting the local Party branch and the co-op management committee, the members of the co-op decided to take the following steps.

First of all, separate shock groups were organized in the different production brigades, with each electing its own group leader. The group leaders were given time by the co-op to hold short meetings to discuss the conditions and problems in their brigades, so that they could assign work to their members to improve the weak points in the work of their brigades. They also arranged for meetings of all brigade members to sum up experience gained during the season, to commend and honour their most outstanding members and set specific demands upon themselves. Secondly, when the production of the co-op required it, the members of the brigade were asked to work together, as in the case of some urgent or difficult task, or carrying out some ex-

perimental farming on a small piece of land. Thus the youth shock brigade was able to remain active under united leadership even when they were divided into several separate groups. It was able to remain a moving force, actively taking part in the co-op's production while carrying out its many-sided activities.

In 1955, the co-op planned to carry out close planting of paddy seedlings on 700 *mou* of land. This was a radical departure from tradition. So at the beginning some co-op members were skeptical and began to grumble. "If you plant them so close," some said, "you get a lot of stalk but not much rice. And if that happens, see if we don't make the management committee pay for it." "The mud-digging work gave us enough trouble, and now they think up some queer close-planting method. If I had only known all this, I probably wouldn't have joined the co-op." Here again members of the youth brigade made themselves useful. They patiently explained to the other co-op members the reason why close planting would bring a bigger yield. At the same time, they themselves strictly followed the instructions of the co-op management committee about close planting. Liang Yun-teng, a member of the brigade, was a new hand at planting, but he did not want to lag behind. He used to get up early in the morning, before dawn, and head straight for the paddy field to do the planting. He learned as he worked and tried his best to meet the standard fixed by the co-op. He ultimately had one of the highest record in the co-op by planting over one *mou* a day. Encouraged by the example of the shock group led by Liang Yun-teng, the No. 1 Production Brigade came out first in planting in the whole co-op. These examples from the youth brigade had a direct impact on the other co-op members. In the end, the target to turn 700 *mou* of land to close planting was overfulfilled.

When the weeding period came, the co-op introduced a new weeding method, but again many co-op members did not have much faith in it. They were worried that this new

method might break the stalks. "I would rather pull out the stalk and plant it back afterwards than do this," some insisted. Members of the brigade were again the first to respond to the call of the management committee. They made a trial run in a plot of 20 *mou* and the result was excellent. After the weeding, the stalks in the plot grew better than any other piece of land. The local Party branch invited members of the various co-ops to see the plot and study the result for themselves. Everyone agreed that this was an advanced method which should be popularized, and the grumbling that "this would ruin the stalks" died out in no time.

When the system of responsibility was adopted in the co-op, many thought the idea was that only quantity and speed count. For example, when close planting was introduced, many people planted the seedlings a distance of 15 inches apart instead of ten inches as required. Others, in order to gain more work-points, planted as quickly as they could without any regard to the quality of their work. Faced with this challenge the youth brigade called an emergency meeting and decided to combat the irregular practices. When the 23 members returned to their production brigade, they immediately drew up their pledges to plant their seedlings according to the co-op regulations. They also agreed to keep an eye on each other, criticize anyone whom they found doing shoddy work in the planting, and praise those whom they found planting well. From then on, nobody dared cheat on the work.

The youth brigade played the role of vanguard not only in popularizing new techniques and guaranteeing the quality of the work. They also fought against situations in which no one in particular was held responsible for some job.

In the spring of 1955, the co-op's more than 8,000 stalks of corn were threatened by drought. But because everyone then had his hands full with other jobs, the season being one of the busiest of the year, nothing was done to save the corn. On their own initiative, the young people asked the

management committee to let them take care of the corn. Using their rest period after supper, they did a fine job—watering, replanting, loosening the soil, weeding, fertilizing, etc. The result was a bumper harvest for the 8,000 stalks of corn.

One day, after they had finished mud-digging, members of the brigade found the boats left to the mercy of the weather in the paddy fields with no one to take care of them. They immediately used half a day's time to clean up the boats and put them in order. Later, when they found farm implements and compost were lying around without anybody taking charge, they sent the co-op management committee a five-point rationalization proposal to solve this urgent problem. It was accepted.

Thus the youth brigade of the No. 9 Agricultural Producers' Co-op in Hsinping Township became a real moving force in the co-op. "They can be called the heart of our co-op," is how the co-op members speak of the youth brigade.

Why is it that this shock brigade could achieve so much success? First, because since its formation it has closely relied on the leadership of the local Party branch and the co-op management committee. In its regular activities, it always seeks the guidance and support of the Party and the management committee. It always acquaints the leadership of the co-op with the facts and situation and invites them to their meetings. The Party branch and the management committee put work of the brigade high on their working agenda. Whenever the management committee discusses production plans or is about to adopt any important measures, it invites the brigade to send its representative to sit on the meetings and gives the brigade appropriate assignments. When the brigade has some success, the Party and the co-op management committee always commend them before the other co-op members and sometimes give them material rewards. This leadership of the Party and the co-op management commit-

tee is the main reason why the brigade has been able to play such a useful role in the co-op.

Secondly, the Youth League group was really able to act as the backbone of the brigade. By using the diverse means and forms available, it was able to conduct constant political and ideological education among the members of the brigade through concrete and living examples. This made it possible to arouse and sustain the labour enthusiasm of the members. It has made the brigade a politically conscious force in building socialism. Since the formation of the brigade, the Youth League has organized scores of studies on "how to be a good co-operative member" and some six Youth League courses. By concrete analysis of the problems and thinking of the members, through discussions and heart-to-heart talks, the young people were brought to see how they could exert their efforts and help promote production. Through the daily routine of work, the Youth League carried out education among the young people, teaching them to love their co-op, their country, and the collective.

During the spring ploughing, half of the brigade's members received public commendation and four were admitted into the Youth League. This was a great encouragement to the young people. Moreover, the Youth League members were able to educate the masses by their own exemplary behaviour. They also helped the other members of the brigade to overcome ideological problems and difficulties. Hence, members of the brigade always felt the loving concern of the Youth League for them. They all wanted to distinguish themselves in their work, to improve themselves and become Youth League members.

Thirdly, the brigade has a large core of active members. This was not the case at the beginning when most of its work devolved on the brigade leader and vice-leader. With the growth of the brigade's membership (from 12 to 36) and the accompanying increase in tasks, the brigade began to pay attention to the problem of training a core. Activists were

assigned all kinds of work and at appropriate times given help in summing up their experience. Through tempering in day-to-day work, they already had six comparatively strong core members capable of doing independent work. Four of them could shoulder leadership tasks. At the same time, the brigade stressed the strength of collective efforts. The members were consulted by the core members on all issues concerning the brigade. This formed a solid nucleus of leadership. This is why, no matter how difficult the circumstances, the youth shock brigade could always act as a shock unit on the production front.

Fourthly, the youth shock brigade, centring all its activity around production, was good at grasping the key problems in production and overcoming weak points. For example, during preparations for ploughing, they saw that the mud-digging work was the key to success. Therefore they put forward the slogan: "Let's do a good job, don't fight for work-points, don't take the boat back unless it is fully loaded." When the seedlings were seriously menaced by alkali, on their own initiative they applied to the management committee for permission to plant the seedlings in distant Tunglung Township. In everyday production, the main work of the brigade is to popularize advanced technique and guarantee good quality in field work, and to help the management committee combat any situation in which work is nobody's particular responsibility. On all these major issues, the youth brigade has made outstanding achievements, contributing directly to increased production. The brigade also laid great stress on overcoming weak points in production. Facts have proved that astonishing results can be achieved in this respect the year round with alert minds that are keen in discovering problems. These are the broad areas in which the youth shock brigade works at all times.

A SERIOUS LESSON

(By Yen Kuang-hung, a *Shansi Daily* correspondent,
February 1, 1955)

Political work is the life-blood of all economic work. This is particularly true at a time when the economic system of a society is undergoing a fundamental change. The agricultural co-operative movement, from the very beginning, has been a severe ideological and political struggle. No co-op can be established without going through such a struggle. Before a brand-new social system can be built on the site of the old, the site must first be swept clean. Old ideas reflecting the old system invariably remain in people's minds for a long time. They do not easily give way.

After a co-op is formed it must go through many more struggles before it becomes strong. Even then, the moment it relaxes its efforts, it may collapse.

The Sanlousze Co-operative in Hsiehyu County, Shansi Province, nearly collapsed, even after it had grown strong, because it relaxed its efforts. Only after the local Party organization criticized itself, returned to teaching the masses to oppose capitalism and strengthen socialism, and resumed its political work, was the crisis averted and the co-op enabled to continue its development.

Opposition to selfish, capitalistic spontaneous tendencies, and promotion of the essence of socialism — that is, making the principle of linking the collec-

tive interests with the interests of the individual the standard by which all words and deeds are judged — these then are the ideological and political guarantees that the scattered, small-peasant economy will gradually be transformed into a large-scale co-operative economy.

Ideological and political education is an arduous task. It must be based on the life and experience of the peasants and be conducted in a very practical manner, with careful attention to detail. Neither bluster nor over-simplification will do. It should be conducted not in isolation from our economic measures, but in conjunction with them.

We already have considerable rich experience in this kind of work on a nation-wide scale. Almost every article in this book shows that.

— EDITOR

After the autumn harvest in 1954, the three-year-old Sanlousze Agricultural Producers' Co-operative of Hsiehyu County, Shansi Province, nearly went to pieces. This was a bitter lesson for the Sanlousze branch of the Chinese Communist Party.

DIZZY WITH SUCCESS

When the Sanlousze Agricultural Producers' Co-operative was first formed in the spring of 1952, all the members were confident that they could run it successfully. And they did gather two bumper harvests in succession, thanks to the conscientious work of every member, the rational use of land, plus vigorous government help. In 1952, the co-op reaped a harvest of raw cotton averaging 100 catties per mou of irrigated land; this was 30 catties more than the year before the co-op was set up in 1951. The average yield per mou

of cotton planted on non-irrigated land was 59 catties, or 16 catties above 1951. And in 1953, the co-op had an even bigger harvest. The yield per *mou* of wheat, for instance, jumped from 102 catties in 1951 to 155; that of raw cotton on irrigated land rose to 105 catties, and on non-irrigated land to 63 catties. In the summer of 1954, the co-op won the title "model co-operative" because its wheat yield was the highest in the whole county.

As a result of constantly increasing production, the income of the co-op members grew and their livelihood steadily became better. While in 1951, the year before the co-op came into being, the average income per household was only 420 yuan; in 1952, the first year the peasants farmed co-operatively, the figure went up to 522. In 1953, this rose to 868 yuan. In the past years, the co-op members have added 63 new, tile-roofed rooms to their homes. It was common for them to make new clothes and buy bedding, thermos flasks, electric torches, galoshes, etc.

The situation turned the heads of the leaders in the Party branch. They began to feel proud and complacent. On the one hand, they thought, "Ours is an advanced co-op. Our members are highly conscious and we don't lag behind in anything. We can't fail even there's no leadership at all!" On the other hand, they felt: "Now that we've increased our production, let's enjoy ourselves a bit!" So, beginning in 1954, the Party branch slackened its leadership over the co-op and let things drift, especially politico-ideological work among the members.

CAPITALIST IDEAS TAKE OVER

And this was the crux of the problem. Now that the Party had given up its efforts to educate the co-op members in the spirit of socialism, capitalist ideas gradually gained a free rein and, with each passing day, became more and more

threatening. The spontaneous tendency towards capitalism clearly showed itself in the following three respects:

1) Secret trading for private gain and alienation from the co-op. Some people felt work in the co-op was too hard; that they could not live as freely as they liked; and that there was not much to gain even though they continued to farm co-operatively. More than 30 members, among them five Party members, were swayed by such ideas in their thinking and behaviour. For instance, co-op member Lu Chien-kang, formerly a poor peasant, had risen to the status of well-to-do middle peasant after he joined the co-op, and his ideology began to change accordingly. In 1953, he thought of trading in chickens to make big money, and so secretly bought 1,200 chickens for 100 yuan; but he finally lost money. Another member, Lu Ping-nan, thought he would strike it rich by dealing in draught animals behind the backs of his fellow members. He lost 500 yuan. There was still another example: Party member Li Chun-shan, ignoring the production needs of the co-op, sold his sturdy mule valued at 300 yuan; then he bought a bony ox for only 120 yuan and used the rest of the proceeds to engage in trading.

2) Complacency with life as it is, self-indulgence, extravagance and idleness. More than 50 members were people of this sort. They seem to think: "Now that we've enough food to eat, enough clothing to wear and enough money to spend, what else could we wish for?" Some of them said, "We suffered half a lifetime in the past, now we can enjoy a comfortable life!" Some families even bought two bicycles. Lu Shun and three other members bought four carriages among them for 800 yuan, for the sole purpose of going to the trade fair to see the opera. As for food and clothing, they were even more extravagant.

3) Indifference to production in the co-op. This manifested itself in the appalling falling-off of labour discipline. Many co-op members thought this way: "Times are much better and we will have more than enough to eat, even if we

work less than before." Seeing that some of the others were getting richer by trading, some of the co-op members became disheartened in work, uncertain whether they would reap the fruit of their labour. So when the busy hoeing season came in 1954, members generally went to the fields late in the morning, and returned home long before sundown. Even while they were in the fields, they dallied over their work and what takes one day to do was not even completed in two.

Because the ideology of the spontaneous tendency towards capitalism took root among the members, the co-op's production plan for 1954 encountered two main difficulties. One was the sharp decline in investment in production, because members shifted their money to undesirable channels. When the co-op had only 22 households in its first year, 5,500 yuan was invested in production, and in the second year, investment increased to 15,000 yuan. But in 1953 when the co-op grew to 113 households and tilled 3,008 *mou* of farm land as against the former 501, investments fell sharply to about 2,500 yuan. This led to a big decrease in the amount of fertilizer applied to the cotton fields in 1954, averaging only one cartload of farmyard manure, four catties of cotton-seed cake and five catties of chemical fertilizer per *mou*. While in 1953, the amount of farmyard manure used was three cartloads per *mou*. Although there was a shortage of draught animals that year, the co-op members bought none; instead they sold 10. The other difficulty facing the co-op in production was that labour efficiency had dropped tremendously, and less and less work was done on the land. In 1953, a total of 40 work-days was spent on each *mou* of irrigated land, and 6 work-days on each *mou* of non-irrigated land. But in 1954, this fell to 8 and 5 respectively, so that the total work-days put in on the 1,148 *mou* of cotton fields were 1,450 less than in 1953.

As a consequence, an unfortunate thing happened: The 1954 cotton yield not only failed to catch up with the target set for increased production, the yield of raw cotton per *mou*

of irrigated land dropped from 105 catties in 1953 to 80 catties; that on non-irrigated land from 63 to 48. Taking both kinds of land together, the average yield per *mou* was only 52 catties, that is, 13 catties less than the mutual-aid team headed by Lu Ching-ming of the same village. Compared with the planned figure for increased output, the co-op reaped 32,088 catties less of raw cotton, incurring a loss of more than 31,000 yuan. This of course caused the members' income to fall greatly. For each work-day, a member received only 1.2 yuan, or 0.478 yuan less than 1953; for each *mou* of land pooled, the owner was paid a dividend of only ten yuan, or four yuan less than 1953. In 1954, 21 households had a shortage of grain for four months' consumption, whereas in the year before there was no such instance.

When it came to distributing income after the autumn harvest, therefore, the co-op members were profoundly discouraged. More than a dozen of them, including Wang Erh-yin who had invested more than others, asked to withdraw. The co-operative, once the pride of the peasants, was on the verge of collapse.

IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE

As things stood, the question of whether the co-operative would survive depended exclusively on dispelling the complacency and indifference of which the Party branch had been guilty ever since the co-op had reaped rich harvests, and on success in educating the co-op members in socialism and thus eradicating the influence of a rich-peasant ideology.

The situation was very grave. So the county Party committee decided to send its deputy secretary, Li Pu, to Sanlousze to help the Party branch and the co-op leadership check over and consolidate the co-op.

First of all, the Party members were organized to study the two documents, "The Eight Requirements of a Communist" and "The Lesson to Be Drawn from Ignoring

Politico-Ideological Work by the Tsao Lin-shui Agricultural Producers' Co-operative in Changchih County." At the same time, they were led to discover the causes for the decreased cotton output and the resulting problems by making detailed calculations and comparisons. Party branch secretary Hsiao Chan-sheng took the lead in making a self-criticism of his self-complacency. This encouraged others to come forward and consciously examine their own errors. For instance, the vice-chairman of the co-op, Chang Tso-pin who is in charge of political work, criticized himself for dereliction of duty. Members Li Tung-lien, Li Chun-shan and others examined their capitalist ideas of self-enrichment through secret trading, and unwillingness to invest in the co-op. Then the Party called upon all members to be bold and launch a resolute and concerted struggle against the influence of the rich-peasant ideology and thereby consolidate the socialist position of the co-op.

Now that all the Party members were ideologically united, the Party branch decided to start a mass campaign of self-criticism and ideological examination among the co-op members, with the Party members taking the lead. Throughout the ideological struggle, efforts were centred around the following three points: First, by making a comparison between the past and the present and visualizing the future, the co-op members were helped to criticize their erroneous ideas about resting content with present living standards and indulging themselves in extravagance, without thinking in terms of the long-term interest. On the one hand, the Party branch acquainted the masses with the happy life of the Soviet peasants and, on the other, it helped them review the suffering before liberation. With the help of the Party members, most of the co-op members gradually came to realize that the Soviet Union of today was their tomorrow, and that a happy life was just beginning for them, so if they rested content with things as they were and no longer worked diligently or invested to expand the co-op's production they could not

guarantee their present happy life, let alone an even better one such as the Soviet peasants have. But there were still some who could not see it. They said: "We'll concentrate on the present and let the future take care of itself!" At this point, the Party branch seized upon the example of co-op member Lu Pai-jen to help them understand the connection between the present and the future, and between the interests of the individual and those of the collective. Lu Pai-jen, who used to fritter away his days, became reluctant to invest in the co-op. No longer concerned with the needs of the co-op, he sold his mule. He squandered the money, buying a ewe for 130 yuan and a bicycle for 165 yuan. Finally, he could not make ends meet without outside help. This story was an eye-opener to these people. They began to see that "When the lake dries up, its outlets have no water"; that happiness of the individuals depends on the increased production of the whole co-op; and that only by constantly investing in the expansion of production and helping consolidate the co-op, could they increase their own income.

Secondly, the co-op members were helped to realize more clearly the difference between choosing this road or the other. Contrasts were made between pre-liberation and post-liberation days, and facts presented showing the development of the co-op's production and the constant improvement in the life of its members in the last three years. It was on this basis that the Party branch led the masses to discuss: "What made us poor in the past? Why does the Party lead us in getting organized? Should we exploit others?" Thus most of the co-op members had their thinking clarified. But there remained some who were more deeply influenced by the capitalist ideology and still thought like this, "You say it's wrong to take the capitalist road, but it brings you a lot of money. You also say the agricultural co-op is the right thing for us, but you earn only a yuan or so for a day's work, and nothing else!" To expose this erroneous thinking, the Party branch presented a series of facts well-known to all and used

them to help the peasants to choose between the two totally different paths and their consequences. On the one hand, there was the case of Lu Chien-kang, who was interested only in doing trading and making lots of money and who had no heart to work diligently in the co-op. But he failed at everything and, in a year, lost nearly 1,000 yuan. (This figure included the payment he would have received for work-days in co-op production.) All this brought him to the brink of bankruptcy, and it was only thanks to education by the Party branch and assistance by the co-op that he was enabled to tide over the difficulties. The exact opposite was the story of Lu Yang-cheng, who had regarded the co-op as his own home from the day he joined and worked as hard as he could. That was why Lu Yang-cheng and his family had a better life with each passing day. Of his family of four, only one was counted as a full labour power, but still they received more than others in 1954. Their income that year was 750 yuan or more, dividends on land included. This method of contrasting facts helped co-op member Lu Ping-nan and others to see and criticize their own capitalist thinking. As Lu Ping-nan put it, "I used to think that trade brought lots of money. I would never imagine that Lu Chien-kang would end up in such a hole. So I started trading in draught animals and chickens. In the end, I lost more than 500 yuan. Now I see that capitalism is a blind alley. We'll only have a better life if we stick to the road of co-operation and work in the co-op heart and soul. It's shameful and dangerous to speculate and exploit others!"

Thirdly, the Party branch analysed the fact that the co-op had a decreased cotton output in 1955 because less work was done on the land. It organized the masses to discuss the relations between the interests of the individual and those of the collective. This was another deep-going education for the co-op members who were helped to correct their wrong attitude towards work. Said Lu Pai-jen, "In 1954, when it was estimated that the cotton output would be less, everybody

complained that their income would be cut. But I thought differently: 'I've more work-days to my credit, and won't get less, no matter what the cotton output!' Then we came to distribute the income after the autumn harvest, and I found that I received 262 yuan less than in 1953. So now I understand that if the co-op output declines, I'll also be affected, even though I do have more work-days than others." In the discussion, the Party cited Lu Yang-cheng for his love of the co-op, respect for common property and observance of labour discipline. One after another, the co-op members pledged that they would learn from Lu Yang-cheng and work hard in the co-op by uniting as one and by mutual help and encouragement.

Following this ideological work, the Party branch strengthened its politico-ideological leadership over the co-op by taking the following organizational measures: a) Tighter Party discipline. Party activities of some sort are to be arranged once a month without fail, and the leading role of the Party members in the agricultural co-op given full play; b) Another deputy leader assigned to each production brigade for political work in it. This deputy leader must make periodical studies of the thinking of the co-op members and do more effective day-to-day politico-ideological work among them; and c) 18 more subscriptions to the *Shansi Daily* and *Shansi Peasant*, and strict observance of the practice of reading newspapers to the co-op members on the 3rd, 6th, 9th, 13th, 16th, 19th, 23rd, 26th and 29th of each month.

A NEW LIFE BEGINS

With the checking over and consolidation completed, not only was the co-operative put on a firmer basis, but 92 households were admitted as new members. Now that the socialist consciousness of all the co-op members was greatly raised, the Party branch again guided them in discussing and

drawing up the co-op's production plan for 1955. It was unanimously agreed that 2,500 cartloads of compost be prepared by decomposing wheat brans and sorghum stalks in the winter, so that in 1955, each *mou* of land would receive three cartloads of manure as a basic amount. In the meantime, the co-op concluded a contract with the local supply and marketing co-op which is to provide it with 10,000 catties of manure, 20,000 catties of cotton-seed cake, 5,000 catties of chemical fertilizer and a double-shared plough, for the winter of 1955 and the spring of 1956. To ensure that its plan to expand production would be carried out, the co-op decided to sell the state 51,700 catties of raw cotton, and 60,000 catties of cotton seeds. Of the proceeds of 47,200 yuan from this sale, 20,000 yuan will be invested in agricultural production, 21,000 yuan distributed to its members, and the remaining 6,200 yuan deposited in the bank. Lu Yueh-hsing and others have voluntarily invested 205 yuan of their savings in the purchase of draught animals, so that now the co-op has 43. At present, a surging winter emulation drive is sweeping the co-operative.

A CO-OPERATIVE GROWS STRONG IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST CALAMITIES OF NATURE AND CAPITALIST THINKING

(By the Chiungshan County Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party, October 10, 1955)

The experience of the Red Flag Co-op of Hainan Island has again demonstrated the superiority of big and advanced co-operatives. After only one year as an elementary co-op, the Red Flag is preparing to move on to the advanced form.

Of course, this is not to say that all co-ops should do likewise. They must first consider whether their conditions are ripe, then decide when it will be best to combine with other co-operatives and form an advanced co-op. Generally speaking, three years from the organization of a co-operative is about right.

The important thing is to create examples to show the peasants. When they see that large and advanced co-ops are better than small and elementary co-ops, they will want to combine their co-operatives and organize advanced co-ops.

— EDITOR

I

The Red Flag Agricultural Producers' Co-operative of the First District, Chiungshan County, Kwangtung Province, is the largest of its kind on Hainan Island. The co-operative consists of 329 households with 1,181 people living in 15

villages. It has 3,842 *mou* of irrigated and non-irrigated land and 3,600 *mou* of hilly slopes. Apart from this, it has 7,000 *mou* of land which has been left unused for years, and about 40,000 *mou* of waste hilly slopes that can be reclaimed and planted to various types of coarse grain and sub-tropical industrial crops.

The Red Flag Co-operative was formed in October 1954 by combining three small co-operatives and drawing in 13 mutual-aid teams and three individual peasant households. It is located in an old revolutionary base where the people, with a comparatively high level of political consciousness, have complete faith in the Party. The Party branch in the co-op (its predecessor was the Tuchiao Township branch) was established thirty years ago, and has ever since remained active through the various periods, leading the peasants in prolonged struggles against both the Kuomintang reactionaries and the Japanese aggressors. The Party branch, with 55 members at present, has always enjoyed great prestige among the people. The co-op has a Youth League branch with 61 members.

The history of the Red Flag Co-operative in the past year has been one of resolute struggle by its members, led by the Party branch, against natural calamities and bourgeois ideology. The experience of this struggle has demonstrated that, once the Party branch really plays its role as a nerve-centre and firmly grasps the two basic tasks of constantly improving its work in giving leadership to the management of production and of strengthening political ideological work, it is absolutely possible to consolidate a large agricultural producers' co-operative, though it may be more difficult than in the case of a smaller one.

II

The Red Flag Co-operative was established at the time when winter planting began. There was confusion in the

management of production and there were mistaken ideas among its members. In the first place, the members cared very little about the co-op; they were only interested in gaining their own ends at the expense of the co-op. No sooner had the assessment of land, other means of production and labour been completed than Ting Man-ying, a Party member, took his ox which had been assessed by the co-op at 116 yuan to the market and sold it for 120 yuan, thus making an extra four yuan. This aroused great indignation among the other members, as he had not got the consent of the co-op. Some of the members took advantage of the co-op in small matters. Having pooled their cattle in the co-op, they took the halters home and asked for new ones instead. The co-op bought a hundred new halters and all of them were issued in no time. Members living in the villages of Fengya and Taolin put their cow-sheds to other uses after having joined the co-op, leaving the co-op's 40-odd head of cattle without any shelter whatsoever. Farm implements were left here and there, without anyone to look after them. A new improved plough was damaged soon after it was bought. "What is mine is really mine, the co-op's property belongs to a thousand people." This attitude of looking after only one's own interests without any regard for those of the co-op created considerable difficulty in management. Secondly, the members' attitude towards work was far from satisfactory, and labour discipline was slack. When the co-op was first formed, the membership was large and management difficult; while the co-op's officers were as busy as bees, there was utter confusion among the rank and file. Work areas were not clearly defined, and no specific requirements were set for work assigned. The question of establishing a system for checking up on any work done was not properly solved either. To top all this, not much was done to raise the political and ideological level of the members. Lack of discipline and a conservative outlook on the part of the members seriously hampered production. For example, people crowded to the fourth work

area as soon as the gong sounded, while in the third work area, the brigade leader could not find anybody willing enough to do the ploughing. Some of the members devoted their energies to their own subsidiary occupations, while others grumbled about the co-op not buying enough halters. In the second work area, the members would not carry out the assignments given by the management committee of the co-op.

Confronted with these problems, the Party branch adopted two emergency measures. Firstly, it began to educate the members to love the co-op as they love their own homes. While it criticized the errors of Party member Ting Man-ying both within and outside the Party, it praised Mrs. Wu and seven other exemplary members, thereby helping everyone to recognize that it was the right thing to do to love one's co-op as to love one's own home, and that the attitude of "what is mine is really mine, the co-op's property belongs to a thousand people" was erroneous and shameful. The members gradually came to cultivate the collective spirit. Thus ended the first round in the battle which the co-operative launched against bourgeois ideology and the lack of discipline of small peasants. Secondly, work areas were clearly defined, permanent production brigades formed and the system of responsibility introduced. As a result, the confusion prevalent in the early days of the co-op was ended. Immediately after these measures were taken, the Party branch called on all the members to give their heart and soul to the spring ploughing, and it organized Party and Youth League members to lead all the co-op members in intensive spring ploughing.

But, as ill luck would have it, when the ploughing just got under way, Hainan Island was hit by the worst frost in many years (the Island seldom has frost). All the 907 *mou* of sweet potatoes that had just been planted were seriously affected and the young leaves began to wither. Nearly 20,000 catties of early paddy seeds just sown were also affected by

the exceptionally cold weather. Due to the continuing cold spell, grass also withered and fodder became scarce. The life of 650 head of cattle was endangered. In these serious circumstances, the Party branch resolutely led all co-op members in taking immediate action to combat the calamity. For days the members carried water and sprinkled it on the shoots, packed earth near the roots and applied manure. Due to the effectiveness of organized action, most of the sweet potatoes were saved. The early paddy seedlings which could be transplanted to 1,586 *mou* of land regained their normal growth, after the co-op members had watered them and applied ash compost and cattle dung to keep them warm. Hay, which had never before been used to feed cattle, was now used as feed and all the cattle were blanketed with straw. At the same time, cow-sheds were built and all the cattle saved from the cold. (In early 1954, more than 1,000 head of cattle throughout the county died of cold.)

A series of measures for improving farming technique was also adopted by the co-op, centring round close, cluster planting of paddy seedlings. All the co-op's 1,586 *mou* of early paddy were ploughed during the winter. The 19,020 catties of seeds required were carefully selected. The methods of improved seed beds, wide sowing and the cultivation of strong seedlings were adopted, and before the planting fully 800 catties of manure were applied to every *mou* of land as planned. As a result, the seedlings grew sturdy. The co-op also reaped two rice crops from 669 *mou* of land which previously only produced a single crop, thereby increasing the income of the members by one harvest. In the 896 *mou* of transplanted paddy fields, all the seedlings were planted closely in small clusters according to plan. In the past, the peasants had never selected seeds, nor applied any manure, and they did only a bit of rough ploughing. Now all this was changed. In preparation for ploughing, the co-op built 13 lime-lined manure pits with a total capacity of 80,000 catties. (In the past there were no manure pits in these parts.)

The co-op also made 1,560,000 catties of compost from 560 piles of straw, and accumulated 1,430,000 catties of compost from other sources. This completed all the necessary preparations for spring ploughing.

III

When it was time to transplant the seedlings from the seed beds to the paddy fields during the spring-ploughing season, the entire county was again hit by a natural calamity — this time drought, and the Red Flag Co-operative was among those most seriously affected. The drought lasted for more than eight months during which it rained only twice, and each time the rainfall was scanty. All the paddy fields of the co-op became dry and cracked (some of the fields did not fully recover even by the time of autumn harvesting). The Party branch led all the members in a resolute struggle against the drought. They dug 133 wells and irrigation ditches, and watered the fields day and night. As soon as a plot of land was watered, seedlings were planted and measures taken to ensure their growth. The threat of a crop failure through drought was finally overcome, and the members overfulfilled the plan for the crop area for the first six months of the year. Compared with 1954, the increases in acreage were as follows: paddy, 555 *mou*; groundnuts, 392 *mou*; taro, 105 *mou*; sesame, 32 *mou*. Sugar-canes and drought-resistant crops, such as pumpkins, hairy sweet potatoes and maize, were also planted. When the members of the Red Flag Co-operative fought against drought, they dug a large ditch, 4 miles long, 1 1/3 yards wide and 1 yard deep, for both drainage and irrigation purposes. When this ditch was completed, over 1,000 *mou* of land were brought under irrigation, of which more than 800 *mou* were turned from single to double crop paddy fields. The digging of the ditch was originally scheduled to take ten days, but thorough mobilization work by the Party branch and the Youth League

branch and good organization of labour brought it down to six days only. The ditch was surveyed and planned by the peasants themselves. After its completion, inspection by the water conservancy section of the county government proved that it was in every respect up to standard. The summer harvest showed that, in spite of the serious drought, the paddy yield of the Red Flag Co-operative fell by only 20 per cent, much less than the average decrease suffered by the five other smaller co-operatives in the township which was 35 per cent (the worst being 50 per cent).

The drought which had not abated seriously threatened the summer planting. The Party branch, relying on the experience gained in the spring ploughing and in the fight against drought, led all the co-op members in an even more arduous struggle against the long spell of dry weather, with the Party and Youth League members as the backbone. They widened and deepened the ditches, and irrigated the land. As before, they planted the seedlings as soon as a plot of land was watered, and took proper measures to ensure their growth. In this way they planted more than 3,800 *mou* of late paddy fields in time; they also carried water up the slopes and planted paddy on 1,200 *mou* of hilly land. However, the drought continued for too long a period and the soil had become so hard that the seedlings grew poorly. So the Party branch again led the co-op members in intensive field work. As luck would have it, rain fell at this time, and after some time, the seedlings grew green and healthy. Those planted on the slopes grew better than ever before and an abundant harvest was in sight. On September 25 and 26, however, the Island was struck by a devastating typhoon which continued for two days. The paddy planted on the 1,200 *mou* of slopes was seriously damaged. Although protective and emergency measures were taken both before and after the typhoon (200 *mou* of paddy harvested in great haste and thus saved from destruction), the loss was still very heavy — 50

per cent of the original estimated yield of 120,000 catties were damaged.

The co-op ran into one difficulty after another in its first year, but thanks to the correct leadership of the Party, those difficulties were overcome successively. Although the spring harvest of sweet potatoes had been poor, the early paddy yield reduced by 20 per cent and 60,000 of the estimated 120,000 catties of paddy planted on the hilly slopes lost, the co-op managed to make up for the losses and maintain the annual yield. This was made possible because the Party branch paid especial attention to the most important task of autumn planting, and enlarged the sweet potato area by 1,600 *mou*.

At the same time as struggles were made against natural calamities to increase the output of staple and coarse grains, the Red Flag Co-operative vigorously developed other branches of production to increase the members' income, enable them to tide over the most difficult spring and autumn seasons, and to improve their livelihood. The other co-operatives in Chiungshan County, also hit by the natural calamities, suffered grain shortages in varying degrees. The situation in the Red Flag Co-operative, however, was stable and normal, and every family had enough to eat. During the past year, no one in the co-op bought a single catty of grain from the state or received any relief, and the members were helped to overcome difficulties with income from various types of production. During the year, the co-op earned more than 13,400 yuan from subsidiary occupations alone, more than 6,700 yuan of which were loaned to members who needed help. In the fourth work area which was the poorest, 35 of its 86 households were often short of food before they joined the co-op. But in 1955 they not only had enough to eat, they also had money to buy pork to celebrate festivals. The Red Flag Co-operative not only helped its members overcome their difficulties, it gave help to peasants who had remained outside the co-op. For example, Chin

Hsueh-hai, an individual peasant who had six dependents, had been short of grain since March 1955. For six months, the co-op gave him help to tide over the difficult period. He was so moved and impressed that he has now applied to join the co-op.

The struggle against natural calamities was at the same time a serious ideological struggle within the Party and the co-op. The bourgeois mentality became apparent among the upper middle-peasant members soon after spring ploughing began, and especially during the fight against drought. Fearing that the poorer households would borrow money from the co-op, the upper middle peasants said: "When there is a drought, whoever gets any money owns it." Great efforts were made to combat drought and many work-points were registered. Most of the land the co-op had failed to plant belonged to the poor peasants, so the richer peasants again feared that dividends on land would be cut sharply when the co-op's income was distributed. Those in the ox-cart transport team were especially influenced by bourgeois ideas, for they frequently visited the towns and had dealings with merchants, and they had eyes only for money and the decadent way of life of the merchants. "The money we have earned," they used to say, "has all been eaten up by your work-points." They despised farm work, and when they were out driving the ox-carts, they engaged in business transactions with merchants in the name of the co-op, but actually for their own ends. Some of the members came under their influence and began to have the same mistaken ideas. One of the examples is Lin Chih-tao, a Party member. Before he joined the co-op, he was an ox-cart driver and traded in timber. He led an extravagant life, and he did not change a bit after he joined the co-op. Looking down upon farm work, he just loafed round. The management committee of the co-op gave him work at side occupations which would bring 9 work-points a day and a cash subsidy of forty *fen*. But he was not satisfied and complained that he did not have

enough money to buy tea and meat, and he said that he would quit if he were not given a subsidy of ninety fen a day. Seriously influenced by bourgeois ideology, he refused to sell the firewood gathered by the co-op members as a side occupation to the state company or the supply and marketing co-operative. Instead, he sold large quantities of firewood to merchants on credit and made money for himself. Besides, he often engaged in private trade for personal gains. The Party branch held him up as an example for open criticism, and led all the members of the co-op to discuss the two roads open to the peasants.

The political consciousness of the members was greatly enhanced and they all rejected the capitalist road. The criticism and discussion served as a profound lesson in socialist consciousness for the members.

After the onset of natural calamities, the conditions for production in the various work areas of the large co-op differed greatly. The first work area was able to increase its output because it had access to convenient sources of water, while the yield of the fourth work area fell because it had no such facilities. As a result, members of the first work area, especially Party and Youth League members, harboured the extremely wrong idea of dividing up the co-op. This caused mutual distrust between members of different work areas. For instance, members of the first work area complained that those in the fourth work area had not worked hard enough, but shared the fruit of their labour, while members of the fourth work area were afraid that those in the first work area would receive more than their due. Because of this, 39 households insisted on withdrawing from the co-op. These erroneous ideas were also reflected in the Party. The disunity among members of the Party branch was largely due to the lack of confidence of some Party members in the practicability of large co-ops. The Party branch promptly called a meeting, which Youth League members were also invited to attend, to study the spirit of

the resolution of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Party. The question of disunity within the Party was properly dealt with. The meeting criticized Party members Chou Hsueh-cheng and Ting Yu-ning, who had become arrogant because of their achievements and created disunity within the Party. The political consciousness of both Party and Youth League members was greatly enhanced. Meanwhile, members of the co-op were organized to study the co-op regulations. The co-op's achievements since its expansion were summed up and everyone was convinced of the excellence of large co-ops. This helped instil a collective spirit in the members and helped them understand better the future of the co-op. Discussions were held and more than 70 exemplary members were commended. All this served to enhance the confidence and determination of the leaders and members in running a large co-op. The question of unity and mutual benefit between middle and poor peasants, which was one of the main problems in the co-op, was also solved. Financial management was improved and leadership strengthened, and three counter-revolutionaries who had hidden themselves in the co-op were expelled. Since the political consciousness of the members had risen considerably, the 39 households that had insisted on withdrawing remained in the co-op. This was the second round in the battle against bourgeois ideology after the founding of the co-op.

The co-op was greatly consolidated after these two shake-ups and ideological battles, and this made it possible for the co-op to overcome difficulties caused by the drought and the typhoon.

IV

In the struggles to consolidate the co-op, the Party branch of the Red Flag Co-operative also paid attention to the following important aspects of work:

First, it gave full recognition to the importance of general education and cultural life for the co-op members. Through

the medium of cultural activities, it constantly gave political education to the members. The co-op set up a club, organized an amateur dramatic group and established nine adult schools which gave lessons in the evening. More than 260 members attended these evening classes, most of them were young people. All these schools had a newspaper reading group, and the "Peasant Paper" was regularly used as material for political education. Over the past year, more than one hundred co-op members have learned to register work-points, eighty have learned to read newspapers and more than seventy have become literate. Illiteracy was wiped out entirely among the young members. In addition, the Party branch ran a miniature paper called *Life of the Co-op Members* with no fixed publication dates. This paper enabled the members living in the various villages to understand the situation of the co-op in time, and made it possible for them to exchange experience in production.

Secondly, it not only paid attention to the over-all and regular education of the members, but also utilized every possible opportunity to carry on political and ideological work among them. For example, it regularly conducted propaganda activities through the blackboard news, broadcasts and the local drama. To cite another example, it called a meeting to celebrate the completion of the big irrigation ditch from Tanwenkou to Pohouchiao, during which a group of co-op members were awarded and commended as the "model group" in ditch digging and another as a "team of heroes" in water conservancy work. Eighty-one model members were also given citation. After the completion of every major kind of agricultural work (i.e. after spring ploughing and summer harvesting, and after preparations for autumn harvesting were made), experiences were summed up and this was a most vivid and effective means of giving education to the members.

Thirdly, special meetings were called to discuss the agricultural work for the season. Through these meetings concrete leadership was given. In the past year, the Party

branch called special meetings of stockmen, technicians, book-keepers and members engaged in specific side occupations to discuss and check up on various types of work. Experiences were summed up, work systems established, and division of labour and responsibilities clearly defined. Thus, serious problems in management and production were systematically and quickly solved. For example, when the county was hit by frost, a special meeting of stockmen was called to discuss the ways and means of keeping the cattle fit for spring ploughing. After the meeting, all the cattle were blanketed with straw, and cow-sheds were built so that they could survive the winter. When spring ploughing began, a special meeting on financial work was called to clear the work-point account accumulated since the expansion of the co-op. Members were called on to discuss the question and a set of rules was drawn up. At the same time, the various departments in the co-op signed contracts with five other agricultural co-operatives in the township to learn from each other. This established connections between corresponding functionaries in the various co-ops. Book-keepers from the various co-ops were thus enabled to learn from one another. The book-keeper of the No. 6 Co-operative of Tuchiao Township, who did not know much about book-keeping before, learned to do so in a very short time.

Fourthly, the Party branch, in giving guidance to the Youth League, has succeeded in knitting together the Youth League members into a shock brigade, and has enabled them to display a high degree of initiative and creativeness in combating natural calamities, in technical reforms and in labour emulation. After spring ploughing began, the Youth League branch, under the direct leadership of the Party branch, organized 13 youth shock brigades and 8 technical study groups, with 61 Youth League members as the backbone and rallying 118 young members round them. Day and night, the shock brigades battled against natural calamities; wherever difficulties arose, they were on hand to tackle them. For

example, when the big ditch from Tanwenkou to Pohouchiao was being dug at a quickened pace, all the 13 brigades were thrown into the work, and the ditch was completed in six days, which was four days ahead of schedule. The shock brigades were also vanguards in the ten-day spring ploughing emulation, the four-day emulation to accumulate manure and the seven-day voluntary labour campaign. In technical reforms, too, the young people were extremely keen and active. For example, they led the way in winter ploughing, in selecting seeds, and in adopting new methods in close, cluster planting of paddy seedlings and in preparing compost from straw, in the work on high-yield plots of land and in the construction of threshing floors. Their exemplary action greatly expedited the introduction of technical reforms in the co-op.

The consolidation of the Red Flag Co-operative was, of course, inseparably linked with the help and support given by the Party and the government which gave not only political leadership and encouragement but also material and technical aid to the members of the co-op. In 1955, the government loaned a total of 14,000 yuan to the co-op and over 3,700 yuan to poor peasant members for the payment of membership dues. The supply and marketing co-op signed advance purchases and sales contracts with the Red Flag Co-operative. One of the important factors which helped to consolidate the Red Flag Co-operative was that the government established a provincial demonstration station in its vicinity and this station gave the co-op invaluable technical assistance.

The Red Flag Co-operative has been consolidated, in the past year, through struggles against natural calamities and bourgeois ideology. Members of the co-op have been convinced that only by taking the co-operative road and by collective efforts can it be possible to overcome the hazards of nature, increase crop yield and improve their livelihood. Their socialist consciousness has been greatly enhanced. The

Party branch has also, over the past twelve months, gained experience in running large co-ops. Recently the request that the co-op be developed into a collective farm has been approved, and the Red Flag Co-operative will become the first collective farm on Hainan Island. This joyful news has greatly heartened all the members. "Socialism has come," they all said. They have pledged themselves to carry out the autumn harvesting well, to enlarge the area of autumn and winter planting, to devote themselves heart and soul to their work and to make everything ready for the establishment of the collective farm after autumn harvesting and the general summing-up. With the help of the provincial demonstration station, the Red Flag Co-operative has already drawn up a comprehensive production plan covering the last quarter of 1955 and the years 1956 and 1957. This plan ensures a bright future for all the members of the co-op.

POLITICAL WORK IN THE CO-OPS

(By the Publicity Department of the Suiyang County Committee, Chinese Communist Party, in the *Work in Kweichow*, issue No. 61, November 10, 1954)

This article is very well written. It deserves to be recommended to all Party and Youth League committees on a county and district level, and to all township branches. All co-operatives should follow the example it describes. The writer understands the Party line and speaks directly to the point. He expresses himself well, too. You know what he means at a glance and his article is free of Party jargon.

In this regard, we should like to call the reader's attention to the fact that many comrades are extremely fond of using Party jargon in their articles. Their writing is neither vivid nor graphic. It gives you a headache to read it. They care little for grammar or phrasing, preferring something which is a cross between the literary and the colloquial. Here garrulous and repetitive, there archaically cryptic, it is as if they were deliberately trying to make their readers suffer. Of the more than 170 articles in this book, quite a few are heavy with Party jargon. Only after several revisions could they be made fairly readable. Even so, some are still obscure, clumsy and difficult to understand. They would not have been included were it not for the importance of their content. How many years will it be before we see a

little less of that Party jargon which gives us such a headache?

The comrades who edit our newspapers and periodicals must pay attention to this question. They should demand of the writers articles that are vivid, clear and well put together. Moreover, they should personally help the writers with revisions.

— EDITOR

In the spring of 1954, three farming co-operatives—Chenkuang, Nungyuan and Yangchiachai—were formed in Kuangta Township of Suiyang County in Kweichow Province. Our Party spared no effort to give them political and ideological leadership at the time when it was needed, and all three co-ops put in nearly a year's intensive work on their farms, finishing up in the autumn with the distribution of the year's harvest. As a result, they find they have made considerable headway and are now on a firm footing. They have created a good impression among the peasants outside the co-ops, who say, "The co-ops do better than us in every way!" These co-ops are really showing the local peasants what co-operation can do. After the year's harvest was distributed in autumn, 14 households joined one or other of the three co-ops. At present, the township has nine farming co-ops; another three are being formed and more will come later. Ninety-three per cent of the peasant households in the township now belong to co-ops or mutual-aid teams, as against only 70 per cent in the winter of 1953.

How did the management committees of these three co-ops carry out their political work?

1) They helped the government personnel sent to assist them and their own committee members to understand the importance of political and ideological education. In the early days of the co-ops, neither the committee members nor government personnel had a correct understanding of this

question. Some of them thought that once the co-op members had been mobilized, everything would be all right. Others said that their time was so taken up in directing the day-to-day work of the farm that they had none to spare for political work. Still others thought of political and ideological education solely in terms of political lectures and the study of political textbooks. Because they neglected political work, the management committees ran into serious difficulties in the work even before spring ploughing. Labour power was poorly organized. People were left idle and the field work was not done well. Later on, the Communist Party county committee pointed out that the management committees should conduct political and ideological education among their members, and link it to their day-to-day work. The leading members of the management committees then went into the problems of the co-ops and their causes at meetings of the Party and the Youth League branches and at management committee meetings, and enabled the government personnel and management committee members to study relevant material. In this way, they all came to understand that the transformation of agriculture along socialist lines is a complicated job. They realized that if they were to guide their members along the road to socialism, it was fairly useless to rely on mere administrative and arbitrary measures alone, in place of painstaking political work; they would have to give consistent socialist education on the basis of the actual problems confronting the members. As expressed by Chen Tien-tsai, a Communist and vice-chairman of the Chenkuang Co-operative, after he had changed his attitude towards political work: "I imagined that as the political consciousness of our members was high, there would be no serious problems. Now I see that to develop a co-op and put it on a firm footing is no simple job." Chen Teh-yun, another Communist in the same co-op, used to be too hasty toward others. With the Party's help he came to see his mistake, and when he came

to mobilize the women members to take part in the spring ploughing, his patience was unending.

2) They enlisted the full help of the Party branch for their political work. There was a Party group in the Chenkuang Co-operative. Being very few in number, the Communists in the Nungyuan and the Yangchiachai Co-operatives formed a combined group. There was a Youth League branch in each of these three co-ops. Guided by the Party branch of the township, political work was conducted among the members of these three co-ops through both the Youth League branches and the management committees with the Party groups as the core. In the Chenkuang Co-operative, for instance, of the four Communists, the co-op vice-chairman Chen Tien-tsai was given the task of leading the political work and work among young people and women members; the other three Party members, apart from leading the routine work of the farm or taking charge of financial affairs, were asked to pay constant attention to familiarizing themselves with the views and worries of all the co-op members, including those on the management committee. Both the Nungyuan and the Yangchiachai Co-ops did rather well in enlisting the help of the Youth League. For example, whenever the Party branch gave him a task, Vice-Chairman Chu Hua-chung of the Nungyuan Co-operative, a Communist, always discussed it first with the Youth League members and reported to them at a Youth League branch meeting. This enabled every one of them to take the initiative seeing the task through. The Youth League branches of the three co-ops gave each of their members the task of keeping in close touch with a definite number of co-op households in the course of their daily farm work. In this way they could discover in good time what were the worries or mistaken views that dampened people's enthusiasm, and so help the Party conduct political work.

All three co-ops paid attention to political education among the more active members outside the Party and the Youth League. They did this in the following ways:

a) Organized periodical study courses for these people to give them basic information about the Party and communism, to help them gain a better understanding of the Party and see clearly the target for which they were doing and work with ever greater enthusiasm.

b) Helped them to understand the general trend of social developments and the benefits socialism would bring to them so that they could cultivate a sincere love for socialism. In analysing typical examples of correct and incorrect views among the members, they learned to distinguish between right and wrong and between socialism and capitalism. Moreover, constant attention was paid to recruiting into the Party or Youth League those co-op members who distinguished themselves in the day-to-day work of the farm. During the past six months or more, in the three co-ops, three members have been admitted into the Party, and five into the Youth League. This has had a tremendous effect in encouraging other active people.

3) Because the leading members of the committees knew what was on people's minds, and what they were thinking, they were able to take up their problems and deal with them in a flexible way, taking all the circumstances into account in every instance. Agricultural co-operation is rather new to the peasants, so it is only natural that they are faced with various worries even after they have joined the co-ops. Some joined with the idea of seeing what came of it, others simply drifted in with the general current. As soon as they started in on the work of the farm, however, it was fairly usual for the newer members to begin worrying for fear they would earn less than when they worked on their own. Therefore, they cared more for the work-points they would get, than the way the work was done. As a result, their work was very sloppy. To change this situation,

an educational campaign was launched in the co-operatives to promote respect for collective interests. It was made clear to the members that "if the lake goes empty, its outlets will be dry too." As part of this campaign, members who took good care of the collective interests were publicly commended. Gradually the members came to see that their personal interests linked with those of the co-op as a whole and the quality of the work improved accordingly. The experience of the three co-ops shows that, to reach this situation, the Party must first train its own members and members of the Youth League to keep in constant touch with all other members of the co-op so that they may become familiar with their views and worries. When a new lot of work has to be planned, they can then look into problems likely to arise. In this way, the Party will be able to anticipate many of the problems and take the initiative in political work.

4) Political and ideological education must be carried out in a living and fresh way. The management committees must therefore regularly sum up the results of the work on the farm and review their own work. In doing this, they must recognize the achievements, no matter how small; for in this way they can give the members constant help in raising their political consciousness, and strengthen their determination and confidence to follow the socialist path. This was done by the three co-ops in the following ways:

(1) They made their summings-up immediately after each stage in the farm work. In these summings-up, they showed the superiority of co-operatives over individual farming, and taught the members to care for collective interests. This reinforced their determination to follow the road of co-operation.

(2) In summing up the help given by the state to the co-ops, they showed the members that the Party and government gave great support to the co-ops because they wanted to help all the peasants take the road to co-operation, the road to common prosperity. They also explained

to the members what advantages the national construction would bring them, so as to enhance their patriotism. As a result of such education, all three co-ops set an outstanding example in selling grain to the state after the autumn harvest. Altogether they sold the state 86,000 catties of surplus grain, more than a sixth of the total amount sold to the state by the whole township.

(3) Through summing up the increase in output resulting from the use of chemical fertilizers, improved farm implements, insecticides and sprayers, they conducted education on the worker-peasant alliance. This helped the members understand the close ties between the workers and peasants and between industry and agriculture, and stimulated their desire to improve production so as to help industrial construction.

(4) By citing and analysing examples of members who pursued their personal interests at the expense of collective interests and examples of members who protected public interests, they compared the two different roads for the peasants—the old road leading to capitalism and the new road to socialism—and gave the members a deeper understanding of the Party's policy for the period of transition to socialism. Thus the members became able to judge which of these two attitudes in dealing with personal and public interests was correct and which incorrect and to distinguish clearly between bourgeois and socialist ideas.

(5) Other methods they used were: (a) Political education through the to-and-fro of discussions on the summing up of farm work between the committees and the rank-and-file members. (b) The management committee assigned every one of its members to exchange views with a particular co-op member, in order to settle his worries or correct his mistaken ideas. (c) They publicized good examples for all to follow, by publicly commending outstanding members and their accomplishments, regularly electing model units and model co-op members and giving

them prizes and commendation. In the spring and after farm work was completed in the autumn, all three co-ops elected their model members and units. This greatly stimulated the members' enthusiasm towards production and raised their political consciousness. The criteria used to choose the models were: love of country, concern for the co-operative, protection of public property, keenness for work, outstanding achievements in work. At the same time, the erroneous ideas and actions of some members were suitably criticized. (d) They organized regular study courses, the content of which was decided upon according to the existing ideological problems among the members.

These co-ops had certain shortcomings, however, in guiding political and ideological education. Sometimes the political work was not carried out regularly. Not enough attention was paid to recruiting new members into the Party and Youth League, which at present are too small. Moreover, there was one-sidedness in educating the members on the importance of improving farming methods: they popularized better ways of selecting seed and planting rice, which was of course necessary, but neglected to stress the value of improved farm tools. The Chenkuang Co-operative, for instance, left two new-style ploughs lying idle for a whole year. One co-op gave too little attention to educating its members in their responsibilities towards society as a whole.

WAGE A RELENTLESS STRUGGLE AGAINST COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY WRECKING

(Adapted from a report of the Public Security Bureau of Tuyun County dated June 6, and published in *The Work in Kweichow*, No. 85, July 30, 1955)

The problem of counter-revolutionaries trying to wreck the co-operative movement is not limited to District Five of Tuyun County, Kweichow. It is quite common. But very little is said about it in similar periodicals of other provinces.

In this period of developing agricultural co-operation, comrades engaged in rural work must give their fullest attention to the struggle against the wrecking activities of counter-revolutionaries. Just as was done in Tuyun County, they must set up security organizations within the co-ops, with Party members and Youth Leaguers serving as the core. Led or supervised by the county Party committee, the district Party committee should first study the situation, publicize and explain Party policy to both Communists and non-Communists, and put the people on their guard against the wrecking activities of counter-revolutionaries. Then it should investigate, weed out and recommend disposition of any counter-revolutionaries or other rascals who may have wormed their way into the management of the co-ops. It is absolutely essential that this be done. Only real counter-revolutionaries and real rascals, however, should be weeded out. No good person, or

someone who only has certain shortcomings, may be labelled "rascal." Special care must be given to making proper disposition of cases. All recommendations must be approved by the county government authorities.

—EDITOR

The instance of the 18 agricultural producers' co-operatives in District Five of Tuyun County in Kweichow Province shows us that the damage done by remaining counter-revolutionary elements and class enemies to the co-op has been serious. All told, 26 cases of sabotage occurred in these co-ops. They include the poisoning of draught animals, twice; the destruction of water conservancy works, twice; the undermining of production plans, four times; the destruction of compost, once; theft, nine times; corruption, three times; creating rumours, four times; the murder of a functionary, once. The general tactics used by enemies to undermine the co-ops, before they were set up, was to create rumours from outside and distort the policies of the Party and government so as to deter peasants from joining the co-ops. For instance, Wu Sen, sub-chief of the remaining bandits in Liangmou Township, spread the rumour that the co-op was a "quagmire, once you entered it, you could never get out." When the peasants heard this, they became skeptical and began to waver; consequently, 11 households wanted to back out. In other townships, there were also landlords and rich peasants who spread rumours against the co-ops. "To join the co-op is to put oneself under supervision; you are freer outside of it," they said. And when it's time to sow rice seeds, they told the peasants, "The co-op is no better than the peasant working on his own." Some peasants grew doubtful when they heard such rumours and dared not join the co-op. On the other hand, once the co-ops were set up, these counter-revolutionary elements and class enemies managed to worm their way into the co-op to

carry out destructive activities by taking advantage of the lack of vigilance by some co-op functionaries and members, and by coaxing and wheedling. Some, because they feined to be enthusiastic, even seized leading posts in the co-ops. According to an investigation, those who had wormed their way into the co-ops included 3 bandits, 4 Kuomintang army officers, 2 members of the San Min Chu I Youth League of the Kuomintang, 2 persons who once served under the puppet regime, 7 puppet *pao* chiefs,* 2 suspected counter-revolutionaries, 1 habitual thief, 3 soldier-robbers or vagabonds, 17 puppet *chia* chiefs,* 4 hirelings of *pao* chiefs, 2 witch-doctors, and 2 others who had just served prison sentences, making a total of 49, or about 0.24 per cent of the whole membership of the co-ops. Nineteen of them took over leading posts, including 4 chairmen and vice-chairmen, 2 book-keepers, 6 management committee members, 5 production brigade leaders and 2 tally keepers. Once they had sneaked into the co-ops and seized leading positions, these bad elements began to take over the reins and go into action. In the process of calculating the work done, recording the work-points and distributing income to the members, they made use of certain shortcomings in the work to create and aggravate conflicts, fanned tension between the functionaries and members, isolated the leadership and discredited Party and Youth League members and the most active people. Or, they would create disturbance and incite the peasants to stop work by deliberately making wrong entries of accounts and work-points. The book-keeper of Hsinan Co-op, for instance, was formerly a San Min Chu I Youth League member. He made such a mess of the accounts that a rational distribution of income was impossible. This caused discontent among the members; 19 households were unwilling to go to work. When

* The *pao* chief was an agent of the Kuomintang, responsible for watching and controlling 100 households, and the *chia* chief, responsible for ten households.

the enemies saw that chances to carry out destruction through these methods were dwindling because the co-ops were gradually becoming better organized, they resorted to even more vicious methods, such as poisoning animals, stealing co-op property, poisoning co-op functionaries and active people. The vice-chairman of Hsinan Co-op was a chieftain of a bandit signal brigade. He got the leadership of the co-op into his hands, discredited Party and Youth League members and undermined production. As a result, the co-op harvested 300 catties less of rape-seed. In order to weaken the effectiveness of the irrigation facilities they were installing, he deliberately had the planks cut 7.6 feet shorter than required and holes bored in the stones in the wrong places, so that around 200 work-days went to no avail. Ting Chun-san and Hu Hsiang-yuan, both counter-revolutionary elements who had sneaked into the Hsinmin Co-op, banded together 7 bad elements and attempted to poison Tsao Ke-jung, a co-op functionary. This state of affairs goes a long way to explaining that the counter-revolutionary elements and the class enemies were seriously undermining the socialist transformation of agriculture and that they were adopting more and more vicious methods to attain their purpose.

Security organizations were at this point set up in these co-ops. There were 37 Party and Youth League members in them, making up 71 per cent of the total. These organizations have done much to protect production. When unified purchase and supply of grain was put into force in 1954, for instance, five cases of sabotage were discovered in the Hsinmin Co-op. The security group in the co-op helped the public security officer to clear up all the cases.

In District Five, we familiarized ourselves with the conditions of the enemy and strengthened protection of the co-ops in the following way: First of all, we studied the experience of other places, and clarified the point that protection of the mutual-aid and co-operative movement was the central

task of rural public security work. Then, on the basis of the important problems existing in the district, we made suggestions on security work and reported to the district Party committee, which examined and studied the question at a meeting of Party branch secretaries. In this way security work was carried down to the Party and Youth League branches, district and township functionaries and the masses of the peasants, and finally transformed into conscious action by the masses. Then we selected a key co-op among the existing co-ops in the key township under the district Party committee and, on the basis of the members' higher level of political consciousness, carried out an examination of the political background of its members, especially its functionaries. In other townships, this work was done mainly by the Party branches. Security work was placed on the agenda of the meetings called by the district Party committee for Party branch secretaries and for functionaries assigned to run co-ops. In this way, the district Party committee was able to find out what the enemy was up to throughout the district, and, by summing up the results of the examination of the key co-op in these meetings, educated the functionaries by making them see the subversive activities of the enemy. This heightened their vigilance and encouraged them to do security work more successfully. In the process of checking up on the co-op functionaries, security personnel was chosen and trained. It was through them that the general estimation of the members was made and their political background clarified. The security personnel of the co-ops was nominated by the Party branches, discussed at mass meetings and examined and approved by the district Party committee.

Through this work we felt deeply that the principal factor in ensuring the success of our rural security work was to rely on the Party branches and the security organizations for the mobilization of the peasants through production. Another point to which attention should be paid is that the public

security workers must work in co-ordination with the co-op functionaries to protect the co-ops; they must help the functionaries to change the view that protection of the co-op is an extra burden to them. Furthermore, security work should not only be carried out in the co-op, but also in the entire mutual-aid and co-operative movement.

THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF PINGSHUN COUNTY

(By Li Lin, Secretary of the Pingshun County Committee,
Chinese Communist Party, September 20, 1955)

This article deserves examination. It can serve as a reference for every county committee leading a co-operative or production movement or doing other work. We would like to see more such comprehensive county plans and more such all-embracing articles—from every province—going into all aspects of the situation.

—EDITOR

I

Before the 1955 spring sowing, 378 agricultural producers' co-operatives (averaging 60 households to a co-operative) had been set up in Pingshun County, Shansi Province. Peasant households in co-operatives made of a little more than 88 per cent of the county's total, and co-operation of a semi-socialist character was in the main achieved.

The 378 co-operatives were established on the basis of the growth of agricultural mutual-aid teams throughout the whole county in the previous ten years and in the three stages of establishing co-operatives on a trial basis in 1951 and 1952, over-all planning in 1953 and expansion on a large scale in 1954 and 1955. Actually, from establishing co-operatives on a trial basis to achieving virtually complete co-operation in the entire county, it took only four years. The rapid growth of the co-operative movement had been possible chiefly because the Party adopted the correct policy of leading the

peasants in developing production, each year one group of co-operatives after another increasing production.

Co-operatives of a semi-socialist character have become the predominant production organization in the rural area. Therefore, they have greatly raised agricultural productivity and promoted the development of production. The total grain output of the whole county in 1954 amounted to 53,600,000 catties, a gain of more than 10,000,000 catties over 1949. The average yield per *mou* registered an increase of 26.6 per cent. This completely reversed the situation of the past when Pingshun County was short of grain and had to make purchases from other places. Apart from the grain for local consumption, this county now has an annual surplus of 9,000,000 to 10,000,000 catties to sell to the government and pay agricultural tax. Forestry and livestock raising also grew. Compared with 1949, the head of cattle increased by 4.4 per cent in 1954, donkeys by 21.6 per cent, mules by 53 per cent, horses by 164 per cent, sheep by 44 per cent and pigs by 207 per cent. Income derived from animal products, subsidiary rural products, special native products and forest products increased by 79.5 per cent. All in all, the county's total income from agriculture and subsidiary products in 1954 was 76 per cent above that of 1949.

Because of the superiority of single, centralized management, the co-operatives have more manpower and money for effectively promoting the development of mountainous areas and the conservation of water and soil. In the past few years, 140,000 *mou* of afforested hills in the county have been closed off to protect the trees, 139,000 *mou* of land on denuded mountains have been sown with tree seeds, 6,680,000 trees planted, 389 *mou* of tree nursery cultivated, 3,150 *mou* of saplings laid out, and dried fruit trees such as walnut, wild pepper, wild peach, and wild apricot planted on a large scale. In addition, 3,421 check dams have been built, 48,035 *mou* of fields terraced, 3,720 *mou* of riverside farmland embanked and 4,452 flood prevention ditches built that can irri-

gate 35,000 *mou* of land. A comprehensive production plan for the whole county was drawn up in 1952 and efforts are being made gradually and completely to change the face of this mountainous area in a planned way.

The emergence of the new situation in agricultural co-operation has brought about a tremendous change in class relations. The poor peasants and lower middle peasants have become predominant economically and politically. The well-to-do middle peasants have changed their suspicious and wait-and-see attitude and are drawing much closer to the co-operatives. The rich-peasant economy has been eliminated throughout the entire county. The living standard of the average peasant has been raised to that of middle peasant. A typical investigation in the typical village of Niuchiahou shows that each person in this village of 69 households now has an average annual income of 776 catties of grain, 17 per cent greater than the income of the middle peasant in the past. Now the peasants have come to understand that the greatest advantage of co-operation is that it makes the poor rich and the rich still richer. Investigations made in Yangchingti Township which is comparatively advanced in the co-operative movement show that the real income of all strata of the peasantry has more or less increased since they joined the co-operatives. The average income of a poor peasant in 1954 was 831 catties of grain, a 38 per cent increase compared with the period before he joined the co-operative. The income of every new, lower middle peasant was 928 catties, an increase of 31 per cent. The income of every old lower middle peasant was 816 catties, an increase of 28 per cent. The income of every new well-to-do middle peasant was 1,090 catties, an increase of 5.6 per cent. The income of every old well-to-do middle peasant was 982 catties, an increase of 5 per cent.

As the peasants' material life improved, their purchasing power has expanded. In 1949, the purchasing power of each peasant was 4.93 yuan annually while in 1954 it had risen to 29.3 yuan. In describing their life, peasants in the

co-operatives say that in the past they ate "bran and wild roots for six months and grain for half a year," but now they have "enough to eat at every meal, surplus grain every year and eat meat during the New Year and festivals." Whereas formerly they had "little clothing and no hat, a very thin mattress to sleep on and nothing to cover themselves," now they have "better clothing to wear and a cotton serge blanket to cover themselves with at night."

Attention has also been paid to culture and public health. The more than 100 lower primary schools in the whole county set up before the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression have been expanded to over 400 and the pupils in these schools account for 93 per cent of the school-age children. There were only three higher primary schools in the past and now the number has increased to twelve and a middle school has been set up. Spare-time schools and literacy classes have been established in every township and 64,000 young people and adults of both sexes are attending. In addition, 272 libraries have been set up subscribing to a total of 5,729 magazines, plus many mobile libraries. One hundred and four film shows were given in the mountainous area and 72 radio receiving sets tune in to broadcasts every evening. All this has greatly enriched the political and cultural life of the peasants. In the field of public health, the county has one health centre and seven clinics. More than 200 doctors have been organized to go from place to place to treat patients. With the extensive application of modern methods of delivery, infant mortality dropped from 31.8 per cent in 1949 to 17.5 per cent in 1954. Young people brush their teeth and feminine hygiene has been popularized. New sanitary habits have been gradually introduced.

With the growth of co-operation in agriculture and improvements in the peasants' material life, customs and habits in the rural areas and the outlook and ideology of the peasants have changed accordingly. The 26,000 households working alone in the past have now been organized into 378 large

collective production units. While in the past the peasants depended on their families and relatives, now they "depend on the agricultural producers' co-operatives for production, supply and marketing co-operatives for daily necessities and credit co-operatives for loans." Widows, widowers, orphans and destitutes generally are taken care of by the co-operatives. New ideas of morality have gradually taken root. There are few people now given to bickering and fighting, and few people burn incense, kowtow, appeal to the gods and supplicate them for holy medicine. Few people get involved in disputes over land. Idlers, loafers, and speculative merchants are on the way out. The predominating new outlook in society is to regard labour as glorious and exploitation shameful.

On the basis of their personal experience, the peasants have linked their individual interests ever more closely with those of the collective body, their immediate interests with their long-term interests. They actively deliver grain tax as an expression of patriotism and sell surplus grain to support the country's industrialization. They buy large quantities of means of production and consumer goods with income derived from selling grain and subsidiary products. In this way, the worker-peasant alliance has been consolidated on a new basis and the development of industry and agriculture has been closely co-ordinated.

II

In the course of the agricultural co-operative movement, the Party organizations of Pingshun County at all levels undertook the following tasks:

First, they seriously carried through the policy of "active leadership, steady advance" laid down by the Central Committee of the Communist Party and followed the principle of "from low to high, from small to large, from few to many and from point to area." They conscientiously strengthened

their leadership of the movement. First of all, they paid attention to completing satisfactorily the work of setting typical examples and various kinds of preparatory work to establish co-operatives. In 1951, under the direction of the higher Party committee, the mutual-aid team of Chuantu Village led by Kuo Yu-en was chosen to establish a co-operative on a trial basis. In 1952, ten villages where better foundation work had been done were selected by the various districts for experiment. The success of the experiment over two years set a good example for the peasants of the whole county. On the one hand, the Communist Party county committee organized the Party members, functionaries, and masses in all villages to visit the co-operatives. Through convening mass meetings to celebrate the co-operatives' rich harvests and the summing up of experience acquired in setting up co-operatives on a trial basis, it publicized on a large scale the superiority of the co-operatives. This educated the functionaries and masses and expanded the influence of the co-operatives among the peasants. At the same time, the county committee worked out practical plans to achieve co-operation in the county, the districts and the township within five years. It devoted attention to the improvement and growth of the mutual-aid teams and created conditions in organization, personnel and experience in leadership to establish co-operatives.

In expanding the co-operatives, the policy was adopted of making preparations along with progress and consolidation and of closely linking the improving and building of co-operatives. When the first experimental co-operative was set up in 1951, the county committee took responsibility itself under the direct leadership of the regional Party committee and established contact with the best mutual-aid teams in different districts. In setting up the ten experimental co-operatives in 1952, responsible comrades from the various district Party committees personally assumed leadership and established contact with more than 160 of the better mutual-

aid teams in nearby villages. In 1953, 110 co-operatives were set up throughout the county, more than 70 per cent of the township having co-operatives. Under the leadership of the township Party branches, broad contacts were made with the county's more than 1,700 mutual-aid teams. Three large-scale evaluations and exchanges of experience were done in the spring, summer and autumn every year. Each time 20,000 to 30,000 functionaries and rank-and-file members exchanged experiences. The training of personnel to establish co-operatives was held every winter and each time three to four thousand people received training. Lectures were given explaining the policy of the Communist Party and tested methods in building co-operatives were popularized. Thus, in the course of the movement, personnel was trained, worthwhile people were cultivated and the masses educated and elevated to a higher level while the whole movement advanced in the direction indicated by the Party. Rules were drawn up in more than 90 per cent of the county's co-operatives and co-operative members were taught to manage affairs in accordance with the co-operative regulations. The co-operative members said: "The country has its laws and the co-operative its regulations. Things are easily done according to co-operative regulations."

Secondly, the Party organization constantly strengthened the Party's concrete leadership over the co-operatives and improved the management and administration of the co-operatives to meet the requirements of their growth. With regard to management and administration, attention was chiefly paid to the following aspects:

(1) It is necessary to strengthen planned control of production and effectively see to it that "each person's ability is brought into full play and land and material resources are fully utilized." In the spring, all co-operatives worked out annual production plans based on the plans and requirements of the county and the township and local conditions as well as the characteristics of each co-operative. They also made

short-term field work arrangements for each season and each month. Thus, on the one hand, the co-operatives could carry on planned production and at the same time agricultural production was gradually brought into the framework of state planning as a whole. This provided a reliable guarantee for the completion of more than 90 per cent of the county's 1955 production tasks by relying on the co-operatives. In addition, the co-operatives have generally worked out three-year or five-year plans for the comprehensive development of agriculture, forestry, livestock raising and subsidiary production. In 1953, Yangchingti Village drew up a long-term 15-year plan. By the 15th year, the average income of each person is to reach 6,542 catties of grain and this has greatly inspired the confidence of the co-operative members to develop the mountainous area. After this advanced experience was popularized by the county committee of the Communist Party, more than 120 co-operatives in 32 townships in the county worked out comprehensive production plans with the townships as the unit and the co-operative as the foundation. Experience shows that this is a good method to strengthen leadership in production after co-operation is achieved.

(2) Attention must be paid to the organization of labour and to lightening the co-op members' enthusiasm for work. During the experimental period, there was confusion in the organization of the labour force and some co-operative members raised the criticism that "the co-operative is a beehive." Later on, the system of responsibility on a temporary basis, the year-round responsibility system and the responsibility system with guaranteed output were introduced step by step. Then the piece-work system and measures for the organization of production quotas and rewards for above-norm production were adopted. At present, with the exception of 29 co-operatives which still use the responsibility system on a seasonal basis, 290 of the county's co-operatives have adopted the year-round responsibility system, 48 co-

operatives the responsibility system with guaranteed output and eleven old co-operatives which have good foundations have adopted the measures of organization of labour quota. With the strengthening of the organization of labour in this way, labour efficiency in general has been raised by 15 to 20 per cent. Women's working potential has also been utilized. In the Hsikou and Tato Co-operatives women who engage in production account for more than 30 per cent of the total work-days of these co-operatives. Furthermore, the policy of "running a co-operative diligently and economically" was applied in financial affairs. Democratic management of financial work was strengthened and the financial system put on a sound basis. The leadership strengthened the training of book-keepers and established book-keepers' mutual-aid groups. Instructors' teams for the book-keepers were sent down from the county to make inspections and give assistance. The financial system used by more than 80 per cent of the co-operatives in the county is now on a sound basis.

Thirdly, the Party organization correctly carried out the policy of the Communist Party. Eighty-eight per cent of the peasant households in Pingshun County are in the co-operatives, including the bulk of the well-to-do middle peasants. The well-to-do middle peasants, having a spontaneous tendency towards capitalism, waver before the road of co-operation. They joined the co-operatives because they saw that the co-operatives could increase production and they themselves would have nothing to lose. For instance, many well-to-do middle peasants in Yangchingti Village were formerly reluctant to join the co-operatives, because they were afraid of suffering losses and losing their freedom of action. But when they saw that Liu Pa-kuang, a Communist Party member who had a large tract of land and good farm tools, in the first year that he joined the co-operative, got 600 catties more grain than when he was in the mutual-aid team, and when they realized that the policy of mutual benefit was carried out in the co-operatives on the questions of evaluating

land, the proportion for the distribution of labour power and land, the pooling of draught animals and farm tools and the pooling of fruit trees, thirteen such households joined the co-operatives at one time.

However, whether the policy of mutual benefit is correctly implemented in the co-operatives depends on whether the poor peasants predominate in leadership. In this county, altogether there are 3,915 leading co-operative functionaries, of which poor peasants and lower middle peasants make up 64 per cent. Relying on this core, the Party correctly executed the policy, carried out a constant struggle against the exclusion of poor peasants and infringement on the interests of the middle peasants, as well as all tendencies to take the capitalist road. This has firmly established the preponderance of the poor peasants in political and economic affairs and at the same time solidly united the middle peasants and rigidly restricted the tendency to take the road of the rich peasantry. Leaving aside a portion of the landlords and rich peasants who have not yet been absorbed into the co-operatives, those who have been taken in were treated according to varying conditions. All landlords and rich peasants who in general behaved themselves well after joining the co-operatives were allowed, if the leadership of the co-operative was strong and the political consciousness of the masses high, to remain in the co-operative to further their reform, but they were not allowed to assume leading posts. Those who did not behave themselves well after joining the co-operatives or those who engaged in sabotage were expelled from the co-operatives if their cases were not serious, or handed over to the government for punishment if their cases were serious. During the last two years, attention has been paid to purifying the co-operatives' membership. In the consolidation of all co-operatives in the county during the first half of 1955, a general class check-up was made and 538 ex-landlords and rich peasants were discovered in 227 co-operatives. In accordance with their behaviour, 260 persons

were kept in the co-operatives as members, 241 were kept in the co-operatives but were not accorded the title of member and 37 persons were expelled and handed over to the judicial authorities to be dealt with according to law. After this check-up, the class consciousness of the bulk of the functionaries and co-operative members was raised higher and their previous shallow thinking that "the landlords and rich peasants are easily led and are obedient" was overcome. They realized that many ex-landlords and rich peasants have "a sweet tongue and a vicious heart" and that at all times they must maintain sharp vigilance to prevent sabotage by counter-revolutionaries.

Fourthly, the Party organization satisfactorily undertook the building of the basic echelons of the Party, carried out in earnest the building and strengthening of the Party, and closely linked the work of building and strengthening the co-operatives with the building and strengthening of the Party. This provided a fundamental assurance that co-operation could be achieved. First of all, with the development of the co-operative movement, four large-scale check-ups of the Party were carried out during the past four years. Rightist ideas within the Party have been criticized in a concerted way and regular attention paid to the recruiting of new members into the Party. In the past few years more than 500 persons have been admitted into the Party while over 130 ideologically degenerated elements have been expelled. A regular Party course was organized and education on the Party's basic theories strengthened. In addition, an evaluation and appraisal of Party members has been carried out each season and a check-up on the work and behaviour of Party members in the co-operatives made in co-ordination with the check-up of the co-operatives. The good ones were cited and the bad ones criticized and disciplined. In educating Party members, the county Party committee paid great attention to summing up typical examples. In 1953, for instance, through discussions comparing Chuanti Village (an advanced

village in mutual aid and co-operation) with Kanhua Village (a backward village in mutual aid and co-operation), the various village Party branches came to realize deeply the importance of leading the peasants actively to take the road of co-operation. Through discussion on the ideology of Party member Kuo Wu-tse, the ideology and tendency towards capitalism existing among Party members was effectively exposed. The constant education given Party members on the fundamental theories of the Party and on the prospects for socialism has effectively overcome the inroads of capitalist ideology on the Party, steadily enhanced the fighting spirit of the Party branches and developed the positive, leading role of Party members. Many peasants say: "One village looks to another village, one household looks to another household while the masses look to the Party branch." It is self-evident that raising the fighting spirit of the Party branches plays an important part in promoting the co-operative movement.

Next, with the growth of co-operation and in accordance with the stipulations of the Party Constitution, Party branches were set up on the basis of production units. All 5,054 rural Party members in the county have joined mutual-aid or co-operative organizations. Of these, 91.3 per cent are in agricultural producers' co-operatives, 3.7 per cent in mutual-aid teams, 5 per cent working in supply and marketing co-operatives and credit co-operatives. On the basis of the production units, 75 general branches of the Party, 26 township branches and 275 sub-branches were set up. Small Party groups were established under the co-operative Party branches according to production teams or production brigades. This has strengthened the leadership of the Party over the co-operatives and enabled the political and ideological work of the Party to go deep into the various items of the co-operatives' work.

Fifthly, with the development of the co-operative movement, the county committee also improved its method of

leadership. (1) It paid attention to the setting up and leadership over the network of mutual-aid teams and co-operatives. Selecting the suitably located old co-operatives which had a comparatively strong core of functionaries and enjoyed prestige among the masses around as centre co-operatives, the county committee adopted the method of making old co-operatives lead forward new co-operatives, the co-operatives lead forward mutual-aid teams and the co-operatives and mutual-aid teams jointly lead forward individual peasants. It gathered the experience of the masses and solved problems on the spot and organized production emulation. In this way, the difficulty of a lack of leading functionaries and experienced leadership in the large-scale growth of the co-operatives was solved. At the same time, the ties between the co-operatives, the mutual-aid teams and the individual peasants were strengthened. This has provided conditions for the constant growth of the co-operatives. Problems of a common character in the network of mutual aid and co-operation were settled through meetings, and special problems were settled separately with the assistance of the Party organization. The spirit of "learn what is not known," "teach what you have learned" and "teach and learn from each other" was developed. This played a big part in consolidating and improving the mutual-aid and co-operative organizations. Many co-operatives and mutual-aid teams have made contract for co-operation and helped the individual peasants to solve their difficulties in labour power and materials. According to partial figures, in the spring of 1954 alone, the co-operatives helped individual peasants with 7,900 units of manpower and 23,000 units of animal power. The peasants call the co-operatives their "elder brothers." Experience shows that the network of mutual aid and co-operation is a good method of leadership drawing the leadership and the masses together. (2) The county committee paid attention to the cultivation of typical examples and adopted the method of giving directions according to different

categories. In accordance with the characteristics of the various districts and the working conditions, the five townships of Hsikou, Chuanti, Yangchingti, Huangya and Kechang were chosen to be led directly by the county committee. Each work process was tried out in these townships first to gain experience and lessons which were then used to advance the movement. At the same time, great attention was paid to the training of various kinds of typical people who could act as examples. During the past few years, many outstanding model peasants have emerged in the co-operative movement such as Li Shun-ta, Kuo Yu-en, Wu Hou-li and Shen Chi-lan. Large numbers of advanced people have also come forward in the supply and marketing co-operatives, the credit co-operatives, and among youth and women. Throughout the county, there are more than 500 models at and above the county level and over 2,000 outstanding people were awarded. These people constitute a large stratum of model peasants and active elements which has become a mighty force for the Party in carrying out the socialist transformation of agriculture. Our slogan is: "Models in every field of work, outstanding persons in every trade, examples everywhere and a core of leading personnel in every village." Considerable attention was paid to developing and citing active elements from the masses and their every skill and merit were encouraged and rewarded. Thus an atmosphere of striving to become models and win honour was created among the masses. (3) The county committee plunged into practical work to overcome bureaucracy. Every member of the county committee was personally in touch with a co-operative. He regularly went down to the fields to examine and discover problems and help the co-operative solve difficulties so that the county committee could be tempered and raised to a higher level in practical work. The county committee also paid attention to the investigation and study of typical examples. Since 1950, 19 investigations into classes, mutual aid

and co-operation, the production potential, the political ideology of all strata of the people, etc. have been carried out. These investigations have provided the county committee with a powerful basis for working out plans and giving guidance in work. They have played an important part in overcoming subjectivism and in correctly carrying out the Party's policy.

III

The co-operative organizations had a new growth in the autumn of 1955 after Chairman Mao Tse-tung's directive on agricultural co-operation was relayed to the rural areas. Up to the present, peasant households in the co-operatives have reached 92 per cent of the total in this county. The agricultural co-operative movement in this county has gone through two of the three stages laid down by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. It has passed from the mutual-aid teams which are of a rudimentary socialist character to the agricultural producers' co-operatives of a semi-socialist character. It is now entering the third stage of advancing step by step, on the basis of the semi-socialist co-operatives, to fully socialist co-operatives. This is the new basic situation and task of the co-operative movement in Pingshun County. The county committee has worked out the preliminary plan for setting up fully socialist co-operatives on a trial basis in 1956 and 1957 and then for all co-operatives to advance to a higher level in groups. By 1960 the socialist transformation of agriculture is to be completed. In addition, according to the provisions of the county's economic plan, in about 15 years' time the average income of each person in this county will increase from the present 650 catties of grain (all kinds of income counted in terms of grain) to 3,433 catties, a more than five-fold increase. This is the target of struggle for the Party and all the people in Pingshun County.

This target undoubtedly is a clarion call to the mass of peasants. To achieve this fundamental task, we must see the new problems arising from the co-operation throughout the whole county:

1) Although the organization of the co-operatives has grown, the production potential has not yet been fully tapped to raise output further and, in general, the peasants' production level and standards of living have not universally reached the level of the well-off peasants.

2) The bulk of the functionaries lack sufficient awareness of the new situation in co-operation. Quite a few rural Party members have an extremely inadequate understanding of the new tasks of socialist transformation being carried out in the rural areas. A small number of Party members have begun to degenerate ideologically.

3) Socialist transformation of the small-scale farming is an arduous and long-term task. The peasants' joining co-operatives is only the beginning of this transformation. The struggle against the spontaneous tendency towards capitalism must be carried out constantly and unequivocally. Therefore, it is an important task to strengthen the political and ideological education of the peasants on a long-term basis. In 1955, 49 cases of counter-revolutionaries sabotaging the co-operatives occurred. This was an 88 per cent increase as compared with 1954. This shows that in a certain period, the more progress the socialist cause achieves, the more acute and complicated the class struggle becomes. The slightest complacency or carelessness is likely to result in heavy losses.

4) In the fields of administration and law, finance and economy, culture and education, public health and in the mass organizations, a conscious, all-round co-ordination of the various kinds of work is lacking.

5) The methods of leadership by the functionaries are not appropriate to the new situation of co-operation and in certain respects a conservative, one-sided, handicraft-type of

leadership still exists. The situation in which the Party, the government and the co-operative do not have a clear division of functions and duties is also very serious.

All these problems must be solved in the movement in the coming period.

In the light of the new situation, these are new tasks of the Party organizations of the entire county:

First, it is necessary to relay downward in the Party Chairman Mao's report on agricultural co-operation, raise the ideological leadership of the whole Party to a higher level, and enhance the Party's fighting spirit and confidence in victory, so that all Party members will understand the new situation and the Party's tasks following co-operation, overcome the serious situation in which the leadership lags behind the mass movement, overcome the blind optimism that is gaining ground among certain functionaries and Party members and fulfil the new strategic task of turning elementary co-operatives to advanced co-operatives. To achieve this, the following tasks must be undertaken satisfactorily:

- 1) To consolidate the Party. It is planned that a large-scale evaluation and examination of the co-operative movement will be held throughout this county in the winter of 1955. All Party branches will appraise their members through this examination. The county committee will provide short-term training courses for rural Party members in groups before and after the autumn harvest.

- 2) After the autumn harvest of 1955, a county-wide meeting of active elements to build socialism is to be convened to celebrate the victory in co-operation and to cite and reward such people.

- 3) About 3,500 people are to be trained in the winter of 1955 and the spring of 1956, to become backbone functionaries of the co-operatives in the county.

- 4) To strengthen the training of young people, and organize shock brigades. A meeting of model peasants is to be

convened in autumn to sum up and popularize advanced experience.

Next, it is necessary to improve the planning of production, publicize the experience of the comprehensive, long-term production plans of Yangchingti and Anyang Townships, and make great efforts to bring to light the production potential, consistently carry out the guiding principle of all-round development of production in the mountainous area, and work out the long-term 15-year plan for each township according to local conditions. In the field of agriculture, the average output of this county per *mou* is 228 catties of grain. That of the Chengkuan and other co-operatives has been raised to over 420 catties and that of the county state farm to 566 catties. If the production level of the whole county is raised to that of the Chengkuan Co-operative, the total output of grain in the county will be increased by some 50 million catties and the income of each person can be raised from the present 500 catties to 1,000 catties; if it is raised to the present level of the county state farm, the county's total output of grain will be increased by 100 million catties and each person's income can be increased to 1,500 catties.

In the field of forestry and livestock raising, if the conditions of the mountainous area are fully utilized to develop forestry and livestock raising on a large scale and to undertake satisfactorily the conservation of water and soil, income can also be increased, according to preliminary plans by the county, to five times the present level. This is the most fundamental way to develop the mountainous area and improve the life of people there. It is also the material foundation for the transition from co-operatives of a semi-socialist character to entirely socialist co-operatives. The mountainous area has very rich natural resources and conditions exist to exploit these resources. In addition, the state will provide economic and technical assistance. It is estimated that if the labour utility rate of each co-operative can come up to the standard of the Hsikou Co-operative, which means

that an average worker works 200 work-days a year, the whole county will have an extra of 2,414,400 work-days. If the women are fully mobilized to participate in production, considering each woman to earn 30 work-days per year, there will be an extra 637,500 work-days. This is quite a sizable figure, and is the basic force we can rely on for the development of the mountainous area.

THE YITAO TOWNSHIP COMPREHENSIVE PLAN

(By the Co-operative Department of the Huaiyin Regional Committee, Chinese Communist Party, October 22, 1955)

This township made a two-year plan to promote co-operation, increase production, improve irrigation, strengthen the Party and Youth League, and better cultural and educational work. Every township in China ought to do the same. If planning is as hard as some people say, how was this township able to do it?

In 1956 every county, district and township in the land should draw up comprehensive plans including even more items than the Yitao Township plan. For example, they should also cover subsidiary occupations, trade, finance, afforestation and public health. Even if they are a bit crude and not entirely practical, at least they will be better than no plans at all.

If a province can produce relatively presentable plans from one or two counties, one or two districts, and one or two townships, they can immediately be publicized and serve as models for the plans of other counties, districts and townships.

People talk a lot about the difficulty of planning, but actually it's not particularly hard.

— EDITOR

THE SITUATION

Yitao Township of Shuyang County, Kiangsu Province, is an old liberated area, where the Party organization was built up in 1941. There are now 122 Party members and 98 Youth

League members. Local government was formally set up there in 1943. In the whole township there are now five administrative villages and 18 natural villages comprising 829 families with a total population of 3,948. Of this number, 387 or 46.7 per cent are poor-peasant families; 134 or 16.14 per cent new lower middle-peasant families; 86 or 10.36 per cent new upper middle-peasant families; 47 or 5.66 per cent old lower middle-peasant families; 110 or 13.25 per cent old upper middle-peasant families; 39 or 4.7 per cent rich-peasant families; and 26 or 3.13 per cent ex-landlord families.

Of the males, 640 are counted as full manpower and 268 half manpower. Among the womenfolk, 572 are counted as full manpower and 344 half manpower. Land in the whole township covers 25,391 *mou*, an average of 6.43 *mou* per head. Each unit of manpower has to work on nearly 14 *mou* of land.

This township has more land than draught animals. The whole township has 362 oxen and 67 donkeys. Each draught animal has to plough an average of 70 *mou*. There are 99 big and 148 small farm carts, 384 ploughs (including 25 new-type walking ploughs and double-shared wheel ploughs in all), 195 rakes and 103 seeders. A tractor station was set up there in 1954 and the tractors ploughed 6,000 *mou*.

This township is located on a plain with many lakes. It is low-lying land which becomes flooded. The soil is silt, mostly soft earth. A smaller portion is white stiff earth. The soil is made up of very fertile alluvial deposits. But its composition is poor, because it is porous and easily water-logged or arid. Annual precipitation averages approximately 800 millimetres, but the rainfall is not evenly distributed. July and August rains account for more than 70 per cent of the whole year's. Generally, if no rain falls for about 40 days, drought results. If the rainfall exceeds 200 millimetres the area becomes water-logged.

Before 1952, this area was hit by river crests every year. After 1952, with completion of the dredging of the Yi River

and the turning of the course of the Liutang River, this problem was solved. However, as this township is situated in the lower reaches of the Chainan and Kutun Rivers, and there are no dikes along the canals to let out the water inland and no culverts in the lower reaches of the rivers, the water level rises during the rainy season and the spate overflows and is not easily drained. Consequently water-logging remains a serious problem.

During the ten years from 1945 to 1955, this township was stricken by floods every year, except 1952. Since there is much land and few people, the peasants ploughed very roughly. They were not in the habit of applying fertilizer to the land. Formerly, very few pigs were reared. The number is now gradually increasing. Statistics up to the summer of 1954 reported 210 pigs reared in the whole township, but the number grew to 812 in 1955.

The mutual-aid and co-operation movement in this township began in the spring of 1951. The growth of the movement year by year is as follows: In the spring of 1951, the whole township had four temporary mutual-aid teams. By autumn, an agricultural co-operative was spontaneously set up by the masses. Up to the spring of 1952 this co-operative remained the only one. There were 28 mutual-aid teams, of which four were long-term mutual-aid teams and 24 temporary mutual-aid teams. By the spring of 1953, there were three co-operatives comprising 28 families, and 36 mutual-aid teams of which 16 were long-term mutual-aid teams. The co-operatives numbered four by the spring of 1954 with 47 peasant families. In addition, there were 35 mutual-aid teams, including 15 long-term and 20 temporary mutual-aid teams. By that autumn, the number of co-operatives grew to eight with 202 peasant families or 26.5 per cent of the total number of peasant households. There were 53 mutual-aid teams in which 411 or 53.8 per cent of the peasant families participated. By the spring of 1955, there were 16 co-operatives having 464 peasant families or 60.7 per cent

of the total number of peasant households. There were 16 mutual-aid teams made up of 185 peasant families or 24.6 per cent of the total peasant households. Around the time of autumn planting in 1955, there were 13 co-operatives with 716 peasant families, representing 93.7 per cent of all the peasant families in the township that can be organized.

After the co-operatives were organized, they showed marked superiority in production. Take 1955 for instance: the average wheat yield per *mou* of the 16 co-operatives was 135 catties, an increase of 15 catties per *mou* compared with 1954. This averaged ten catties more than the yield of the mutual-aid teams, or 20 catties higher than that of individual peasants. The autumn crops were stricken by serious floods. Nevertheless, the average maize yield per *mou* was 115 catties, which was 20 catties higher than that of the mutual-aid teams or 55 catties above the yield of individual peasants.

The planting of summer crops covered a wide area. This, coupled with the good harvest of 1955, brought increased income to most of the co-operative members, although there was a decrease in output of the autumn crops. Take the Machangtang Co-operative for instance: 70 out of the 118 families in the co-operative had higher incomes. This is 60 per cent of all the peasant households in the co-operative. Two peasant families increased their income by more than 2,000 catties; 22 by more than 1,000 catties; and 30 by more than 500 catties. The rest had an average of 300 catties more. Twenty-two or 19 per cent of the peasant families in the co-operative had neither an increase nor a decrease. Twenty-six peasant families in the co-operative had lower incomes. Of this number, the income of two peasant families had decreased by more than 1,000 catties, 11 families had their income reduced by more than 500 catties and 13 families each received approximately 300 catties less. What accounted for the increased or decreased income? (1) Among the peasant families with increased incomes were some that lacked draught animals, farm tools and manpower before joining the co-

operative, and hence their ploughing was poor and not deep enough and the yield was small. But they have all raised their income since joining the co-operative. Take poor peasant Chin Hsueh-wu for instance: he lacked draught animals and farm tools before joining the co-operative. His ploughing and planting were not timely and he could only harvest something over 70 catties of wheat per *mou*. After he joined the co-operative in 1955, his income was 1,247 catties higher than in 1954. (2) Poor peasants or new middle peasants whose manpower is comparatively strong have increased their income. For instance, of the 46 new middle-peasant families in the co-operative, 30 families or 65 per cent have increased their income. In the family of Yang Yung-hsiang, a new middle peasant, five of its six members can work. In 1955, they received 4,911 catties of grain, 1,303 catties more than in 1954. (3) Those who looked after draught animals received more wages and so their income has also increased. Poor peasant Szu Wen-tao did not take care of any draught animals in 1954 and his income that year was 1,360 catties. He tended draught animals in 1955 and, during the wheat harvest, he received 2,139 catties.

Those who have less income may be divided as follows: (1) Those who had more wheat fields and a high yield in 1954. For instance, new middle peasant Liu Kuei-fu received 6,788 catties of wheat in 1954, but in 1955, he received only 5,564 catties, which was a decrease of 1,224 catties. (2) Lack of labour power, or not quite adequate manpower. For instance, the Chou Kuang-pi family consists of three persons with 25 *mou* of land. It had only one person who could work and he, moreover, was not strong enough. This family received 2,557 catties in 1954 and 1,992 catties in 1955, which was a decrease of 565 catties. (3) Reduced income for the functionaries of the co-operative as a result of delay in farm work. For instance, Chu Feng-lou, vice-chairman of the co-operative, received 3,500 catties in 1954 but only 2,992 catties in 1955, a decrease of 508 catties.

ATTITUDE OF THE PEASANTS

Members of the original small co-operatives have all asked for amalgamation into the big co-operatives. Peasant families who have just applied for admission also wish to join big co-operatives. Thus the big co-operatives have been expanded. For example, the Machangtang Co-operative has been expanded from 118 peasant families in 1954 to 256 in 1955. The reasons are: (1) The big co-operatives have higher yields. For instance, the average output of wheat of the Machang big co-operative in 1955 was 139 catties per *mou*, which was 9 catties higher than the Hsu Hsueh-kao Co-operative, 40 catties higher than the Wang Chi-neng Co-operative, and 39 catties higher than the Changchuang Mutual-Aid Team. (2) It is generally believed that the big co-operatives are more profitably managed. (3) Good feeling towards the big co-operatives because of the contact established by peasants with the mutual-aid and co-operative network. (4) The capacity for leadership of the functionaries of small co-operatives is comparatively poor, and the peasants believe that the big co-operatives have better leadership and less problems. The head of the Wang Chi-neng Co-operative, for instance, has three times asked to join the big co-operative. (5) The peasants have no backbone staff to form a co-operative themselves. For instance, 24 peasant families in Changchuang wanted to organize a co-operative but, because there was no strong leading personnel, eight of them persisted in asking to join a big co-operative while the rest had no objection and so they had all joined the big co-operative. That being the case, the 16 old co-operatives of the whole township were merged into ten co-operatives in 1955, and only three new ones were established.

The following tables illustrate the attitudes of various strata of the peasantry towards agricultural co-operation.

(1) THE DIFFERENT ATTITUDES TOWARDS AGRICULTURAL CO-OPERATION OF THE
248 PEASANT FAMILIES WHO ARE NEW CO-OPERATIVE MEMBERS

	Enthusiastic Elements	Middle Elements	Passive and Backward Elements	Inclined to Oppose the Co-op	Grand Total
Poor-Peasant Families	102 or 75.56%	23 or 20.74%	5 or 3.7%		135
New Middle-Peasant Families:					
Upper Middle Peasants	6 or 28.57%	12 or 57.14%	3 or 14.29%		21
Lower Middle Peasants	28 or 56.00%	16 or 32.00%	6 or 12.00%		50
Old Middle-Peasant Families:					
Upper Middle Peasants	4 or 13.35%	6 or 20.00%	16 or 53.34%	4 or 13.33%	30
Lower Middle Peasants	7 or 58.34%	4 or 33.32%	1 or 8.33%		12
Total	147 or 59.28%	66 or 26.61%	31 or 12.5%	4 or 1.61%	248

(2) THE DIFFERENT ATTITUDES TOWARDS AGRICULTURAL CO-OPERATION OF
48 FAMILIES OF INDIVIDUAL PEASANTS

	Enthusiastic Elements	Middle Elements	Passive and Backward Elements	Inclined to Oppose the Co-op	Grand Total
Poor-Peasant Families		3 or 14.29%	15 or 71.42%	3 or 14.29%	21
New Middle-Peasant Families:					
Upper Middle Peasants	1 or 9.09%		1 or 9.07%	9 or 81.82%	11
Lower Middle Peasants			5 or 100%		5
Old Middle-Peasant Families:					
Upper Middle Peasants	1 or 20.00%		3 or 60%	1 or 20%	5
Lower Middle Peasants			6 or 100%		6
Total	2 or 4.17%	3 or 6.25%	30 or 62.5%	13 or 27.08%	48

Explanatory Notes:

1. Although one new upper middle-peasant family is enthusiastic toward joining the co-operative, the head of the family (a woman) came from a landlord family, and so this upper middle-peasant family is not admitted to the co-operative for the time being.
2. Although one old upper middle-peasant family is enthusiastic toward joining the co-operative, the head of the family is under surveillance for political reasons and so the family is not admitted.
3. Of the 21 poor-peasant families, 5 are loafers, 15 have no labour power (some of them are leasing land to others) and they are reluctant to join the co-operative. The remaining one is under surveillance. They are therefore not admitted.

(3) THE DIFFERENT ATTITUDES OF THE 255 PEASANT FAMILIES THAT ARE
MEMBERS OF FOUR OLD CO-OPERATIVES

	Enthusiastic Elements	Ordinary Elements	Passive and Backward Elements	Wavering Elements Bent on Finding Pretext to Walk Out	Grand Total
Poor-Peasant Families	112 or 82.35%	20 or 14.71%	4 or 2.94%		136
New Middle-Peasant Families:					
Upper Middle Peasants	20 or 50.00%	15 or 37.5%	3 or 7.5%	2 or 5.00%	40
Lower Middle Peasants	25 or 73.53%	6 or 17.65%	3 or 8.82%		34
Old Middle-Peasant Families:					
Upper Middle Peasants	7 or 25.00%	20 or 71.43%		1 or 3.57%	28
Lower Middle Peasants	12 or 70.59%	5 or 29.41%			17
Total	176 or 69.02%	66 or 25.88%	10 or 3.92%	3 or 1.18%	255

As indicated by these tables given above, the attitudes of the peasant masses toward co-operation differ by virtue of their different economic conditions and productive forces. Poor peasants are short of draught animals and farm tools. They have difficulties in production and their life is not well off. Therefore, of the 387 poor-peasant families, 366 or 94.5 per cent have joined or have applied to join co-operatives. Of the 271 peasant families which have joined the co-operatives (new and old co-operatives), 214 families or 80 per cent were energetic in production and determined to make the co-operatives a success. For instance, poor peasant Chang Huai-pao dived into the water amidst heavy rain to make a breach during the campaign to drain the water-logged land. He thus saved 200 *mou* of maize from floods. He said: "I was poor all my life in the past. Land reform freed me to a great extent. Now thanks to the co-operative I have harvested more grain. I am determined to go ahead to socialism for complete emancipation." Of the 134 new lower middle-peasant families, 129 families or 96.2 per cent have joined or applied to join co-operatives. Of the 84 families that have joined co-operatives, 53 families or 63 per cent have worked energetically in production and want to make the co-operatives a success. For instance, Ko Shao-hsien, a new lower middle peasant, said: "The Communist Party emancipated me by giving me land. I cannot forget this. I will follow the advice of Chairman Mao Tse-tung to take the road to socialism." Out of the 47 old lower middle-peasant families, 41 families or 87 per cent have joined or applied to join co-operatives. Of the 29 peasant families already in the co-operatives, 19 families or 65 per cent are working actively and resolutely to make the co-operatives a success. Seventy-five families or 87 per cent of the 86 new upper middle peasants have joined or applied to join co-operatives. Twenty-six families or 42 per cent of the 61 peasant families already in co-operatives want to work actively to make the co-operatives a success. Of the 110 old upper middle-peasant families, 105 families or

95 per cent have joined or applied to join co-operatives. Out of the 58 such peasant families already in co-operatives, only 11 families or 19 per cent work energetically in an effort to make the co-operatives a success.

The attitude of upper middle peasants towards the co-operative is backward or even inclined to opposition. The chief reasons are as follows: (1) They have better economic conditions and have adequate draught animals and farm tools. They have no difficulties in production. For instance, old upper middle peasant Sun Teh-shun has a family of seven persons including himself with 40 *mou* of land. This family has four persons who can work (two men and two women), one farm cart, one plough, one rake, one ox and half ownership of a donkey. His land is near his dwelling and high. He said: "I am living a good life by working on my own. My land yields when others fail. I don't want to mix with them (meaning the poor peasants). I'll wait for two or three years." (2) They are reluctant to give up exploitation. For instance, Ko Tsung-kao, an old upper middle-peasant family consisting of six persons with 53 *mou* of land. It has two persons who can work (a man and a woman) and has adequate draught animals and farm tools. In the busy season, it regularly employs a farm labourer on a monthly basis. Sometimes, it employs temporary farmhands. When the co-operative was to be organized, he said: "I'll wait for two years." His son tried several times to persuade him to join the co-operative but he refused. Finally, after the cadres several times came to persuade him and they also asked his relatives to persuade him, he hesitantly joined the co-operative. Another instance is Tsao Teng-fu, an old upper middle peasant (the dependant of an armyman). His family consists of his wife and himself, two aged persons. He has 70 *mou* of land. Formerly he employed farmhands every year. As he had the privilege of having others till the land for him, he lent out more than 6,000 catties of grain every year at high interest (the rate of return is two for one). When the

co-operative was organized, he had to join because he is the representative of the families of army men in this township. But after he joined, he raised the demand that the co-operative be responsible for tilling 20 *mou* of his land as a privilege for the family of an army man and that all the incomes derived from it be given to him. Finally, he walked out of the co-operative on the pretext that the co-operative failed to give him special consideration. (3) There were certain upper middle peasants who believed that the yield of the co-operative was not as high as theirs as individual peasants and were afraid that their income would fall after joining the co-operative. For instance, old upper middle peasants Chou Yu-shan and Chou Kuan-ku of Taiping Village have land totalling more than 150 *mou* and three draught animals. Their output per *mou* was approximately 50 catties higher than other peasant families generally and they used to have surplus grain of over 3,000 catties every year. After the cadres came seven times to persuade them, they joined the co-operative with reluctance. They put forward as a condition to the co-operative that they sell a draught animal to buy a donkey for grinding. Facts show that it does no good to drag these upper middle peasants into the co-operative. For instance, Wu Ko-chun, a new upper middle peasant, reluctantly joined the Wu Ko-tsai Co-operative in 1954, but in less than a month he wanted to withdraw. During 1955, he made a lot of trouble by asking four times to withdraw. Finally, he said that he did not want the co-operative to till his land and threatened to cut off the legs of the ox of anyone who tilled his land. New upper middle peasants Wu Shu-chih and Tsao Teng-yang sold their two draught animals as soon as they joined the co-operative.

The reasons why poor peasants or lower middle peasants are unwilling to join a co-operative or fail to be active after joining are as follows: (1) Those who lack labour power fear they may not be able to earn enough work-points after joining the co-operative and thus their income would be

reduced. For instance, Chin Wei-kuei, a new lower middle peasant who has no family but 20 *mou* of land, was reluctant to join the co-operative. He said: "After joining the co-operative, I'll not be able to work as much as others and so I'll go hungry." (2) Certain loafers believe that after joining the co-operative they will have to work hard and will not be able to keep up with the others. (3) A small number of those who are widows or widowers but have relatives to depend upon are also reluctant to join the co-operative. For instance, Chung Huai-yu, a woman peasant who has only an 11-year-old son, has 18 *mou* of land. Relatives help her till the land. When the woman was persuaded to join the co-operative, she said: "If I join the co-operative no one will help me. I cannot earn the work-points myself. How can I support my son and myself?" (4) Those individuals doing small business are afraid that they cannot continue after joining a co-operative.

The above analysis shows that the attitudes of co-operative members are not identical. In particular, the well-to-do middle peasants have many apprehensions. Hereafter, it is necessary to carry out intensified socialist education among them. Different measures should be taken as regards different well-to-do middle peasants. Those who actively asked to take part in the co-operative should be kept. Those who vacillate or want to withdraw should be allowed to go.

ALL-ROUND TWO-YEAR PLANS

1) Plans for agricultural co-operation.

(1) Since the autumn of 1955, the number of agricultural co-operatives has increased to thirteen. Peasant families in the co-operatives have reached 93.7 per cent of all the peasant families that can be organized. After the autumn harvest, these co-operatives can be checked over through the autumn planting work, so that in the main they can be consolidated.

(2) By the spring and summer of 1956, the consolidation of the existing co-operatives is to be the chief task. A systematic reorganization of the existing co-operatives will be carried out separately to lay the foundation for organizing the advanced co-operatives on a trial basis. By autumn, the big co-ops in Machang, on the basis of their existing membership of 256 peasant families, will be merged into three co-operatives and their membership expanded to 356 peasant families. The remaining six co-operatives will be merged into three big co-operatives. There will be four co-operatives in the whole township. Twenty of the individual peasant families will be drawn into the co-operatives so that the number of peasant families in the co-operatives will reach 736 or 96.3 per cent of all the peasant families that can be organized.

(3) The Machang big co-operatives will be changed over to advanced co-operatives in 1957. Good preparations are to be made to switch the remaining three big co-operatives to advanced co-operatives. By 1958 all the co-operatives are to become advanced co-operatives. In addition, ten individual peasant families will be drawn into the co-operatives. With the approval of higher authorities, 15 rich-peasant families will be drawn into the co-operatives.

2) Plans for agricultural output.

The total output of grain in 1956 is to reach 6,330,000 catties, an increase of 70 per cent over 1955. The total output of grain for 1957 is to be 6,900,000 catties, or 9 per cent more than that of 1956. In order to achieve these goals, apart from water conservancy projects, attention should be paid to the following four points:

(1) Expand the area of land ploughed by tractors. There are now 6,000 *mou* ploughed by tractors. This will be expanded to 10,000 *mou* by 1956 and to 15,000 *mou* by 1957.

(2) Expand the area on which several crops are grown a year. The existing area for summer planting of wheat takes up 70 per cent of the total farm land. This will be

expanded to 80 per cent by 1957. In the 4,000 *mou* of low land, 2,000 *mou* of paddy field will be added.

(3) Increase the amount of natural fertilizer. The foremost thing to do is to raise pigs. There are now 1,060 pigs, 20 per cent in pigsties. By 1957, 1,600 pigs should be raised, 60 per cent of them in pigsties. Forty basket-loads of pig manure are to be provided by each pig. Secondly, 64,000 basket-loads of green manure are to be prepared. Thirdly, each of the 429 oxen and donkeys should provide 160 basket-loads of manure, thus bringing the total to 68,600 basket-loads. This will yield seven basket-loads of natural fertilizer for each *mou* of land sown, a 75 per cent increase over 1955.

(4) Introduce close planting and improved strains.

3) Water conservancy plans.

The question of water conservancy will be dealt with in two separate stages. The first thing is to end water-logging, next to expand the irrigated areas. To eliminate water-logging, the water must be drained away within three days after rainfall reaches 200 millimetres as a result of three days of successive rain. It is planned to achieve this in the main within two years. The measures to be taken are as follows:

(1) One trunk canal will be dug in the winter of 1955 and the two existing trunk canals widened. These three trunk canals, together with the six branch canals and the dike to be built along the small Yang River, will involve 40,000 cubic metres of earth work for which 500 peasants will be required to complete them within forty days.

(2) Dikes will be built on the 14 other branch canals in the spring of 1956. Three roads (for driving tractors) will be built. A canal will be opened on both sides of the roads. This will involve a total of 50,000 cubic metres of earth work for which 500 peasants will be required to complete it within 50 days.

(3) In the winter of 1956 and during 1957, the dikes already built will be reinforced.

4) Plans to strengthen and build the Party and Youth League.

Out of the present 122 Party members, 92 are more active (including all 37 members of the Party branch committee), 16 are ordinary and 14 are backward. It is planned within two years to train ten of the Party branch committee members through various campaigns to become the backbone for the advanced co-operatives, train the 16 ordinary Party members to become more active, and strengthen education among nine backward Party members to raise their class consciousness gradually. One of the remaining five backward Party members used to hire farmhands and lend out money at high interests. He has shown no improvement after being admonished. It is proposed that he be expelled from the Party. The other four are housewives who have taken no part in Party activities for a long time. Efforts will be made for a certain period of time patiently to educate them. If they fail to change they will be asked to withdraw from the Party. It is planned to draw into the Party 20 of the 98 Youth League members and 186 activists who meet the standards; and 30 more are to be taken in in 1957.

There are now 98 Youth League members in the whole township. Some of them who are outstanding will be trained to become Party members. It is planned for 1956 to draw 30 young activists into the Youth League and 40 more in 1957.

5) Plans for culture and education.

It is planned to set up an adults' school in each co-operative by the winter of 1955. Two hundred functionaries of the co-operatives above production team leaders and 200 young people will be admitted into the schools. Among these, 130 now can do a little reading. They will be able to read one thousand characters by 1957 and 270 of them approximately 500 characters by that time.

6) The work of weeding out hidden counter-revolutionaries is now in progress throughout the township. Hereafter,

political-ideological education among the co-operative members must be constantly strengthened. The political vigilance of the masses must be raised to guard against enemy sabotage in order to ensure the successful completion of the socialist transformation of the whole township.

THE EXPERIENCE OF A TOWNSHIP IN PLANNING CO-OPERATION

(By the Hsuchang Regional Committee's Rural Work Department, Chinese Communist Party, in *Mutual Aid and Co-operation*, issue no. 15, September 4, 1955)

This is another excellent article. It can serve as a reference everywhere. Especially noteworthy is the part dealing with organizing the higher elementary school and middle school graduates to take part in the work of the co-ops. All people who have had some education ought to be very happy to work in the countryside if they get the chance. In our vast rural areas there is plenty of room for them to develop their talents to the full.

— EDITOR

NEW SITUATION DEMANDS LEADERSHIP THAT KEEPS THE PACE

The township of Talichuang in the county of Chiahsien, Honan Province, has 708 households with 3,240 people. It is composed of eight villages that have 7,705 *mou* of farm land. Among the villagers there are 33 Communist Party members, 83 Youth League members, seven non-Party functionaries of the township government, and 12 activists. There are now nine agricultural producers' co-operatives, comprising 276 or 38.9 per cent of all the households. Four villages have been collectivized. Two villages have set up four co-operatives, while co-operation does not exist in two other villages.

The first agricultural producers' co-op in the township was set up in the winter of 1953. The following winter eight more were added. Within the last two years, both the old and new co-operatives have proved what they can do for the productivity of agriculture. In the autumn of 1954, the older co-operatives achieved an average crop increase of 30 per cent per *mou*. In 1955 all the nine co-operatives had rich harvests of wheat, with an average of 145 catties per *mou*, more than ten per cent above the average of 130 catties which peasants outside the co-operatives gathered. The masses of peasants were powerfully attracted by the developing movement for agricultural co-operation and the increased yields it brought. Their thinking was in turmoil over the question as to whether they should join a co-operative, and when to do so. And so it came about that in the whole township there was a high tide of unprecedented enthusiasm among the peasants for taking the path of agricultural co-operation.

Statistics for five villages of the township showed that 126 households had not yet joined co-operatives, including 22 poor-peasant households, 76 new and 28 old middle-peasant households. Those eager to join numbered 108 households, or 85.6 per cent of the total; those ready to swim with the current numbered six households, or four per cent; those unwilling to join numbered 12, or 9.5 per cent.

The absence of timely and concrete Party leadership had created many new problems during the high tide in the movement for agricultural co-operation. First, there had been a tendency to draw in the better-off households and to exclude poor peasants. For instance, the mutual-aid team led by Wang Lao-hu admitted 16 more households, of which 13 were old and three were new middle peasants; but no poor peasants were taken in. In Talichuang Village, the mutual-aid team led by Chen Yuan-cheng and another led by Wu Pao-liang were on bad terms simply because both were struggling to draw in a well-to-do middle peasant. On the other hand, six poor-

peasant households were not admitted to co-operatives or even mutual-aid teams, although they were very eager to join.

Second, there had been a preference for more active peasants and literate people. In Talichuang Village, two mutual-aid teams vied with each other, trying to draw in the secretary of the Party branch. In Chiuchuang Village, an agricultural co-operative and a mutual-aid team tried to beat each other in enrolling a member of the people's council of the township and the secretary of the village administration.

Third, the struggle for being ahead in line. The mutual-aid team led by Huang Kuan was dissatisfied because it had been officially named Co-operative No. 9; its members considered it should have been called No. 2.

Fourth, former landlords, rich peasants and counter-revolutionaries were trying to win over the peasants. They organized mutual-aid teams and co-operatives that were such in name only. They became speculators—all in order to undermine the agricultural co-operation movement. For instance, the notorious bandit Chen Chiu, who has since been punished according to law, induced backward members to withdraw from the co-operative, then tried to pull them into a "co-operative" of his own. Former landlord Liang Lao-kuei persuaded six new co-operative members to withdraw, then got them to go into business with him, buying up and selling dried sweet potatoes and other rural produce.

In this state of affairs, the following facts were brought to light: First, the township was experiencing a new upsurge in the socialist revolution. Second, the class struggle had become more complicated and acute. Third, local Party leadership was lagging behind the developing situation and the demands of the masses.

LEADING THE WHOLE TOWNSHIP FOR COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING

To ensure the healthy development of agricultural co-operation, the Party branch of the township, acting under instruc-

tions from the county Party committee, at the end of June 1955 led the peasants of the entire township in drawing up a comprehensive plan.

1) The Party branch made clear to its members how the rural areas should develop in future and what the Party's fundamental task was in these areas. A concrete analysis was made of the situation and the characteristics of the tremendous development which agricultural co-operation was experiencing. This analysis was intended to enable the rank and file to understand that over-all planning was the principal method in systematically guiding the agricultural co-operation movement, overcoming the lag of the leadership behind the masses and carrying out comprehensively the Party's policy. Party members were helped to get an understanding that they must prepare themselves for long-term construction. There was criticism of the erroneous ideas held by some members like conservatism and reluctance in developing agricultural co-operation—a feeling which arose from fears that too many co-operatives would lead to confusion, trouble and difficulty.

At the same time, the policies to be followed towards the various classes were explained; and the incorrect viewpoints and practices of certain members—such as departmentalism, reluctance to rely on the poor peasants, struggles for more active peasants and better-off households, and unprincipled disputes—were examined and criticized. When the ideological level of the Party members had thus been raised, the villages of the township were classified into three categories, according to the amount of mutual aid and co-operation that existed in each and to the prevailing natural and economic conditions. First came the four villages Panchuang, Hsin-chuang, Chiuchuang and Kouchuang that were practically collectivized. Their five co-operatives comprised 177 of the total of 250 households. There remained 57 households outside the co-operatives, exclusive of 16 households of ex-landlords and rich peasants. Because people lived far apart, it was not advisable to set up any new co-operatives in these villages.

Therefore, it was decided to expand the existing co-operatives by admitting new members. Second came the two villages of Tali and Wutang which had four co-operatives embracing 99 of the villages' 269 households, while 170 peasant households remained still outside. Here the decision was to give priority to the setting up of new co-operatives while also expanding existing ones. Third and last came the two villages of Yangchaochuang and Yangchuang with 289 households which had no co-operatives as yet and where efforts had to be directed towards setting up some.

Once the line of action was laid down, thorough examination of specific conditions followed. After considering the experience of mutual aid and co-operation in the different villages, the distribution of the more active peasants, the thinking of the masses, their economic conditions and so forth, the following problems then received careful attention: How many co-operatives should be planned in setting up the framework, where should they be located, and which mutual-aid teams should serve as their backbone? How many households should be the initial members of each co-operative? Which of the old co-operatives should be expanded and by how many households? How many more mutual-aid teams should be organized? Which among the more active elements and peasants should join the new, and which the old, co-operatives? Which activists and peasants should form the new mutual-aid teams? Who should be together in the same co-operative or mutual-aid team? Which mutual-aid teams were to be reorganized into co-operatives in 1955 and which in 1956?

A preliminary programme was drawn up at the same time, based on the following concrete items:

(1) Line-up of mutual-aid teams. Of the 23 teams in the township, seven qualified for the immediate change-over to a co-operative and 16 would qualify at a later date.

(2) Analysis of the more active elements. There were still 58 of the more active elements outside the co-operatives.

Eight of them were Party members, 36 were Youth League members, four were non-Party activists, five worked in the government of the township, and five were competent leaders of mutual-aid teams. These people were examined one by one with regard to their political consciousness, impartiality in handling public matters, and exemplary role in production. Then, with due consideration for where they lived and the situation of the mutual-aid teams in which they worked, they were assigned among the seven new co-operatives and the new mutual-aid teams (without, however, involving too big a change). It was found that, among the poor and middle peasants of the township, there were seven young people with secondary school education and 25 who had finished primary school. In order to solve the shortage of book-keepers and work-day tallymen, two of the secondary school students were assigned to older co-operatives, and the rest were assigned to the seven new co-operatives planned.

(3) Class differentiation. There were 708 households in the township. Of these, 49 were ex-landlord and rich-peasant households that were excluded from co-op membership. Those that had joined co-operatives included 63 middle-peasant households, or 41.7 per cent of all the 151 middle-peasant households; and 213 poor-peasant households, or 41.9 per cent of all the 508 poor-peasant households. There were still 383 poor and middle-peasant households that had not joined co-operative farming. In the new co-operatives planned, the ratio between poor and middle peasants to be drawn in was readjusted according to their ratio outside the co-ops.

(4) Ideological examination. It was shown that, apart from the 276 households in the township which had already joined co-operatives, 272 others had given the matter careful thought and were ready to join, 59 wanted to join in 1956 only, 16 were not in favour of co-operative farming and therefore did not want to join.

(5) Line-up of hostile elements. In the township there were 20 ex-landlord households, or 2.8 per cent of the total; and 29 rich-peasant households, or four per cent of the total. Besides, there were 13 households with members who had been *pao* chiefs¹ in Kuomintang days, one family had a member who formerly was the Kuomintang chief of a small town, six families comprised ringleaders of secret societies, two were those of people placed under public surveillance, and 14 contained incorrigible bandits or evil-doers. These made up five per cent of all the households.

When the results of the investigations and conditions in the three different types of villages were known, it was decided to expand eight of the older co-operatives by 57 households, and to set up seven new co-operatives with a total of 215 households in the winter of 1955. This would bring the number of households in co-operatives up to 548, or 77.4 per cent of the total. In 1956, 59 more households were to be admitted and the number of households in co-operatives brought up to 85.7 per cent of all the villages' households.

2) The comprehensive programme was revised in accordance with the Party's policy towards the various rural classes and the principles of voluntariness and mutual benefit. And, by strictly adhering to the method of leadership linked with the masses, the masses were mobilized to discuss the programme. To adapt the programme to the demands of the masses, it is essential to define the number and quality of co-operatives, the distribution of the more active elements, who should join which co-operative, time for the change-over to a co-operative, and the proportion between poor and middle peasants in co-operative membership. After the Party branch had worked out the draft programme, it was brought up for discussion and revision at an enlarged meeting of the branch; a meeting of cadres in the township, the people's representative conference of the township, and at

¹See note on p. 338.

mass meetings. The programme went into all the details of enumerating the villages, the mutual-aid teams and households in them. In accordance with public opinion, the following decisions were made:

(1) Number of co-operatives to be set up. Based on the peasants' experience in mutual aid, the distribution of year-round mutual-aid teams and the demands of the peasants, it was possible to set up seven new co-operatives.

(2) Assignment of cadres. Since the Party branch had handled this matter very sensibly, neither the cadres nor the peasants raised any objections. Only the secretary of the Youth League branch was transferred from another mutual-aid team to Wang Lao-hu's team which had had poor leadership.

(3) Deciding which co-operative to join. On the basis of the principle of voluntary participation and the draft programme worked out by the Party branch, the peasants announced which co-operative they wanted to join after they had had discussions with the cadres and among themselves. For instance, Liang Fu-hai's mutual-aid team was to join Co-operative No. 4 according to the original plan of the Party branch. But after some discussion the team members decided instead to join the new co-operative to be set up on the basis of Wang Lao-hu's mutual-aid team. Individual households outside mutual-aid teams also decided on their own which of the planned new co-operatives they wanted to join.

(4) Ratio in membership from the various social strata. The ratio of poor and middle peasants in the new co-operatives to be set up was generally fixed at what the Party branch counselled it should be.

(5) Time for the change-over to co-operatives. All the members of mutual-aid teams that were the framework for the seven new co-operatives to be set up agreed this event should take place in the winter of 1955. There were

59 households, however, that decided to join the co-operative only in 1956.

(6) Qualifications for the change-over from mutual-aid teams to co-operatives. Those peasants who wanted to change over were to set up the framework for a co-operative in accordance with the Party programme. The successes of their mutual-aid teams in agricultural production would be the yardstick by which to measure their qualifications for the change-over.

Practice proved that deciding on these six things involved a process of painstaking ideological education and tactful organizational work. Special care had to be taken to explain thoroughly and widely the policy to be followed in agricultural co-operation and the superiority of agricultural producers' co-operatives. Those who formed the backbone of the co-operative movement should be relied upon to go among the peasants and encourage the more backward of them in the direction of co-operative farming. Once the socialist consciousness of the masses had been raised to a higher level, their strength should be given full rein and they should be allowed to join whichever co-operative or mutual-aid team they chose. Steps should be taken to prevent the forced establishment of mutual-aid teams or co-operatives or anything else that went against the voluntary principle. Only by so doing could the programme proposed by the Party branch win the conscious and voluntary support of the masses and rest on a solid foundation.

3) With agricultural co-operation as the centre, efforts had to be made to work out a successful, comprehensive production plan, so as to arouse the peasants' enthusiasm simultaneously for mutual aid and co-operation as well as agricultural production. A programme for agricultural co-operation providing the basis, the masses in the township of Talichuang were mobilized to find the key to increased output. A three-year production plan—to be completed in 1957—was mapped out, mainly for the older co-operatives.

The plan's provisions are:

(1) Irrigation facilities. Fifty water-wheels and 100 wells are to be added to the existing 83 water-wheels and 200 wells, to enlarge the irrigated area by 3,000 *mou*.

(2) Improvement of farm tools. To the existing 26 ploughs with eight-inch shares, three cultivators and three sprayers, there are to be added 16 double-shared ploughs, 10 improved ploughs, three cultivators and two sprayers.

(3) Livestock. Nine Mongolian horses are to be bought; the villagers are to raise young draught animals—50 head in all.

(4) Soil improvement. Co-operative No. 1 is to experiment with soil improvement on 100 *mou* in the winter of 1955; by 1957 the area with improved soil is to be ten times larger.

(5) Afforestation. To strengthen the dikes, 200 *mou* of land are to be afforested.

(6) Manure supply. To add to the sources of manure, 300 pigsties and 200 outhouses are to be built.

(7) Domestic animals. More domestic animals—pigs, chickens and ducks—are to be raised.

Through these measures the township expects to increase the output of food crops ten per cent annually.

COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME BRINGS THREEFOLD SATISFACTION

The comprehensive programme has brought about the following salutary changes in the township:

1) The Party branch worked according to plan; the peasants knew where they were going and showed greater enthusiasm both for mutual aid and co-operation and for increased production. The four new co-operatives reorganized the production brigades and groups in accordance with the programme, and two other co-operatives adopted the method

of democratic assessment in deciding the amount of work done by their members and the system of fixed responsibility.

2) The practice of excluding poor peasants from co-operative membership was corrected. All poor peasants who had been refused admission now joined. They were very satisfied with the programme for "having solved their troubles."

3) The more active elements were shown clearly what their duties were and their confidence was thereby increased. After the programme was laid down, all cadres expressed their determination to make a go of the co-operatives and to lead the peasants on to the road of socialism.

4) There were no more backward villages. Even Yang-chaochuang Village, the most backward of all, was enthusiastically setting up the framework for a co-operative and had promised the Party branch to make it a success, in the effort of becoming an advanced village.

5) After due investigation, the ex-landlord Huang Ying-tsai was put under public surveillance, and the incorrigible bandit Chen Chiu was punished according to law. The attempt of counter-revolutionaries to organize bogus co-operatives was frustrated. The hostile elements had been further isolated. Agricultural co-operation had consolidated its positions. Said Huang Hei-han, the head of the township: "Our programme has brought threefold satisfaction — to the activists, to the poor peasants and to the middle peasants."

Now the peasants of the whole township are busying themselves with agricultural production, the co-operatives setting the pace. The mutual-aid teams are making preparations for the change-over to co-operatives in the winter.

A CO-OP'S THREE-YEAR PRODUCTION PLAN

(By the Pankiang Work Team of Kweiting County Committee, Chinese Communist Party, October 7, 1955)

This is a good article which everyone ought to read. All co-ops should use it as a reference in long-range planning. The writer is absolutely correct when he says: "The entire process of drawing up a plan of production is a struggle between advanced and conservative thinking." Conservatism seems to be making trouble everywhere now. To overcome it and allow production and the forces of production to take a big step forward, every locality and every co-op should make its own long-range plan.

— EDITOR

The Pingpao Agricultural Producers' Co-operative of Pankiang Township in Kweiting County, Kweichow Province, was established in the spring of 1954. After expansion, it now consists of 50 peasant households, totalling 250 people having 129 units of labour power. It has 2,200 *tiao* (a *tiao* is generally one-fourth, in some areas one-fifth, of a *mou* — Tr.) of paddy field and 193 *mou* of non-irrigated land and a fair number of draught animals and farm implements. In the two years since the establishment of the co-operative, production has increased, its food crops being 28 per cent more than the harvests in an ordinary year. In 1955, every person is expected to receive 523 catties of grain and 35 yuan in cash from agricultural production and side occupations.

But at the beginning of spring cultivation in 1955 some new questions emerged. The main one was that the increase in production lagged behind the growth of the co-operative. As a result of the co-operative's single, centralized management of land, less labour power was needed than when the peasants worked separately on their own small plots. The use of labour power was also centralized. The application of the principle "to each according to his work" raised work enthusiasm. Many women and those who had only half a unit of labour power also joined in production. In addition, the co-operative had too much labour power in proportion to land (at present, there are only 17 *tiao* of paddy field and 1.5 *mou* of non-irrigated land to every unit of labour power, though generally a unit of labour power can work 30 *tiao* of paddy field and 2 *mou* of non-irrigated land). As a result, a large amount of labour power is idle. If each of the 129 units of labour power in the co-operative works 240 work-days (eight months) a year, the co-operative has 30,960 work-days a year. But in 1955, the year in which the greatest number of work-days was used by the co-operative for agricultural production, only 22,000 work-days were used, making 8,960 superfluous. Therefore, in 1955, some co-operative members on their own initiative tried to find some other work for themselves. Four of the co-operative's households opened up waste land and planted it to tobacco. One member alone, Li Chung-wu (a well-to-do middle peasant), planted 1,300 tobacco plants. Some others undertook capitalist occupations outside the co-operative. Those having handicraft skills wanted to work elsewhere and did not want to do farming which they considered would limit their future. In distributing work, there were frequent cases of discrimination against the aged, the weak and women.

All this fully shows that with the growth of the co-operative, the scope of production must be extended to include new fields of work. Only by doing so can the needs of the co-operative be met, the demands of its members to develop

production satisfied, living standards raised and the co-operative consolidated. In these circumstances the township Party branch called a meeting of all its members to discuss over-all planning of production in the township and draw up a three-year plan. Questions about developing the potential, finding the "tricks" and improving farming techniques were discussed. After returning to the co-operative, the Party members, taking into consideration the actual conditions of the co-operative, convened meetings of the co-operative's personnel and members. A three-year plan for agricultural production and construction was worked out for the co-operative after full preparation and discussion.

The first obstacle encountered in urging the co-op members to find ways to increase production and draw up plans was the idea that "production has reached its maximum." Some people said: "Every year you want us to find tricks and tap the potential. Where are so many tricks to be found?" One member, Hsu Shang-hui, said: "It's like adding oil to fat. It's utterly impossible!" Some members were not sufficiently clear about the significance and aim of planning and therefore adopted an indifferent attitude. Some of them declared: "We have to do farm work, plan or no plan. Long-term planning means nothing if we cannot carry it out. It's better to speak about what we are doing and plan how to do it." Some of the personnel thought that plans were made just because the higher authorities wanted them. One co-op functionary, Lo Chao-hsiang, said: "Let's get some of our personnel together and have a discussion and report the results to the higher-ups. That's enough." When the plan was being made, some functionaries had a tendency to blindly fix targets higher than possible under the conditions in an effort to make the co-operative a "model." Some of the aged were afraid lest too much work would impair their health. They regarded diversified production as "consuming too much time, yielding little profit, putting things off without immediate return." One co-op member, Lo Lin-chang, said:

"We peasants live in the present. We are not so interested in things that take several years to yield anything." These were all obstacles to drawing up a correct plan. Bearing in mind these views held by co-operative members, the Party branch convened timely meetings of co-operative personnel and members to make the personnel and then all the co-operative members understand the aim and significance of planning, the connection between agricultural production and socialist industrialization of the country, the significance of strengthening the worker-peasant alliance and observing the state plan. This was intended to raise the socialist consciousness of the members and rectify their erroneous attitude toward planning. On this basis, the Party branch made the co-operative members cognizant of these facts:

1) Surplus labour power: The co-operative has 129 units of labour power, which, on the basis of 240 work-days (eight months) for a unit of labour power a year, can be counted as 30,960 work-days. In 1955, the busiest year, only 22,000 work-days were used. The remaining 8,900 work-days were superfluous. If every work-day were paid half a yuan, these unused work-days would worth 4,480 yuan. This figure helped the co-operative members understand the importance of increasing the types of work to provide an outlet for the surplus labour power. At the same time, it refuted the idea that "increased work with insufficient labour power may mean an increase in working hours." A co-operative member, Lo Hsien-mo, said: "We are really groping in the dark. The figures show that much labour power was not used. Some planning is really needed to find an outlet for it."

2) Summing up the benefits of popularizing new-type farm tools and improving farming techniques and ascertaining ways to increase production: In 1954, the co-operative widely used the methods of close planting and direct planting in paddy fields. The result was that one hundred catties more were harvested on each *mou* than before. The method of close planting wheat increased the output per *mou* by 150

catties. This showed that improved technique is one key to increased production. The increase in the acreage cropped more than once a year is another key to greater output. Such land now only takes up 60 per cent of the cultivated area of the co-operative. Still bigger potentialities remain untapped. These facts give the lie to the idea that "production has reached its maximum."

3) Developing a diversified economy, taking into account the conditions of the hills and finding new spheres of work: The co-operative first summed up the experience of the peasant households planting tung-trees on scattered plots. Three years after the trees were planted, each tree on the average yielded five litres of tung-oil seeds. The co-operative has two uncultivated hill slopes. They can be planted to 10,000 tung-trees that would yield five hundred *tan* (a *tan* equals 50 kilogrammes) of tung-oil seeds in three years. In addition, the co-operative has two hill slopes planted to tea-oil trees which need only fifty work-days for some weeding and cultivation and would produce ten piculs of tea-oil seeds. These both conform to the needs of the state and can increase the income of co-operative members. It is clear that there is no lack of ways to increase production.

After a detailed study of these facts, the co-operative members have become more enthusiastic in looking for tricks that promise higher output. Members of the co-operative examined and discussed the question and finally came to the unanimous decision to raise the yield by deep ploughing and intensive cultivation, improving farming skills, accumulation and use of more fertilizer, using better seeds and increasing the number of crops harvested annually. Moreover, the co-operative will open up new spheres of work, such as expanding the area under cultivation by reclamation, conservation of soil and water, building small irrigation projects, turning unirrigated land into irrigated land and turning non-irrigated land into paddy field. A diversified economy will be developed on this basis and in accordance with the existing con-

ditions. This will include the development of animal husbandry, fisheries and tree planting.

The enthusiasm of co-operative members for increasing production rose constantly after considerable potential was brought to light by the functionaries under the guidance of the secretary of the Party branch, Yang Chun-hsi, who took the lead in finding 115 *tiao* of reclaimable waste land and 131 *tiao* of non-irrigated land that can be turned into paddy fields. Some members suggested digging ponds to breed fish. Others put forward rationalization proposals in connection with the use of better seed and increasing the acreage cropped more than once a year. A long-term plan for agricultural production and construction for 1956-1958 was worked out in ten days. The co-operative members' view was characterized by these words: "The plan shows the basis for our production and its future."

Following are the contents of the plan:

1) Capital construction and diversified economy. This includes mainly expanding arable land by reclamation, increasing the number of crops harvested annually, conserving soil and water, building irrigation projects, extending the acreage of paddy field and increasing livestock, aquatic products and trees. The aim is to find an outlet for the surplus labour power by increasing the spheres and scope of production.

(1) Capital construction:

(A) Expansion of arable land by reclamation. The three-year plan envisages the opening up of 115 *tiao* of paddy field and 95 *mou* of non-irrigated land. Of this total, 30 *tiao* of paddy field and 20 *mou* of non-irrigated land will be opened up in 1956; 50 *tiao* of paddy field and 35 *mou* of non-irrigated land in 1957; and 35 *tiao* of paddy field and 40 *mou* of non-irrigated land in 1958. All this promises an increase of 15,300 catties of grain.

(B) Turning non-irrigated land into paddy field. The three-year plan target is 131 *tiao* of paddy field. The breakdown figures are: 31 *tiao* in 1956; 50 *tiao* in 1957; and 50

tiao in 1958. Thus, an increase of 11,790 catties of grain is to be expected.

(C) Turning hill slopes into terraced fields and conserving soil and water. Twenty-five *mou* of terraced fields will be built in three years: five *mou* in 1956, ten *mou* in 1957 and ten *mou* in 1958, which will increase the income by 2,000 catties of grain.

(D) Breaking up of baulks to increase the acreage of cultivated land. The co-operative has 30 baulks that can and will be ploughed in 1956. This will increase the acreage of paddy field by 20 *tiao* and the income by 1,800 catties of grain.

(E) Increasing the number of crops harvested annually and expanding the acreage of spring crops. The plan stipulates that by 1958, 80 per cent of the paddy fields and 88 per cent of the non-irrigated land will be cropped more than once a year. The plans for each year are: 70 per cent of the paddy fields and 80 per cent of the non-irrigated land in 1956; 75 per cent of the paddy fields and 88 per cent of the non-irrigated land in 1957; 80 per cent of the paddy fields in 1958. An increase of 11,000 catties of wheat and 4,000 catties of rape will result.

(F) Building irrigation projects to increase the paddy fields. An irrigation ditch will be enlarged and a new water-wheel made in 1956. A pond will be dug and a new water-wheel made in 1957. One hundred and thirty-one *tiao* of paddy fields will be opened up from non-irrigated land, and 34 more *tiao* from unirrigated land.

(G) Miscellaneous. Two ox-carts will be made in 1956. Ten barns will be built in 1957. A pigsty for each household to increase fertilizer.

(2) Diversified economy:

(A) Livestock raising. The co-operative now has 34 head of cattle and 18 calves. The increase in the head of cattle, according to the plan, is ten in 1956, five in 1957 and ten in 1958. Two buffaloes and a bull will be reared for prop-

agation. Pigs will be raised by the members themselves. The plan is for two pigs for each household (totalling 100 pigs) in 1956; two and a half, on the average, for each household (totalling 125 pigs) in 1957; and three each (totalling 150 pigs) in 1958. Chickens and ducks will also be raised by the members. The plan is for one duck or chicken per person (totalling 250) in 1956; one and a half (totalling 375) in 1957; and two each (totalling 500) in 1958.

(B) Fisheries. Fish will be raised mainly in ponds and paddy fields. The three-year plan provides for three fish-ponds to be dug and 90 *tiao* of paddy fields to be used to breed fish. In 1956, one fish-pond will be dug, another pond repaired and a smaller one enlarged. In 1957, fish will be raised in eight paddy fields that total 90 *tiao* in area. Two thousand catties of fish will be produced annually, averaging 40 catties for each household.

(C) Tree planting. (a) The work of planting trees will be entrusted to the members. The target is for each household to plant one tree in 1956, two in 1957 and three in 1958. (b) Tung-trees will be planted by the co-operative. According to the plan, 5,000 tung-trees will be planted in 1956, 3,000 in 1957 and 2,000 in 1958, totalling 10,000. (c) Tea-oil trees. Fifty work-days will be used in 1956 to weed and cultivate the two hill slopes planted to 1,000 tea-oil trees.

2) Improving agricultural technique. On the basis of the experience in 1954, the co-operative will take such measures to raise agricultural production as popularizing new-type farm tools, using better seeds and more fertilizer and improving farming skills.

(1) Popularizing new-type farm tools. The co-operative now has six improved ploughs and two threshers. It plans to add 30 new-type farm tools in three years. Of this number, seven will be added in 1956, 14 in 1957 and nine in 1958. Then the co-operative will have a total of 38 such tools that can work 70 per cent of its land.

(2) Use of more fertilizer. At present, for every *tiao* of paddy field only 1,000 catties of fertilizer is used (for both spring and autumn crops). The plan is that for every *tiao* of paddy field, 1,200 catties of fertilizer will be used in 1956, 1,300 in 1957 and 1,350 in 1958. Now fertilizer is applied to only 25 per cent of the dry land. The percentage, according to the plan, will be increased to 30 in 1956, 35 in 1957 and 40 in 1958.

(3) Popularizing better seeds. According to the plan, improved varieties for rice, wheat, barley, rape, maize, potato, tobacco and millet will be planted on 80 per cent of the land in 1956 and 100 per cent of the land in 1957.

(4) Improving farming methods. 1. Close planting of paddy (7-8 inches between rows) is now used on 75 per cent of the fields. The percentage will reach 90 in 1956, according to the plan. 2. Direct planting of paddy. Experiments were made in 1955 on 12 *tiao* of paddy field. The co-operative plans to use this method on five per cent of all paddy fields in 1956, 20 per cent in 1957 and 25 per cent in 1958. 3. Inter-row close planting of wheat. The three-year plan envisages that this method will be applied to 80 per cent of the fields and 80 per cent of the non-irrigated land in 1956, 90 per cent of the fields in 1957 and 100 per cent in 1958. 4. Close-and-even-planting of rape: to reach 10 per cent in 1956, 30 per cent in 1957 and 50 per cent in 1958. 5. Other methods, like the selection of seeds by the muddy water and salt water methods, new arrangements for seed beds, etc., which were already carried out in 1955, will continue being used.

3) Targets for increased output:

(1) Food crops (all in terms of grain). According to the plan, the output of food crops in 1956 will be 243,359 catties, that is, 34,549 catties or 16.5 per cent more than in the previous year. The increase will be the result of reclaiming land (2,700 catties), turning non-irrigated land into paddy field (2,790 catties), planting potatoes (7,500 catties),

increasing the number of crops harvested annually (7,240 catties), turning up baulks (1,800 catties) and adopting other technical measures (12,519 catties). In 1957, food crop output will be 273,239 catties, that is, 29,880 catties or 10.2 per cent more than in 1956. Of this increase, 4,500 catties will come from reclamation; 4,500 catties from turning non-irrigated land into paddy field; 1,000 catties from building terraced fields; 2,580 catties from the increased number of crops harvested annually; 5,000 catties from planting potatoes; and 12,300 catties from the adoption of general technical measures. In 1958, 301,505 catties of food crops, that is, 28,266 catties or 10.3 per cent more than in 1957, will be harvested. Of the increase, 3,150 catties will come from reclamation; 4,500 catties from turning non-irrigated land into paddy fields; 1,000 catties from building terraced fields; 1,000 catties from the increased number of crops harvested annually; 5,000 catties from planting potatoes; and 13,616 catties from the adoption of other technical measures.

(2) Industrial crops. 1. Tobacco: to be planted on 125 *mou* in 1956, which are expected to yield 17,500 catties (worth 5,250 yuan), averaging 140 catties a *mou*; 150 *mou* in 1957, which are expected to yield 28,000 catties (worth 8,400 yuan), averaging 186 catties a *mou*; 185 *mou* in 1958, which are expected to yield 33,300 catties (worth 9,900 yuan), averaging 180 catties a *mou*. 2. Rape: to be planted on 900 *tiao* of land in 1956, which will produce 15,000 catties of rape, that is, 3,000 catties or 25 per cent more than in 1955; 1,000 *tiao* of land in 1957, which will produce 16,200 catties, that is, 1,200 catties or 8 per cent more than in 1956; 1,050 *tiao* of land in 1958, which will produce 18,700 catties, that is, 2,500 catties or 15 per cent more than in 1957.

Finally, an account of the use of labour power is taken. The co-operative has 129 units of labour power which, on the basis of one unit of labour power working 240 work-days

(eight months) a year, can provide 92,880 work-days in three years. At present, 22,000 work-days are used a year, or 66,000 work-days in three years. This plus the work-days needed for the new spheres of work — 575 work-days for reclamation, 655 work-days for turning non-irrigated land into paddy fields, 250 work-days for building terraced fields, 60 work-days for eliminating baulks, 500 work-days for using the method of direct planting, 10,000 work-days for planting tobacco, 500 work-days for planting tung-trees and 7,900 work-days for other work — will be 86,440 work-days in three years. The remaining 6,440 work-days are not included in the plan. This shows that there will be enough labour power to ensure that the plan is carried out.

(3) Fulfilment of the plan will raise the living standards of the co-operative members considerably and contribute to the national economy.

In 1956, the income from agricultural produce and subsidiary occupations, after planned purchase by the state, will ensure that every member obtains 694 catties of grain and 45 yuan. In 1957, every member will get 830 catties of grain and 54 yuan. In 1958, every member will get 910 catties of grain and 65 yuan.

Moreover, after the completion of the three-year plan, the co-operative can sell 165,000 catties of surplus food grain to the state, deliver 96,000 catties of tax grain to the state, and sell to the state 78,800 catties of cured tobacco and 49,950 catties of rape.

From the facts revealed in the process of making plans for production and construction by the Pingpao Agricultural Producers' Co-operative, we have come to understand that:

1) Planning for production represents a further growth of co-operation. Successful planning of production contributes greatly to consolidating agricultural producers' co-operatives. More potentialities can be brought to light through planning. The work is centred around agricultural production, but the appropriate development of a diversified economy is also

necessary to provide an outlet for surplus labour power and enhance the confidence of co-operative members in taking the road of co-operation. For instance, one member of the Pingpao Agricultural Producers' Co-operative who had been doubtful about the future became confident after the three-year plan was mapped out. Two other members who had intended to go out and do some handicraft work indicated willingness to devote all their time to work in the co-operative. The members urged that the co-operative be turned into an advanced co-operative in 1956.

2) With the plan worked out, the functionaries are clear about what is to be done and so they can tackle the work actively. The other members, too, now see clearly the future toward which they can strive. This greatly increases their enthusiasm in production. The co-operative members unanimously expressed the view that "a plan is like a signpost that tells us where to go and how to manage our production." Members of the Pingpao Agricultural Producers' Co-operative, after the plan was made, have become increasingly active in production. As a result, the acreage projected for cropping more than once a year has been increased by 30 *tiao*.

3) The entire process of drawing up a plan of production is a process of struggle between advanced and conservative ideas. It is therefore necessary to educate the members politically and ideologically from beginning to end to ensure that the plan is neither conservative nor rash, that it conforms to the state plan and suitably increases the income of the co-operative members, that it centres around agricultural production while at the same time foresees an adequate development of a diversified economy, and that it emphasizes collective management by the co-operative while taking into consideration the individual production of members. Only in this way can the production plan meet the demand for the socialist transformation of agriculture step by step.

4) Planning itself covers both collective management by the co-operative and individual management by its members.

Therefore, it is ill-advised to demand that everything be collectivized when the matter concerns both the collective interests of the co-operative and the personal interests of individual members. For instance, such subsidiary occupations as the raising of pigs and chickens and planting of fruit trees which are suitable for individual management should not be brought under the single management of the co-operative. Otherwise this would cause difficulties for the co-operative in its management and give rise to anxiety among the co-operative members.

THE LONG-RANGE PLAN OF THE RED STAR COLLECTIVE FARM

(By the Combined-Plan Work Team of the Bureau of Agriculture, Forestry and Irrigation of the Peking People's Council and the Rural Work Department of the Peking Municipal Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, in the *Peking Daily*, October 10, 1955)

This is a seven-year plan of a large co-operative (they call it a collective farm, which is a kind of co-op) whose membership is composed of the entire population of a township of over a thousand families. The plan deserves study everywhere. Why does the plan cover such a long period? You will readily understand when you examine its contents.

Man has been developing for hundreds of thousands of years, but in China it is only now that he has secured conditions under which he can develop his economy and culture according to plan. Now that we have these conditions, the face of our country will change from year to year. Every five years will show a relatively large change. With several five-year periods, the change will be even greater.

— EDITOR

The Red Star Collective Farm, located in the southeastern corner of Nanyuan District in the outskirts of Peking, is composed of more than 30 villages scattered in the three townships of Yinghai, Yilo, Ssuhai. A part of the alluvial plain in the middle reaches of the Yungting River, this low-

lying area with its high water table and highly alkaline soil, suffers from water-logging nine years out of ten and its yields of cotton and grain are low.

Before liberation, the output of cotton per *mou* here was only 50 to 60 catties, and that of grain between 70 and 80 catties. Although the yield had been raised somewhat in the early days after liberation, the average peasant still had a very hard time. Because of this the peasants had a great enthusiasm for mutual aid and co-operation in farming. Two agricultural producers' co-operatives of a semi-socialist nature were set up in 1952 on a trial basis. In the autumn of that year, these two co-ops were merged and transformed into a socialist collective farm with a membership of 63 households. The farm showed great superiority in production in its first year of existence. It quickly expanded and now it has over 850 households. The membership, it is planned, will grow to 1,400 households by the winter of 1955 or the spring of 1956, making up 86.36 per cent of the total of 1,621 peasant households in the whole area. Land under cultivation owned by the farm will increase to 28,560 *mou* or 86.5 per cent of the total cultivated land in the whole area. By the winter of 1956, the whole area will be integrated into the collective farm with its cultivated land increasing to over 33,000 *mou*.

As the collective farm is situated near the Peking Machine and Tractor Station, mechanized farming has already been introduced on 40 per cent of the farm land. Most of the wheat farming, from sowing to harvesting, is done entirely by machine. But the efficiency of tractors in farming is rather limited because the villages are too scattered, the roads zigzag, and the plots of land scattered and irregular. All this also makes it difficult to practise a rational rotation of crops, which in turn limits the yield. In addition, it is impossible to drain off rain water quickly because there are insufficient drainage canals around the farm and no unified arrangement for that purpose. As a result, the farm suffers from water-logging. Although weather conditions were

favourable in 1955, over 4,000 *mou* of the farm land were still water-logged.

The collective farm formerly concentrated on farming and the amount of field work at any given time varied greatly with the season. It was impossible to put the labour power to full use since there was too much to do in the spring, summer and autumn but not enough in the winter. The solution to all these problems, which are blocking the advance of the collective farm, has become the central issue on which the progress of the farm hinges.

CONTENTS OF THE COLLECTIVE FARM'S OVER-ALL PLAN

Drafting of a four-year (1954 to 1957) over-all plan for the collective farm started in the spring of 1954. On the basis of this plan a seven-year over-all plan covering the period 1956 to 1962 was drawn up in the autumn of 1955. If this plan is carried out step by step, the above-mentioned problems can be solved systematically and the necessary conditions created for large-scale agricultural production, thereby putting the collective farm on the road of successful development.

1) The plan for the use of land.

(1) To join small plots into large tracts.

Planning for the collective farm must not be taken as an isolated entity, because it has connections with the surrounding villages, towns, and the land of the peasant households. Planning work should start from without.

As a result of the peasants tilling scattered small plots of their own, there had been numerous intermingled plots of land belonging to different villages. So readjustment of land was carried out when planning first got started. The collective farm exchanged over 800 *mou* of land with the neighbouring state farm and the Luchuan Township agricultural producers' co-operative on the basis of equal

land prices. After the exchange, the land owned by the collective farm was joined into large tracts, which makes it possible for the farm to apply mechanized cultivation and new farming technique, to put the land to full use and improve the soil, and to carry out better planning within the farm.

(2) To fix the locations of the farm office and the residential areas.

The farm office was originally located in Chiangkia-chang. But in view of the farm's gradual southward extension over the years, the location is no longer a good one. It is eight *li* from Nankung Village in the southern part of the farm and six *li* from Ssuhai Village in the east, but only slightly over one *li* from the farm's northern boundary. In order better to direct production work, the plan provides that the office remove to Sanhuaitang Village where there are better communication facilities and a more concentrated population.

The dwelling places of the farm members are widely scattered because the villages and homes were built in a planless and arbitrary way near the peasants' own plots of land where it suited them best. As a result, small villages of two or three households are dotted all over the fields, hampering mechanized farming and increasing costs for such construction work as building roads, installing electric wires and setting up cultural and recreational facilities. In conformity with the principle of giving priority to production and construction work on the farm, the plan stipulates that such villages as Fulin, Liuho and Haiyen which are too small and scattered will be gradually evacuated and 11 residential areas will be built up with farm members moving in from other places if their old houses have become dilapidated and provided they are willing to move.

(3) To mark off fields for crop rotation.

The planning for crop rotation, the main topic in the over-all planning for the collective farm, is a plan concerning

the utilization of land. The farm's entire land will be divided into 14 crop rotation fields based on the quality of soil, the location of ditches, canals and roads, and the distribution of labour power. Different crops will be planted in these fields appropriate to the four types of soil. Cotton, wheat (late maize after the wheat harvest) and spring maize will be rotated in fields where part of the land is low-lying, lacking in natural drainage facilities and slightly alkaline. Where the land is above the ordinary level and fertile, cotton, millet, wheat (late maize after the wheat harvest), spring maize and potatoes will be grown in rotation. Where there is low-lying land of average fertility and light alkaline erosion, cotton, sorghum and wheat will be planted in rotation. Where the land is low-lying and infertile and suffers from serious alkaline erosion, a type of sorghum capable of resisting alkali and water-logging will be planted for the time being and rotation of crops will be added only after the soil is improved. One thousand four hundred *mou* of land with irrigation facilities will be turned into vegetable fields and winter leeks will be extensively cultivated so that there will be more work during the winter slack season. Another 600 *mou* where the land is high and the water table low will be used for orchards. The 1,300 *mou* of low-lying and highly alkaline land where the yield has been poor will be converted into paddy fields with high yields assured. The fields for crop rotation will be shaped for the most part like parallelograms, taking into consideration the lay-out of drainage canals, roads and forest belts. This will get rid of the difficulties of mechanized farming on small irregular plots and raise the efficiency of machinery.

Per *mou* yield in the farm will increase each year as a result of the rational use of land according to plan, plus intensified field work, extra fertilizer and new farm technique. As the menace of water-logging is alleviated by dredging the drainage systems, output of maize per *mou* will

rise to 300 catties by 1957 or 177.7 per cent higher than the estimated per *mou* output (108 catties) of 1955, while output of cotton will increase by 13.3 per cent. By 1960, per *mou* yield of cotton will reach 215 catties, 43.3 per cent over 1955, owing to the increased fertility and reduced alkaline content of the soil brought about by heavy manuring, rotation of crops and deep machine ploughing over the past years. Average output of maize per *mou* will come to 420 catties, while the highest will reach 900 catties.

By 1962, that is, the end of the Second Five-Year Plan, the shelter belts on the farm will have grown to the point where they will be able to protect the crops and lessen the menace of spring drought to sowing. As a result of this, average per *mou* yield of maize will be 500 catties or 363 per cent higher than 1955, that of cotton will reach 250 catties, and the output of vegetables, leeks and other crops will also increase year by year.

(4) Planning of drainage systems.

Although the Fengho River adjacent to the farm was dredged even before the plan, the drainage systems still must be repaired. Floods are constantly caused by rain. Disputes between the villages over the problem of water have not been settled in a thoroughgoing manner. To remove this serious threat to production, the plan provides that three more main drainage canals are to be added, using the tributaries of the Luliang, Chiangyi and Hsifeng as their courses, that old canals be repaired and dredged and that a number of unnecessary small ditches are filled in. Reconstruction of the main canals will start in the slack farming season after the autumn harvest of 1955. Their completion will lessen the threat of water-logging in the low-lying fields of the farm and disputes between villages over water conservancy will also be eliminated.

(5) Planning for roads (highways, trunk roads and secondary roads for farming purposes) and forest belts (main

forest belts, border forest belts, roadside tree belts and afforestation in the residential areas).

Three main roads—one leading from the highway through Yilo Township to Ssuhai Village, another through Chiangkiachang Village to Chienchuangtse Village and the third leading to the residential area of Yinghai Village—and 12 secondary roads will be built on the basis of old roads to facilitate communications within the farm and with other places. Construction of these roads will be undertaken according to production requirements and within the framework of the country's over-all planning for road construction.

In mapping out the sites for windbreaks and shelter belts, primary consideration has been given to the numerous canals and ditches in the farm. These tree belts therefore will be raised along the drainage canals, ditches and the road networks. According to the plan, over 1,000 *mou* of trees, seven main forest belts and five auxiliary forest belts will be planted by 1958 on the banks of the canals, along the roads and around the houses and other buildings. By 1962, when the trees are fully grown, they will be able to protect the fields, ward off attacks by arid winds, provide large quantities of timber for the use of farm members, and supply large amounts of twigs for basket making, and a kind of wild indigo plant will be available for green manure.

2) The plan for livestock raising.

The collective farm in the past had no over-all plan for expanding livestock raising. There was no plan for raising pigs, the number of which varied with the number of piglets available for the farm. The farm had even less experience in keeping milch cows. According to the present plan, barns will be built in five places where the land is comparatively high, with convenient communication facilities and very close to grazing land. Raising of milch cows in the farm will start in 1956 and their number, both full-grown and calves,

will reach 1,900 by 1962. At the same time, 325 pedigree pigs will be kept collectively for the sole purpose of breeding so that the farm will be self-sufficient in piglets. The number of hogs raised by the production brigades and individual farm members will come to 6,000, ten times greater than the present figure. These hogs alone can yield 37,000 tons of manure annually, excluding that from other sources. In addition, families of the farm members will be encouraged to raise large numbers of poultry and rabbits.

3) The plan for training technicians.

A group of skilled technicians, capable of using new agro-technique to guide production, must be trained to meet the growing needs arising out of the extension of the farm and the expansion of its activities. This is particularly necessary because such new undertakings as raising milch cows and hogs require far more advanced methods of animal husbandry than previously used.

It is planned that during the seven years from 1955 to 1962, farm members who are specially skilled in production, politically reliable, ideologically advanced and with a certain amount of education will be selected and trained to be technicians with qualifications equivalent to those of a secondary technical school graduate. Such training will be given in practical work and in training courses run by the city or district governments.

The plan provides for 40 veterinarians, 20 cattle-raising technicians, 19 hog-raising technicians, 45 agronomists (with each production group and basic production unit having a specialist in grain and cotton growing), seven fruit-growing technicians and eight vegetable-growing technicians to be trained. Each of these technicians must himself be able to direct a production unit in the use of new farming technique, map out technical measures for production, practise seed selection, cultivate good strains and conduct simple experiments. Three or four persons will be trained in afforestation. In addition, scientific knowledge about agriculture will constantly

be publicized among all members of the farm and the training of technicians in side occupations will be accelerated.

4) The plan for cultural and welfare facilities.

There are now four elementary schools (including a special class teaching secondary school courses), a medical centre and three supply and marketing co-operatives in the farm. But the farm area is extensive and these facilities are not properly distributed. School-children from Nankung Village, children no more than seven or eight years of age, have to walk more than ten *li* to attend school in Chiangkiachang Village, and farm members of Nankung Village have to cover four or five *li* to buy oil, salt and other daily necessities in Yilo Village.

To remedy this irrational situation and meet the wishes of the farm members for culture, it is planned to establish in 1956 a secondary school in Sanhuaitang Village, conveniently situated at the heart of the farm, to extend the elementary school in Nankung Village, and to remove the supply and marketing co-operatives to places easily accessible to all. In addition, a nursery, a reading room and a small club will be set up in each production brigade, starting in 1956.

Of the more than 6,300 people on the farm, adolescents and adults (between 15 and 45 years of age) number more than 2,290, of whom 73.4 per cent are illiterate. There are only 610 people in this age group who can read and write, and some functionaries are also illiterate. The development of large-scale production requires that illiteracy first be wiped out among the farm's functionaries. According to the plan, by 1957, illiteracy will be eliminated among the 43 higher functionaries, the 190 functionaries at lower levels and the 433 young farm members. Spare-time study and special courses for some of the higher functionaries will be the method used to achieve these goals. By 1962, the average level of education of the farm's functionaries will be raised to that of secondary school. Beginning in the same year, spare-time

secondary schools will be set up on a trial basis to raise the educational level of the farm members.

CONFIDENCE GROWS AS POTENTIAL IS TAPPED

The area in which the farm is located had been regarded by many as hopeless because of its heavy alkaline erosion, low-lying land, and infertility. When output was raised after the farm came into being, many thought that the area had reached its ceiling in increasing production and no further increase could be expected. There were also people who maintained that no milch cows could be kept and no fruit trees grown in such low-lying land and therefore they lacked confidence in the production work there. But on-the-spot surveys and specific planning brought the real situation to light and knocked the props from under the conservative ideas. The fact is that the collective farm, instead of having no prospects at all as some said, has very bright prospects. With rational use of land and improvement of soil, the constant water-logging can be eliminated, output of grain and cotton substantially increased and large tracts of waste land used for afforestation. In addition, suitable sites for cattle raising and planting of fruit trees were discovered in the course of planning. People will see that by 1962 the collective farm will be able to produce 6,000 tons of grain, 176 per cent above 1955. Of this, 520 tons will be rice, which was not grown on the farm till 1955. The output of cotton will reach 1,250 tons, 65 per cent more than at present. Over 1,000 *mou* of land suitable for vegetable growing will have been turned into market gardens and over 600 *mou* of higher ground will have been brought under fruit trees with an annual yield of 400 tons of fruit. The farm will be able to supply the city with 3,725 tons of milk and 705 tons of pork every year. By 1962, the farm will become a multi-purpose collective farm, combining farming with livestock raising and rich in grain and domestic animals. The income and living

standards of the farm members will rise steadily in keeping with the growth of production. The average income per household will go up from 400 yuan in 1955 to 1,277 yuan, which is a threefold increase. The economic conditions of the farm will also improve greatly. The vice-chairman of the farm, Chang Feng-chi, said: "This kind of planning has given us in the leadership of the farm a clear idea of the whole situation and has set definite goals for our farm members."

HOW TO PLAN

In view of the collective farm's proximity to the city and its existing conditions in production, the policy for the farm's development has been defined thus: promote livestock raising gradually, promote high-yielding crops, combine farming with animal husbandry, multiply the lines of occupation, and supply the needs of the city. This was the main basis on which over-all planning for the collective farm was made.

Before the planning got under way, there were two different schools of thought as to how planning should be done. One favoured the division of the cultivation areas into squares and the concentration of residential areas in certain places in disregard of all existing conditions, contending that this was "convenient." The other was the conservative idea that all planning should be done on the basis of the present conditions without taking into account possible development. The results of following either of these two arguments would be: Either all old roads would be abandoned and new ones built, and all old canals filled up and new ones cut; or the land would remain in small irregular plots, hampering mechanized cultivation. After debate and argument, both erroneous opinions were rejected and a policy decided upon that planning for the collective farm should look ahead, taking into consideration both the existing conditions and the possibilities for development.

At the start of the planning, on-the-spot surveys were made and discussions held by the farm's functionaries together with experienced old peasants to collect and compile data on the existing farm situation. The data on the quality of soil and on the utilization of land in particular were collected in a short space of time without laboratory facilities. It was only after on-the-spot observations and repeated discussions that the quality of local soil was roughly classified into four categories as basic material for planning crop rotation. Investigations were also made of farming methods, the systems of crop rotation and the proportions between different crops planted to work out the standards for fixing the order of crop rotation and the use of land in planning. The social conditions in the villages and the distribution of labour power were studied on the basis of which cultivation areas would be mapped out. The distribution of trees and the conditions of their growth were examined to provide data for laying out forest belts and selecting the right species for this purpose. Enquiries were also made into and information compiled on local natural, climatic and hydrological conditions, crop diseases and pests, agro-technique and cultural and welfare facilities.

The over-all farm planning was carried out after ample material on such questions had been collected and the sphere for planning fixed. But, due to the chaotic steps taken and the lack of a proper schedule at the beginning of the planning work, farming fields and residential areas were cut across by roads in some cases and in other cases no roads existed to link up some residential areas. Experience summed up in practical work showed that the steps to be taken in internal planning for a collective farm as such should be: First, map out the locations and sizes of the farming fields, vegetable gardens, orchards, pasture, seedling plots, grounds for side occupations, the site of the farm's management committee, residential areas of the farm members and the sites of the production brigade offices, based on the amount of land

available, the quality of soil, the topography and the water levels. Second, lay out the roads, drainage and irrigation systems according to needs and concrete conditions. Third, mark off the shelter belts, and last, draw up a blueprint and compile explanatory notes to expedite the execution for the plan according to schedule. After a general programme for the utilization of land is worked out, annual plans of cultivation and production are to be drawn up on the basis of actual needs and possibilities for crop rotation. The prospects opened up by these plans will be the goals for all the farm members. After all this, a draft of the plan should be presented for discussion by all farm members and necessary changes and amendments made in accordance with the opinions of the masses. The plan becomes final when it has been passed by a representative meeting of farm members.

A POPULAR NIGHT SCHOOL FOR AGRICULTURAL TECHNIQUE

(By the South Shansi Regional Work Committee, New Democratic Youth League, in issue no. 1 of *Study Material*, May 10, 1955)

All townships—or, for the present, at least the majority of them—ought to set up technical night schools like this one. This is something that the Youth League organizations at various levels should attend to. The peasants' study of technique should be linked to the elimination of illiteracy, with the Youth League being responsible for both. Teachers for the technical night school can be found locally, and we must encourage them to study while they teach.

—EDITOR

A GLARING CONTRADICTION

In the spring of 1953, an agricultural producers' co-operative was set up in Hsichangkeng Village, Hsiehyu County, Shansi Province. Members of this co-operative showed high enthusiasm in their work. A plan mainly to increase the output of cotton and wheat was worked out by the co-operative according to local conditions.

Cotton and wheat are delicate crops whose output can scarcely be raised if farming techniques are not improved. The government has long urged the application of advanced

techniques in planting cotton. This co-operative took note of this question, but there were difficulties from the very beginning. The co-operative called on its members to adopt the close-planting method of transplanting cotton plants one foot apart with rows two feet apart. But this did not work as most of the co-operative members were skeptical. They grumbled: "Why go to so much trouble planting crops? It is really more troublesome than raising a baby." "Pure formality! I have lived half my life without ever seeing anyone measure distances to plant cotton."

It was still more difficult to convince the older members. Old men Wang Meng-ho and Wang Kwang-ming secretly thinned out the cotton planted by other members according to the close-planting system. They even argued: "Don't you think the crop will be ruined by planting so close together?"

The leadership of the co-operative was at its wit's end. The majority of the members stubbornly refused to work according to the standard rules, even if you talked yourself hoarse.

In summer, cotton crops were affected by pests. The government supplied the co-operative with more than 20,000 catties of "666" insecticide and four sprayers to prevent crop failure. But in the whole co-operative only Wang Yun-sheng, head of the technical section, knew how to handle these things. He alone prepared the liquid and powder insecticide and repaired the sprayers. This kept him so busy he had to drop other work. The co-operative had earlier asked Wang Yun-sheng to prepare some granular fertilizer. Now this had to be abandoned. Technical instruction on selecting wheat seeds in the field was also given up.

The worst headache for the co-operative was the work of pruning the cotton plants. Usually this light work could have been done very well by women members. Unfortunately even young women with clever hands also made mistakes. They either cut off the branches with cotton bolls or left intact the poor branches or those without bolls at all. The

plants were very poorly pruned. This infuriated Wang Yun-sheng who said: "This is destroying cotton!" A group of women co-operative members surrounded him and said: "Section Head, how should the work be done? Tell us! Please tell us."

After the autumn harvest, the co-operative failed to reach its planned targets for increased output, though its output was higher than in previous years. A careful study showed that the cotton crop was specially poor because the method of close planting had not been properly applied. This alone caused the loss of 12,500 catties of raw cotton or, in terms of money, over 2,650 yuan. This amount could buy 18,000 catties of wheat to feed the 323 co-operative members for two months.

From this fact, the young people began to realize that farm work was really something that had to be learned. They realized that if farming technique were not mastered, not only would less be produced and earned by each person but this would also directly prevent the co-operative from increasing its output, thereby affecting the income of all members.

Wang Yun-sheng fully realized that popularizing farming technique could not be done single-handed. He began to recognize that it only could be carried out smoothly when all members of the co-operative, especially the younger ones, learned the advanced technique.

This was a glaring contradiction. The co-operative had to popularize scientific farming techniques in order to increase output; but its members, particularly the younger ones, knew very little about technique. The only way to solve this contradiction was to mobilize the members, especially young members, to learn scientific farming techniques.

FROM SMALL GROUP TO NIGHT SCHOOL

The co-operative expanded early in 1954. Apart from several ex-landlord and rich-peasant families, the entire vil-

lage joined the co-operative. The year's increase-output target set by the co-operative was higher than that for 1953. To solve the problem of technique and to increase production, Wang Yun-sheng wanted to set up a study group on farming techniques and discussed the matter with Yao Feng-lan, vice-chairman of the co-operative. This idea was warmly supported by the Communist Party branch. A study group was formed of a dozen or more young active elements, including Yao Feng-lan and some primary school graduates who had just returned to the village. Wang Yun-sheng patiently taught them how to prepare insecticide and repair sprayers and how to manufacture granular fertilizer. They showed great enthusiasm in study. Shortly afterwards, young co-operative members of other villages in the township learned of this technique-learning arrangement. They took the question up with their Youth League branch and asked: "Why don't we have the chance to learn. We are also co-operative members. You cannot treat us differently."

It was a happy coincidence that several comrades from the Academy of Sciences and the county's agro-technical station just then came for field study. The Youth League branch of the township took this as a golden opportunity to organize young people to learn techniques. It brought the matter up before the Party branch and the management of the co-operative, suggesting that the study group be reorganized into a night school on farming techniques for the whole township. Yang Shih-chun, chairman of the co-operative, said: "All right. If you can set it up, we will support you. This is the time for you Youth League people to show what you can do." Some comrades of the county's Youth League committee who were then in the village actively helped in the preparatory work.

A night school on farming techniques for the whole township was finally established. A classroom and a carbide lamp were provided by the co-operative. More than forty young people were enrolled. The Youth League branch invited the

agronomists who were staying in the village and Wang Yun-sheng, the head of the co-operative's technical section, to teach the school. A night school commission was formed with the township chief as the principal. There was class every five days. The school then started its work.

In the first few classes, both teachers and students were enthusiastic. But not long afterwards, only about 20 persons came to class. Why? The Youth League branch held a meeting to hear opinions about the night school. The teachers were also invited to attend. Someone said straightforwardly: "So many things are taught in one evening. Some of them we cannot understand, others we cannot memorize. In my opinion, this is torturing our tired heads for nothing." Another said: "The lessons are hard. Too few examples. They can't be applied in our work even if we do memorize them."

These opinions were correct. The teachers had overestimated their students. They had regarded these people who did not have even the most elementary knowledge of scientific farming technique (some illiterate or semi-literate), as students at a regular agronomy school. The teachers had lectured on the life cycle of the cotton aphid and its reproduction and in a single lecture had described the nature and special features of over a dozen species of wheat and the important rules to be followed in growing them, etc. The young peasants eagerly asked their teachers: "Speak our peasant language when you lecture and teach us more methods." "Give us more examples." "Tell us something about techniques that we can apply right away." The teachers accepted the suggestions without reservation.

The Youth League branch also made a study of the students. Some were more interested in having fun than in learning. Others even made trouble in the class. They were criticized for these failings. The Party and Youth League branches in the township divided up the tasks of solving the ideological

problems of the students quickly and strengthening political education of the students. The technical night school was again consolidated.

FROM CLASSROOM TO FIELD

The school commission, accepting the suggestions from the students, issued regulations governing roll-call, absence and examinations (once every season). The students were told that the aim of the school was to train technical personnel for agricultural co-operation, that the school would be expanded gradually and regularized and that all of them would be technical personnel in the future. This greatly strengthened the students' confidence. At the suggestion of the students, the school commission and the teachers adopted a new method — teach fewer things in each lecture, explain more clearly, teach what is needed in the field so that the students may apply immediately what they have learned.

The teachers also prepared systematic lecture notes on basic scientific information about agriculture, arranging lessons in a way to lead the students from simple things to complicated matters. They tried their best to explain every scientific point and method plainly in the language of the peasants. For instance, in teaching the advanced method of selecting cotton plants in three stages, the teachers composed simple verses. That for the first stage of selection was: "If they are thick, thin them out. Keep them in single and avoid doubles. Keep two inches between plants." For the second stage, the verse went: "Uproot the diseased, keep the healthy, remember the rule of close planting at equal distances."

Before each lecture, the teachers usually asked for suggestions from the students and tried in every possible way to combine theory with practice during the lecture. On one occasion, a lecture was given on the method and effect of applying a phosphorous fertilizer to cotton leaves. After the lecture, the teachers led the students to the field to see the

contrast between cotton plants to which phosphorous fertilizer had been applied and those to which it had not. The leaves of the former were dark green and even the originally yellow leaves had turned green, whereas the leaves of the latter were still yellow. After seeing this, the students exclaimed: "Now we understand. Science can really do great things!"

When the method of manufacturing granular fertilizer was taught, the teachers immediately asked the students to do it themselves. In 1954, the Hsichangkeng Village co-operative alone produced tens of thousands of catties of such fertilizer. A big proportion of this was made by the students.

During lectures, the teachers were ingenious in showing "real things" to the students. In teaching how to prune cotton branches, a cotton plant was brought to the classroom to illustrate the harm if this process was ignored and which branches should or should not be cut off. This aroused keen interest among the students. They understood and remembered what had been taught and could easily apply the lesson.

The night school students also played their part in popularizing farming techniques. They came down to the field from the classroom and introduced the skill and knowledge they learned to members who were not going to the school. Wang Feng-chen taught her mother the method of separating cotton plants. Tsai Yin-miao taught her mother-in-law how to prune cotton branches.

Here is another story. In 1954, eight members of the Tung-changkeng Village co-operative were students at the night school. After learning how to apply phosphorous fertilizer to cotton leaves, Chang Tao, who was also a member of the Youth League, told the chairman of his co-operative, Keng Chung-yuan, all about it. He said: "We ask the co-operative to give us some basins, string and gauze."

"What for?" the chairman queried.

"We want to use these things to filter the phosphorous fertilizer for the cotton leaves," Chang Tao said.

"You people are really trouble-makers. What is the good of using it? I have grown cotton for nearly thirty years and never heard of applying fertilizer to cotton leaves," the chairman disagreed.

"This method we have learned really works. Let's try it if you don't believe it," Chang Tao replied.

"From now on, after you attend class there, please brush yourself off every time and leave everything you have learned behind you. Don't bring it back," the chairman said.

"What do you mean?" Chang Tao demanded.

"Because it is useless!" the chairman said.

Then Chang Tao reported to the Youth League branch in the township that the chairman of his co-operative belittled the importance of new techniques. The deputy secretary of the Youth League branch, Yang Chun-ching, relayed this opinion to the township Party branch.

Later at a meeting of co-operative chairmen in the township, Lu Cheng-lung, secretary of the township Party branch, told Keng Chung-yuan, chairman of the Tungchangkeng Village co-operative: "If your co-operative does not want phosphorous fertilizer, send yours to other co-operatives. There is a shortage now!"

"Certainly we want to use it, why not?" said Keng Chung-yuan.

"Then," said Lu Cheng-lung, "why didn't you actively support the idea of the night school students? Why do you keep three to four thousand catties of phosphorous fertilizer idle in the warehouse?"

"This . . . I didn't trust it," Keng Chung-yuan explained.

Keng Chung-yuan was also criticized by others for not supporting the suggestions of the night school students.

After the meeting, Keng Chung-yuan asked Yang Chun-ching to take him to see the good results on the cotton plants to which phosphorous fertilizer had been applied. He was greatly impressed with the results. "I never imagined such a world of difference," he remarked.

After he returned, his co-operative used phosphorous fertilizer on thirty *mou* of cotton field. The students are now able to apply the knowledge they have acquired in practical work.

SATISFACTORY RESULTS

Satisfactory results have been achieved in the year and more since the night school was set up, although it is still feeling its way ahead. Of the 110 students, more than 90 have mastered the technique of pruning cotton branches and other skills such as the three-stage selection of cotton plants, methods of selecting cotton and wheat seeds, the way to identify ten species of insect pests harmful to cotton crops and the ordinary ways of preventing and killing them, and how to use and repair the sprayers.

Forty-two of them have learned how to prepare liquid "E605" insecticide, 48 have learned how to manufacture granular fertilizer, 45 know how to burn cotton stalks to make smoked manure, and 54 can handle the work of applying fertilizer to cotton leaves.

Twenty-two young students have become farm-tool operators in a tractor station. Another 44 have become technicians in the work teams (or groups) in agricultural co-operatives.

In the summer of 1955, more than 700 *mou* of wheat in the Hsichangkeng co-operative were ready for harvest. The slightest breeze rustled the heavy ears of wheat. Any delay in harvesting would cause serious losses. The cotton field was fatally attacked by aphids which gnawed the plants. There was no sign of rain. People had to work around the clock at the water-wheels. This tense situation was commonly called the period of "snatching food from the dragon's mouth." In these circumstances, all kinds of work were urgent and they required skill. Here, the night school students played a great part in overcoming the difficulty. Strong male members who were also night school students were mobilized by the co-operative to reap the wheat. Over 60 women mem-

bers were entrusted with the job of wiping out the insect pests in the cotton field. The women successfully achieved their task by using the methods they learned from the night school. At this critical moment, young co-operative members effectively supported the co-operative with all the scientific techniques they possessed. The co-operative also demonstrated its tremendous strength. Everybody admired the power of the co-operative. The night school had armed the co-operative members with skill. The co-operative members supported the night school with added enthusiasm.

The old lady, Keng Tu-chin, in seeing the skills her daughter, Wang Feng-chen, had learned, said happily: "When I was a girl, I was not allowed to cross the threshold, let alone learn skills. Times have really changed. Our life is getting better and better in the co-operative." She also said to Yang Chun-ching, deputy secretary of the Youth League branch: "Take your wife to meetings and let her understand something about current affairs and learn some skill."

In Hsichangkeng Township, learning scientific farming techniques has become a very popular topic of discussion among the young people. Books on farming techniques in the co-operative's library are in heavy demand.

The technical night school has become the centre of activity for young folks during leisure hours. As soon as the lamp is lit, large numbers of people flock in to study. Agricultural co-operation and socialist construction in the rural areas attract the young people and stimulate their eagerness to learn techniques. They say: "We are now technicians in the agricultural co-operative groups. When our co-operative becomes fully socialist, we will have more chances to study. Maybe we will become agronomists in a socialist co-operative."

That ideal is no longer something for the remote future. It will come true quite soon.

HOW A YOUTH LEAGUE BRANCH ESTABLISHED A COURSE IN WORK-POINT RECORDING

(In the *Shantung Mutual-Aid and Co-operative Bulletin*,
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The experience described here should be made known everywhere. Lenin said: "A nation of illiterates cannot build communism." Although there are many illiterates in our country today, we cannot wait until illiteracy is eliminated before commencing to build socialism. This has created an acute contradiction.

Aside from the fact that many children have no schools to go to when they reach school age, there is also a large number of teen-agers and young people with no schools to go to either, although they are well past the age for entrance. As for adults, it goes without saying, the situation is even worse.

This is a serious problem which must be solved in the course of bringing co-operation to agriculture; in fact it is only during this stage that a solution can be found. After the peasants form co-ops, they demand to be taught to read and write. For them it is a matter of economic necessity. Once they form co-ops, they have collective strength. The situation changes completely. They can organize their own literacy courses.

To keep records of the points earned each day, first they have to learn how to write the names of the

persons and places in their village, the names of farm implements and different kinds of farm work, and other agricultural terms. This requires a knowledge of two or three hundred characters.

Next, they must go on to more advanced characters and vocabulary. Two kinds of textbooks are needed for this. The first should be compiled by the local educated people with the help of the comrades guiding the work of co-operation, according to the needs of the co-ops in that locality. Each place should compile its own text; there cannot be one unified text for all. These need not be checked by the authorities.

The second kind of textbook should also be compiled by the local educated people with the help of the comrades guiding the work of co-operation, and be based on the affairs and vocabulary of a relatively small area (such as the county or the region), as well as on the affairs and vocabulary of the whole province (city or autonomous region), and of the entire nation. This text, too, should only contain a few hundred characters. Though it need not be the same in each locality, it should be examined briefly by the educational authorities of the county, region, or province (city or autonomous region).

When the first two steps are completed, the peasants should go on to the third. For this the educational authorities of each province (city or autonomous region) must prepare a third text containing general material. Thereafter, they should continue to compile increasingly advanced textbooks. The cultural organizations of the Central Government should give proper guidance in this matter.

The Youth League branch of Kaochialiukou Village of Chunan County, Shantung, has done a creative piece of work. It makes one very happy to see a

situation like theirs. They found their teachers—the graduates of their township's higher elementary school. Progress was rapid. In two and a half months, more than a hundred youths and grown-ups learned over 200 characters. They now can keep records of their own work. Some have become book-keepers for the co-op. "Work-point recording course" is an apt name. This kind of course should be offered everywhere. Youth League organizations on every level should lead this work. All Party and government organizations should give them whatever support they need.

—EDITOR

When the tasks of the state for the period of the transition to socialism were popularized, Kaochialiukou Village in Chunan County of Shantung Province set up the Red Banner Agricultural Producers' Co-operative, together with three branches. Because the villagers had little education, the co-op could not find book-keepers after it was formed. To solve this difficulty, the village Party branch instructed the Youth League branch to select a few young people who were comparatively more literate to do this work. The Youth League branch called together Youth League members and other young people in the co-op and gave them a dictation test; seven who were able to read more than one hundred characters were chosen to be the co-op's book-keepers. But their grasp of characters was so limited that they could not even write down the names of the members or the kinds of farm work done (ploughing, hoeing and harvesting, for instance); they made entries by drawing circles or lines. When they exhausted their store of symbols, they asked people with good memories to memorize what they could not put down on paper by drawing. But memories were short, and as time

passed, the people not only forgot what was memorized but could not make head or tail of their symbols of circles and lines. When the time came for them to present an accounting of the work-points they could do nothing but ask the co-op members to come together again and recall what they could bit by bit. At times they worked till midnight with their calculating, but nothing came of it. There were even quarrels which led to estrangement among the members. Some members declared: "Socialism is not so easy to reach. Let each go his own way as soon as possible." Some members, feeling discouraged, asked to withdraw from the co-op.

The Youth League branch made a study of this question and proposed to the co-operative's management committee that a literacy class should be organized for the young people to solve the book-keeping problem. At first the proposal was received coldly by the management committee. They said: "You can't feed a hen in the morning and expect it to lay in the afternoon. A literacy class is a sheer waste of time. It's not worth the bother." One committee member said: "I've been attending literacy classes for I don't know how many years. Now I'm a father of three children and I still can't read more than a dozen characters. Just imagine how long it would take to train a book-keeper!" Later, with the support of the Party branch and the vice-chairman, the proposal was adopted by the management committee and it was decided to make an effort in the co-op. The Youth League branch managed to persuade 26 of its members and young members of the co-op to attend the course.

A committee was formed under the leadership of the Party branch so that the study course would be conducted in a planned manner. Study groups were formed on the basis of production brigades. Four graduates of primary schools were appointed teachers, including three Youth League members. There were no textbooks. The Youth League branch could not decide about what should be taught when the class start-

ed. The teachers were consulted, and it was decided first to teach them seven characters: *Chin Tien Wan Shang Kai Hsueh Le* (the class starts this evening). Then they were taught three more characters: *Shih Tse Pan* (literacy class). One evening, Kao Wei-ko, a young book-keeper in the co-op, said: "I've attended the winter school for a couple of years, but up to now I can't read more than a dozen or so characters. At the rate things are going, I don't know when I'll be able to learn my job." The Youth League branch thought that he had made a good point. It got the teachers and students together to study the question. It was agreed that the students should be taught in a way best calculated to meet the needs of training book-keepers for the co-op. It was decided therefore that they should start with people's names, then go on to the names of where the fields were, the names of different kinds of farm work and farm tools, and then numbers and forms of book-keeping. The actual method used was to classify the characters in the names of the co-op members, the locality of the co-op fields and the different kinds of farm work and farm tools. The students were first taught similar characters in the same category and then different characters. The 59 men and women members of the co-op have four surnames, i.e. Kao, Shen, Wu and Chu. In learning the names of co-op members, the students were first taught these four characters and then the characters which appear in their second names (for instance, there are four characters, i.e. *Hsi, Wei, Yun* and *Tsun* in the second names of the Kaos). Under this classification, there are 33 different characters in the names of 29 members whose surname is Kao, 17 in the names of 13 Shens, 14 in the names of 15 Wus, two in the names of two Chus, and two in the name of a member whose surname is different from all the others in the co-op. There are 68 characters all told. When all these characters are learned the names of all 59 co-op members can be written. In the co-op's land, five places include the

character *Tun* (mound) and eight other characters; two places include *Ping* (a plain) and three other characters; five places include *Ling* (ridge) and six other characters; two places include *Ho* (river) and three other characters; three places include *Yai* (cliff) and four other characters. Nineteen other places consist of 28 different characters. The names of a total of 39 places include 52 characters. The students were first taught the five characters *Tun*, *Ping*, *Ling*, *Ho* and *Yai*, and then the characters associated with them, such as *Tun-chien* (in front of the mound), *Tunhou* (behind the mound), *Nanping* (south plain) and *Taping* (big plain). The names of farm work, classified into 29 categories according to ploughing, sowing, hoeing and harvesting, consist of 54 characters. As for the names of farm tools and animals and numbers, these were taught separately because there are very few characters in common. Over a period of two and a half months the students learned 243 characters. In this way, the young members of the co-op learned how to record the work-points and became co-op book-keepers. And it was possible to triple-check the recording of work-points for each member.

The course of study initiated by the Red Banner Agricultural Producers' Co-operative played a vital part in helping members become literate and particularly in helping to solve the problem of recording work-points. Inspired by this example, the three branches and the mutual-aid team led by Shen Wen-teng set up learn-to-record-work-point classes. In addition to drawing upon the experience gained by the Red Banner Co-op, they adopted the learn-from-work method. For instance, when the co-op was in the midst of sowing and carting manure during early spring, members were taught such characters as *Keng Ti* (ploughing) and *Sung Fen* (carting manure). When members were catching red spiders they were taught the characters *Hung Chih Chu* (red spiders), and when they were doing deep ploughing they were taught the

characters *Shen Fan Ti* (deep ploughed land). When they added more top-soil to their land they were taught the characters *Tieh Ti* (top-soil). To ensure that the study course would be regular, students attended evening classes at which teachers gave lessons. Each production brigade also had attached to it an assistant who went to the fields during the day to help members review their lessons. Among the 115 young and older members who had attended the study course for two and a half months, 19 were qualified to be book-keepers (in fact ten had been given such jobs), 92 were able to record work-points. Only four were still unable to record work-points. On the basis of what had been achieved, the Youth League branch set up a class to train book-keepers for ten students who had learned more characters than others. (Before attending the class they had studied peasant readers for six months.) The lessons included the use of the abacus and book-keeping which were taught by the co-op accountant. Those who did not attend this class studied the peasant readers.

In organizing the study course, the Youth League branch did a great deal to help the co-op solve its shortage of book-keepers. As a result, management of the co-op was improved. Most of the confusion in the co-op's book-keeping was eliminated, and people didn't have to work at it at night till their eyes became weary. This made the co-op's young members happy and won the peasants' approval. Seeing what two months of study could do, the young people had greater enthusiasm to become literate, the functionaries and peasants became more confident in running the co-op. Wu Chang-kuei, the vice-chairman, said: "When people join the co-op they can also learn how to read and write quickly." When Wang Shou-ching was selected to be a co-op book-keeper his father was overjoyed and said to him: "People like us can see the daylight now. Study hard, son. I'll buy whatever you need for your studies." Seeing that study was

really useful, many parents encouraged their sons and daughters to join the literacy class and bought slates and fountain-pens for them. The co-op management also helped. For a time, the literacy class had no fixed meeting place and was short of kerosene for the lamps. The co-op vacated its office and allowed it to be used as a classroom; it also paid for the kerosene needed by the class.

HOW YINTA TOWNSHIP STARTED SPARE-TIME EDUCATION FOR PEASANTS

(By Che Hung-chang, Huang Hsien-teh, August 1955)

There are not many articles in this book about cultural work. This is a fairly good one. In order to eliminate illiteracy for the most part within seven years — that is, by the end of the Second Five-Year Plan — and meet the urgent needs of agricultural co-operation, in 1956 every locality must make all necessary preparations and reach their targets for the first year of this project.

— EDITOR

VERY PRESSING NEEDS

Yinta Township, Chiuchuan County, Kansu Province, is one of the townships where the mutual-aid and co-operative movement developed fairly rapidly. The whole township has 318 households. At present, 242 peasant households have already joined the May Fourth Yung Feng Agricultural Producers' Co-operative and 44 are organized in mutual-aid teams. Except for ex-landlords and rich peasants, there are only four households of peasants working on their own.

With the growth of the mutual-aid and co-operative movement, the peasants' needs for culture became increasingly urgent. Members of the agricultural co-operative were very worried because they could not read or write the accounts of work-points. Wang Hsiu-chen, a woman member

of the co-operative, said, "We women even cannot read the work-points. What shall we do?" The chairman of the co-operative and the heads of the production brigades wanted to study policy and do a good job, but they were not educated and had many difficulties. Wang Hsueh-lu, chairman of the No. 1 branch of the co-operative, said, "Since I have been in the co-operative, the shortage of livestock and farm implements has been solved. Now the only trouble I have is that I cannot read." Li Mao-yuan, head of a production brigade, said, "I myself cannot read. Who knows whether the tallyman keeps a correct account of work-points!"

The agricultural co-operative, the credit co-operative and mutual-aid teams did not have an adequate number of qualified book-keepers and tallymen. The May Fourth Yung Feng Agricultural Producers' Co-operative, with its five branches and 25 production brigades, needed at least seven book-keepers and 25 tallymen. In addition, the credit co-operative needed one book-keeper and the eight mutual-aid teams eight tallymen. If five others were added, namely one radio monitor and four literacy school teachers, a minimum of 46 people having four to six years' schooling were needed. But at the time of liberation, the whole township could boast of only 32 literate people. Of these, only 21 were poor or middle peasants. Since liberation, 12 persons have been promoted to work as personnel not dealing with direct production. Therefore, tallymen of most of the production brigades could only read a small number of characters. In 1954, several of the 13 tallymen were still semi-literate and attending a quick-method literacy class. When registering the work-points, some wrote 15 as 105 and 8 as 18. Because of the wrong accounts, disputes occurred with the members of the co-operative when work-points were counted.

Facts showed that it would be extremely difficult for illiterates to run the agricultural producers' co-operative well and improve farming techniques. If rural spare-time education fails to keep pace with the mutual-aid and co-operative

movement, these difficulties will become an obstacle to the growth of the mutual-aid and co-operative movement and to the development of agricultural production. The State Council in a directive on strengthening the spare-time education among the peasants pointed out: "It must be understood that socialism cannot be founded on mass illiteracy." Therefore, to strengthen literacy education for the peasants has become an important political task in the present co-operative movement.

OPENING AN EXPERIMENTAL LITERACY SCHOOL

To keep in line with the growing mutual-aid and co-operative movement, Yinta Township began to set up experimental winter schools early in 1950. In 1952, quick-method literacy classes were opened. After the founding of the May Fourth Yung Feng Agricultural Producers' Co-operative in 1954, a system of responsibility was put into effect, thus changing the situation in which evaluation of work-points lasted till late in the night every day. Step by step, the contradictions between production and study were overcome and time was made available to turn the four original winter schools into a literacy school run by the co-operative. In all, 173 persons attended the school. According to the location of residences, three literacy classes were set up (61 per cent of the students being poor peasants). A senior class was organized for 35 young and middle-aged people in the co-operative (four Party members, seven Youth League members and 24 young people) who had attended the winter schools and had had some years of schooling. They were put in one group to study in the township.

Four teachers taught at the literacy school. One of them was concurrently the township clerk. The other three were young members of the co-operative. They had all received education and training after liberation. To encourage the teachers to do their work well, teachers of the senior class

were given one and a half work-points for every class hour and those of literacy classes one work-point. The educational level of the teachers of the literacy school was generally not high. Only one of them was a graduate of a junior normal school. Thus, the cultural and educational committee of the co-operative called them together for studies once every two weeks. During the studies, a literacy school teacher in the No. 1 branch of the co-operative reported on the teaching methods. Then discussions followed to solve difficult problems. Once a week, the three teachers in the four-year primary school of the township took turns in coming to the co-op's literacy school to give advice and assistance to the teachers to raise their teaching ability step by step.

To overcome the contradictions between production, meetings and study and to ensure that the study help production, the co-operative's literacy school classes were properly arranged to meet the different circumstances at busy or slack farming seasons. The township Party branch decided that Monday, Tuesday, Thursday and Friday evenings should be used for courses in language and arithmetic, Wednesday for meetings, Saturday for political study and Sunday for Party and Youth League lectures or for Party and Youth League meetings.

There used to be comparatively less work before spring sowing and the number of study hours each time was proportionately increased (one and a half hours up to two hours). During the spring sowing, the literacy school had a one-month vacation. As rural life was busy after the spring sowing, the number of study hours was shortened. During the hoeing season, lessons for self-study were assigned by the teacher for students in the senior class. For students in the literacy classes, not only was the number of study hours cut but also the teaching method was changed from the teaching of several lessons as a unit into that of teaching lessons one by one.

With regard to the subjects studied, the Chinese language course in the literacy classes is primarily the study of the *Peasants' Vocabulary Textbook*. Forty-three persons use Book III. By the winter of 1955, they will be able to read 800 characters. They are to serve as tallymen of work-points after their graduation. Ninety-two persons use Book I. Of these, 35 persons can read 500 characters and the remainder 300 characters. The language course for the senior class is essentially the study of Book I, *Chinese Reader for Peasants*. Seventeen persons study this and after completing this course, they will be able to write a simple composition of three hundred words. Without exception, the arithmetic textbook is *General Arithmetic for Workers and Peasants*. Students in the literacy classes all study Book I. Eleven students in the senior class use Book III and 25 others Book I. As a preliminary step, the literacy school has worked out rules for roll-call, leave, and examinations (one examination every month). In the senior class written tests are given for all courses. In the literacy classes written tests are given for the courses in language and arithmetic while oral tests are given for political study.

The time schedule was not properly arranged when the literacy school first opened in the winter of 1954. As a result, there was little time left for any study when there were meetings. In particular, the co-op functionaries had no assured hours for study. Besides, the questions of lighting and heating facilities and salaries for the teachers were not settled promptly. All this made running the school difficult and criticisms came from all sides, from co-op members, functionaries and the teachers. To remedy this deplorable state of affairs and ensure the smooth progress of the studies, the work of the cultural and educational committee was improved. The secretary of the Youth League branch, the head of the Women's Federation, chairmen of various branches of the co-operative and the principal of the primary school were made responsible for encouraging and mobilizing the students

to attend school and for examining and planning the studies. The Party branch also assigned the head of the township chairman of the cultural and educational committee, and the chairmen of the branches of the co-operative class leaders of the literacy school. Functionaries in charge of production were also made responsible for checking up on the studies.

In 1955, the co-operative drew up a unified time schedule for production, meetings and study. This, plus the institution of the system of responsibility covering each section after the spring sowing by the co-operative, enabled most of the co-op's personnel to take part in the studies. Of the 89 functionaries in the co-operative, 52 joined the studies. Considering that the functionaries were busy with work, had many meetings and urgently wanted education, a system of responsibility for teaching and learning was adopted for some leading functionaries of the township administration and the co-operative to ensure their study. The method of teaching two characters a day and having one test every three days was used. This greatly speeded up their progress in study. For example, Li Cheng-ying, chairman of the No. 3 branch of the co-operative (and also chairman of the township's credit co-operative), in the past had been too busy to study. But after the co-operative made a unified time schedule, in particular after special guidance and assistance was given him by the book-keeper of the branch, he was able to read about 200 characters in just a little over three months. Wang Hsueh-lu, chairman of the No. 1 branch of the co-operative, could only read a few names when he began studying. Now he not only can read the *New Chiu-chuan Daily* and the *Kansu Peasant*, but also can write simple letters. At meetings, he can jot down brief notes. He was chosen model student.

He said gratefully, "All these benefits are given us by the Communist Party and Chairman Mao Tse-tung." On the whole, members of the co-operative who took part in the study are now able to read the work-points written on coupons and handbooks. Most of the students in the senior

class are able to keep accounts of the work-points for the brigades.

In the literacy school, attention is paid to political studies as well as cultural studies. The political initiative of the co-operative members has been heightened in the course of the studies as adequately evidenced in a number of mass movements. At the same time, the literacy school has taught the students to love to work and raised their enthusiasm for work. For example, of the 23 people outstanding in production cited by the five branches of the co-operative after the spring sowing, seven were outstanding in studies.

As a result of the work to eliminate illiteracy in the past few years, more and more people want to read books and newspapers. Statistics show that the whole township now subscribes to 79 copies of newspapers and 12 magazines. Apart from subscriptions by the township government, schools, mutual-aid teams and some individual peasants, the co-operative subscribes to 42 copies of papers and magazines. Newspaper-reading groups have been organized by each production brigade in the co-operative. It has now become the practice of the co-operative members to read papers or listen to the papers being read aloud, in rest periods during field work or in their spare time in the evening.

Although the township has made these gains in the field of spare-time education for the peasants, it has not been able to catch up with present needs. Leading comrades in the township, even quite a few comrades in the county and district, still depend to varying degrees on personnel in cultural and educational work to operate the literacy schools. They take the view that to operate winter schools and literacy schools or to end illiteracy is a small matter since characters are not as important as food or drink. Other than giving passive support, individual comrades also cut into the time set for studies at will. A number of persons in cultural and educational work also have the narrow viewpoint of "pure culture and pure work." This shows that many comrades

still lack a comprehensive understanding of the political significance of the peasants' spare-time educational work in serving agricultural production and the mutual-aid and co-operative movement directly. It shows that they fail to do their best to link this work with the central task of rural work. This has greatly handicapped the consolidation and growth of the agricultural co-operatives and impeded the tempo of co-operation. Lenin in his work "On Co-operation" written in 1923 pointed out two epoch-making essential tasks confronting us. He said, "... The second is to conduct educational work among the peasants. And the economic object of this educational work among the peasants is to organize them in co-operative societies. . . . But the organization of the entire peasantry in co-operative societies assumes such a standard of culture among the peasants (precisely among the peasants as the overwhelming majority of the population) that this entire reorganization in co-operatives is impossible without a whole cultural revolution." He also pointed out, "... Without universal literacy, without a proper degree of efficiency, without sufficiently training the population to acquire the habit of reading books, and without the material basis for this, without certain safeguards against, say, bad harvests, starvation, etc., we shall not achieve our aim." Comrades working in rural areas, therefore, should know the far-reaching political significance of raising the cultural level of the peasants.

SOME EXPERIENCES

1) With respect to the enrolment of students, attention should be drawn to taking in functionaries, Party members, Youth League members and active elements (this is the point of emphasis in the work of eliminating illiteracy). Since they are the backbone in the villages, raising their cultural level will directly help the smooth progress of the work. At the same time, attention should also be paid to correcting the deviation of increasing numbers without regard to quality,

and the situation that among the students there are more youngsters than adults. As to the expense of purchasing the desks and benches needed by the literacy schools, for lighting and heating facilities and for stationery, it would be best, at present, for the students to settle these problems by themselves.

2) The time schedule for study must be arranged in accordance with the farming seasons. There should be more time for study during the slack season and less time or no time at all during the busy seasons. Attention must be paid to solving the contradictions between work and study. As far as possible, do not use production time and leave adequate time for the members of the co-operative to rest in order to avoid affecting production. For example, in the winter of 1954, the co-operative wanted to call meetings while the literacy school had students attending class. The students attended morning classes while others engaged in production. This not only affected production and work but also made the students uneasy over their study.

3) The contents of the lessons must be linked with practice. The best thing to do is to teach the peasants what they use or see every day. This will make it easier for them to understand, memorize and apply. For example, to teach figures in the literacy classes or arithmetic in the senior class will help the heads of the production brigades and tallymen clear the accounts of work-points and thus apply what they have learned. It is also necessary to set a fixed period for the teachers to study and meet to exchange experiences so as to raise their level and efficiency in teaching step by step, and encourage the initiative of the masses to acquire culture.

4) Political lessons should generally be taught by the secretary of the Party branch. If he cannot teach because of pressure of work or for other reasons, the Party branch can assign politically reliable persons or school teachers in the township to do the job. Political study should be taught with the current tasks as the central theme and in conjunc-

tion with the thinking of the masses, so as to criticize and rectify incorrect ideas or misconceptions among the students. To teach students to read while neglecting their ideological education is an incorrect attitude. The Party branches and agricultural co-operatives must, by various means, help the newspaper readers who are responsible for reading the papers aloud to their groups to raise their ability so that the newspaper-reading groups can play the role they should.

A HARD STRUGGLE MUST BE WAGED AGAINST GRAFT AND STEALING

(By the Yenpei Regional Committee, Chinese Communist Party, in *Forward*, organ of the Shansi Provincial Party Committee, No. 195, June 24, 1955)

All co-operatives should give this article their closest attention. They should form supervision committees responsible for examining their account books. These committees must wage a relentless battle against graft and stealing. Party and Youth League branches should take this matter seriously.

— EDITOR

When agricultural producers' co-operatives in Shansi Province were investigated in 1955, many cadres were found guilty of corruption and other unlawful practices. Investigation of 31 co-ops in Tajen County, where the accounts were in chaos, showed that corruption was reported in six of these co-ops with cadres pocketing a total sum of 161 yuan, and that cadres in nine others were suspected of having sticky hands. Among some 30 co-ops in Shanyin County where a check was made, corruption was found in 18 of them. Some cadres wasted the co-ops' money and enriched themselves at the expense of the co-ops. Such unhealthy conditions were also found in some of the older co-ops. Formerly these co-ops had done a lot of hard work and been run very economically; but when some achievements had been made, the cadres became smug about increased yields, and didn't think it necessary to make any further efforts. They grew haughty

and priggish, unwilling to tolerate any supervision by the membership. They put on airs and went so low as to help themselves to public funds. Such lawless behaviour greatly influenced all the co-op members, lessened their interest in working hard, damaged the reputation of the co-operatives and thus put the socialist transformation of agriculture itself in jeopardy.

The Nanchiaoshan Agricultural Producers' Co-operative in Kuangling County originally had 14 households. But seven withdrew because they were dissatisfied that nothing was done when the production brigade leader (a rich peasant) and the book-keeper made away with some 60 yuan of public money. In Shanyin County, the 18 households of Peilochuang Village had formed a co-op. The leadership somehow took it for granted that the village was one where co-operative farming did well in the county and that the co-op was a standard-bearer. But actually facts were just the opposite. Not only had the way of carrying out Party and government policies been rash and extreme, but the cadres of this co-op were utterly corrupt. Lo Shou-fan, the chairman, set the example. When he was to buy 200 catties of linseed cake for the co-op, he took 40 catties for himself. In buying cotton for padding saddles, he took three catties of good, fresh cotton and replaced it with old stuff. In buying an ox, five yuan found their way into his pocket. He did not mind taking 4.80 yuan out of loans granted to needy members, nor even one yuan from the amount due to some members for road repairs. Once when he had to buy a sow for the co-op, he bought it from a relative which cost the co-op an extra 35 yuan. He stole four pecks of wheat during the threshing, and made away with 16 pecks of linseed during the first pressing. His continued thieving and pilfering irritated the co-op members to the point where 16 of the 18 households filed charges against him with the county Party committee. The person sent subsequently by the committee to investigate the case stayed a couple of days in the co-op, replaced the chairman

with someone else and thought his duty of checking was thereby fulfilled. But actually the main trouble remained untouched. It was understandable that the co-op members were not enthusiastic to do any more work than was necessary. Instances like this, though varying in seriousness, were to be found in many counties. The corruption of cadres could be attributed to the following three causes:

1) The cadres in the co-ops did not have a clear idea what the line was along which co-ops should be steered; they disregarded the policy of "concentrating on the expansion of agricultural production, supplemented by the gradual development of a diversified economy" and engaged, instead, in speculations and private business. Cadres of the Shuiposze Agricultural Producers' Co-operative in Tajen County, including the co-op chairman and three members of the local Party branch, bought 800 yuan worth of ox tripe on credit from the State Provisions Store, hoping to resell the stuff at a handsome profit. But, unfortunately, the tripe did not sell. Not wanting to lose all that money, they asked the co-op members to buy the stuff and thus share their loss. The members did buy about 200 yuan's worth, but this amount was again secretly squandered by these few cadres. They wine and dined and announced brazenly when they had had their fill: "This is what we call socialism." The chairman and other cadres of this co-op also took it into their heads to sell for 160 yuan the eight *mou* of land belonging to four households plus a section of the public road adjoining this land, together with two trees that had been a landmark in the village. With this amount they bought, first of all, a bicycle. They also bought 82 feet of cloth without surrendering coupons to the supply and marketing co-op, and had six suits made. Whenever these cadres had to attend meetings, they strutted in their new uniforms and took turns riding the bicycle. It was their boast that this showed how resourceful and smart-looking the cadres of the Shuiposze Co-op were. At another time, when the State Provisions Store needed stones, they thought

this a rare opportunity to make money. Under cover of night, they made inroads on the supply of stones the Yuho Water Conservancy Bureau kept for its work, and they also carted away the stones that two peasants in the co-op and one outside had bought with a loan for building a well. The thieves got away with one cartload, but were caught with the second. The stones they had managed to get away they sold for 70 yuan. Such unlawful practices caused serious losses to the co-op and lowered its prestige in the eyes of peasants outside.

2) The co-op membership was mixed; the accounting system was in chaos. Some co-ops even did not have account books, which fact made it very easy for the people in charge to indulge in corrupt practices. An example was the book-keeper Chin of the Changtoupu Co-op in Shanyin County. A rich peasant, he had wriggled into this post by making himself out as one of the "active elements" when the co-op was first set up. Once in the job, he began to take things easy. He did not use the account books that were provided for the purpose, kept no record of old accounts, and made a complete mess of the co-op's finances. Bills and receipts were stuffed into a chest. When accounts had to be settled at the end of the year, over 70 out of 2,400 items were found to have been wrongly entered. Three times the published accounts were found in disorder. The members began grumbling. The very first check-up led to the discovery that Chin had put his hand into the till no less than eight times, bagging altogether 44.10 yuan. The methods he employed varied; sometimes he entered a small sum where actually a bigger one had been paid in; or he made a disbursement to appear bigger than it was; sometimes he even didn't make any entry for the intake, but doubled the amount of a disbursement; and so on. Accounts were in such a state that sometimes expenditures were merely reported by word of mouth, with the book-keeper making a mental note of the "entry." Such chaos in the financial system made pilfering very easy.

3) The higher administrative levels did not give sufficient practical leadership to the co-ops for their finances and book-keeping. Even when several cases of corruption were discovered, nothing was done about them. Training centres for book-keepers, with nobody around to give practical demonstrations or explanations, remained paper plans. With only one possible exception, none of the 27 training centres for book-keepers for the 129 co-ops in Shanyin County functioned at all. The finances of 86 co-ops were in a muddle and nothing was done about it for a long time. Of the three people sent by the county to help with book-keeping, one was put in charge of "internal affairs" in the Bureau of Agriculture and Forestry, while the two others were put in charge of the bureau's canteen. In three whole months the book-keeping instructor of Tajen County did not once go out into any of the villages. "We are rejected by both sides"—by the Bureau of Agriculture and Forestry and by the Rural Work Department of the Party—people said sadly. Since this potential force was not utilized to their best ability and since the ordinary cadres of the county neither knew how to do financial work nor cared for it, the disorder in the co-ops' accounts was never put to rights. By March 1955, of the 465-odd co-ops in the counties of Tajen, Yinghsien, Shuo-hsien, Yangkao, Yuyu and Pinglu, 61 had not yet settled their accounts for the distribution of income for the year 1954. Naturally the members weren't too keen to go on working hard.

Better guidance in the financial work of agricultural producers' co-operatives is an important measure for their consolidation. It is as incorrect to pay no attention at all to this matter as to be perfunctory about it. The leadership of the county should classify co-ops as good or bad according to whether their finances are efficiently administered; should make the book-keepers' training centres function properly; should make it a rule that the responsible cadres meet regularly at certain periods, making the best co-op their pivot;

should call meetings to discuss and exchange experience, learn from one another and improve the work, and should fix a deadline for the settlement of all accounts. Every co-op must draw up a budget; accounts must be entered properly every day and balanced at the end of every month. Financial work should be put under supervision by the membership, and the keynote in running co-ops must be hard work and economy. In addition, book-keeping instructors should divide the work, so that each will be responsible for intensive work in a specified area, seeing that accounts are kept properly. They should give more practical guidance to book-keepers, set up the necessary systems for book-keeping and accounting, cite as examples those co-operatives that are doing well, sum up their experience and popularize it.

At the same time, those co-ops where finances and book-keeping were in chaos should be subjected to thoroughgoing examination, so that all the difficulties can be uncovered and resolved. Cadres guilty of corrupt practices should be investigated and all incriminating facts brought to light; then they should be dealt with as circumstances and the nature of their misdeeds warrant it. Those who are heavily implicated in corruption and those who are working for ulterior purposes (like landlords, rich peasants and counter-revolutionaries) should be punished according to law. Their crimes should be made public so as to educate the masses.

HOW FOUR CO-OPS IN WANGMANG VILLAGE, CHANGAN COUNTY, ORGANIZED A JOINT MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE

(By the Rural Work Department, Shensi Provincial
Committee, Chinese Communist Party,
August 1955)

This is a useful experience which all places can emulate. District Party committees and township Party branches should draw up plans whereby those small co-ops which intend to merge first organize a joint management committee like the one in Wang-mang Village, Changan County. After a period of joint management, they can go ahead and combine.

— EDITOR

HOW THE JOINT MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE WAS FORMED

In the winter of 1954 more than 100 peasant households in Wangmang Village, Changan County, Shensi Province, applied for admittance into the local agricultural producers' co-operative. This was the result of the propaganda and education carried out among the peasants which helped them to understand the general line of the state for the period of transition to socialism. The achievements of the Pu Chung-chih Agricultural Producers' Co-operative, set up in the village a year ago, helped to open their eyes. As the responsible officers of the co-op at that time thought that they did not have enough experience in running a large co-op, they ex-

panded the old co-op to embrace 66 households instead of 14 and renamed it Co-op No. 1, and set up, in addition, 3 new co-ops which were called Co-op No. 2, Co-op No. 3 and Co-op No. 4 respectively. The total membership of the four co-ops had thus increased to 135 households. In order to make it easier to exercise unified leadership and pave the way for forming a large co-op, the four co-ops in question organized the "July First" Joint Co-operative. Economically, the co-ops remained independent of one another. The joint management committee was composed of the chairmen, vice-chairmen and book-keepers of these co-ops. A chairman and a vice-chairman were elected from among its members to head the joint committee which generally met once every ten days to study and solve such important questions that faced the different co-ops as plans of agricultural production and subsidiary occupations, projects for soil improvement, finance and accounting, distribution of income, summing-up of experience in production, selection of model workers, etc. Minor questions were dealt with whenever they arose through consultations between the co-op chairmen. In the beginning and at the end of a farming season, the joint committee was to call a general meeting of members to explain the jobs they were expected to do or sum up the experience they had gained in their productive activities. Six months passed and practically all the members recognized that a small co-op was not as good as a large one and requested that the four small co-ops be amalgamated. Before the autumn harvest of 1955 they were merged into a large co-op, with 23 new member households joining it.

HOW THE JOINT COMMITTEE GIVES ITS GUIDANCE

Firstly, in dealing with questions that arise in the different co-ops, officers of the joint committee must not make arbitrary decisions, but must consult with the co-op chairmen and canvass the members for their opinions. In the spring

of 1955, shortly after the formation of the joint management committee, the various co-ops wanted to exchange their small draught animals for large ones, so that they could carry out deep ploughing and intensive farming. But the prices of animals in the local market were high and, moreover, it was hard to get them. The joint management committee took up this question with the co-op chairmen and it was decided to send experienced and reliable co-op members to buy the animals elsewhere. They went to Hupeh and Szechuan Provinces twice and bought 26 mules and horses, to the great satisfaction of all the members. However, when the animals were to be distributed, every co-op wanted to have the large and strong animals and those which cost less money. Such being the case, Pu Chung-chih and Yi Chi-tung, chairman and vice-chairman of the joint committee, consulted with the leading officers of the various co-ops and reached an agreement with them. A meeting of the joint management committee was called, during which a decision was made to the effect that the animals should be distributed in the interest of the collective whole, while taking into account the needs of the individual co-op, and that the animals allocated to each co-op must include both good and lean ones. A tentative plan for the distribution of the animals was put forward for democratic discussion by the members of the various co-ops. The arrangement finally reached made everybody happy.

Another example. Every co-op had a mill for making vermicelli from bean starch. The members had to go to a place 15 li away to buy beans from the supply and marketing co-operative and to deliver the vermicelli they made. Besides, the selling of pigs and buying of fodder bean-cakes would entail a lot of trouble if they were done by the co-ops separately. The joint management committee took up this question immediately. After consulting with the various co-ops, it was agreed that the joint committee should make unified arrangement to allocate manpower to do the work. To settle questions like those mentioned above, the joint

management committee never failed to seek the advice of the various co-ops, and decisions were made only after the members had fully expressed their opinions. There were many advantages in so doing. (a) It saved a lot of manpower and money for the co-ops. The purchase of draught animals as mentioned above, for instance, saved the time of six men and more than 1,000 yuan for them. (b) If such questions were handled by the co-ops separately, they were likely to run into difficulties which would not arise if their resources were pooled together. (c) By giving full rein to the spirit of democracy in dealing with various matters, the joint committee set an example for the officers of the various co-ops to rely upon the masses and to run the co-ops in a democratic way. (d) Co-op members were brought to realize that the officers of the joint management committee were competent and impartial in their work, and the prestige of the committee was enhanced. The members gradually came to the conclusion that a large co-op could be run successfully once the small co-ops were merged.

Secondly, the joint committee made unified arrangement and gave co-ordinated leadership in respect of all the important matters that concerned all the member co-ops. Work was done in this way: First, its chairman personally led a co-op (or a production brigade) so as to obtain experience through actual practice, and the experience thus gained was studied and discussed by all those concerned. The next thing was to lay down measures in the light of the actual conditions of the various co-ops and put them into practice. In drawing up production plans in the spring of 1955, the three newly established co-ops which had just been brought under collective management didn't know what to do about allocating manpower and arranging farm works. The joint committee first helped Co-op No. 1 to draw up its production plan and set the norm for crediting the work-points of a specified job. Through popularization by the joint committee, the other co-ops benefited from the experience gained by Co-op

No. 1. Co-ops No. 3 and No. 4 were inexperienced in the matter of accounting. Wrong entries and missing items were not uncommon in their books. The joint committee carefully considered this question and decided to organize "accounting mutual-aid teams." These teams entered into mutual-aid agreements under which a meeting was to be called twice a month (on the 1st and 15th of every lunar month) to study and solve any questions that might crop up; and those who attended the meetings were to bring the ledger books with them. The accounts must be made public to the members in oral statement once a month, and in written statement once every three months. This helped the book-keepers of the various co-ops to do their work better, and financial and accounting work was thus placed on a sound basis. The distribution of autumn harvest affected the economic interests of all co-op members, and the work was as important as it was complex and delicate. The leadership of the joint committee asked all the members to study the scheme of distribution drawn up in advance by Co-op No. 1, and in this way helped to solve the question of distribution for the other three co-ops. Since the joint committee included all the key personnel of the various co-ops, it was in a position to help solve those difficulties arising from the fact that there were too many co-ops and very few officers, and that experience in collective farming was still inadequate, and to concentrate all their efforts on studying and solving problems in the various co-ops. It was also in a position to play to the fullest the role of helping the backward co-ops with the experience of the advanced ones, the new co-ops with the experience of the old ones, and the co-ops under weak leadership with the experience of those which enjoyed a strong leadership, thus ensuring each and every co-op to do a first-rate job in production. The officers of Co-op No. 3, for instance, were comparatively weak and not so capable, but after the joint committee gave them a helping hand and showed them the right way of doing things,

they were able to make their own co-op keep abreast with the others. The joint committee also succeeded in training a group of cadres capable of doing big jobs. When the joint committee was formed, the chairmen, book-keepers and production brigade leaders of the three new co-ops were inexperienced. By now most of them were able to do their jobs properly without much outside help. And this would help solve the staff problem of the large co-op when it was formed.

Thirdly, the four co-ops in Wangmang Village, Changan County, were not of the same standing both in regard to their economic condition and the level of political understanding of their members. Some tried to rush ahead of others and, in handling practical questions or dealing with small matters, they only considered their own interests without the slightest regard for others. Some chairmen didn't want to work together with other co-ops because they thought that they were more capable than the others and that their co-ops had large animals and all the farm tools they needed. Other chairmen were in the habit of trotting out their own co-ops and telling their members that their co-ops would surely get more income than the others because their land was good, near the village and would save labour, and also that they had more favourable conditions for running side lines. If this way of thinking and doing things were allowed to grow unchecked, the result would be that each co-op would mind its own affairs and the joint co-op would exist in name only. To stop this wrong tendency from developing, the Party sub-branch in the village and the leading officers of the joint committee decided to take the following steps:

1) From the day the joint co-op was formed, the Party sub-branch paid attention to instructing the officers and members of the various co-ops on the importance of working collectively and on the necessity of a merger in the future. It was explained that the joint co-op was merely a transitory form; sooner or later the various co-ops must be merged into

one. The joint co-op was an organic whole, and if things went wrong with any one co-op, the rest would also be discredited. Only when the joint co-op was a success could honour go to all, and could a foundation be laid for merging the small co-ops into a large one. In this respect, every member co-op had its responsibility and every member should contribute his proper share. The leadership took every opportunity to impress the co-ops on the importance of running their affairs in the interest of the whole, and of helping each other to overcome difficulties in their work. Such education was usually carried out in co-ordination with the productive activities. In the summer harvest of 1955, because it did not have enough animals, Co-op No. 1 lagged behind in threshing. The joint committee persuaded Co-op No. 2 to lend two beasts to the former. The co-ops also helped each other in running their side lines (mainly making vermicelli from bean starch, as indicated above). When one co-op was short of raw materials—coal, firewood or tools, the other came out to help. Apart from this, Co-op No. 1 and Co-op No. 2 taught members of Co-op No. 3 and Co-op No. 4 the skill of making vermicelli. The co-ops gradually forged closer relations between themselves and a sense of working as a collective was steadily developed among their members. After the summer harvest was over, one of the draught animals in Co-op No. 4 suddenly fell critically ill. When Chao Ching-hsiu, a member of Co-op No. 1, discovered this, he at once went out on his bicycle to fetch a vet and get medicine for the animal. The joint committee didn't let slip any opportunity to explain to the members that a small co-op, with a few households in it and limited resources, couldn't make as good a job of its productive work as a large one. Co-op No. 3 and Co-op No. 4, for instance, had more land than their members could cultivate, and the land was so far away from the village that, despite their efforts, they failed to reap a good harvest. Co-op No. 1 and Co-op No. 2 had surplus manpower which was not fully utilized. As all the

four co-ops had mills for making vermicelli and reared pigs, it was impossible for the leaders of the co-ops to concentrate their efforts on agricultural production. These facts brought the members to realize that a single large co-op would do far better in production than four small co-ops working independently. So everybody requested that the co-ops be merged at the earliest possible moment.

2) Questions which affected the interests of the various co-ops were dealt with according to the socialist principle; things were not allowed to run their own course, nor compromises made with the idea of "departmentalism." In the spring of 1955, the joint management committee proposed that the plots of land interlocked with each other but belonging to different co-ops should be exchanged on the basis of voluntariness and mutual benefit, so as to facilitate the productive works of the various co-ops. Every co-op supported this proposal. But when it came to the actual exchange, some co-ops thought only of their own interests and wanted the fertile land of other co-ops in exchange for their land which was lean, scattered, far from the village and with poor irrigation facilities. The co-ops quarrelled over this for a long time; no solution could be found to the satisfaction of all, and the co-op chairmen were at loggerheads. Yi Chi-hsi, who was a Party member and the chairman of Co-op No. 2, was particularly noted for his "departmentalism." He told his co-op members that they got a raw deal from the joint committee in the matter of exchange of land, and this led to a split between some of the members and the leadership of the joint committee. The Party sub-branch tackled the question in good time by calling a meeting of Party members, at which Yi Chi-hsi was criticized and the members were reminded that, on the question of exchange of land, they must take into account the interests of all concerned. A number of Party members examined their own attitude towards this question. Yi Chi-hsi made self-criticism before the meeting. In the end, the question was fairly and reason-

ably solved. The way this question was dealt with helped to raise the level of political understanding of all the members.

3) The leadership of the joint committee must always understand what was uppermost in the minds of the members and find out if there was any difference between the various co-ops. Once the idea of "departmentalism" cropped up they must find the ways and means to get rid of it.

FOUR MERGED INTO ONE

The joint committee, under the leadership of the Party sub-branch, constantly carried out political education among the members and made efforts to overcome "departmentalism." This helped to forge closer relations between the different co-ops and instilled the members with a collective spirit. Having gone through the strenuous work in the summer harvest, they saw more clearly than ever that although the small co-ops were superior to the mutual-aid teams they were restricted in so many ways that further development of production was impossible, and so they felt more keenly the need of merging the four small co-ops into a large one. The members of Co-op No. 4 felt that their work was much too heavy for lack of manpower. The leadership of Co-op No. 3 was comparatively weak and was unable to promote work in the co-op. "The sooner the co-ops are merged the better," said Kao Tseng-chen, a co-op member. "That's the way to get solid leadership." After the summer harvest was over the Party sub-branch called a meeting of the members on the committee of the Party sub-branch. It was decided that the small co-ops would be merged after the autumn harvest and that members of mutual-aid teams and peasants working on their own would be enrolled. Next, the Party branch called a general meeting of its members at which the following questions were discussed: Would it be better to merge the co-ops or not? If it was better, what steps

should be taken to merge them? Was it necessary to enrol new members after the merger? If no merger was effected, would further development be handicapped? If there was to be a merger, what questions would have to be solved? Those present at the meeting sized up the situation and, after weighing the pros and cons, everybody was for the formation of a large co-op in the village. Meanwhile, two Party members were sent to persuade members of three mutual-aid teams to join the co-op. The third step was the calling of a meeting of members of the joint committee, during which Pu Chung-chih raised the question of merging the four small co-ops into a large one and obtained the agreement of the leading personnel of the different co-ops. The fourth step was the calling of a general meeting of co-op members, to which mutual-aid team members and peasants working on their own were invited. In the course of summing up the work of the first half of the year, the officers of the joint committee again raised the question of merger and the question of new membership for co-op members as well as mutual-aid team members and peasants working on their own to discuss. All co-op and mutual-aid team members supported the amalgamation of the co-ops. The fifth step was for people inside the Party and outside it to study the principles and the measures in dealing with the practical questions of amalgamation and enrolment of new members. These principles and measures were chiefly as follows:

- 1) The common property of the different co-ops (including equipment for subsidiary occupations and the draught animals, carts and ploughs granted by the government as rewards) should be wholly transferred to the big co-op, as it was the socialist property of which every member had a share.

- 2) When new members pooled their animals as shares in the co-op they would be reckoned at market price. Animals which belonged to the various co-ops were to be transferred

to the big co-op at the price originally paid by the co-op which owned them.

- 3) The land which belonged to the members of the different co-ops was to be transferred to the big co-op, the number of shares being reckoned as when they first joined. The land pooled by new members in the big co-op should be dealt with in the same way as the land pooled by members who had previously joined the small co-ops.

- 4) Autumn crops should be reaped by the co-op which had sown them, while winter wheat was to be sown under a unified plan. Finally the joint committee called a meeting for merging the co-ops and enrolling new members; at the meeting three mutual-aid teams (including 21 households) and two peasant households working on their own enrolled. There were 158 households in the big co-op, all told. All the peasant households in the village, with the exception of ex-landlords and rich peasants and four middle- and poor-peasant households, joined the co-op.

THE SUPERIORITY OF LARGE CO-OPS

(By the Municipal Committee of Hsinhailien, Chinese Communist Party, September 21, 1955)

This is a very well-written article, well worth reading.

Most of our present semi-socialist co-ops have only twenty or thirty families in them, because co-operatives of that size are easy to run and they give the administrative staff and the members an opportunity to gain experience quickly. But small co-ops have fewer members, less land and not much money. They cannot operate on a large scale or use machinery. The development of their forces of production is still hampered. They should not stay in this position too long, but should go on to combine with other co-operatives.

Some places can have one co-op for every township. In a few places, one co-op can embrace several townships. In many places, of course, one township will contain several co-ops.

Not only the plains sections can form big co-operatives, the hilly regions can form them too. The township in Anhwei Province where the Futseling Reservoir is located is all hills. Yet a big farming, forestry and animal husbandry co-op has been established there that stretches dozens of miles in each direction. Naturally, combining of co-ops must

be done in stages. Suitable administrative personnel are necessary, and the members must agree to the merger.

— EDITOR

The Advance Agricultural Producers' Co-operative of Chaoyang Township, Hsinhailien in Kiangsu Province is a big co-operative. The co-operative has 578 families, which comes to 93 per cent of all the peasant families in the township who can be organized. It has 1,568 units of labour power. It has 3,344 *mou* of land pooled by its members, 2,200 *mou* of reclaimed waste land (there are 4,400 *mou* of reclaimable land in the township) and 350 *mou* of land on lease. There are 32 Communist Party members and 134 Youth League members in the co-operative.

Chaoyang Township is on the slope of Yuntai Mountain and was a terribly poverty-stricken rural area before land reform. 50.6 per cent of the land was owned by landlords and rich peasants who constituted only 2.4 per cent of all the inhabitants. Poor peasants, who made up 81.3 per cent of all the inhabitants, owned only 28.6 per cent of the land. Oppressed and exploited by the landlords and rich peasants, the peasants could only obtain an annual return from their land to feed themselves for three months. At that time, over 40 per cent of the peasants in the township were forced to go elsewhere to beg or do odd jobs. Theirs was a life of empty belly and cold back. Those remaining at home to till the land were old, weak, disabled or sick people, women and children who could not easily leave the township. Because of the shortage of labour power farm work was very poor.

FROM MUTUAL-AID TEAMS TO CO-OPERATIVES, FROM SMALL TO BIG CO-OPERATIVES

The enthusiasm of the peasants for production was greatly raised after land reform in the spring of 1951. But there

was a widespread need for farming implements, draught animals and agricultural technique. The township Party branch, after studying the draft decisions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on mutual aid and co-operation that winter, led the peasants to set up four temporary mutual-aid teams with 30 families. Mutual-aid teams increased in 1952. By autumn of that year, there were 71 year-round mutual-aid teams and 13 temporary teams comprising 74.1 per cent of the peasant families. After this, the emancipated peasants solved problems regarding draught animals, farm tools and labour power for the most part and reaped a good harvest. That winter, some of the more enlightened peasants in the year-round mutual-aid teams began making preparations for the establishment of a co-operative.

The Advance Agricultural Producers' Co-operative was formed in the spring of 1953 from the year-round mutual-aid team of model peasant Yang Chin-ting with 15 poor-peasant families and one family of the lower section of the old middle peasantry. In the three years since it was set up, the co-operative has increased its output each year, in spite of natural calamities in two years. The superiority of collective management has greatly impressed nearby peasants and the Advance Co-operative has expanded from year to year. It grew to 132 families in the winter of 1953, and further to 578 families by the winter of 1954. Thus it has become a very large co-operative.

FROM NO DIVISION OF WORK TO DIVISION OF LABOUR AND OCCUPATIONS

This big co-operative has a lot of people and land, and engages in varied lines of productive work (there are plains, mountains, rivers, agricultural work and subsidiary rural occupations). It faces complex problems in its daily work and the members have different ideas of their own. The cen-

tral task in consolidating this big co-operative is to strengthen its organization. The Advance Co-operative feeling its way forward during the past three years has been advancing steadily. When its membership increased from 16 to 132 families, its leading body still remained unchanged. The co-operative had only a management committee with a division of labour among its chairman and vice-chairman and five committee members. But in the production brigades no one had any special duties, apart from the brigade leaders and deputy leaders. The management committee members either spent the whole day in the brigades or threw the whole weight of work on to the brigade leaders. Consequently the latter became much too busy and could not cope with their work. Some of them said: "There are too many demands made upon us and we don't know what to do." The management committee members could not make a thorough study of their work nor could they carry through any plan. As a result, the work of the co-operative was done poorly: farm tools allotted to the production brigades were thrown about at random; nobody looked after the harvested grain; no one took charge of the political education of co-operative members; labour discipline was lax. The end result was that the co-operative chairman had to take everything into his own hands. When he took charge of maintenance work, he neglected production; when he gave production his personal attention he neglected financial affairs. He attended to everything and could do nothing well.

The facts teach the leading personnel of the co-operative that a big co-operative should practise a division of labour if success in its work is to be assured. When the co-operative expanded in 1955, the following committees were set up under the management committee: a supervisory committee (7 members), a production technique committee (9 members), a financial management committee (7 members), a public security committee (9 members), and a cultural and public health committee (7 members). (It is to be noted that the super-

visory committee should be independent of the management committee and responsible directly to the general meeting of members or the representative conference of the co-operative members.) The chairman of the co-operative and members of the management committee became chairmen of these committees. Specialized groups were also formed in each production brigade in which a member from each production group serves. All specialized committees and groups hold meetings at fixed intervals to study matters in the light of the co-operative's plan. Important questions are decided by the management committee. Matters of a general nature are decided directly by the various bodies concerned. For instance, in the spring of 1955, when the co-operative decided to publicize the transplanting of water paddy (originally rice had been sown here on non-irrigated fields), the production technique committee held meetings to study the question. It sent people to other places to learn the technique of transplanting, selected plots for experiment (such plots should be near water sources) and drew up a concrete plan. After discussion and adoption by the management committee, the plan was given to the production brigades and groups to carry out. The expansion of the production brigades (the biggest consisting of 140 families) was followed by an increase in the number of production groups (altogether 41 in the co-operative). Committees were also formed within the production brigades to strengthen collective leadership. A production brigade is an independent unit operating under the leadership of the co-operative. On the one hand, the brigade carries out the co-operative's plans and measures, on the other, it draws up detailed executive plans based on its specific conditions and organizes and supervises each production group and its members in the timely fulfilment of their tasks. In such organizations in the co-operative, the heads of the co-operative, brigades and groups have a clear-cut division of labour, apart from the members who are assigned special duties. The chairman of the co-operative particularly takes

charge of political and ideological education in addition to being responsible for the co-operative's over-all work. Of the co-operative's vice-chairmen, one is responsible for production techniques, one for financial affairs and another for capital construction. Heads of the production brigades, apart from being responsible for the over-all work of their brigades, are also responsible for political and ideological education and inspect and check up on the book-keeper to see that the accounts are kept properly. Deputy heads of brigades are responsible for production and the protection of common property. All production group heads are responsible for directing production. The production group head, in accordance with the group's plan, allocates labour power for an assigned task and controls the distribution of work-points for which he is responsible.

FROM CONFUSION TO PERFECT ORDER

When the Advance Co-operative was set up there was no division into brigades or sections and all members worked together in great confusion. Nobody went to work in the morning unless the co-operative chairman called him up. Dozens of members worked on a piece of land with everyone trying to till as much and as quickly as possible, without regard to the quality of his work. An evening discussion on accrediting work-points would frequently last till midnight. All co-operative personnel complained that they "could not stand the strain." When membership in the co-operative increased to 132 families in the winter of 1953, everybody felt that the original way of working was impractical, and so the co-operative began to form production brigades, production groups, mark out areas for cultivation and carry out the system of responsibility for work. But in marking out areas for cultivation the land originally belonging to individual families was still allotted to these families to work on, so it often happened that members living at the west end of the village had

to work their land at the east end and vice versa. For instance, the 4th brigade on the east end had 7 *mou* of land on the west end five *li* away. But this land was not allotted to the nearby 2nd brigade, thereby involving a great waste of labour power. No standard norm was fixed beforehand for different kinds of work under the system of responsibility. Land was assigned to the brigades at 12 work-days per *mou* and when the work-points were discussed at meetings, all past work was calculated at this rate. In this manner, the number of work-points far exceeded the work-days allowed, since summer planting alone required 12 work-days. Nobody wanted to do work for which there were no work-points, and this created chaos in the responsibility system.

In 1955, the management committee improved the work of the co-operative in the light of the experience gained during the previous two years. First of all, it made a rational readjustment of the production brigades and production groups and redivided the cultivation areas. The whole co-operative comprised seven production brigades distributed on the basis of the location of villages. The largest brigade had 140 families and the smallest, 38. A separate brigade for subsidiary rural occupations was formed because of the great variety of such occupations and the large number of members who took part in them (as many as 350 members at one time took up subsidiary occupations). Altogether 41 production groups were formed under the brigades on the basis of the labour power, level of technique, distance from fields and ability of the leading personnel. The largest was composed of 18 families, the smallest, 12. At the same time, the land of the co-operative was divided into seven sections that were permanently assigned to the brigades in accordance with the average acreage per labour-power unit and the topography of the villages. The brigade equitably re-allocated its land to the groups for permanent cultivation, taking into consideration these factors: amount of labour

power, distance from the field, irrigated or non-irrigated land, kind of crops to be planted and quality of the soil.

Secondly, planned management was instituted. The co-operative had its yearly plan and seasonal plans, and the production groups had short-term plans. Included in the yearly plan were the production norms for agriculture and subsidiary rural occupations (the agricultural production plan covers the cultivated acreage) and all measures to be taken for ensuring the fulfilment of the plan, including the irrigation projects. The seasonal plan dealt mainly with each season's concrete work mapped out on the basis of the yearly plan. In their short-term plans, the production groups specifically set the amount of time and labour power for every work assignment. Plans were drawn up in this manner: The management committee, in accordance with the requirements of the state and the people, first of all determined the potentialities for increased production by a thorough investigation of the co-operative's land (as for instance high-yield land, low-yield land, land suitable for dry cultivation or water paddy) and placing the various crops in order of importance (as for instance, why the output of such crops should be increased or reduced). The committee, taking into account the labour power, financial and technical conditions of the co-operative, also put forward initial recommendations for discussion by the brigades, groups and all co-operative members. The committee then amended its recommendations on the basis of the opinions of co-operative members and submitted the revised recommendations to a representative meeting of the co-operative members for decision. The decision was then passed on to the brigades and groups to discuss the ways of carrying it out. Seasonal plans were drawn up through the same procedure, based on the direction of the yearly plan and the specific conditions of the season (such as natural conditions). Seasonal plans and short-term plans were inter-linked. When the plan for one season was drawn up the preparatory work for the next stage had to be included. This

was to ensure a link-up between the plans and prevent any discontinuity. The advantage of drawing up plans in this way is that the plans thus formed will work out all right, they meet the state's requirements and give full scope to the enthusiasm of the masses. For example, in the autumn of 1955 the co-operative planned that every group should select 160 catties of good seeds. In their discussions, however, the members said that this work should be done more energetically because of its importance to production. They decided that the labour power then available would enable every group to select 250 catties. Take another example. The irrigation project for the spring of 1955 was extensive and beset with difficulties. At the outset some of the personnel were not very confident that the projects could be completed. In the discussions, co-operative members voiced their support to the plan and made many proposals to overcome the difficulties. This ensured completion of the projects as scheduled. When a plan has been drawn up and is being carried out, the co-operative chairman, members of the management committee and the supervisory committee should go to every brigade and group to investigate how the work is proceeding, discover any problems and study and solve them in good time. If they come across good methods or outstanding achievement, these should be commended and given immediate publicity in writing or by mention in the wall newspaper. Mutual inspections should also be carried out by the brigades to encourage each other and exchange experiences. At the end of every month and every season, a summing-up by the masses is made from top to bottom to analyse how the plan has been carried out and give commendations or criticism. At the same time the production plan for the next month or next season is drawn up.

Then there is the system of responsibility with fixed norms and piece-work. The brigades are responsible to the co-operative for fixed assignment and output. The co-operative leadership makes detailed calculations of the entire process

of cultivation for all kinds of crops and sets the norm for all kinds of farm work, taking medium labour power as the standard. It works out the work-points required for a *mou* of land and the total work-points for each brigade and assigns the work to each brigade. The output of each kind of crop to be produced by each brigade is calculated on the basis of the output level assessed in 1954 and responsibility for carrying it out passed on to every brigade. Twenty per cent of above-norm output is appropriated for the co-operative's common reserve fund and welfare fund, while 80 per cent is placed at the disposal of the brigade. The co-operative bears responsibility for any decrease in output due to overwhelming calamities. Work-days are deducted proportionately if the decrease in production is due to failure in carrying out the co-operative's plans in the course of production. The brigades assign work to the groups on an annual basis, with the same work-points given them under the responsibility system. If the general output of a brigade exceeds its norm, rewards may be given to the groups according to their achievements after discussion and appraisal. If the output of a brigade is below its norm, work-points may be deducted on the basis of conditions in the various groups also after discussion and appraisal. The production group, after accepting the assignment from the brigade, sets the time-limit for completion of the work with 80 per cent of the work-days provided by the brigade. The rest of the work-days are reserved for extra work or special difficulties that may arise. Should there be surplus work-points after the accounts are drawn up, they are returned proportionately to the members. The groups fix concrete work-points on the basis of a uniform work-points standard fixed by the co-operative and on the basis of the advance study they make of conditions of cultivation and the distance members have to travel to the fields, and then assign work to their members on this basis. Every member receives standard work-points after fulfilling his assignment,

if his work can be clearly differentiated from that of others. Work that cannot be clearly attributed to individual members is paid for after discussion by the members in accordance with the work-points set for the assignment. Fixed work-points are paid to members who are responsible for looking after draught animals and other livestock. They are awarded if they tend the cattle well and are held responsible for poor management. Work-points for subsidiary rural occupations are fixed in two ways. For work which receives a daily wage, as for example, digging salt in a salt field, work-points may be fixed according to the wages received by each worker. In the case of afforestation or planting of fruit trees, which yields nothing for the time being, the voluntary labour of the members is recorded so that they may be paid accordingly at a later date when their work yields proceeds.

POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL WORK

After a peasant has joined a co-operative, he faces a constant struggle between personal and collective interests, between immediate and long-term advantages, and between capitalist and socialist ideas. Thus, it is essential to strengthen the political and ideological education among the co-op members if the continued advance of the co-op is to be ensured.

1) While developing the co-operative, those who give a good account of themselves during the movement should be drawn into the Party or the Youth League to augment their ranks. The number of Party members has grown from 11 at the time the co-operative was set up to 32 at present (all members of the co-operative) and they are divided into five Party groups. Youth League members have increased from 63 to 134 (all co-operative members) and a general branch has been set up with seven sub-branches in seven production brigades.

2) Educate co-operative members in the collective spirit and patriotism by the use of typical examples. For instance in the spring of 1955, one of the co-operative's cows calved in a field flooded with water. The weather was cold and the calf was freezing to death. When co-operative member Sun Ping-chung saw it while he was collecting manure, he covered the calf with his padded jacket and put his padded cap on its head. He carried the calf back to the co-operative and saved its life. The Party branch made use of this incident to launch an educational campaign on love for the co-operative, thus combating certain members' attitude of indifference to common property.

3) Periodic emulation campaigns and their evaluation. The co-operative competes for a month and the brigades for a fortnight. The content of these is simple and clear-cut and is based on the requirements of the season and of production or according to the main task of the period. During the emulation campaign, mutual inspection and supervision exists between brigades and between groups. A mass summing-up and evaluation are made and red banners awarded to the winners. When the accounts are drawn up after autumn, model brigades and groups are selected by comparison and prizes are awarded. Once every ten days every group holds a democratic review in which self-education is carried out by the masses. Subjects under review include attitude toward work, protection of common property and unity among the members for the period under review and members at the meeting make criticism and self-criticism. This is important for advancing production and improving unity.

4) To meet the cultural demands of the members, the co-operative has set up nine spare-time schools for adults, a library, and an amateur dramatic group which gives brief performances at regular intervals to arouse the labour enthusiasm of the members and cultivate a collective spirit.

THE BIGGER THE CO-OPERATIVE, THE GREATER THE SUPERIORITY

The existence of the Advance Co-operative over the last three years fully shows the superiority of collective farming. This superiority became all the more marked after the co-operative expanded. This can be seen from its output. In the first year of its existence, the 16 member families of the co-operative, 15 poor-peasant and one lower middle-peasant families, were facing many difficulties in production. The better-off peasants near the co-operative said scornfully: "Just look at their superiority!" The autumn harvest, however, furnished a ringing answer. The yield for every *mou* in the co-operative was 301 catties, the highest in the township. Compared with the time before the co-operative was set up (that is, compared with the basic output fixed at the time of land reform), the yield had increased 50 per cent. It was 20 per cent higher than that of peasants outside the co-operative. In the second year, the co-operative had good summer and autumn harvests. Its total annual output increased by 18.4 per cent and that of wheat and water paddy by more than 50 per cent. There was drought in the summer and autumn of 1955, and apart from a slight increase in sweet potatoes, the yield per *mou* was lower than that of 1954, with the output of wheat, rice and maize ten per cent less. Its harvests nevertheless were still higher than those of nearby mutual-aid teams. Maize output, for example, was higher than that of mutual-aid teams by 12 catties per *mou* and higher than that of individual peasants by 19 catties. In the winter of 1954 and spring of 1955 the co-operative reclaimed 1,400 *mou* of waste land and increased its grain output by 260,000 catties. It also expanded its area cropped more than once a year with an additional 500 *mou* planted to wheat and 70 *mou* to sweet potatoes. Thus the total output in 1955 was higher than that of 1954 by 26 per cent.

What made it possible for the Advance Co-operative to increase its output? This was because the characteristics of a big co-operative were fully utilized and its superiority developed:

1) Land was completely readjusted. In the past the land was divided into widely scattered small plots, usually far away from the homes of its tillers. Li Chi-meng, a peasant living in Tungan Village, had 2.3 *mou* of land in Hsiwan, five *li* from his home. It was inconvenient for him to go to work on his land and he could not transport manure there. There were altogether 1,103 *mou* of such scattered fields in the co-operative. Readjustments were made in accordance with residence. This saved 2,000 work-days formerly spent in travelling to and from fields. Arable land was expanded by 20 *mou* through the levelling of 500 boundary ridges. This created conditions for intensive cultivation.

2) Only suitable crops were planted. In this part of the country, rice had been sown directly on the land before it was flooded and great contradictions arose between the planting of early and late rice crops. In the past, the poor peasants generally grew early rice crops because they lacked capital. When it was time to open the sluice gate to irrigate the crops, the wheat growing in the late rice crop fields had not yet been harvested, and the peasants owning such land were opposed to letting in water. This frequently led to fights and the farm work suffered. Now, because of thorough investigation by the co-operative, 250 *mou* growing early rice crops in the midst of late rice fields have been switched to late rice crops. This has not only solved the difficulties involved in irrigation but, by switching to late rice crops, an increase of over 100 catties per *mou* has resulted.

3) Carry out technical reforms, particularly deep ploughing, close planting and increased manure. In the past, 50 per cent of the wheat fields and 60 per cent of the rice fields in the co-operative did not use any manure. Now 70 per cent of the wheat fields and 87 per cent of the rice fields use

manure. The amount used has also been increased. Originally 1,500 catties of manure were used on a *mou* of wheat, but now 3,000 catties are used. With regard to deep ploughing, in the past ploughing was less than three inches deep, but now double-shared ploughs used on a quarter of the land plough more than five inches deep. Even when the old-type ploughs are used, they generally bite about four inches into the earth by combined ploughing.

4) Expand the area to double crops, turning one-crop fields into two-crop fields. In the past only 2,300 *mou* of summer wheat were planted, but now the area has been expanded to 2,800 *mou*, not including reclaimed waste land.

5) Plant high-yielding crops instead of low-yielding crops. For example, the acreage planted to low-yielding green peas has been reduced year by year and planted to soya beans instead. The acreage under green peas was reduced from 391 *mou* to 73, and that under soya beans increased from 174 *mou* to 492 *mou* at present.

6) Make full use of labour power in capital construction projects. First of all, the labour power of the entire co-operative was organized to reclaim waste land on a large scale during the slack season. In the winter of 1954 and the spring of 1955, altogether 1,400 *mou* of waste land was reclaimed. With the 800 *mou* previously reclaimed, the total came up to 2,200 *mou*. Secondly, launch irrigation projects. In the winter of 1954 and the spring of 1955, 450 men and women members of the co-operative spent 8,622 work-days digging 19 canals both to conserve water and drain it off the land reclaimed, thereby protecting it from natural calamities. For example, the crops on 800 *mou* of land reclaimed in 1953 all withered because of the autumn drought. No crops had ever been grown on 500 *mou* of these 800 *mou*. A complete change took place in 1955. Thirdly, carry out diversified production by making use of hilly areas in accordance with the natural conditions of the township. The over-all aim of the co-operative is to turn barren hills into groves and hill slopes

into orchards. At present saplings have been planted on the top of high hills and 47,000 fruit trees have been planted on hill slopes. Vegetable growing has developed each year to meet the urban demand. The vegetable acreage has been increased from 2.1 *mou* in the spring of 1954 to 70 *mou* in autumn 1955. The proceeds from every *mou* of vegetables equal that from four *mou* of grain. The co-operative also raises poultry and livestock. It has 91 pigs and is raising lots of fish, ducks and chickens. In addition, 350 members were sent to the Huaipei salt field to dig salt. Income from subsidiary rural occupations in 1955 amounted to 80,000 yuan (excluding income from waste land reclamation), with an average of 140 yuan for each member family. This has increased the income of its members and also helped agriculture. Therefore, labour efficiency has been raised. Before joining the co-operative, each unit of labour power averaged only 68 work-days a year. In 1955, it averaged 156 work-days a year, an increase of 150 per cent.

The income of the co-operative members has increased as production has developed. In 1955, 524 of its 578 member families, that is 90.6 per cent, had larger incomes, and 24 families' income remained unchanged. Only 30 families, or 5.2 per cent of the total, had less income. Originally only 96 families had surplus grain, 102 families were self-sufficient in grain, and 380 families were short of grain. In 1955, 503 families in the co-operative had surplus grain, 24 families were self-sufficient and 51 families short of grain. The common property of the co-operative had also increased. It now has 239 draught animals, six double-shared ploughs, 12 new-type ploughs, six insecticide sprayers and one maize sheller. The relationship between the members has changed in the course of collective work. The spirit of mutual help and unity has developed between villages, families and individual members. For instance, the peasants in Tungli Village and Hsili Village used to come to blows over petty matters when they were under feudal rule. Since joining the co-operative, both

villages have been put in the same production brigade and the peasants, in the course of working together, have developed an affection for one another and have buried their past grudges. Both parties have voluntarily proposed changing the names of the two villages which indicated that one was stronger than the other, namely, calling Hsili Village the "Small Li Village" and Tungli Village the "Big Li Village." There has also been a big increase in the number of women taking part in production. At present 725 of the 731 women members, or 99.2 per cent, are taking part in production. Women account for 57 per cent of all the 78,686 work-days spent by the co-operative on agricultural production. The members' enthusiasm for more education has grown considerably along with the increase in production and in higher living standards. The co-operative is now running nine spare-time adult schools, with 320 members who study during the slack season and 120 in busy seasons.

A CO-OP THAT ADVANCED FROM AN ELEMENTARY TO A HIGHER FORM

(By the Rural Work Department, Peking Municipal Committee, Chinese Communist Party, *Peking Daily*,
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Consideration should be given to encouraging co-ops which have the necessary requirements to advance from an elementary to a higher form so that their production and their forces of production may develop a step further. Because ownership in elementary co-ops remains of a semi-private nature, sooner or later it restricts the expansion of the forces of production and people begin to demand that the form of ownership be changed to permit the co-operative to become a collectively managed economic organization in which all means of production are owned in common. When the ties hampering the forces of production are loosened, production will develop much more rapidly.

Some places can make the change-over fairly quickly; others will probably have to go a bit slower. Most co-ops of an elementary form which have been in existence about three years have the necessary requirements. The Party organizations in every province, city and autonomous region should look into the situation and, with the agreement of the people, arrange for the establishment of a number of experimental advanced co-operatives during 1956 and 1957.

In general, the co-ops today are small. When they begin turning toward advanced co-operation, many small co-ops, with the consent of the people, should be combined into big ones. If in 1956 and 1957 every district can have one or several co-operatives of this kind, and their superiority over the elementary form of co-op is made plain to the people, it will create favourable conditions for merging co-ops and going on to advanced co-operation during the next few years. This work must be co-ordinated with general plans to expand production.

When people see that large and advanced co-operatives are better than small and elementary co-operatives, when people see that long-range planning brings them a life of a much higher material and cultural level, they will agree to combine their co-ops and build advanced ones.

Conversion to advanced co-operatives should spread more quickly in the outskirts of cities than elsewhere. The experience of this Peking co-op can serve as an example to other co-operatives in similar circumstances.

—EDITOR

The Yuanta Agricultural Producers' Co-operative of Tungjantsun Township in the suburbs of Peking is a co-operative chiefly engaged in growing vegetables. When it was first set up in the winter of 1953, its income distribution was mainly based upon labour. The rate of land dividends was fixed on the basis of the output quota determined at the time of land inspection. The proportion between land and labour dividends was 30 per cent to 70 per cent, and the income from above-quota output was attributed to labour. Draught animals, carts and other means of production were pooled according to their price, and if the price was higher

than the share, the credit would be paid to the original owner in annual instalments.

In 1954, with the development of production and expansion of the vegetable-growing area, there was a general increase in the members' income as compared with the time when they worked individually. After consultation and discussion among the members, they unanimously agreed to abolish land dividends and adopt the method of distribution completely according to labour. Thus the Yuanta Co-operative was turned into an advanced co-operative. In the year since the transition, the members' labour initiative has risen and output and income have generally increased. The members feel satisfied and the co-operative has become much stronger. Following is an account of how the Yuanta Co-operative was consolidated and how it developed from the elementary to an advanced co-op.

THINGS GETTING BETTER IN THE FIRST YEAR

When the Yuanta Co-operative was first set up in the winter of 1953, it had a membership of 30 peasant households. Before the founding of the co-op, these peasant households worked rather carelessly and did not grow very many vegetables, and labour power was not properly used. An average worker worked only 150 to 160 days a year, and most women did not work. After the co-operative was founded, the members' initiative and labour productivity were greatly raised and collective management saved much labour power (for instance, the 30 households, when working on their own, used to have 30 persons selling vegetables in the market, but in the co-operative two people were enough). Thus 1,450 work-days could be saved in one year. If there had not been plans to expand production, many members would become idle, and it would have been difficult to strengthen and develop the co-operative further. At that time there

was an ever-growing demand for vegetables in Peking, and the government called upon the peasants in the suburbs to produce more. In view of this situation, the township Party branch and the chairman of the co-operative, Shen Tuo, submitted the question to the management committee and the co-operative members for discussion.

These are the decisions made after the discussion: to increase investments according to the capability of the members, to expand the vegetable-growing area, to carry out more careful cultivation and to make full use of surplus labour power, so as to increase production and income. Following the decisions on the methods of increasing production, the members became very enthusiastic about making investments. A total of 13,300 yuan was invested by the 30 member households. Three middle-peasant households alone invested 2,880 yuan, making up 21.7 per cent of the total investment. In the year after the new investments were made, the co-operative added 24 more "warm rows" (for vegetable growing) and 20 *mou* of land for high-grade vegetables and turned 14 *mou* of non-irrigated into irrigated land. This expansion, together with more intensive farming, solved the problem of the members' surplus labour power and increased the co-operative's income. The three measures of adding more "warm rows," expanding the vegetable area and irrigating more land added 6,920 yuan to the income of the co-op, an average increase of some 230 yuan for each household.

In 1954, although the Yuanta Co-operative had a poor harvest on its more than 80 *mou* of low land because of heavy rainfall, its vegetable output was excellent; the main vegetables such as cucumbers, egg-plants and cabbages showed an average increase of 13.3 per cent, compared with the time when the members worked on their own. Of these products, the per *mou* yield of egg-plants was 6,744 catties, an increase of 92.7 per cent, and cucumbers 7,369 catties, an increase of 79.7 per cent. After paying the state agricultural tax, the co-operative members' net incomes did not

suffer any decline from excessive rainfall, but increased remarkably through increased vegetable output.

An ordinary male peasant had an annual income of some 500 yuan, and a strong male peasant over 600 yuan; an ordinary woman peasant some 300 yuan, and a strong woman peasant some 400 yuan. Nine of the ten poor-peasant households had an income of 700 to 800 yuan each, an average increase of 114.2 per cent over the time they worked on their own. The only exception was the one poor-peasant household which had a decline in income because one member of the family who could work was away from home. Only one of the 20 middle-peasant households had an income the same as the previous year because it no longer hired short-term farm-hands. All the other households each had an income of about 1,000 yuan, an average increase of 76 per cent over the time they worked on their own.

ADVANCE FROM AN ELEMENTARY TO A HIGHER FORM

The marked increase in production, in the members' incomes and in the co-operative's common property in 1954 enabled the members to see clearly the superiority of collective labour and collective ownership, thus greatly raising their socialist consciousness. The peasants outside the co-operative also began to understand the superiority of co-operation. They saw that a work-day could bring more than 2.6 yuan in dividends and an ordinary worker could make 500 to 600 yuan in a year. Then they became very enthusiastic and came with their draught animals and carts to join the co-operative. In the winter of 1954, two other smaller co-operatives in the same township merged with the Yuanta Co-operative and its membership increased to 185 households.

The transition of the Yuanta Co-operative from an elementary to a higher form was achieved in the following way. In the autumn of 1954, the district Party committee of Hai-

tien, Peking, set up a training class to develop the co-operative movement. The township Party branch secretary, Chao Teh-tsai, and the chairman of the co-operative, Shen Tuo, received training there. After their return, they gave more teaching in socialism to the co-operative members and acquainted them with the experiences of the advanced co-operatives of Huangtukang Township in Fengtai District and other places. They also explained the nature of elementary and advanced co-operatives and the conditions for the transition, and fully prepared the members mentally for the setting-up of an advanced co-operative.

At that time, because of the increased production in 1954, there was a marked increase in the members' income, and certain members who had more labour power than land and others who had a higher political consciousness were dissatisfied with land dividends in the distribution of income. Some of them told the management committee: "Vegetable growing requires more work and capital and the output depends on how much labour and capital are put in, unlike millet and maize which one can harvest with only a few hoeings after planting. In the first year of the co-operative, all the households had bigger incomes. If dividends for land remain 30 per cent, this will be unfair to labour power."

The Party branch and the management committee of the co-operative studied the opinions of the members and held that more work and capital were required in vegetable growing and an increase in output and income depended mainly on labour power and capital. With production expanded, there would be work for the members all the year round. The income could be increased not only for member households who had strong or more labour power, but also for those who had weak or less labour power. There is more light work in the vegetable-growing co-operative than in co-ops growing grain crops. There would be work for the households of the orphaned, widowed, old and weak that were short of labour power, and their incomes could be ensured. In-

dividual members who had lost labour power could live on subsidies out of the welfare fund. Therefore, the co-operative already had the economic conditions for switching over to the higher form. At the same time, after receiving several years of education in mutual-aid and co-operative movement and seeing the continued growth of the common property of the co-operative, all the members had come to understand that in order to increase income they had to depend on collective labour and the gradual accumulation of common property, and that land dividends did not matter much. Thus, there existed the necessary mental preparation for the transition.

After studying the problem in various aspects, the Party branch and the management committee, with the consent of the district Party committee, concluded that the time was ripe for the abolition of land dividends, and for income distribution to be made completely according to labour. They submitted the problem to the members for discussion.

During the discussion, those who had less land but more and stronger labour power actively supported the abolition of land dividends. Most of those who had no great difference in land and labour power agreed to it. Some middle-peasant households who had more land agreed, too. Even the few who held different views finally agreed after carefully comparing the distribution with and without land dividends. For instance, old middle peasant Shen Ching who had more land said after a detailed calculation: "Our co-operative pays over two yuan for each work-day. Last year I received 450 yuan more in labour dividends than when working on my own. Although with the abolition of land dividends my income would be 20 to 30 yuan less, I can make up for it by working a few days more. Moreover, distribution completely according to labour will make us all more energetic in work, and this will ensure increased output and income. Increased production is better than anything else,

and land dividends or no land dividends doesn't matter much."

Old upper middle peasant Wang Cheng-ching said: "When working on my own, I had a hard time buying manure and selling vegetables. Because I was short of labour power, I couldn't pay equal attention to work in the fields and the market. My income at that time was not higher than now. Hiring farm-hands gives one the bad name of exploiter. I have no objection to the abolition of land dividends."

The members who had weaker labour power also agreed because there was light work for them to do and they could raise their income. For instance, the old man, Wang Chun-fu, formerly was afraid that he could not do heavy work when he joined in the co-operative and that he would have difficulties in his living. But now he saw that most of the women members had an income of 300 to 400 yuan in 1954. He said: "I have only a few *mou* of land and can't get much in dividends. All my problems can be solved if the co-operative gives me more light work to do so that I can make more than 1,000 work-points and get 200 to 300 yuan a year. There will be more dividends for labour after abolishing land dividends. It's all the same."

With the poor peasants supporting, middle peasants being satisfied, and the orphaned, widowed, old and weak agreeing, the Party branch and the management committee, on the basis of the opinion of all the members, decided that the socialist method of paying completely according to work would be adopted starting in 1955. Thus the Yuanta Co-operative advanced from the elementary to the higher form, from semi-socialist to socialist in nature.

MORE ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT WORK

After the transition of the co-operative to the higher form, the management committee organized discussions among the

members as to how to increase production and their income. All members actively tried to find ways to increase production. During the discussion, some proposed that the co-operative's low land which yielded very poor harvests every year should be converted into paddy fields so as to ensure income. Others held that with the co-operative enlarged and labour power increased, more careful cultivation was needed, and adding more "warm rows" and increasing vegetable output could supply more to the city and increase the co-operative's income. Based on the members' suggestions, the management committee decided, during the spring slack season, to use 1,600 work-days to convert into paddy fields the 51 *mou* of low land which had suffered from heavy rainfall every year. With the members' investments and government help, the co-operative expanded the vegetable land to 400 *mou* (originally 225 *mou*), "warm rows" to 400 (originally 225) and the cheap vegetable area to 200 *mou* (originally 185 *mou*). These four measures alone brought an additional income of nearly 30,000 yuan, an average of over 160 yuan per household. This also laid the material foundation for enlarging the members' income in 1955.

With land dividends abolished, the members thought less and less about depending upon land, and the adoption in 1955 of the system of work according to contract and output quota and awards for above-quota output has raised their labour initiative still higher. Work has become a respectable thing, and it is a matter of honour if a member does more work and is paid more. One hundred and eight of the 111 women members worked regularly in the fields, 20 per cent more than in 1954. The woman Chang Yu-ho, who did not work regularly in the fields in 1954, worked 220 days in 1955. Sun Hsiu-chuan, mother of two children, who did not work in the fields in 1954, worked 130 days in 1955. Some women members say: "Work in the fields makes you healthy and also pays." The man Han Yun-lung used to work off and on when there were land dividends in 1954. But in 1955 he

worked regularly and with increased energy. He had a record of 220 work-days in the year, 60 days more than in 1954.

In 1955, although the co-operative enlarged the "warm rows" and vegetable production and carried out more careful cultivation, there still was surplus labour power because of the members' greater labour initiative. Therefore in August 1955, the co-operative used more than 800 work-days to reclaim 30 *mou* of low land, to be converted into paddy fields in 1956. At the same time, it organized the members to do weeding and watering trees for the Municipal Forestry Bureau as well as transport and other subsidiary occupations, which brought an income of over 5,590 yuan. The co-operative chairman Shen Tuo said: "The land and the people are the same, but there is not enough work to do and we have to look for subsidiary occupations, although we have enlarged the vegetable area and the 'warm rows.' Distribution according to work is really a good method. If things go on like this, there will be not only more fresh and cheap vegetables for the capital to support the country's socialist construction, but the members' incomes will also increase, and there will be no question about developing and consolidating the co-operative."

MEMBERS SATISFIED WITH PRELIMINARY DISTRIBUTION

In early October 1955, the co-operative made its preliminary calculation of distribution. Its vegetable output in the first half of the year exceeded the original plan by 16 per cent. An estimate was also made of the labour power to be used and output of vegetables in the second half of the year. A 29 per cent increase in production is expected in 1955 over the previous year. According to the preliminary calculations, the co-operative's income from agricultural produce will be 228,147 yuan, and its incomes from subsidiary occupations

5,592 yuan — 233,739 yuan in all. The labour power is estimated at 60,977 work-days. After deductions are made for the agricultural tax, production expenses, reserve and welfare funds, it is estimated that there will be a payment of 2.15 yuan for each work-day, and each household will receive an average of some 707 yuan.

The members in general, and particularly the new ones, will have increased incomes, whether strong or weak in labour power. An ordinary male peasant will receive some 500 yuan, and strong ones over 600 yuan each. An ordinary woman peasant will receive some 300 yuan, and strong ones over 400 yuan each. Of the ten old member households of poor peasants, only one will have a lower income owing to illness. All the other nine households will have an average increase of 122.3 per cent over the time they worked on their own. Of the 20 old member households of middle peasants, 19 will have an average increase of 60.8 per cent over the time they worked on their own, and only one well-to-do middle-peasant household will have the same income as in the previous year. In general the new members will have an increase of over 50 per cent in income compared with the time they worked on their own. The ten member households of the orphaned, widowed, old and weak, which were unable to deliver the agricultural tax before they joined, will each receive 300 to 400 yuan in 1955.

Sixty-year-old widow Mrs. Shao earned over 30 yuan from four *mou* of non-irrigated land when working individually. She joined the co-operative in 1955 and took part in binding vegetables, weeding and other light work, and received 328 yuan from 153 work-days. The old man Wang Chun-fu and his wife had a hard life before joining the co-operative. They earned 635 yuan from 300 work-days in 1955. Mrs. Shao said: "When working on my own, I couldn't do heavy work and had to hire farm-hands. And there was too little light work for me. How could I have enough food and clothes then? In

the co-operative there is much light work to do all the year round. I have more income, no difficulty in living, and even enough to spare. Truly, the Communist Party and Chairman Mao have opened the socialist road to happiness for the poor."

Now that the co-operative is being merged with the Szechiching Co-operative in the same township, the membership will increase to more than 500 households. Work groups are being organized and production plans for the winter of 1955 and 1956 are being drafted, to develop vegetable production, increase the members' incomes and meet the needs of Peking.

HOW COLLECTIVE FARMING CAME TO PAIPENYAO

(By the Rural Work Department of the Peking Municipal Committee, Chinese Communist Party, October 1955)

Here two advanced co-operatives were formed directly from mutual-aid teams, skipping the stage of elementary agricultural co-operatives. Other places where conditions are suitable can do the same. The situation in Paipenyao is a pleasure to behold. Some of their experience is also useful to co-ops of an elementary form.

—EDITOR

Paipenyao Township, predominantly a vegetable-growing village, is located in the suburbs of Peking. There are 451 peasant households in this township, and 4,872 *mou* of irrigated and non-irrigated land. After the land reform in 1950, there was a big increase in the township's vegetable output, with a resultant improvement in the peasants' livelihood. But the expansion of production was accompanied by a development of capitalism. In 1951, 106 peasant households hired 86 long-term farm-hands, 15 households that had been poor peasants and farm-hands at the time of land reform also hired farm-hands, and six middle-peasant households became new-type rich peasants. Thus class differentiation began anew.

In order to make the peasants give up the road of capitalism under which only a few become rich by exploitation and the majority suffer poverty, and to lead them on to the road of socialism which means common prosperity for all, the town-

ship Party branch, following the Party's policy, in 1952 began actively to lead the peasants in developing the mutual-aid and co-operative movement, strengthening and expanding the mutual-aid teams. In the winter of the same year, the Party branch decided, on the basis of the three mutual-aid teams under its direct leadership, to set up two agricultural producers' co-operatives in which the income would be distributed entirely according to work, with no land dividends. One co-operative of 18 households was put under the leadership of the Party branch secretary, Li Tsung-ho, and the other of 14 households under Party member Kuo Feng-tai.

One year after the co-operatives were set up (1953), the yields showed an average increase of more than 40 per cent, and the income of the members had more than doubled. The higher output and bigger income drew into the co-ops many peasants working on their own. In the spring of 1954, the two co-operatives merged with the Hsiung Chen-wu Co-operative (13 households) of Fenchuang, a village which had just been amalgamated with this township. The member households then rose to 260, a sixfold increase. In the same year, despite heavy rainfall, the co-operative grew 20 per cent more vegetables than in 1953. That winter, more than 100 peasant households joined the co-operative, bringing its membership up to 370 households, or 82 per cent of the total in the township. Paipenyao has, in the main, become a co-operative township. Judging by the good growth of autumn vegetables, excellent yields are expected in 1955. The crops of the co-operative are estimated to be 40 per cent above 1954. It is expected that some 90 per cent of the peasant households in the township will be in the co-operative this winter or next spring.

WHY THE CO-OPERATIVE MEMBERS FAVOUR AN ADVANCED CO-OPERATIVE WITH NO LAND DIVIDENDS

When the co-operatives were first set up in the winter of 1952, the township Party branch and the leading members

of the co-operatives spent nearly half a month studying the method of income distribution. After repeated discussion and minute calculations, it was unanimously agreed to form advanced co-operatives, distributing income completely according to work with no land dividends, and pooling in all draught animals and bigger farm implements as shares according to their price.

At the beginning of the discussion, the Party branch suggested two methods of income distribution: one was 30 per cent for land and 70 per cent for work; the other was 100 per cent for work with no land dividends. During the discussion, those members who had more labour power but less land said: "It's better to work as farm-hands than to have land dividends. Raising vegetables depends chiefly on labour, the land alone can't yield anything of great value. As the saying goes, 'One *mou* of vegetable garden is equal to ten *mou* of grain field.' Vegetable growing brings a higher income than grain, but it also requires ten times more labour and capital. Besides, in our vegetable-growing area there is quite a lot of work but we are short of labour power. During the busy seasons all households have to hire long-term or short-term farm-hands. Without labour and capital the land can't yield much."

Co-operative member Kuo Hsing-wang, who had more land but not enough labour power, said: "I have a family of seven. The four having labour power work on 18 *mou* of irrigated and 14 *mou* of non-irrigated land. We are so busy that some land is left unirrigated. Moreover, we are short of capital and don't have much skill. The vegetables grow badly. What the land yields can't support my family; every year we have to dig up tree roots and sell them."

However, with enough labour power one can do well, even with less land. For instance, peasant Chang Yung-ting had a family of five, with one and a half units of labour power, and grew three *mou* of vegetables. Although land was not much, since the family had enough labour power and capital,

they made more than 300 yuan annually from each *mou* of land, and they were well off. Party member Kuo Feng-tai showed by his personal experience the difference between grain and vegetable growing. The latter, he said, required more and concentrated labour, and a little delay would cause a decrease in output, or even a loss of money. He said:

"We often say the farming season waits for no one. Delay affects the output of certain vegetables, and, what's even worse, you may lose money. We all know that unless you plant cabbages within a few days in late August, they won't grow well. Without enough labour power no one can plant on time. For instance, the five *mou* of potatoes my family grew this year (1952) yielded only 700 catties, because of the lack of labour power and capital, late planting and less irrigating and hoeing in the summer. This was just the amount we planted."

All the concrete facts cited by the members showed that income from vegetable growing depended not so much on the amount of land as on labour power and capital. But unfortunately, there was a real shortage of labour power in this vegetable-growing area. When working on their own, the peasants of Paipenyao Township wasted much labour power in irrigating, selling their vegetables and other sundry work. A strong worker could work only three *mou* of land. But on the average a poor peasant actually had 3.8 *mou* to cultivate, and a middle peasant 5.6 *mou*. In general, the middle peasants, who could not afford to hire long-term farm-hands, often had to hire short-term farm-hands. During the busy seasons even the poor peasants hired farm-hands. Because there was not enough labour power in the vegetable area and many households hired farm-hands, the wages of farm-hands were high. A long-term farm-hand, working ten months between February and December, generally made 350 to 360 yuan. The wages of short-term farm-hands were even higher, generally 1.5 yuan a day during an ordinary season and 2 yuan a day during the busy season, plus meals.

There was a common saying among the peasants in the township that "if you can't cultivate your land properly, better work as a hired short-term farm-hand."

The shortage of labour power and the high wages enabled the peasants to see clearly the part played by land, labour and capital in production. After discussion and calculations, most co-operative members said that labour power really was the greatest "treasure" and one could not depend solely on land.

Moreover, after land reform, the difference in the amount of land cultivated by the peasant households was not great (1.6 *mou* per head among the poor peasants, 1.8 *mou* per head among the middle peasants). Therefore it did not matter much whether they received land dividends or not. At the same time, the co-operative members knew that land dividends could never exceed 100 catties, the rate of land rent in the old society. Finally they unanimously decided to abolish land dividends and adopt the method of distribution completely according to work.

TO EACH ACCORDING TO HIS WORK IS FAIR AND REASONABLE

Now the Paipenyao Agricultural Producers' Co-operative has made its preliminary calculations of the year-end distribution for the third year since its establishment. All the members, whether they are middle peasants or poor peasants, whether they own more land or less, all say: "We don't receive land dividends, but earn our living by labour. This is fair and reasonable and it cures the lazybones." Why do they say this? It is because the abolition of land dividends has ensured that the income of the middle and poor peasants is much bigger than when they worked on their own. In 1953, for example, the Li Tsung-ho Co-operative registered a 40 per cent increase in output as compared with the year before the co-operative was set up. The members' income increased on an average to 2.5 times as much. Only two well-to-do middle-

peasant households, which had hired farm-hands when working on their own, earned less. The members of the Kuo Feng-tai Co-operative trebled their income, compared with the time when they worked on their own. Not a single household had less income. Results of the preliminary calculations of the 1955 year-end distribution show that the average income of each household in the co-operative will be 570 yuan, owing to the 40 per cent increase in output over 1954 and the expansion of its vegetable-growing area by 460 *mou*. Of the 96 new member households, the income of 92 will be higher than when they worked on their own. Only four households will have a lower income. Two of them had hired long-term farm-hands and exploited others when working on their own, another household lost half a unit of labour power, and the fourth is a trader-peasant household.

One of the chief factors in increasing production in the co-operative and its members' incomes is the higher labour initiative among the members. And the higher labour initiative results mainly from distribution completely according to work. The members often say: "Do away with land dividends and the lazybones are cured." This means that with land dividends abolished, one cannot depend on land, and daily diligent work can increase income and improve one's living. And this is what has actually happened. Those who were formerly lazy or rarely worked became active in work once they were in the co-operative. Hsieh Yung-hai was formerly a notoriously lazy fellow in the township. He used to work off and on, idling away most of the year whenever he got enough to eat. After joining the co-operative, he could no longer depend on his land, and consequently did more than 160 days' work in one year. Kuo Chao-fu, a member over 50 years old, did not work but was supported by others before joining the co-operative. But he has been active in all kinds of work since joining the co-operative.

Before joining the co-operative, the members generally worked 180 days at the most in a year, but now many of

them work more than 200 days. In 1953, on the average each member of the Li Tsung-ho Co-operative worked 256 days, and those of the Kuo Feng-tai Co-operative 270 days each. Owing to the high labour initiative of the members, these two co-operatives had no shortage of labour power in 1953 when they turned more than 50 *mou* of non-irrigated land into vegetable land. The 32 member households, when working on their own, had to hire about ten long-term farm-hands each year. But not a single farm-hand is needed now.

MIDDLE PEASANTS, THE ORPHANED, WIDOWED, OLD AND WEAK ALSO ACTIVELY JOIN THE CO-OPERATIVES

Once certain people were worried lest the abolition of land dividends should prevent the middle peasants from joining the co-operatives, and encroach upon their interests. The practical experience of the Paipenyao Township co-operatives has shown that such is not the case. Since the co-operative can ensure a higher income, why should they not join, and how could their interests be encroached upon? Statistics for the two smaller co-operatives before they merged in 1953 show that after joining the co-operative 17 of the 18 old middle-peasant households had greater incomes. Only the other household, which had hired more farm-hands and exploited others while working on its own, showed a lower income. Among the 56 middle-peasant households that joined in 1955, only two which had hired more farm-hands when working on their own had a decline in income; all the other 54 households had larger incomes. The middle-peasant members do not feel that the abolition of land dividends is unfavourable to them. At present, 214 (82 per cent) of the 261 new-type and old-type middle-peasant households in the township are in the co-operative. Classified into upper and lower middle peasants, 87 per cent of the lower middle peasants and 70 per cent of the upper middle peasants are in the co-operative. It is expected that, following the deep-going

political and ideological education during the course of the co-operative movement this winter and next spring, more than 20 other middle-peasant households will join the co-operative. Then, over 90 per cent of the peasant households in the township will be co-operative members.

Certain people said that with land dividends abolished, most middle peasants having labour power could increase their income by active work, but how about the orphaned, widowed, old and weak? Facts in the Paipenyao Township co-operatives have shown that after joining the co-operative these people need not worry about their income or livelihood. In the township there are 17 such households (26 persons in all). Twelve are poor-peasant households, and five lower middle-peasant households. At present there are seven poor-peasant households and three lower middle-peasant households in the co-operative (19 persons in all). In these ten households there are only two (three persons) who cannot work regularly. The other eight households can do light work regularly. There is much light work in the vegetable-growing area, and the co-operative always sends them to watch and alter irrigation ditches, wash and sort out vegetables, and do other light work so as to earn their points. For instance, Hsiung Wan-chung, who is over 70 years old and has only one leg, can sit every day mixing manure and tending the draught animals. He worked more than 150 days in one year and had an income of over 250 yuan.

According to the co-operative's preliminary calculations of the 1955 distribution, the eight households of the orphaned, widowed, old and weak that can work regularly will have an average record of 170 work-days each and an income of around 290 yuan. Their income shows an increase over the years before they joined the co-operative, and they have no difficulties in making a living. Each of the two other households (three persons in all) that cannot work regularly has a record of 80 work-days and will receive more than 130

yuan. With a little subsidy out of the co-operative's welfare fund, their living can be ensured.

Therefore some members said jokingly to them, "Just show up and you will get pay; if it is still not enough, you can get more from the welfare fund." This means that light work is given to those who can still work, and those who actually cannot work are supported by the co-operative. Of course, these households did not join with empty hands. In addition to the 85 *mou* of land they turned over to the co-operative, they invested more than 400 yuan, and this is good for the co-operative. The co-operative personnel often say: "There are still seven households of the orphaned, widowed, old and weak outside the co-operative. If they are willing to join, the co-operative is ready to take care of them all and enable them to pass their declining years happily in the big family of the co-operative."

ADVANCED CO-OPS ARE BEST, AND THEY'RE NOT HARD TO ORGANIZE

(By the Rural Work Department, Chekiang Provincial Committee, Chinese Communist Party, October 23, 1955)

This article does one's heart good. We hope everyone will read it carefully and that in all co-ops where conditions are ripe it will be read and explained to the members, who should also discuss it among themselves. This will encourage them to merge with other co-ops and form advanced co-ops and do it gladly.

The remarkable accomplishments of this co-operative in the village of Wutungcha, Tsehsi County, Chekiang, should be publicized throughout the land. In Chishan Township, where it is situated, 92 per cent of the peasants have joined eight advanced co-operatives. Who says advanced co-operatives are hard to organize?

— EDITOR

A POOR VILLAGE BECAME RICH

Wutungcha was a poor, out-of-the-way village five *li* from the sea in Chishan Township in Tsehsi County, Chekiang Province. It had 202 households, most of which were poor cotton growers who had come from other places. In the spring of 1952, when the secretary of the district Party committee read an article in the *Liberation Daily* on "The Growth

of a Collective Farm," he thought it a good idea to let the peasants set up an advanced co-op (collective farm). So he talked the matter over with 14 peasant households. They all agreed to the principle, "to each according to his work," as most of them were village functionaries and active elements who were themselves poor peasants and had greater socialist consciousness. After the co-op was formed, it aroused the serious attention of the leading comrades in the county, regional and provincial Party committees, who sent personnel to help lead the co-op. They also gave it considerable financial help. So the province's first agricultural co-op of a completely socialist character was formed.

During these four years, with the constant rise in output and the increase in the members' income, the co-op has been expanded year by year. Its membership has increased from 14 to 188 households; it now cultivates 1,550 *mou* of land as against 150 when it was first formed. The output of its principal crop, cotton, has grown rapidly from year to year.

In 1951, before the co-op was set up, the average yield per *mou* of raw cotton was 120 catties.

In 1952, it rose to 160 catties, an increase of 33 per cent.

In 1953, after the first expansion of the co-op, average output per *mou* reached 249.5 catties, 48 per cent over that achieved by old and new members in 1952.

In 1954, after the second expansion, it was 227 catties, 22.7 per cent over that achieved by old and new members in 1953.

For 1955, the estimated yield is 313 catties, 49 per cent over that of 1954 or 160 per cent over that of 1951.

The quality of the cotton has also improved. Before the co-op was formed, the peasants could get only 33 catties of ginned cotton from a hundred catties of raw cotton. In 1955, they got 37 catties. The yield of other crops also grew. The rate of utilization of land rose from 70 to 85 per cent. The per unit area yield increased by 140 per cent over the year before the co-op was formed. Output from subsidiary occupations also rose. The co-op did not engage in this line

in 1952; but in 1953 they got 4,500 yuan, and in 1955 they expect 9,346 yuan.

The income of the members has increased markedly from year to year. In 1952, the average net income for a member household was 3,680.5 catties of unhusked rice. In 1953, it jumped to 6,660 catties; and in 1954, to 7,686 catties. The estimated figure for 1955 is 9,450 catties, an increase of 150 per cent over that of 1952. Poor peasant Ying Po-jung is one whose earnings rose rapidly. Among the six members of his family two can do major field work and two minor work. They had seven and a half *mou* of land. The year before they joined the co-op, their net income was only 1,940 catties of unhusked rice. In 1955, they expect to get 24,000 catties, over 12 times greater than their 1951 figure. "In the past," said the members, "we covered our windows with reed mats, used mould of earth for stoves and bamboo strips for sandals. We used to eat grass roots and wild vegetables. Now every household is eating rice and wearing clothes made of khaki. We are all going along the bright path pointed out by Chairman Mao and are heading for a yet more prosperous future."

During these four years, with the development of production the co-op's members have had more welfare facilities and a richer cultural life. Now the co-op has three seasonal nurseries with 16 nursemaids taking care of more than 120 children. A school was set up which has three classes with more than 120 students. A library housed in three rooms was also set up with more than a thousand volumes. In the past, not a single person in the village could read a notice for a meeting. Now more than 60 co-op members can read newspapers and are qualified to record work-points. Four of them can write short articles for newspapers. A club has been set up that is equipped with lantern slides, and a radio, and a sports ground for basketball and badminton. There are also midwives and a clinic.

The change during these four years has been appreciable.

FRUGALITY AND HARD WORK LED TO INCREASED OUTPUT

When it was first set up, the Wutungcha Advanced Agricultural Co-op had to overcome various difficulties through industry and frugality. Of the 202 households in the village (excluding two ex-landlord households, two rich-peasant households and some peasant households of other sections), more than 100 were very poor. Although land was distributed in 1951, the counter-revolutionary elements had set fire and burnt down the houses of 69 households. The houses of nine of the 14 households which had first formed the co-op were razed. But the county people's government came to their aid by giving them a loan of seeds, fertilizer and grain to enable them to tide over the hard time. With the help of all the members, they had an excellent harvest in the very first year the co-op was formed. They got a 33 per cent increase in output. All members had a bigger income. However, since they had so little to fall back on, and since their management had not been satisfactory, they still faced many production difficulties in the winter of 1952 and the spring of 1953. The better-off peasants outside the co-op took advantage of the situation to mock them. The co-op was on the verge of collapse. Fortunately, the Party branch, with the support of the district Party committee, guided the co-op members in summing up the experience of 1952 and urged them to tide over the spring food shortage through self-help by production. Utilizing the slack winter season, the members accumulated a large amount of river mud for fertilizer; they collected enough to spread 150 piculs on every *mou* of land. Thus they not only saved three yuan's worth of fertilizer for every *mou* of land, but also improved the soil. Meanwhile, they ploughed and weeded the land, keeping insect pests to a minimum and saving on the outlay for insecticides. When spring came, the members cut firewood, reclaimed waste land and went fishing. Thus they tided over the grain shortage in the spring of 1953.

In order to increase output, the co-op has taken steps in these past few years to popularize various types of advanced technique. Thirty per cent of the acreage formerly planted to local cotton was planted to selected cotton. Sowing in rows and close planting were practised. Various kinds of new-type farm tools were used. The co-op has bought 92 pieces of new-type farm tools, including sprayers, two-wheel double-bladed ploughs, sowers and cultivators, and some 800 ordinary farm tools. They also built two latrines and 60 store-houses.

After the co-op had been set going, the rich peasants and some well-to-do middle peasants passed cynical remarks about it, saying that the co-op's output was lower than theirs. In spring 1953, when there was a shortage of grain, the co-op concentrated its efforts on accumulating river mud for fertilizer. A rich peasant named Yu Fu-chang took 2,000 catties of rice to hire a large number of labourers to collect river mud for application to his ten-odd *mou* of cotton field. He swore that he would beat the co-op. What was the result? The co-op harvested an average of 249 catties per *mou*, while Yu Fu-chang got only 180 catties per *mou*. Ever since then, the rich peasants have had to acknowledge the superiority of the co-op.

SUPERIORITY OF AN ADVANCED CO-OP

The first and foremost reason for the achievements made by the Wutungcha Co-op is that they applied the socialist principle of distribution, "to each according to his work." This greatly stimulated the enthusiasm of the members. Before the co-op was formed, an able-bodied peasant could do only a hundred work-days or so in one year; but in the seven months from April 1952 when the co-op was set up to the end of the year, the average was already 120 work-days. In 1953, the average figure was 180 work-days; in 1954, over 220, and in 1955, it is estimated it will reach 250.

Before the co-op came into existence, very few women took part in field work. After the system of equal pay for equal work was put into force for all members of the co-op, women became much keener at work. In 1953, women members accounted for 18.2 per cent of the total work-days. In 1954, this rose to 20 per cent. The estimated figure for 1955 is 26 per cent. Mao Hsing-ti, a woman member of the co-op, had 170 work-days to her credit in 1954. At the busiest time of the year, members often leave for the field as soon as the cock crows and go back home only after the stars come out. Their labour productivity averages around 30 per cent higher than that of peasants outside the co-op. Shen Ta-cheng, an outstanding member of the co-op, picked 170 catties of cotton a day. Tung Chao-fu bound more than 700 sheaves of wheat stalks a day. Their labour productivity is more than double that of neighbouring peasants.

Secondly, because land dividends were done away with, members no longer clung to their small plots. "Now that the land belongs to all and everybody has a share," they said, "we must run the co-op successfully with one mind." The introduction of public ownership of land made unified management more feasible. Crops were planted to the most suitable land. New construction works of all kinds were carried out. The co-op land was merged and boundaries levelled. The irrigation system was improved and more than 30 gullies were filled in. Uneven land was levelled or terraced and the cultivated acreage expanded by more than 30 *mou*. The merging of the land into a large tract not only facilitated irrigation and saved labour power, but also provided greater facilities to overcome crop diseases and insect pests.

With the constant growth in output, an advanced co-op can accumulate more public funds than an elementary co-op. During the past three years, the Wutungcha Co-op had accumulated more than 41,000 yuan in public funds; its capacity for expanded reproduction grows from year to year, and it

can now cope with the difficulties of its members resulting from illness or natural calamities. Co-op member Ting Yung-chang, for instance, was confined to bed throughout 1954. The co-op gave him a subsidy of over 200 yuan for medical treatment. When he subsequently became crippled, the co-op gave him a light job to do and got minor work for members of his family. As a result, they were able to reach an income of more than 800 yuan in 1954. When five households suffered from fires in 1955, the co-op set aside a sum from the welfare fund to build them new houses. "When you got the land you still weren't safe," said these members, "you are really safe only after you have joined the co-op."

Apart from the superiority inherent in the co-op itself, the guidance of the Party has been a decisive factor in the growth of the Wutungcha Co-op. During the past three years, the co-op Party branch of 12 members has done much in organizing production, improving management and strengthening political work, and has accumulated much experience. Material aid by the Party and government was also an important factor in the development of the co-op.

A PUSH FOR CO-OPERATION IN THE WHOLE DISTRICT

The success of the Wutungcha Co-op stimulated the agricultural co-operative movement throughout the district. At present there are 30-odd elementary co-ops and 17 advanced ones. Around 70 per cent of the peasant households have joined the co-ops. In Chishan Township where the Wutungcha Co-op is situated, 92 per cent of the peasant households have joined eight advanced co-ops, and more and more peasants are applying for membership. Most of the better-off peasants who have not yet joined are asking their relatives and friends in the co-ops to speak in their favour so that they may also join.

The Wutungcha Co-op is drawing up a three-year plan for production and construction. Their plan for 1958 is that the per *mou* yield of raw cotton should reach 400 catties, that they should raise 800 pigs, that pay for a work-day should be raised to three yuan and income for the members increased by an average of 30 per cent.



